T Clark may be right that metaphysics can be thought of as what is useful. I only add that if something is useful then an aspect of your belief must have some tenuous connection to the nature of the world, as in existentialism, Daosim and different traditions say something about the world which is not captured by our physics or other sciences. It just can't be proven. — Manuel

That's not what I said. I said particular metaphysical concepts can be judged based on their usefulness in particular situations. "Visions of the world" are such metaphysical concepts. It's true, Taoism is a vision of the world and a metaphysical concept, but so are objective reality and the scientific method.

This tangent could go on for a long time and it's off topic. We should leave it here.

Well if metaphysical views apply to ordinary life, then it's relevant. But fair enough, you are correct that it could go off topic.

In ordinary life I have virtually no tendency to speak about such issues with other people, unless they happen to be interested in philosophy, which as some of you may know, is very rare. — Manuel

Same.

When someone asks me a question along the lines of "are you sure?" or "are you certain?" I very rarely say "yes". I always reply by saying "I think this is what I saw" or "it's likely", but I cannot for the life of me say "I'm certain" or "I'm sure". — Manuel

Also same. I find it very hard to say I “believe” something. Rather, I say I “think.” But I’m also really indecisive, so it may just be a personality quirk. I’m usually just too apathetic to make up my mind.

Interesting attitude of "what do you have to lose". I suppose I have the opposite disposition because most of the time I'm satisfied. But yours is a good view to adopt as it's sensible. — Manuel

Yep, me too. And to add to @Pfhorrest’s comment, I’m a shy, anxious person, but I don’t give up because I’m afraid of failing. I don’t try because I’m afraid of the anxiety/embarrassment/shame I would experience if I did try.

You live in more 'civilized' parts than i do. Religious belief is the aesthetics of custom around these parts (US southeast). — 180 Proof

I’m about 1,000 miles North of you in upper Appalachia, and it’s no better. Christianity is always the default assumption, and the first question asked upon discovering someone is an atheist is “then how do you explain [insert version of creation mystery].” It seems most people are just not suited to be able to live with doubt or uncertainty.

How many of you actually live any philosophy? — jgill

Yeah, I have hodgepodge nihilistic/existentialistic lifestyle. Also a bit of an hedonist/egoist, in that I try to eliminate whatever causes me distress, and do whatever I want as often as I can, which usually results in other “duties” being neglected.

I don’t try because I’m afraid of the anxiety/embarrassment/shame I would experience if I did try. — Pinprick

Would you feel that still if you tried and succeeded? Or only if you failed? Assuming the latter, that’s the point of adopting the “try just in case” attitude: it reframes the failure from something new to feel bad about, to just the already-existing status quo, with nowhere to go but up.

:up:

I mean the "nothing to lose attitude" is great and good and is often sound advice. But if you are fine with how you are, there's nothing wrong with that. One thing is to try to keep improving on certain areas, if one deems it necessary.

But on the other hand - and this has nothing to do with Phorrest - this cultish obsession in our society of improving yourself all the time is kind of obscene. As if people were corporations who have to make more money no matter what.

It seems most people are just not suited to be able to live with doubt or uncertainty. — Pinprick

:up:

How many of you actually live any philosophy? — jgill

I strive to do so. 'Epicurean freethinking pragmatist' perhaps describes my philosophical modus vivendi best. Daily doses of blues & jazz and on/offline dialectic also keep up my reveries which fortify the courage to go on (Beckett). Decades on, so far so good.

Oh come on, do you really believe that your average Wisconsin Christian is examining their beliefs and studying the philosophy underpinning them more rigorously? This is not an "atheist" or "scientist" thing: most people don't have a solid philosophical foundation for what they believe, and probably shouldn't tbh.

Sure, I agree. This applies to virtually to everybody. Few people bother to study the underpinnings of belief systems.

:up:

Would you feel that still if you tried and succeeded? — Pfhorrest

No, not really. I’d just be glad to be out of the situation. And my anxiety is geared more to social situations; public speaking, participating in meetings, interviews, etc. So it’s more that I try to avoid jobs that require this type of work. Ironically enough, I’m a social worker. :rofl:



Yeah, it’s kinda weird because the “nothing to lose” attitude is sort of how I keep my anxiety in check. I remind myself that, being a nihilist, none of this shit matters. Also, success to me means happiness, which for me equates to lots of mindless entertainment and self indulgence. I just never really bought into a lot of these unspoken social norms, like making small talk or trying to impress people. I’m much closer to a Diogenes at heart. Something about the idea that our “lesser” or “animalistic” impulses and urges should be suppressed, or things we’re ashamed/embarrassed of never set right with me.

