Until the diverse preachers indoctrinators proselytizers chill out, they should expect others asking them to justify their claims. In case they impose their faiths on others, politics, have their faiths interfere in other peoples' lives, whatever social matters, etc, then they should expect all the more. (Incidentally, Leviticus 20:13 came up recently elsewhere; responses varied.) — jorndoe

I do agree with you here, but don't see this as peculiar to religion and it's not a dispute over theology. You're talking about the violation of others imposing their beliefs on you and your taking reasonable efforts to protect yourself from ideas you disagree with.

You also have to be sensitive to stereotyping by assuming that those who wear the theistic label are in favor of proselytizing and force feeding their beliefs on others. If you're not, you will inevitably attack a theist who was content leaving you alone and will just see you as some irrationally angry atheist with some odd bone to pick.

I get that bad apples exist in both baskets.

I did mean to come back to this, even though it will probably, on experience, meet with a mouthful of abuse rather than anything useful.

(it is circular) — Bartricks

No, it's a modus tollens reductio. That god is necessary is inconsistent with that we can specify a possible world without god. It shows we can have a necessary being or we are able to specify a possible world without some given individual, but not both.

God is not a necessary being. — Bartricks

Well, yes; that's rather the point.

the law of non-contradiction is contingently true — Bartricks

If it were so, there would be a possible world in which for some proposition A, (A & ~A) however (A & ~A)⊃B; that is, denying the law of non-contradiction leads to every and any proposition being true.

Now you have made this point several times, and I've countered it several times. The logic you have chosen here lads to the end of conversation.

Which is why for the most part I ignore what you have to say.

Anyway, have you a way of saving yourself from this?

Could there be a possible world which is made of no necessary thing? A world that lacks any necessary thing? Or is it required for a possible world to have at least one necessary thing to be a possible world?

Edit Could there be a possible world in which the quality of "necessary" does not exist (as part of such world)?

Yep; that's the question, which have passed on to those with a bit more understanding of formal logic than I. See A question concerning formal modal logic.

I maintain that the suggestion that there is a being who must exist in every possible word - a necessary being - undermines modal logic. But that is indeed the point of contention here.

Could there be a possible world which is made of no necessary thing? A world that lacks any necessary thing? — Daniel

The actual world.

Or is it required for a possible world to have at least one necessary thing to be a possible world?

As an actualist, I can only refer to a possibilist, or 'possible worlds semanticist' (e.g. Kripke, Lewis ... @Banno(?))

Wouldn't possibility entail necessity? it is necessary that the conditions which make a world "possible" exist (or will exist) for such world to be a possible world. A world cannot be possible if the conditions on which its "possibility" rests are not (or will never be) existent*.

That is: the proposition "A possible world is a possible world if and only if it contains (depends on) at least one necessary thing"** is true.

This does not mean that god is a requirement for possible worlds since each possible world could have a different necessary thing. The quality of necessity would be what's common among all possible worlds.

* for a possible world to exist, it must be possible (now or in the future).
** (the necessary thing being that which gives the possible world its quality of "possible")

Can I imagineer a solar system without a sun and then assert one possibly exists based on this reasoning?

A statement is possible if it is true in some possible world; but all this means is that we could posit a world in which the statement is true.

So "Donovan might never have gone into music" posits a possible world in which Donovan did not become a musician. We might then proceed to look at the consequences of this - Mellow Yellow might never have been written, or been written by someone else, and so on.

But there is no possible world in which 1+2=4; in every possible world our number still add up. It's not possible that it not be true that 1+2=3; hence 1+2=3 is necessarily true.

So a proposition is possible if it is true in at least one possible world, and necessary if it is true in all possible worlds.

Does possibility entail necessity? Well, Possibly P entail not necessarily not P; that's just the definition of possibility and necessity given above. So yes, possibly P entails not necessarily not P.

Could there be a possible world in which the quality of "necessary" does not exist (as part of such world)? — Daniel

The question is ill-formed, since necessarily P means that P is true in all possible world; in effect you seem to be asking if a thing that is true in all possible worlds might be false in some possible world, and that's clearly not going to happen.

