It's a choice we've made based on the kinds of things we want to say. It doesn't necessarily correspond to some natural boundary. — T Clark
Well, no, there is no paradox. — Banno
An excess of precision impairs our actions.
And precision is available, as required. — Banno
Why is linguistic imprecision a problem? "Heap" trades referential precision for flexibility, whilst retaining the necessary semantics for useful, albeit less precise communication. — sime
obviously it's a puzzle if we accept also the premise that calling a single grain a heap is absurd. If calling it a heap is tolerable then, as I keep saying, no puzzle.
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap.
Game over. — bongo fury
The interesting (and paradoxical) thing is that the clarity is so easily achieved, by choosing obvious counter-examples. Which is what the sorites puzzle reminds us of. Occasionally. When it pumps absolutist zeal, so that the game gets started:
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] No of course not, and I know I'm a long way from the smallest number of grains that could possibly be the smallest heap! Far enough that a single grain is an obvious case of a non-heap!
Of course, later on, the same player may feel differently...
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap.
Game over. People often finish up claiming 2 had been their position all along. Perhaps it should have been, and the puzzle is a fraud. — bongo fury
The puzzle is how to avoid arriving at that position [assuming we are indeed determined not to], without denying the validity of any one step along the way. — bongo fury
what can one say about this problem of the valence of what a "heap" actually is. — Shawn
The delightful thing about the sorites is that it can spring up again from the rubble... — Don Wade
Well, yes; but, the paradox is still pertinent. — Shawn
There's only a "paradox" if you insist on the truth of contradictory premises — Michael
But of course you are able to use the word "heap" effectively, not despite it's imprecision, but in virtue of its imprecision.
Compare "throw yours on the heap" to "add your twenty-seven to that four thousand, two hundred and seventy three".
An excess of precision impairs our actions.
And precision is available, as required. — Banno
Yes, but the premises, that we are obliged to reject or reform at least one of, are, rather:
P1. a single grain is clearly not a heap
P2. adding a single grain can never turn a non-heap into a heap
P3. heaps exist
Please clarify which, or how. — bongo fury
There's no contradiction or paradox there. — Michael
There is, however, perhaps implicit in the argument that to become a heap there must be a point at which adding a single grain "turns it into" a heap, but that would be essentialism which ought be rejected. — Michael
There are good piano players and bad piano players, but you can't look at someone's progress from bad piano player to good piano player and point to a specific instant where they "became" good. — Michael
I don't understand. Are you saying they are, all 3, compatible, as they stand and appear to signify? — bongo fury
Garbled? What are you saying might perhaps be implicit in what?
Yes, this is the paradox? If parsed into a plausible set of premises, and subjected to logical iteration? You are familiar with how this is generally done?
The implicit premise is "if P1) a single grain is clearly not a heap and P2) adding a single grain can never turn a non-heap into a heap then C) heaps can't exist". — Michael
However this implicit (essentialist) premise is false. The existence of heaps does not depend on there being a specific number of grains that qualifies a collection as a heap. — Michael
And there's no specific generation where a proto-human gave birth to a human. Would you say that there's a paradox of speciation? — Michael
"Nothing to see here folks" is less interesting. — bongo fury
Less interesting, but correct. — Michael
This doesn't show some paradox about the metaphysics of identity or whatever — Michael
A language that doesn't have a word comparable to "heap" doesn't "fail" to refer to some "real" identity inherent in — Michael
Enough metaphysics! Solve the puzzle. — bongo fury
There is no puzzle. — Michael
obviously it's a puzzle if we accept also the premise that calling a single grain a heap is absurd. If calling it a heap is tolerable then, as I keep saying, no puzzle.
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap.
Game over. — bongo fury
Take the heap/sorites paradox. The heap-ness has nothing at all to do with the sand grains individually but what it actually is is the shape (roughly conical). — TheMadFool
There's no contradiction or paradox there. There is, however, perhaps implicit in the argument that to become a heap there must be a point at which adding a single grain "turns it into" a heap, but that would be essentialism which ought be rejected. — Michael
Definitions are not all essentialist - Banno himself showed this. — bert1
Banno's position is extreme and dogmatic. — bert1
unanimously a heap (e.g. a million grains). — bongo fury
When you identify a definition as "essentialist," do you mean that the definition corresponds to a natural boundary inherent in the phenomenon and not established by human consensus? — T Clark
Have I got this wrong? — bert1
So even 'bachelor' could be vague, as at precisely what point does someone go from being unmarried to married? — bert1
Banno's position is extreme and dogmatic.
