Thanks! Will take all that on board for future discussions.

At various points in your preceding posts, you refer to 'reality as it is', 'independently of models'. But, that presumes you can know 'reality as it is', when that is precisely what is at issue. — Wayfarer

Just because reality is not immediately and non-inferrentially given doesn't mean we don't know what it is. The Myth of the Given isn't necessarily resolved by postulating an inaccessible noumenon as Kant did. There are even materialists who reject the Myth of the Given and use this as a way to justify that Sellars' Manifest Image (phenomenon) presupposes and is influenced by a Scientific Image (noumenon) to which we have access to.

Just because reality is not immediately and non-inferrentially given doesn't mean we don't know what it is. — Agustino

Ah, but do we? I am inclined to accept the view that nobody knows what anything really is. All knowledge is approximate except for in regards to those attributes of things which can be numerically abstracted and predicted according to natural regularities (as we are discussing in this thread). But aside from such scientific knowledge, a lot of what we think we know, just a melange of ideas we've absorbed from those around us; what we think of as real is irredemiably conditioned by concepts, ideas, theories, and attachments which are largely subliminal in nature but which strongly condition what we think and how we react.

“If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, Infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern. — William Blake

I think this is the basically the same as aesthetic knowledge in the narrower sense, when we know beauty or harmony, for example, or in the moral sense, when we know goodness, or in the religious sense when we know God, or in the 'Zen' sense of 'being enlightened'. This knowing of the 'familiarity' kind cannot be, to the great frustration of many philosophers, inter-subjectively corroborated, but it is not through any lack of trying; in fact philosophers are often very stubborn, and so I doubt they will ever give up the attempt. For me, metaphysics is firmly in this latter character of knowing. An inter-subjectively corroborate-able (horrible word but I could not think of any other) metaphysics is simply impossible to achieve — John

The use of the term 'metaphysics' ought to respect the Aristotelean derivation, otherwise it becomes a catch-word for all kinds of woo. That, I think, is why scholastic metaphysics tends to appear cumbersome - its formality ensures every key term is defined very precisely, specifically to avoid debate sliding off into vagueness.

I think what you call 'direct knowing' might be part of what Michael Polanyi defined as 'tacit knowledge' - things you learn by experience, on the job, through life experience, and so on. That is indubitably an important aspect of knowledge.

I think the 'religious sense' you refer to, is a lot more difficult to generalise about, as there are many forms of spirituality with various kinds of cognitive modes. But I would say, that as far as the sapiential traditions are concerned a key characteristics is 'knowing how you know', also known as meta-cognition. Buddhist insight meditation (vipassana), for example, is aimed at direct cognition of the conditioned nature of perception. I think that kind of understanding metaphysics requires or facilitates meta-cognitive insight - an insight into knowing how you know (in the case of Buddhist meditation, knowing how your affective processes hang you up all the time).

Pierre mentioned that the concept of enduring substance doesn't enter the purview of the laws of physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said that, also, the reason being that Galilean and Newtonian physics rejected Aristotelean physics, it didn't need the scholastic concept of 'substance' in order to do its work (and besides wanted to break from the 'dead hand of scholasticism'). However some Aristotelean ideas, especially formal and final causality, are making a comeback, because (especially in biology) they seem to be indispensable. I think in the hands of a skilled philosopher, such as Pierre-Normand, the traditional (or neo-traditional) concept of 'substance' makes supreme sense.

Ah, but do we? I am inclined to accept the view that nobody knows what anything really is. — Wayfarer

You and Kant, but Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza before, all rebelled against this separation of noumenon from phenomenon, and granting access only to the one and not to the other. I don't see how Kant's distinction is valid if we don't have access to the noumenon. If we actually don't, then the Kantian distinction is merely a logical formalism, and nothing else.

The use of the term 'metaphysics' ought to respect the Aristotelean derivation, otherwise it becomes a catch-word for all kinds of woo. That, I think, is why scholastic metaphysics tends to appear cumbersome - its formality ensures every key term is defined very precisely, specifically to avoid debate sliding off into vagueness. — Wayfarer

The problem is that there cannot be any precise formulations of metaphysical categories and definitions of metaphysical terms that everyone will agree upon. To practice metaphysics is to undertake a purely logical exercise in consistency, and the disagreements people have about metaphysics are on account of what cannot be produced or proven by mere logic; namely the assumptions that form the premises upon which any metaphysical thinking is based.