...each possible world could have a different necessary thing. — Daniel

But if some thing were necessary, then by definition that means it exists in every possible world. If it is necessary in one possible world, it is necessary in them all. So something could not be necessary in one possible world and not in them all.

All this is just setting out the notion of possibility and necessity in a way that leads to consistent conversations - a semantics of possibility and necessity built form talking in terms of possible worlds. There might be other ways that this could be done, but the best semantics we have for modal logic is possible world semantics. SO if someone wants to reject possible world semantics, they might only do so by presenting an alternative that is of more use.

that's the best way to think about possible worlds... as conjectures.

I did mean to come back to this, even though it will probably, on experience, meet with a mouthful of abuse rather than anything useful. — Banno

Yes, but only once you start trying to abuse me rather than addressing my arguments, then I will abuse you back and abuse you better. I'm almost certain that'll happen....but let's see, it's entirely up to you.

No, it's a modus tollens reductio. That god is necessary is inconsistent with that we can specify a possible world without god. It shows we can have a necessary being or we are able to specify a possible world without some given individual, but not both. — Banno

I explained why it is circular and you have said nothing at all to address my point. So I will just say it again and you can put whatever Latin label you want on it, just so long as you address it. How about that?

To say that a person exists in all possible worlds 'just is' to say that they exist of necessity. Possible worlds talk is just a way of trying to talk about necessity and contingency. That's what it was designed to do.

So, if you assert that God does not exist in some possible worlds, then all you have done is say "God does not exist of necessity". Yet that is what you are seeking to conclude. So it is really no different from this argument:

1. Fromage exists
2. Fromage means Cheese
3. Therefore Cheese exists

1. God does not exist in some possible worlds
2. If something does not exist in some possible worlds that means it does not exist of necessity
3. Therefore God does not exist of necessity.

True, but just pointless.

To be non-circular you'd need to extract your conclusion - that God does not exist in some possible worlds a.k.a. God does not exist of necessity - from some premises that do not assert it.

I then kindly suggested a way - it is conceivable that God does not exist.

If something is conceivable, it is metaphysically possible (that is, there is a possible world in which it is the case).

Thus, there is a possible world in which God does not exist. That is, God's existence is not necessary.

That's not an especially strong argument, as its second premise is dubious. But it is at least not circular.

Note - I am a theist who thinks God exists contingently. And I have a good, non question begging argument for that conclusion. God can do anything, including destroy himself. This he exists contingently. That's a good argument for your conclusion. It also shows it to be a straw man.

As for the law of non contradiction and its contingent status - I do not understand what your problem is. Genuinely. It is true. That is, I think it is true. Not false. True. I just don't think it is necessarily true. I don't even know what it means to say something is 'necessarily' true. I am a sceptic about necessity.

But anyway, I believe the law of non contradiction is true. You think I think it is false, yes? I don't. I think it is true. Show me how I have contradicted myself 'without' helping yourself to the notion of necessity. (For note, I do not believe the law of non contradiction is necessarily true because and only because I don't think there are any necessary truths - I think necessity doesn't exist).

Incidentally, if Graham Priest was on this site, I assume you wouldn't debate him either? He's worse than me. He thinks the law of non contradiction is actually false. At least I think it is actually true (although I am open to persuasion - I wouldn't dismiss what priest says, not at all)

↪Cheshire that's the best way to think about possible worlds... as conjectures. — Banno

Shooting from the hip here; but do you end up proving the negative as a result. There is now a necessary rule about God's lack of necessity that must be false in one instance. Don't bother reading that twice. Thanks for the response, I'll mull it over.

Yes, but only once you start trying to abuse me rather than addressing my arguments, then I will abuse you back and abuse you better. I'm almost certain that'll happen....but let's see, it's entirely up to you. — Bartricks

Yep:

Do move aside, amateur! — Bartricks

let's crucify your opening argument: — Bartricks

the argument is shit — Bartricks

I admit to hitting you back first.