Sure, I'm similar in many respects. It just that if you espouse views like this, people tend to think that you're doing something wrong or are missing out on something or had some trauma, etc., etc.

And that may be true for a lot of people. But not all. If you're happy or content with who you are, I think that's what's important. No one is going to live your life for you.

I agree that it’s also very important to be able to feel about yourself that you’re good enough already — and to let other people know that they’re good enough for you, so that they can feel allowed to feel that way about themselves too.

It’s one of those... what @Gnomon would call “BothAnd”... things. Like my simultaneous optimism and pessimism (success is possible... but so is failure), or my endorsement of joyful passionate sanguine experiential input but also peaceful sober phlegmatic behavioral output. You’re good enough, you don’t have to be more... but you can be more, you’re never just stuck as you are.

Oh come on, do you really believe that your average Wisconsin Christian is examining their beliefs and studying the philosophy underpinning them more rigorously? This is not an "atheist" or "scientist" thing: most people don't have a solid philosophical foundation for what they believe, and probably shouldn't tbh. — Kenosha Kid

I agree. Not sure why you raised the Wisconsin Christian thing with me - I was simply saying that there are also 'Wisconsin atheists'.

Oh come on, do you really believe that your average Wisconsin Christian is examining their beliefs and studying the philosophy underpinning them more rigorously? This is not an "atheist" or "scientist" thing: most people don't have a solid philosophical foundation for what they believe, and probably shouldn't tbh. — Kenosha Kid

This makes sense. It's silly for us to expect most people to live with a need to examine everything in themselves and their world just because we do.

You’re good enough, you don’t have to be more... but you can be more, you’re never just stuck as you are. — Pfhorrest

And again, you're view is totally sensible. I'd even say it's pragmatic, in terms of the classical American tradition.

I'd even say it's pragmatic, in terms of the classical American tradition. — Manuel

:up: I am a fan of that tradition.

I’m much closer to a Diogenes at heart. Something about the idea that our “lesser” or “animalistic” impulses and urges should be suppressed, or things we’re ashamed/embarrassed of never set right with me. — Pinprick

:up:

Than you have excellent taste. Peirce, James and Dewey and all the others of that era are sometimes underrated, there's just a wealth of knowledge to be found in there works. :cool:

When someone asks me a question along the lines of "are you sure?" or "are you certain?" I very rarely say "yes". I always reply by saying "I think this is what I saw" or "it's likely", but I cannot for the life of me say "I'm certain" or "I'm sure". — Manuel


Also same. I find it very hard to say I “believe” something. Rather, I say I “think.” But I’m also really indecisive, so it may just be a personality quirk. I’m usually just too apathetic to make up my mind. — Pinprick

I’ve been a self-proclaimed philosophical (aka, anti-Cartesian-skepticism) skeptic since at least my late teens. Due to feedback from this forum and more so from its predecessor, more recently the term’s been updated to “fallibilist” so as to minimize confusion. Same thing to me. As such, I’ve never had problems in saying “yup, I’m certain” because I’ve always equated it to psychological certainty, this rather than epistemic certainty. The latter is for me cognitive (a certainty justified to the highest degree); the former is a kind of wager that your belief is in fact true despite your inability to evidence the belief’s claim to be epistemically certain.

Just in case it might be of interest: Taking a step back, when I say “I believe X” I see myself as choosing to endow X with the property of being real, this irrespective of the degree of conscious justification I may have for X, if any. So to me it connotes a less stanch position than that of “I think that X”. “I believe X” allows me the leeway of being wrong in what I believe, because beliefs are readily understood to be fallible. “I think that X”, however, is sterner: it to me claims that not only do I believe X but I’ve given this same belief thought wherein I’ve justified its verity to myself. Being wrong in the latter is more embarrassing, because to me it shows that my thought processes are not trustworthy to others or to myself. But “I believe” is more whimsical, so not as embarrassing when what I believe (without much if any conscious consideration) is wrong.

Then, to say “I’m certain that X” is to say that a) I believe that X (i.e., I choose to endow X with the property of being real), which is on its own flimsy, and b) that I wager my belief of X to be in fact true, typically because I find good enough justifications for it to so wager. But it to my mind is never the claim of infallible certainty.

Interesting for me to see others’ takes on this.