So, vagueness necessarily consists in the impossibility of logically proving the overarching validity of any precise definition within metaphysics. The ideas of substance, identity, being, reality and so on are ineluctably ambivalent. Metaphysical preferences then, inevitably come down to people's intuitions, because the meanings of the base terms are themselves intuitively decided upon.

I said that, also, the reason being that Galilean and Newtonian physics rejected Aristotelean physics, it didn't need the scholastic concept of 'substance' in order to do its work (and besides wanted to break from the 'dead hand of scholasticism'). — Wayfarer

The argument I made to Pierre-Normand is that the concept of enduring substance is inherent within Newtonian physics, as the given. It is taken for granted by Newton's first law. So my argument is that it is not the case that the concept of enduring substance does not enter into the laws of physics, it is right there in Newton's first law, as the given, that which is taken for granted.

If the phenomenal and the logical are all that we can know; the former as experience and the latter as thought, then what more could the noumenal be, since it obviously cannot, by mere definition, be known as phenomenal, but a "logical formalism", as I have been trying to convince you for some time now?

I don't see how Kant's distinction is valid if we don't have access to the noumenon. If we actually don't, then the Kantian distinction is merely a logical formalism, and nothing else. — Agustino

It's about the perspectival nature of knowledge, that we know anything as it appears to us, not as it is in itself. 'The concept [of ding an sich] was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the "thing in itself" as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble'. (more)

There's also a very interesting discussion by Eric Rietan:

Both Hegel and Schlieirmacher thought that Kant [in naming the ding an sich] had missed something important—namely, that the self which experiences the world is also a part of the world it is experiencing. Rather than there being this sharp divide between the experiencing subject and things-in-themselves, with phenomena emerging at the point of interface, the experiencing subject is a thing-in-itself. It is one of the noumena—or, put another way, the self that experiences the world is part of the ultimate reality that lies behind experience.

So: the self that has experiences is a noumenal reality. Both Schleiermacher and Hegel believed that this fact could be made use of, so that somehow the self could serve as a wedge to pry open a doorway through the wall of mystery, into an understanding of reality as it is in itself.

But this understanding couldn’t be achieved by simply turning our attention on ourselves. As soon as we do that we’ve made ourselves into an object of experience, and this object is just as likely to be the product of our own cognitive reconstructions as any other object. In other words, what we are presented with when we investigate ourselves introspectively is the phenomenal self, not the noumenal self. The self as it appears to itself may be radically unlike the self as it is in itself. ....

...Schleiermacher dealt with this conundrum by privileging a distinct mode of self-consciousness, one in which all attempts to make the self into an object of consciousness—that is, all attempts to come to know the self—are set aside. When the self is made an object of study it becomes a phenomenon, and as such is divorced from the noumenal self. But it is possible to simply be—to become quiescent, if you will, and simply be what one is rather than attempt to know what one is.

And in this place of cognitive stillness, one discovers in a direct experiential way an ultimate reality that cannot be conceptualized or made into an object of study.

I'm pretty near to Schleiermacher, and also I agree that the 'thing in itself' is a sign of the limits of knowledge: it reminds us that our supposed knowledge of external things is meditated, is perspectival and conditioned; some of what we take for granted that we know, specifically the inherent reality of the objects of appearance - maybe we actually don't know.

The concept of enduring substance is inherent within Newtonian physics, as the given. It is taken for granted by Newton's first law. — Metaphysician Undercover

Newton's laws concern mass, not substance, in the Aristotelean sense. Crucial distinction.

The problem is that there cannot be any precise formulations of metaphysical categories and definitions of metaphysical terms that everyone will agree upon. — John

I don't know about that. Scholastic metaphysics is very rigorous. You and I and most people here don't play in that space. I think you say that the distinctions, etc, are 'ineluctably ambivalent' because you're not actually speaking from within that domain. But many metaphysical arguments (for example, the cosmological or ontological arguments) are indeed logically provable, but they're not empirically verifiable; given certain axioms, then their conclusions certainly follow, but the axioms cannot themselves be proven.