And I will ignore your reply to this post. Just not interested.

To Which we ca now add:

More squiggles and squoggles. You love your latin and your squoggles, don't you? — Bartricks

Maybe you should learn English 'before' you start squiggling and squoggling. — Bartricks

And here we go.
You ARE an amateur. That's not an insult, it is accurate.
The others were addressed to your argument, not you. Your argument IS shit. You are not your argument.
This is the problem: if I tear your arguments into bits, you think I am attacking YOU - yes? I am not. I am attacking your position.

Now, take a breath and address my criticisms and stop trying to goad. Address the argument. Call it shit if you want, but at least have the decency to explain its shitness as I did yours. Good luck.

And I will ignore your reply to this post. Just not interested. — Banno

Then why did you make it? Just goading, yes? You're not remotely interested in addressing anything of substance that I have said. I assume because you can't.

Now, once more: your argument is circular. You can put a latin name on it if you want. But I am accusing it of being circular, and I explained its circularity.

Your argument is also attacking a straw man, as the credibility of theism in no way depends upon God being a necessary existent. (Theism is true if God exists; he doesn't have to exist of necessity - just plain old vanilla existence will be enough).

I am a theist, and I think God exists contingently. I think that any theist who thinks God exists of necessity, believes a contradiction. That is, they believe there exists a being who can do anything, but also cannot do some things. That's an actual contradiction. And I don't think contradictions are true, because I believe the law of non-contradiction - which says just that - is true. True, not false.

God exists contingently because God can do anything and thus God can destroy himself. Thus God exists contingently. And so does everything else. And every true proposition is true contingently as well, as God can do anything and thus can make any true proposition false if he so wishes.

Thus, there is no such thing as necessity. Which is good, as philosophers don't know what it is anyway.

Thus, the law of non contradiction, though true, is not necessarily true.

I explained why it is circular and you have said nothing at all to address my point — Bartricks

No, you claimed it's circular. You did not point out a circularity. Now you engage in the rhetorical strategy of claiming to have presented an argument previously, an argument which is not there. YOu've done this on several occasions before, in previous discussions we have had.

In a circular argument the conclusion is taken as an assumption. In my argument there are two assumptions, that god is necessary and that there are possible worlds in which god does not exist. The point is to set out that these are incompatible, not that one or other is true. Hence the link back to 's post that set the ball in motion - post three in this thread.

You've misread the argument. Not a big problem.

As for the law of non contradiction and its contingent status - I do not understand what your problem is. Genuinely. It is true. That is, I think it is true. Not false. True. I just don't think it is necessarily true. I don't even know what it means to say something is 'necessarily' true. I am a sceptic about necessity. — Bartricks

Yeah, asserting a contradiction is not a very strong argument, even if you assert it three times.

But anyway, I believe the law of non contradiction is true. You think I think it is false, yes? — Bartricks

No, I, along with almost everyone else I have met except you, think it is a necessary truth. Just like 1+1=2 is a necessary truth. And by necessary I mean it is true in every possible world.

Here is the argument I presented in defence of that view:

If it were so, there would be a possible world in which for some proposition A, (A & ~A) however (A & ~A)⊃B; that is, denying the law of non-contradiction leads to every and any proposition being true. — Banno

Show me how I have contradicted myself ' — Bartricks

Ok, let's assume you are right that the law of non contradiction is contingent. Something is contingent if and only if it is false in some possible world. The law of noncontradiction is "~(A& ~A)"; So in some possible world, ~~(A & ~A); that is, A & ~A. A contradiction. SO if the law of noncontradiction is not necessary, then a contradiction ensues. You assert that the law of noncontradiction is not necessary; hence, you assert a contradiction. You have contradicted yourself.
Cheers.