— bert1
I don't agree. — T Clark
I don't think there is any good reason to fiddle around with "heap" to make it more precise, but if there were, this would be a good way of going about it. — T Clark
obviously it's a puzzle if we accept also the premise that calling a single grain a heap is absurd. If calling it a heap is tolerable then, as I keep saying, no puzzle.
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap.
Game over. — bongo fury
P1. a single grain is clearly not a heap — bongo fury
P2. adding a single grain can never turn a non-heap into a heap — bongo fury
Although language is a human construct, — Nigel Warburton, aeon article
that does not make it transparent to us. — Nigel Warburton, aeon article
Like the children we make, the meanings we make can have secrets from us. — Nigel Warburton, aeon article
Another possible route to knowledge of the boundary locations is blocked by the fact that our knowledge of the application of a vague term is inexact. Inexact knowledge is governed by margin for error principles, viz., principles of the form ‘If x and y differ incrementally on a decisive dimension and x is known to be Φ (old, blue, etc.), then y is Φ’.[2] For example, where knowledge is inexact, we can know of a blue object that it is blue only if objects whose colors are incrementally different are blue as well—hence, only in clear cases. In contrast, in the borderline or “penumbral” region of a sorites series for ‘blue’, where the boundary lives, some shade of blue is only incrementally different from, indeed may look the same as, a shade that is not blue; and we cannot know where this difference lies. Consequently, if we classify the former shade as blue, that classification is correct by luck, and so does not constitute knowledge. (On the plausible assumption that seeing that something x is blue is sufficient for knowing that x is blue, it follows that some blue things are such that we cannot see that they are blue, even under ideal viewing conditions.)
The virtues and the appeal of the epistemic theory are significant, and it has earned its share of supporters. At the same time, the view may be hard to accept. Even its proponents grant that epistemicism is intuitively implausible; and it seems to multiply mysteries. As a first approximation, the epistemicist says that
vague terms have unknowable sharp boundaries that are fixed by an unknown function of their unknowable (i.e., not fully knowable) patterns of use. — SEP
There's only a "paradox" if you insist on the truth of contradictory premises, such as:
P1. objects have a set of attributes that are necessary to their identity (essentialism)
P2. no specific number of items is necessary for a collection of items to be a heap
P3. heaps exist
The "solution" is to reject one of the premises. I reject the first. Essentialism isn't the case. — Michael
The reason I'm having a somewhat random whack at Banno is because his views on language and definitions prevent him talking about things that I and many others want to talk about, — bert1
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] No, absolutely not.
[1] And tell me, do you think that adding a single grain could ever turn a non-heap into a heap?
[2] Well, certainly it could, it's just that, for somewhat technical reasons, we can probably never discover which grain that is. — bongo fury
Where I don't agree with Banno is that all predicates are like this. Nor do I agree all philosophical problems can be solved this way. Some putative examples of non-vague terms (there aren't many, at least outside maths perhaps): less than seven, spatial, conscious. — bert1
I do indeed venture that there are no natural boundaries; that like simples, boundaries are not found but inflicted on the world. The point being that no matter how we divide stuff up, we might have done otherwise. I'd be more than happy to consider counter instances, should you have any at hand.When you identify a definition as "essentialist," do you mean that the definition corresponds to a natural boundary inherent in the phenomenon and not established by human consensus? If so, I, and I think Banno and @Michael, don't believe any phenomenon has an essentialist definition. — T Clark
I'm flattered. Thank you.The reason I'm having a somewhat random whack at Banno is because his views on language and definitions prevent him talking about things that I and many others want to talk about, for example, my philosophical interest, consciousness. However it doesn't stop him writing posts anyway and messing up threads. I've tried to get him to talk about consciousness, but he insists on talking about consciousness. I tell him to shut the fuck up and stay on topic. And he says he is on topic. — bert1
Yes, our friend Banno can be a pain in the ass. I have no objections to you giving him a hard time, it's certainly something he likes to do to others. — T Clark
I would agree that a rigorous definition or rejection of one has no bearing on the use of know in this context. I'd also note that people don't tell each other they know obvious things. So, using the language "in use" as representing knowledge is at least as obtuse as expecting the term true to hold a binary meaning.But neat that you relate this to the Problem of the Criterion; there's a similar unjustified expectation of exactitude in what one counts as knowledge, or as true. We don't need a definitive understanding of knowledge in order to establish that we know this thread is in English. — Banno
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