I don't know about that. Scholastic metaphysics is very rigorous. You and I and most people here don't play in that space. I think you say that the distinctions, etc, are 'ineluctably ambivalent' because you're not actually speaking from within that domain. But many metaphysical arguments (for example, the cosmological or ontological arguments) are indeed logically provable, but they're not empirically verifiable; given certain axioms, then their conclusions certainly follow, but the axioms cannot themselves be proven. — Wayfarer

Scholastic metaphysics is something I have not studied much. But I am familiar enough with it to know that there were major disagreements between philosophers within that tradition. Now disagreements in philosophy are only possible where one or other (or both) of the disputants is asserting something that is inconsistent with their premises, or else if they are arguing consistently, but from different premises and definitions

In the first kind of case, if there is good will, it should be possible to expose the inconsistencies and resolve the dispute. IN the second kind of case, there can be no resolution because the protagonists are coming form different definitions, even notions, of key concepts and presupposing different premises. No inconsistency in the arguments of either protagonist need to be at work, and yet they will forever disagree.

That is what I mean by the terms being "ineluctably ambivalent"; the possibility of different definitions and understandings of the terms can never be eliminated; and I think my assertion that this is so has nothing at all to do with what domain I am speaking from. It is quite simply the human condition; and I think anyone with their eyes open should be able to see the truth of that.

You say many metaphysical arguments are logically provable, but that is not true at all. The arguments are only as good as their premises, and premises can never be proven within an argument because the argument is dependent upon them. Arguments can be shown to be consistent and valid or not, that is all logic can achieve. If the argument is consistent and valid, then its conclusion will be true if and only if its premises are true. And to repeat, that can never be proven. I am saying this only to emphasize that you have been inconsistent in saying that metaphysical arguments can be proven, while admitting that axioms cannot be proven. It is axioms or premises that must be either accepted as intuitively self-evident or not, or in cases where premises are by no means self-evident then they must simply be accepted on faith, or not. It is always possible that what seems self-evident to one will not seem so to others. Philosophy is actually very messy and imprecise, and ineluctably so, I would say.

No inconsistency in the arguments of either protagonist need to be at work, and yet they will forever disagree. — John

Well, in support of your argument, that was one of Kant's major motivations - that metaphysical arguments had been going on for centuries and never looked like being resolved, and that is certainly true.

But, what I was commenting on was this:

People follow their metaphysical intuitions or else some authority (which really amounts to other's intuitions as canonized); there is no possibility of evidence or logical proof when it comes to metaphysics. — John

I still don't think that's correct. I had intended a couple of times to enroll in an excellent-looking external course offered by Oxford (this one and may try again for April). But they do discuss a curriculum in such courses - it isn't just 'what anybody thinks'.

Arguments can be shown to be consistent and valid or not, that is all logic can achieve — John

That is what is said: logically provable, but not empirically verifiable.

The problem is, if you simply say that metaphysics is whatever anyone feels intuitively about what is true, then it doesn't add up to much of a philosophy. Even Buddhism has its metaphysics, notwithstanding it's usual reputation as anti-metaphysical.

Philosophy is actually very messy and imprecise, and ineluctably so, I would say. — John

Well, perhaps that is because of the approach you've taken?

Right, so I agree with that objection to Kant that you have listed, in the way you have phrased it too. Allow me to explain. Kant goes at length in the Critique to establish the Transcendental Logic, and the synthetic unity of apperception, which alone makes the empirical world possible - including the "I think" of representation - possible. Thereby, Kant has identified a process which is noumenal - which is presupposed by representation. Since representation is real, then this process which alone makes it possible must also be real. So this process then is the noumenon - the unexperienced cause of all experience - this is basically what Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schleiermacher, etc. identified as the noumenon. This process constitutes both the self and the world of representation, and we do know it. These thinkers disagreed how we know it though - Schopenhauer and Schleiermacher thought we know it through mystical intuition, while Hegel thought we know it through speculative reason. I agree with Hegel. We know it by virtue of becoming aware how it is that we and our world itself are generated - by speculative reason.

