Hanovers approach doesn't require any exposition beyond pointing to what we all know. — frank

Well Hanover's exposition seems largely to be pointing out things we don't know.

It is undisputed that there are (1) minds and (2) bodies. I count two things, which means it is undisputed that dualism is the case.

For instance, it isn't remotely obvious that this is good counting, nor that arbitrarily categorising things is a good basis for metaphysics (although that does seem to sum it up). I suspect what you think of as "what we all know" is probably what others might call "bunkum".

Neither property nor substance has succeeded in the sense of putting the question to rest for philosophers or scientists. — frank

Then I guess Hanover was doomed, since his position is supposed to be that substance dualism succeeds. All I'm seeing atm is: substance dualism is better if you prefer a non-physical mind; property dualism is better if you prefer a physical mind but still like dualisms. They both seem poor options, but the wording of the proposition allows 180proof to win by default in that case. Which is maybe why Hanover isn't taking it all that seriously.

Boy, I'm pretty disappointed with the debate so far — T Clark

Well, I can't have that! I'll actually try to respond to the concerns here within the context of the debate. It's good feedback.

It is undisputed that there are (1) minds and (2) bodies. I count two things, which means it is undisputed that dualism is the case.


For instance, it isn't remotely obvious that this is good counting — Kenosha Kid

It's obvious to your doctor. If you're going to tell your doctor she's wrong, don't come with a thesis that convolutes off into wtf, as property dualism does at this point. And I like property dualism. I wish it the best. I'm just following my own critical thinking here.

Then I guess Hanover was doomed, since his position is supposed to be that substance dualism succeeds. — Kenosha Kid

Succeeds at what? I thought it was just: which one is a better bet for the busy consumer?

Good shout!

Is this really an accurate generalization? — Cheshire

I'm open to counter-examples, but mind-body dualists certainly seem to break things down that way. A thought can't be physical, for instance, since it has no volume, no mass, you can't taste it, smell it, or poke it with a stick, things that are true of lots of physical things like spacetime, motion, force, etc. I can't pick up an executing subroutine of a program and spread it on my toast, or, as I said above, taste the gravity of an orange. You need phonons to hear anything but you can't hear a phonon.

The physicalist description of mind is that it's something the brain _does_, so describing it in a way that fits in very well with that doesn't seem like a compelling argument against physicalism. But maybe there's better dualist arguments I haven't heard yet.

It's obvious to your doctor. — frank

I hope not. Most doctors need to handle computers these days. I don't want mine falling to pieces because she thinks hers is either conscious or cannot possibly work. I can say nothing about your doctor except maybe keep an eye out for a better one.

Succeeds at what? — frank

The proposition is in the OP of the debate thread.

I hope not. Most doctors need to handle computers these days. I don't want mine falling to pieces because she thinks hers is either conscious or cannot possibly work. I can say nothing about your doctor except maybe keep an eye out for a better one. — Kenosha Kid

wut

Is the program execution on my doctor's computer a mind or a body?

Is the program execution on my doctor's computer a mind or a body? — Kenosha Kid

Same sort of thing as a body. Quartz clock, registers, blah blah blah. Why?

Same sort of thing as a body. Quartz clock, registers, blah blah blah. Why? — frank

Because neurons, synapses, blah blah blah.

The physicalist description of mind is that it's something the brain _does_, so describing it in a way that fits in very well with that doesn't seem like a compelling argument against physicalism. But maybe there's better dualist arguments I haven't heard yet. — Kenosha Kid

There's the argument that the mind is something the brain _does_ and vice versa, the brain is something the mind does. The idea that it's a two-way street

floating in space like grapes in a Jello salad — T Clark

I think I'm going to fast for the rest of the day after reading that.

Because neurons, synapses, blah blah blah. — Kenosha Kid

And if there was any science to show that, you could go in that direction. There isn't.

What makes property dualism worth the evil of being open-ended confusion? Think about the yea-buts. There are some biggies.

There's the argument that the mind is something the brain _does_ and vice versa, the brain is something the mind does. The idea that it's a two-way street — Olivier5

But that's an idealist argument, no? Not dualist. I have fewer conceptual problems with idealism.

And if there was any science to show that, you could go in that direction. There isn't. — frank

Well there is, of course. But regardless, what you're saying here is that dualism is founded entirely on ignorance. I agree.

What makes property dualism worth the evil of being open-ended confusion? — frank

I have no idea, not a dualist, all sounds crazy to me. Property pluralism, fine, but that's nothing to do with minds and bodies.

I have no idea, not a dualist, all sounds crazy to me. Property pluralism, fine, but that's nothing to do with minds and bodies. — Kenosha Kid

As Searle said, the man on the street is a Cartesian. You're barking up the wrong tree.

