It’s not complicated; each participant answers as he sees fit. — Mww

Ah. Well then neither (or both equally useless). The first I didn't understand and so could not possibly make use of even if I thought doing so might be a good idea. The second is just ad hoc guesswork, I see no reason at all why I'd make any use of it. If I wanted guesswork I'd just guess myself.

If I had to pick, I suspect someone like @Kenosha Kid could at the very least explain the relevance of the first. I know neurons are made of such elementary particles and also that their properties are somewhat determined by that make-up. I also know a fair bit about how neurons relate to cognition, so it's not hard to see the link.

How we get from what a long dead German writer reckoned to anything that might actually be the case is not so easy a path to trace... unless Kant was a spectacularly good guesser.

Well...there ya go. Wasn’t that complicated after all, was it. As a legitimate survey participant, you’ve concluded the first is a model for the absolutely useless, the second is a model for guesswork. And by admitting to the possible commission of your own guesswork, you’d tacitly acceded to the second-order usefulness of the one in form if not in content, over the absolute uselessness of the other.

Well done.

Welcome back, by the way. Where ya been the last few weeks?

There's a word missing up there after 'someone's'. — Olivier5

I think it was soup? I love an idea soup.

I'm not an idealist. — Olivier5

I didn't think you were, I was just annotating the edges of our conversation for clarity :)

As a legitimate survey participant, you’ve concluded the first is a model for the absolutely useless, the second is a model for guesswork. And by admitting to the possible commission of your own guesswork, you’d tacitly acceded to the second-order usefulness of the one in form if not in content — Mww

I'll concede to the latter, but not the former. You're right, if I had no other route I would just guess and as such Kant's guesses are as good as any (there's a separate question of whether I actually am in such circumstances, but we'll shelve that). But you've made an unwarranted jump from something which is useless to me (on account of my ignorance) to something's being useless sensu lato.

I could resolve the current uselessness of the first option by education. I can do nothing about the limitations of the second.

Welcome back, by the way. — Mww

Thanks.

I think it was soup? I love an idea soup. — Kenosha Kid

You're describing TPF. I love it too.

I didn't think you were [an idealist], I was just annotating the edges of our conversation for clarity :)

Right. So there's one edge which is idealism, aka only forms exist; and another edge which is materialism, aka only matter exists. In between these two extremes lies the not-so-new idea that there's no matter without form and no form without matter.

Ya know what? I’d like to take a survey, of people in general, after a quick perusal of this:

https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~vadim/Classes/2012f/vertex.pdf

.....followed by a quick perusal of this:

https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4280

.....with the survey question being, which one of these is the least useless, with respect to a theoretical description of goings-on between the ears of the human rational animal.
2hReplyOptions — Mww

I won't denigrate vertex corrections in QED as it's not my field but in condensed matter theory, last time I checked, they were pretty damn useless. After the first few orders of approximation, adding more is as liable to make your answer worse than better.

As for QED generally, it wouldn't surprise me if it proved crucial: the brain is an electrochemical system, and QED is a complete and insanely successful theory on electromagnetism and chemistry. But it's a computationally exhaustive method just for small inert systems like ground state atoms: for large dynamic systems such as brains, it's also extremely useless. Maybe when we got dem quantumising puters.

I think Kant's metaphysical exposition of space and time is probably more useful even while being less correct. It leads to questions about the brain that are more targeted. How does the brain order things temporally (which I think we understand quite well, and the answer is "quite badly")? How does it order things spatially (not a clue... I have no idea how imaging happens, it seems like magic to me)? Back to for that stuff.

But anyway, if vertex corrections in QED are really standing in for all of science, and Kant's metaphysical exposition is standing in for all of philosophy, I've got to risk angering members with my scientific bias and say: science, without a doubt, is more *useful*. It's not that philosophy isn't vital or contributive, it's just a lot less nimble, nippy and collaborative than its cocky offspring. Empiricism and falsification make science quick to evolve, while philosophers still debate between Platonic formalism, Cartesian dualism, and more up-to-date holistic approaches. But I don't think Platonists, Cartesians and Kantians would see it that way, since science isn't providing the kinds of understanding that philosophy is about. It might be closer to the truth, might be more useful, but it's not very satisfying to be told to shut up and calculate.

It might even be that, because the kinds of calculation required to describe systems scientifically must rely on number-crunching over insight, and advances in computing make this easier, we're already at the point of science becoming, ironically, competent without comprehension. We've been using machine learning and neural nets to make predictive calculations for decades now. So far, thinking hasn't become completely black-boxed... Even adding a vertex correction diagram, while not physical in itself, has a certain kind of insightfulness (relating to how light doesn't really travel at speed c in a straight line). This might not have a big impact on neuroscience directly, but could be important in e.g. condensed matter theory.

It's an interesting question, probably deserving of its own thread.

But you've made an unwarranted jump from something which is useless to me (on account of my ignorance) to something's being useless sensu lato. — Isaac

Oh no, you don’t!!! I know you. No need to over-analyze such a simple mental exercise.

Peruse this, peruse that, judge degree of explanatory content relative to a given condition.