People follow their metaphysical intuitions or else some authority (which really amounts to other's intuitions as canonized); there is no possibility of evidence or logical proof when it comes to metaphysics. — John


I still don't think that's correct. I had intended a couple of times to enroll in an excellent-looking external course offered by Oxford (this one and may try again for April). But they do discuss a curriculum in such courses - it isn't just 'what anybody thinks'. — Wayfarer

You have entirely misunderstood what I said. I have not suggested that metaphysics is "just what anybody thinks". Many rigorous metaphysical systems can be constructed on different premises, and metaphysics as the study of what we are able to imagine as possible premises and what consistent arguments we can construct based on the elaborations of those premises is a fascinating, rewarding and creative discipline. Of course different peoples' metaphysical views will be more or less sophisticated depending on their familiarity with the dialectical evolution of the whole tradition.

The fact is though that no metaphysical system can ever be demonstrated to be the one true system or even the most true one; different views will always be in play even at the highest levels of sophistication; and I can't see how it does not, in the final analysis, come down to individual intuition, taste, faith or merely opinion as to what an individual believes is true (if she believes anything is true) when it comes to metaphysics. All metaphysical systems are ultimately models and none of them can ever be completely adequate to what they purport to be modeling.

So, philosophy as a whole (which is what I was referring to, rather than my own philosophy) will remain "messy" and it has nothing at all to do with "my approach". How could it? The messiness consists in the welter of different approaches and standpoints, not in the individual works of philosophers, which would be messy only if they were inconsistent. Philosophy is more an art than a science.

You agree with Hegel now, against Schopenhauer? Actually Hegel's philosophy was arguably very influenced by the mystical tradition, so it is by no means as cut and dried as you are painting it. For an interesting discussion see:
https://www.amazon.com/Hegel-Hermetic-Tradition-Glenn-Alexander/dp/0801474507/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1487493228&sr=1-1&keywords=hegel+and+the+hermetic+tradition

You agree with Hegel now, against Schopenhauer? Actually Hegel's philosophy was arguably very influenced by the mystical tradition, so it is by no means as cut and dried as you are painting it. For an interesting discussion see: — John

:s I agree with Hegel's conception of how we access the noumenon, not with some of his other positions. This is in fact no different than the Spinozist conception, but since Spinoza (the improved Hegel :P ) isn't in this discussion, I'm using Hegel as an alternative.

We should maybe discuss this, but I probably wouldn't agree with a mystical interpretation of Hegel. But I do know Hegel was influenced by the mystical tradition, both by Holderin, and by Schelling. The book you linked looks interesting, I will have a look, thanks! :)

I do think it is true that Hegel and Schelling reintroduced elements of Spinozism. But of those two Hegel's concerns at least (I don't know much about Schelling) were far more comprehensive than Spinoza's as Hegel was attending to the whole dialectical development of speculative reason, and understanding each phase as a piece in the whole puzzle.

Schopenhauer actually criticizes Schelling and Hegel for doing precisely for following Spinoza in his On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; which I took from the shelves to do a little rereading of the other day. I have long thought that Schopenhauer himself appropriates Spinoza's notion of conatus and redresses it as Will, but I can't remember encountering any acknowledgment of this from Schopenhauer.

Some of his bitter diatribes against Hegel are quite amusing, and they, along with his repeated references to his "prize-winning essay" and the immense importance of his own work clearly show his monumental ego. He is a better writer than either Kant or Hegel, though, and I think perhaps his main value lies in making Kant more easily comprehensible.

Hegel's concerns at least (I don't know much about Schelling) were far more comprehensive than Spinoza's as Hegel was attending to the whole dialectical development of speculative reason, and understanding each phase as a piece in the whole puzzle. — John

Yes, but it is a different style of presentation that is at stake. Spinoza gives a completed system, Hegel gives a Phenomenology - the process of completion of the system. Spinoza is more difficult to learn and understand though, since he doesn't show how his system is completed in the first place. Understanding some Hegel (or Schopenhauer), does help in understanding Spinoza though.