What's the draw of property dualism? It takes a tiny bit of philomind to answer that. Last time I talked to 180 he came up pretty short in that area, so I don't expect much

What makes property dualism worth the evil of being open-ended confusion?
— frank

I have no idea — Kenosha Kid

On which:

I'm not arguing against dualism per se, only against SD and thereby not undermining PD at all, especially as the latter is only epistemic whereas the former – your (Descartes') position – is extravagantly ontic. (Occam's, anyone?)

Anyone able to provide some commentary on this? Nothing in Hanover's argument suggests he's attacking an epistemic position and defending an ontological one.

As Searle said, the man on the street is a Cartesian. — frank

I guess if this was The Vox Pop Forum, that might be worth a damn :rofl:

What's the draw of property dualism? It takes a tiny bit of philomind to answer that. Last time I talked to 180 he came up pretty short in that area, so I don't expect much — frank

Ah, so I'm guessing don't hold my breath re: my previous post.

But that's an idealist argument, no? Not dualist. — Kenosha Kid

Not to my mind. It is dualist in that it postulates the existence of minds and bodies as two different things, provides a possible reason why bodies might have developed minds through evolution (because minds are needed, they do something that cannot be done without them) and describes a realistic relationship between bodies and minds.

I guess if this was The Vox Pop — Kenosha Kid

What's a vox pop?

Not to my mind. It is dualist in that it postulates the existence of minds and bodies as two different things, provides a possible reason why bodies might have developed minds through evolution (because minds are needed, they do something that cannot be done without them) and describes a realistic relationship between bodies and minds. — Olivier5

Now that sounds like physicalist :groan:

What's a vox pop? — frank

Vox populi

Why not 2 types of stuff. Stuff and the information about stuff. Pretty much how Fedex sees the world. And they seem to navigate it well.

Sigh.

Now that sounds like physicalist — Kenosha Kid

Why yes, science is based on a dualist framework (empiricism + rationalism), so a logical form of scientism or physicalism would include the mind as the central place where science happens.

Yet again another debate going nowhere.

Mainly because 180 is overemotional and dogmatic,and doesn't engage with any charity.

To be Frank,substance dualism is unassailable and self evident.

There is life and there is matter. They mix but neither can be derived from the other.

Confusion results from suggesting the mind is non physical...Of course mind is physical. Mind is desire,and desire is physical. But not everything physical is inorganic material.

Next time any materialists see a block of steel desire a sandwich call me...

What a shit 'debate'

I don't think it's necessary to invent a new material to explain why people think and trees don't in a complex sense. Remove a person's brain and their opinions will follow it. How the brain or tree is arranged is an emergent aspect, but they are both just carbon persisting.

Why not 2 types of stuff. Stuff and the information about stuff. — Cheshire

Information _about_ stuff? Because all information about any system is in the system. Any copies of the system's information are, at best, just that -- copies -- at worst, erroneous, and typically incomplete. This is why simulation theory fails for me: the most efficient way to simulate a universe is to build it.

This goes for the mind too. All the information about the brain is in the brain, but not all in the mind. The weird thing is, rather than make us doubt, this actually convinces us of things that truth be told we should really doubt.

Why yes, science is based on a dualist framework (empiricism + rationalism), so a logical form of scientism or physicalism would include the mind as the central place where science happens. — Olivier5

Does it happen in the mind, though? Yes, I see the results of the experiment or work out the theory. But that's not science yet. I need to get people to agree with it, ideally reproduce it, force me to defend it, in which case I'm dealing directly with objects not minds (although minds are the best explanation for those particular objects' behaviours).

Yeah, I didn't expect you to follow through. Patterns emerge... I am genuinely interested though, should you have a eureka moment.

Does it happen in the mind, though? Yes, I see the results of the experiment or work out the theory. But that's not science yet. I need to get people to agree with it, ideally reproduce it, force me to defend it, in which case I'm dealing directly with objects not minds (although minds are the best explanation for those particular objects' behaviours). — Kenosha Kid

Exactly. The validation you seek is from other minds. Science is fundamentally dualist, it's always about minds understanding matter. And it has been very successful at doing that. It's only philosophers (or scientists who try and play philosophers, sometimes) who try to imagine an alternative, without much success so far.

The validation you seek is from other minds. — Olivier5

But I don't have access to other minds. I have access to their physical effects.

Information _about_ stuff? Because all information about any system is in the system. Any copies of the system's information are, at best, just that -- copies -- at worst, erroneous, and typically incomplete. This is why simulation theory fails for me: the most efficient way to simulate a universe is to build it. — Kenosha Kid

I'm not a fan of simulation theory because it has a built in infinite regression. But, suppose you wanted to build it; you would have to have some way of informing matter how it is to be arranged. Supposedly we could vaporize an object and the information about what it was remains.

I don't understand it but supposedly the Higgs tells matter what it's mass is supposed to be.

So what? You operate (at least as a default position) under the assumption that other scientists don't lie to you about this, when they say that, e.g. they ran the math again and it doesn't work. You infer that the guy saying that did some actual thinking and reports truthfully about the result of said thinking.