No, you claimed it's circular. You did not point out a circularity. Now you engage in the rhetorical strategy of claiming to have presented an argument previously, an argument which is not there. YOu've done this on several occasions before, in previous discussions we have had. — Banno

No, I argued it. Here:

Now for your next line: There is a possible world in which god does not exist. That's no different from saying that God does not exist with necessity. That is, you are not inferring from it that God does not exist with necessity. You are just stating it in other words. To say that God does not exist in a possible world is one and the same as saying that God does not exist with necessity. And that's also your conclusion. Thus your argument is circular. You've said "God does not exist with necessity.....therefore God does not exist with necessity'. — Bartricks

And above, here:

To say that a person exists in all possible worlds 'just is' to say that they exist of necessity. Possible worlds talk is just a way of trying to talk about necessity and contingency. That's what it was designed to do.

So, if you assert that God does not exist in some possible worlds, then all you have done is say "God does not exist of necessity". Yet that is what you are seeking to conclude. So it is really no different from this argument:

1. Fromage exists
2. Fromage means Cheese
3. Therefore Cheese exists

1. God does not exist in some possible worlds
2. If something does not exist in some possible worlds that means it does not exist of necessity
3. Therefore God does not exist of necessity.

True, but just pointless.

To be non-circular you'd need to extract your conclusion - that God does not exist in some possible worlds a.k.a. God does not exist of necessity - from some premises that do not assert it. — Bartricks

Now, address that argument.

Yeah, asserting a contradiction is not a very strong argument, even if you assert it three times — Banno

Where do I assert a contradiction, Banno? Highlight it.

No, I, along with almost everyone else I have met except you, think is a necessary truth. — Banno

So? Get out more. I think it isn't a necessary truth. But I think it is true. You think I think it is false, yes? Can you just confirm that for me - are you saying that I think the law of non-contradiction is false? Because that's false. I think it is true.

SO if the law of noncontradiction is not necessary, then a contradiction ensues. You assert that the law of noncontradiction is not necessary; hence, you assert a contradiction. You have contradicted yourself. — Banno

How does an actual contradiction ensue? I think it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false. I think it is actually true. How is there a contradiction there? I don't think it is true and false. I think it is true. Capable of being false. But actually true.

Again: I think that if a proposition is actually true, then it is not also actually false.

But I think it is possible for a proposition to be true and also false.

I just don't think any are.

I think all actually true propositions are not also actually false.

Where is the contradiction?

Where do I assert a contradiction, Banno? Highlight it. — Bartricks

Ok, I bolded it, back in the thread where I showed it.

. You think I think it is false, yes? — Bartricks

No, as I said here:

But anyway, I believe the law of non contradiction is true. You think I think it is false, yes?
— Bartricks

No, I, along with almost everyone else I have met except you, think it is a necessary truth. Just like 1+1=2 is a necessary truth. And by necessary I mean it is true in every possible world. — Banno

"I... think it a necessary truth."

I see you put what you consider to be the relevant part in bold, as if that will somehow affect things.

SO if the law of noncontradiction is not necessary, then a contradiction ensues. You assert that the law of noncontradiction is not necessary; hence, you assert a contradiction. You have contradicted yourself. — Banno

How? I don't follow you. Don't use symbols, I don't know what they mean. Explain in words (if you can't, you shouldn't be using symbols).

I know - I'll explain myself in bold.

If a proposition is true, it is not also false. That's the law of non-contradiction, right? It tells us how things are in actuality - in actuality, no true proposition is also false. Now I believe that's true. And thus not also false. Just true. Now, I also think that it is possible - metaphysically possible - for this proposition "If a proposition is true, it is not also false" to be false. Which is another way of saying that I think the law of non-contradiction is contingent, not necessary. But I don't think it is false. I think it is true. Where - where - have I contradicted myself? Don't just tell me that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth. That's precisely what is in dispute. Show me where I contradict myself. Again: "no true proposition is also false" I think that's true. I don't think it is necessarily true. I think it is true. Now show me how my thinking it is true rather than necessarily true involves me in a contradiction.

Hmm. Perhaps this will help:

Bartricks has contradicted himself if he makes an assertion that implies a contradiction.