Schopenhauer actually criticizes Schelling and Hegel for doing precisely for following Spinoza in his On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason — John

Yes

I have long thought that Schopenhauer himself appropriates Spinoza's notion of conatus and redresses it as Will, but I can't remember encountering any acknowledgment of this from Schopenhauer. — John

Yes I think so, but he also, at least early Schopenhauer, anthropomorphises the thing-in-itself by identifying it completely as the Will. Both Schopenhauer and Hegel are Spinozists though, effectively performing a re-reading of Kant through the lens of Spinoza.

Some of his bitter diatribes against Hegel are quite amusing, and they, along with his repeated references to his "prize-winning essay" and the immense importance of his own work clearly show his monumental ego. — John

>:O >:O >:O Personally I love his insults, but then, like him, I'd also say I have a big ego :P - which explains why I admire people like Schopenhauer.

making Kant more easily comprehensible. — John

It's not just making Kant comprehensible, it's also synthesising Kant with other philosophers.

Are you trying to bring me to the dark side? :-O >:O

"This is an excellent book. It performs a significant service by its uninhibited exposure of Hegel's dark side."―Michael Inwood, Trinity College, Oxford, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3, September 2002 — Review of the book you recommended

If you are going to quote, then the name is "Consistent Histories" or "Decoherent Histories". — tom

Yes, I meant "consistent histories". Thanks. Michel Bitbol's paper Decoherence and the Constitution of Objectivity is relevant to this discussion, as well as Rom Harré's The Transcendental Domain of Physics, both published in Constituting Objectivity: Transcendental Perspectives on Modern Physics, Michel Bitbol, Pierre Kerszberg and Jean Petitot, eds.

Newton's laws concern mass, not substance, in the Aristotelean sense. Crucial distinction. — Wayfarer

Mass was said to be a fundamental property of matter, weight or some such thing, which is quantifiable. Matter has mass, means that the matter of a body is quantifiable as the mass of the body, and being quantifiable means that it has a form. Mass is assumed to be the most fundamental form of matter. Therefore to discuss the mass of a body is to discuss substance in the Aristotelian sense, matter with form (mass). That's the point, mass is substance for Newton, in its most fundamental form, and Newton's laws take substance for granted, as a given, and describe the behaviour of substance.

Mass was said to be a fundamental property of matter, weight or some such thing, which is quantifiable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mass was so fundamental that they needed two different types of it.

Your point?

Since representation is real, then this process which alone makes it possible must also be real. So this process then is the noumenon - the unexperienced cause of all experience - this is basically what Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schleiermacher, etc. identified as the noumenon. This process constitutes both the self and the world of representation, and we do know it. — Agustino

It's more accurately what we know through. It seems to me that what is being discussed here is 'the unconscious' - the mental and affective processes that underlie discursive thought and reason, which are not themselves objects of knowledge.

Many rigorous metaphysical systems can be constructed on different premises, and metaphysics as the study of what we are able to imagine as possible premises and what consistent arguments we can construct based on the elaborations of those premises is a fascinating, rewarding and creative discipline — John

Well, good!

The fact is though that no metaphysical system can ever be demonstrated to be the one true system or even the most true one; different views will always be in play even at the highest levels of sophistication; and I can't see how it does not, in the final analysis, come down to individual intuition, taste, faith or merely opinion as to what an individual believes is true (if she believes anything is true) when it comes to metaphysics. — John

Well, that's true, but it's also a reflection of a world where every school of thought and tradition vie in the marketplace of ideas. (I have often reflected on the fact that in these debates, there is no ultimate court of adjudication, but all that said, I still cling to the hope that there really is a 'higher philosophy'.)

Mass is assumed to be the most fundamental form of matter. Therefore to discuss the mass of a body is to discuss substance in the Aristotelian sense, matter with form (mass). — Metaphysician Undercover

I really don't think that's correct MU. The equations of matter work for matter in a generalised sense, it doesn't matter which type. The whole point about Aristotelean 'substance' is that it is a complex concept, and isn't really part of modern natural philosophy, except by analogy.