------

More in line with the OP, here's a philosophical compulsion I once had in everyday life: Years back, due to my contemplations at the time, I had problems in proclaiming anything to be perfect. As in, a perfect cat, or a more typical "perfect storm". Thought it to be a misapplication of language. Nothing in space and time could be completely without faults, and hence perfect. Much like cognitive objectivity, perfection was for me strictly an abstract ideal to be aspired for that can’t be obtained in anything concrete or spatiotemporal (akin to this Sting lyric: To search for perfection is all very well, but to look for heaven is to live in hell.). Then a former colleague humorously exclaimed that what someone or other did was “better than perfect!”. In its context, it made emotive sense, but at the moment not cognitive sense. Afterwards, I came to the conclusion that it referenced X being better than what was required of it to fully suit its purpose. The person, in other words, outdid themselves. Since then, I’ve become a lot more easygoing in saying of something, “perfect”: as in, the given suits the purpose(s) in question fully; rather than it having obtained a metaphysical status of perfection. So, nowadays, in the right context, I can make sense of things such as perfect cats (cats that completely suit the purposes in question), as well as of cats that are better than perfect (at things like catching mice). :wink:

When someone asks me a question along the lines of "are you sure?" or "are you certain?" I very rarely say "yes". I always reply by saying "I think this is what I saw" or "it's likely", but I cannot for the life of me say "I'm certain" or "I'm sure". — Manuel

A short(?) argument for your reading pleasure

Argument A

1. If good justifications exist, Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter

2. If Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter, Agrippa's trilemma argument is good

3. If Agrippa's trilemma argument is good, good justifications don't exist

4. If good justifications exist, Agrippa's trilemma argument is good [1, 2 HS]

5. If good justifications exist, good justifications don't exist

6. Good justifications exist [assume for reductio ad absurdum]

7. Good justifications don't exist [5, 6 MP]

8. Good justificiations exist & Good justifications don't exist [6, 7 Conj]

9. Good justifications don't exist [6 - 8 reductio ad absurdum]

Argument B

10. If good justifications don't exist, argument A is not a good justification

11. If argument A is not a good justification, good justifications don't exist (9), is not justified

12. If good justifications don't exist, good justifications don't exist (9), is not justified

13. Good justifications don't exist (9) is not justified [9, 12 MP]

Argument C

14. If good justifications don't exist, Argument B is not a good justification

15. If argument B is not a good justification, good justifications don't exist (9) is not justified is not justified

16. If good justifications don't exist, good justifications don't exist (9) is not justified is not justified

17. Good justifications don't exist (9) is not justified is not justified [9, 16 MP]
.
.
.
18. Good justifications don't exist (9) is not justified is not justified is not justified is not justified...ad infinitum/ad nauseum.

However, look closely at 9. Good justifications don't exist. For me it was a Zen moment?! Mu?!

Another way of looking at it would be,

G = Good justifications exist

19. G -> ~G [3 above]

20. ~G -> G [if ~G is true, there has to be good justifications, the justification for ~G]

21. G -> G [19, 20, HS]

22. ~G v G [21, Imp]

23. G v ~G [22 Comm]

It may seem that the skeptic lost but look cloesely, G v ~G undermines G and ~G but both of them are something someone who believes knowledge is possible would say. The skeptic, true to his beliefs, would say precisely what line 23 says G v ~G.

What then happens is, for every proposition p, p v ~p but ask which is true, p or ~p, and like you, the skeptic will reply, "I'm not sure."

"there are no accidents" and "everything happens for a reason" – the folk psychologism of misapplying the Principle of Sufficient Reason. — 180 Proof

Thanks for the info 180 Proof. My views on the matter are that those who think, "there are no accidents" or that "everything happens for a reason" experience certain events tha were favorable/unfavorable to a person. Later on these very events turn out to be precisely what was required for a certain good/bad outcome. The events, disjoint initially, finally begin to make sense at a psychological level. An example would be a person who breaks his leg in a car accident and takes sick leave; the day he misses work, fire guts his office killing everyone inside. This would prompt him to think of his car accident as meant to save him from the blaze.

The Principle Of Sufficeint Reason, on the other hand, is more about physical phenomena. It was never meant for interpretations of causal significance in a psychological context.

Let's examine the story of the person above. Clearly, the leg fracture caused the person to miss work and prevented a fiery death at the office. We can't doubt that. The PSR is applicable in full. Why is it that something seems off when someone comes over to his house and tells him, "everything happens for a reason" or "there are no accidents"? The mistake, to my reckoning, is what's being implied is that the car accident that broke this person's leg was deliberately caused to keep him away from the office that fateful day - the "someone's watching over him" sentiment. A supernatural hand is being suggested if not explicitly stated.

There's more that can be said. I'll wait for your remarks on what I said.

Don't know if it's been mentioned already, but the philosophical issue that bothers me the most in life is the issue of evil, i.e. why are people doing evil things like raping children or killing them? Or lying about climate change.

