The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin substantia, which means ‘something that stands under or grounds things’.
According to the generic sense, therefore, the substances in a given philosophical system are those things that, according to the system, are the foundational or fundamental entities of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms are the substances, for they are the basic things from which everything is constructed.
In David Hume’s system, impressions and ideas are the substances, for the same reason. In a slightly different way, Forms are Plato’s substances, for everything derives its existence from Forms. In this sense of ‘substance’ any realist philosophical system acknowledges the existence of substances. — SEP entry on Substance (Philosophy)
Just as well, because goats are notoriously bad at racing. — Wayfarer
The vastly greater part of (physical) substance "cannot be sensed by our five sense" and yet is not "non-physical" (e.g. dark matter, planck scale events, brains insensible to themselves, etc) — 180Proof
I'm doing philosophy, not science.
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world
everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no
value exists--and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any
value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what
happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is
accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since
if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.
6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is
transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
But as everything is a goat, I'll let this pass. — Banno
There's space and the things in it or things and the space in between; is that 1 or 2? — Cheshire
Substance dualism succeeds where property dualism fails to account for the conceptual coincidence, or interaction, of ideality (mind) and reality (body).
I contend that substance dualism will (1) offer a better explanation for how our thoughts are composed (as I've already discussed), (2) will offer a better explanation for questions related to free will, (3) will offer a better explanation for how we experience the world (providing an anchor for the infinite regress homunculus problem), (4) will offer a better explanation for our ultimate origins, and (5) will offer a better explanation for our purpose and meaning.
I'm not sure how property dualism has been shown to fail — Kenosha Kid
So does that mean there is 'nothing higher', or that there is 'something higher', but that it can't be expressed by propositions? I feel the 'something higher' seems rather dualistic in spirit! — Wayfarer
Is this really an accurate generalization? I've read some of the material provided but this makes some sense. So, the argument is whether the "what stuff does" has a separate existence from stuff itself and not just a function of the arrangement of stuff?Why instead we differentiate between stuff and what stuff does is beyond me. — Kenosha Kid
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