It's more accurately what we know through — Wayfarer

It's not only what you know through. It's that through which the whole empirical world is constituted (not only your self - in fact your self and the world presuppose one another - that which constitutes them both is the noumenon - the real). Hegel was fundamentally right in identifying the limits of the subject to also be the limits of the world - hence ultimately bringing down the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, in the sense of rendering us access to both.

Well, that's true, but it's also a reflection of a world where every school of thought and tradition vie in the marketplace of ideas. — Wayfarer

Would you rather live in a world like that, or a world in which a politically enforced predominant view is mandated, and competing views are at the very least frowned upon, and at the extreme enforced? So, if there really 'is' a "higher philosophy", what can that actually mean? How would we recognize it, if rigorous reason can lead to multitudes of metaphysical views, each based on different starting assumptions?

Would not recognition of a "higher philosophy" be itself a 'higher' recognition and thus necessarily be a supra-rational process? Wouldn't it be something like the gnosis of the mystics, or the abhijñā of Buddhism? If such a process is possible and if it yields genuine insight into the nature of reality, then surely it must a 'higher' intuition, perhaps we could say an intellectual intuition, that transcends logic and defies rational explanation.

How would we recognize it, if rigorous reason can lead to multitudes of metaphysical views, each based on different starting assumptions? — John

I don't think it actually does, as you know. So there is even disagreement about this, because there are others like me as well.

Would not recognition of a "higher philosophy" be itself a 'higher' recognition and thus necessarily be a supra-rational process? Wouldn't it be something like the gnosis of the mystics, or the abhijñā of Buddhism? If such a process is possible and if it yields genuine insight into the nature of reality, then surely it must a 'higher' intuition, perhaps we could say an intellectual intuition, that transcends logic and defies rational explanation. — John

:s You mean naval gazing Sir?

Would you rather live in a world like that, or a world in which a politically enforced predominant view is mandated, and competing views are at the very least frowned upon, and at the extreme enforced? — John

To be honest, I wouldn't actually care much, so long as there was no state police involved, or abuse in the workforce by the bosses towards the workers.

I don't think it's right to say that Hegel "brings down" the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon if by that you mean abolishes it. I think it is right if by "bring down' you mean 'immanentizes'. He wants to show that the in itself is not in itself for itself, but only in itself for us.

So, I understand Hegel to be denying there is any in itself for itself; but that for us, there is a valid distinction between what is in itself and what is for us. It is to the extent that we can think the in itself that we can know it, and what we are thus knowing is what the in itself is for us, and nothing more. Hegel denies that there can be any in itself beyond this; that is he denies transcendence or what is the same, he denies that anything is truly transcendental for us. The transcendental is thus nothing over and above being an immanent thought.

I am not all too confident of this interpretation of Hegel, as he is the most complex of thinkers, and not easy to read. A good deal of my understanding, since I don't have a lifetime to devote to being a Hegel scholar, is derived from readings of secondary literature.

To be honest, I wouldn't actually care much, so long as there was no state police involved, or abuse in the workforce by the bosses towards the workers. — Agustino

There'd be a paucity of philosophical literature; and if you found yourself capable metaphysical speculation you would either have to keep it to yourself or risk censure and perhaps prosecution, incarceration, or even execution, depending on how prohibitive your society was and how severe your heresy was seen to be.

You mean naval gazing Sir? — Agustino

No.

I don't think it's right to say that Hegel "brings down" the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon if by that you mean abolishes it. I think it is right if by "bring down' you mean 'immanentizes'. He wants to show that the in itself is not in itself for itself, but only in itself for us. — John

What I mean by brings down the distinction is this... In my reading:

Hegel maintains the Kantian Subjective Logic whereby the Subject and the Object are mutually constituted through the synthetic unity of apperception (the noumenon), thereby also maintaining the a priority of the noumenon with regards to the phenomenon. However - Hegel does shatter the epistemological distinction between the noumenon and phenomenon - both the noumenon and the phenomenon are known. Reality is not a mystery. My reading probably is quite close to Yovel's reading of Hegel.