My conclusion has nothing to do with "...thoughts are always inseparable..." — TheMadFool

I'm suggesting that stand alone non-physicals do not and can not exist but non-physicals contained by neurons do exist and that is a state that should be recognized.
A lot of frustration debating monism vs. dualism gets cleared up when this relation is acknowledged.

Oh no, you don’t!!! I know you. No need to over-analyze such a simple mental exercise.

Peruse this, peruse that, judge degree of explanatory content relative to a given condition. — Mww

OK, to give you some leash, the answer to the question as posed is probably Kant.

So likewise, if I may -

your second example vs. https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.2044-8295.2010.02010.x

Same question.

As for QED generally, it wouldn't surprise me if it proved crucial — Kenosha Kid

Absolutely, but it remains.....crucial for what? It’s quite irrelevant what the math entails, just as it is equally irrelevant what a moldy tome on metaphysics entails, the point being, the average smuck on the street will most likely throw down the math, yet give the book at least a cursory read before throwing it.

Then it merely becomes a matter of....why? For which there is a rather obvious answer.

the answer to the question as posed is probably Kant. — Isaac

Cool.

So likewise, if I may — Isaac

While accommodating the fairness of the request, I deny the expense.

Got something this virgoyankeebabyboomer don’t gotta pay for?

Ah, I see. Useful for explaining something previously unexplained. Then again, as a sheer numbers game, Kant might inspire more people to learn more about where we're at now and where we want to be and, who knows, maybe they'll end up changing the way we think. In terms of that idea of usefulness, whatever gets you there is perfect.

Therefore ideas are empirical, and can be considered as physical. — Olivier5

Do you think your ideas have physical attributes? Size, weight, texture, etc.?

In between these two extremes lies the not-so-new idea that there's no matter without form and no form without matter. — Olivier5

But then you have the mind-body problem, which seems insolvable, at this point.

While accommodating the fairness of the request, I deny the expense.

Got something this virgoyankeebabyboomer don’t gotta pay for? — Mww

Ah, sorry about that. BPS lets me see everything on account of my charming personality (and possibly my membership) I forgot about the paywall. It was only a review (of the standard undergraduate textbook) - treat it as a hypothetical. Kant or the standard undergraduate textbook on cognitive science. If you had to gamble on which would give you a useful picture of what going on between the ears, where would your money be?

Here's a look inside https://www.amazon.co.uk/Cognitive-Psychology-Students-Michael-Eysenck/dp/1848724160?asin=1848724160&revisionId=&format=4&depth=1

Do you think your ideas have physical attributes? Size, weight, texture, etc.? — RogueAI

How are you deciding that those things are the properties of physical things without begging the question? If you treat 'physical' as a category of existent things which simply happen to have some set of attributes (size, weight and texture) then sure, some things are physical and some aren't. A trivial conclusion from the definition and of very little consequence other than for philologists. The point being made by idealists is that some things exist which cannot be empirically detected by our senses. As I demonstrated above, no-one is in any doubt that their ideas can be detected, as such they don't undermine physicalism any more than gravity or magnetism do.

All right, let's pin the basics down on "physical". What would happen to the universe if all minds dissappeared? Would planets, stars, galaxies, etc. still be around?

What would happen to the universe if all minds dissappeared? Would planets, stars, galaxies, etc. still be around? — RogueAI

That's the theory, yes. They wouldn't be 'planets', 'stars', and 'galaxies' of course - those are human ways of interpreting the sensations we assume those parts of reality produce, but the causes of those sensations would still be there.

But then you have the mind-body problem, which seems insolvable, at this point. — RogueAI

We'll solve it one day. In the meantime, I'd rather have a mind-body problem than have no mind or no body.

Right, there wouldn't be labels for anything, but the stuff would still be there. I think we're agreed. So the physical is mind-independent. Agreed?

No but we can play with ideas, analyse them, communicate them. So we have ways to detect them.

We'll solve it one day. In the meantime, I'd rather have a mind-body problem than have no mind or no body. — Olivier5

Idealism doesn't entail you don't have a body. It entails that that body is not made of physical stuff.

So what would my body be made of? Ideas?

No but we can play with ideas, analyse them, communicate them — Olivier5

I agree. I think it's evidence that they're obviously not physical things. Playing with an idea and playing with a physical object are two very different things.

So what would my body be made of? Ideas? — Olivier5

What is it made of when you dream at night? Ideas, yes.

But dreams and reality are different.

Right, there wouldn't be labels for anything, but the stuff would still be there. I think we're agreed. So the physical is mind-independent. Agreed? — RogueAI

No, I don't think that follows. You asked me if planets, stars and galaxies would still be there if minds ceased to be. There are clearly lots of physical things produced by minds, all those things would obviously cease to exist if minds ceased to exist.

Playing with an idea and playing with a physical object are two very different things. — RogueAI

I agree.

But dreams and reality are different. — Olivier5

Hallucinations and reality are often indestinguisable rom each other to the person experiencing it. Idealism is the argument that reality is a hallucination. Idealists always say "dream", but hallucination is more accurate, because, as you say, there are obvious differences between the dreaming and waking world.

Hallucinations and reality are often indestinguisable rom each other to the person experiencing it. — RogueAI

That is not true for me. I can feel the difference quite well.