That's quite an argument! I prefer to keep it a bit more simple and simply say that, obvious things aside such as the capital of Italy or math, we rarely get to the point in which we would be justified in saying that have completely certain justification for beliefs. Even if something happened 3 seconds ago. I don't feel comfortable stating such things, though I know it can be silly on occasions.

Don't know if it's been mentioned already, but the philosophical issue that bothers me the most in life is the issue of evil, i.e. why are people doing evil things like raping children or killing them? — Olivier5

Isn't the problem of evil a problem specifically within a theological context? Because it seems to me that if we are going to speak about the problem of evil absent theology, then we have to speak about the problem of good or the problem humor, etc.

Isn't the problem of evil a problem specifically within a theological context? Because it seems to me that if we are going to speak about the problem of evil absent theology, then we have to speak about the problem of good or the problem humor, etc. — Manuel

I used to think so, but I realized at some point that evil is not just the absence of good, and that there ARE evil behaviors, generally coming from certain (rare) individuals rather than from others. E.g. serial killers; the people at FAUX News, Bashir El Assad.

I suspect us moderns ignoring the problem of what is evil has only helped it make further progress.

I used to think so, but I realized at some point that evil is not just the absence of good, and that there ARE evil behaviors, generally coming from certain (rare) individuals rather than from others. E.g. serial killers; the people at FAUX News, Bashir El Assad. — Olivier5

Yes. But then I'd say that instead of speaking about evil people, of which we can find quite a few, all of us can do evil things. And evil people can do good things, trivially.

One thing is to say that we don't want these types of behaviors in society, another thing is to say they're a problem, because, why would there not be evil? It's assuming that "good" is something natural or obvious.

One thing is to say that we don't want these types of behaviors in society, another thing is to say they're a problem, because, why would there not be evil? It's assuming that "good" is something natural or obvious. — Manuel

Well yes, Rousseau basically assumed that good was natural to men (within limits). And I went along with that in a humanist world view. A bit like Freud after WW1 considered the instinct of death (Thanatos) and not only the instinct of life (libido or Eros), I realized at some point that our human nature do tend to enjoy destruction and inflicting unnecessary pain on others.

The Principle Of Suffic[ie]nt Reason, on the other hand, is more about physical phenomena. It was never meant for interpretations of causal significance in a psychological context. — TheMadFool

Tell that to e.g. Aristotle, Leibniz & Schopenhauer...

All this intended in good sport:

1. If good justifications exist, Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter — TheMadFool

To start with premise (1), how do you figure its verity? For: If good justifications exist, then Agrippa’s trilemma indeed matters, this because it is of itself concluded from good justifications. And until the trilemma is solved, it presents the fallibly proven truth (fallible because the trilemma can be applied to the trilemma’s own justification) that no infallibly proven truth can be obtained as far as we (fallibly) know. Which, apropos, is the only rational way I can make sense of Nietzsche’s mindset of there being no (infallible) truth.

How are you not here equivocating between good justification (in the sense of beneficial - implicitly given, beneficial to those subjects that utilize it) and perfect justification (in the sense of being completely absent of any actual or potential fault)? For one thing, a good justification is comparative, i.e. can be a better or worse justification relative to other good justifications – and a best justification is always so deemed by comparison to other justifications. On the other hand, a perfect justification, in the sense “perfect” is here used, is superlative rather than comparable, thereby absolute, thereby necessarily infallible.

[...] the skeptic will reply, "I'm not sure." — TheMadFool

And as a side note: I’m currently quite certain/sure (psychologically) of my position on fallibilism being (fallibly) true. :razz:

If you're happy or content with who you are, I think that's what's important. No one is going to live your life for you. — Manuel

:up:

Interesting for me to see others’ takes on this. — javra

It is interesting to see how we apply different meanings to the same word. :smile:

All this is just a way of asking, what more-or-less technical aspect in philosophy shows up in your personal life? — Manuel

I work in an industry where the causes for events remember themselves better than I do. Bracketing that unfolding of the world as determinist or not doesn't capture our distance from it or closeness to it.

We need to perceive as well as we can and that requires analysis and intuition. Whatever proportion is correct for one moment may not be right for another. It is a performance art.

And as Stanislavsky says, An Actor Prepares.

All this is just a way of asking, what more-or-less technical aspect in philosophy shows up in your personal life? — Manuel

I expect that what people say should be logical. Silly me.
By now, I know better than to point it out to them (heaven forbid pointing out a logical fallacy!). It just makes for such tedious communication ...

Person: "If you agree with a part of the contract, you must agree with the whole contract."
Baker: *sigh* *silence*