Bartricks asserts that the law of noncontradiction is not necessarily true.

The law of noncontradiction is ~(A & ~A).

If ~(A & ~A) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, (A & ~A)

(A & ~A) is a contradiction.

Bartricks makes an assertion that implies a contradiction

Bartricks contradicts himself.

QED.

Replace the symbols with words. I don't know what they mean.

Bartricks has contradicted himself if he makes an assertion that implies a contradiction.

Bartricks asserts that the law of noncontradiction is not necessarily true. — Banno

Yes, certainly those claims are true. Although I can actually demonstrate that it is not necessarily true. But here I am asserting it.

The law of noncontradiction is ~(A & ~A).

If ~(A & ~A) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, (A & ~A)

(A & ~A) is a contradiction. — Banno

Squiggle squoggle squiggle squoggle - Bartricks has contradicted himself. Nah, having trouble with that.

No more squiggling and squoggling please: explain how I have contradicted myself.

Replace the symbols with words. I don't know what they mean. — Bartricks

Really? But you claim to be familiar - even expert - at logic.

"A" is any proposition.

"~" is "not"

Brackets are...well, indications of scope...

So

The law of noncontradiction is: not(any proposition and not that proposition)

If not(any proposition and not that proposition) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, both any proposition and it's negation are true.

That a proposition and its negation are true is by definition a contradiction.

Although I can actually demonstrate that it is not necessarily true. — Bartricks

Well, go on, do so.

Quit the rambling, .

Someone (a few) declared that God is a necessary being. And that's what the thread is about. If you come up with some different definition then that's not what the thread is about. *shrug*

Inability to come up with a self-consistent (possible) world without any given being (or mind or whatever) is an argument from incredulity. You see Yahweh or life or Bartricks in R³ or Q³?

Anyway, ramblery and wasting time go hand-in-hand, over and out.

Oh shut up. I have addressed the topic of this thread and I am answering questions someone is putting to me. If you don't like it, use that thing called 'your will' and stop reading me. Christ.

If not(any proposition and not that proposition) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, any proposition and not that proposition. — Banno

Oops. You put that word 'necessary' in there. That's question begging. Without - without - assuming that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth - for that's what's at issue - show me that I am contradicting myself when I say that in reality no proposition that is true is also false. But that it is metaphysically possible for there to be propositions that are true and also false. Show how I am actually contradicting myself. You haven't done that. As suspected, the symbols disguised an assumption of necessity (or at least, the argument would need to make one to get to the conclusion that I have contradicted myself).

Really? But you claim to be familiar - even expert - at logic. — Banno

No, I've never claimed expertise in that area. It's an embarrassing lacuna in my knowledge, though it is one that has in no way hampered me. So, despite not knowing what the symbols mean, I'm very good at spotting a valid argument.

That's question begging. — Bartricks

I don't see how. Again, it's in the nature of reductio arguments to assume what is in contention and then derive a contradiction from that assumption. that's what I have done here. Assume Bart is right, and noncontradiction is not necessary. Then in some possible word, contradictions ensue. Hence, the assumption is false.

If what's at issue is whether the law of non-contradiction is necessary or contingent, then you beg the question if you assume it is a necessary truth for the purposes of demonstrating it to be.
What you need to do, to avoid begging the question, is assume it is a contingent truth and show that 'that' leads to an actual contradiction. Then you'll have shown me to be contradicting myself. But if you have to assume it is a necessary truth, then all you've shown is that I am contradicting you. Which isn't in dispute - I know I am contradicting you. You need to show me to be contradicting myself. So, for the purposes of a reductio, assume the law of non-contradiction is contingent and derive from it a contradiction.

Incidentally, if Graham Priest was on this site, I assume you wouldn't debate him either? — Bartricks

Oh, what an opportunity that would be. Yes, I'd love to discuss dialethism with him.

But as I understand it, you are asserting that the law of noncontradiction is true but contingent, while Priest takes it to be false.