What you mean by “organizing principles” is what I meant by “structure” and “pattern” — khaled

I would agree, with the caveat that these structures and patterns are not material. Rather, they show up as patterns and structures in material forms, but they are logically prior to material form. They are what 'informs' matter. I think in some schools of traditional philosophy, this is known as the 'formal realm', that being the domain of forms, regularities and principles. It was that domain which Plato had intuitive insight into. (I haven't been able to track down the reference to the 'formal realm', however.)

Some people suppose that things that aren't physical exist, — Pfhorrest

It's more that 'ideas' in the above sense are real, in that they provide the bounding principles for thought, and also for phenomena, in that they manifest as principles. But they're not physical - they exist as bounds, limits, principles, and regularities. That's how I interpret the meaning of universals.

What you interpret as 'what exists', is always that which can be made an object - which is why you think of it as 'stuff'. What I'm referring to here, is the structure of thought, and also the structure of reality. But you won't find that understanding in modern science, because of the influence of nominalism.

That's the form-substance distinction again, which as stated already is not something anybody is denying: — Pfhorrest

Well then we agree. I see this distinction as fundamentally dualistic. I note that you have not even tried to express the map-territory relation in monist language.

I also note you sport yourself as a panpsychic, which I take as being the dualist view where tables have thoughts (but no sex, for some odd reason).

What are we seeing, when we say that 'this equals that' or 'this means that'? We take for granted this ability, but really it is at the foundation of rationality, it is an awesome power. — Wayfarer

I agree. Any comparison between two objects involves abstraction, ie thinking of pure forms (seeing the form as independent of its material substrate). And we certainly have this capacity to think in abstract forms, such as in mathematics. But from there, it does not follow (I think) that pure abstract forms exist elsewhere than as hypotheses in our mind. (which is a form of existence)

Not sure what difference it makes in practice, to hypothetise the existence of pure forms outside of minds. What do you see as the methodological or conceptual advantage? How does it help you think?

What type of word is 'New York'?

I would agree, with the caveat that these structures and patterns are not material. — Wayfarer

But they are structures of material stuff. Always. So in the end the number of "kinds of stuff" that exist is still 1.

Sure we can talk of the structures without there being any material thing that takes on that structure (we can talk of triangles even if no triangular objects exist), but even there, all that exists is matter, and forms of matter. Not matter and another substance.

But they're not physical - they exist as bounds, limits, principles, and regularities. — Wayfarer

The structures are not material, in the sense that they don't have any mass (triangle, the idea, has no mass, but a dorito has mass). But usually when we talk of the structures of physical stuff we call those "physical" too. Like sound waves. We call sound waves physical, even though a wave is just a pattern of air, and a pattern has no mass.

In any case, the disagreement seems to be on whether or not to call structures physical or non physical. Not actually on what exists. Which is matter and its structures.

A toponym.

And how many words are there on that page (binomials, in fact - it would have been easier had you chosen Boston)?

But they are structures of material stuff. Always. So in the end the number of "kinds of stuff" that exist is still 1. — khaled

Material stuff which could not exist without those forms. So they’re prior to matter, and they’re not physical in nature. They don’t have to exist - things do the hard work of existing - but things depend on them for existence.

It's the same toponym, composed of two words, and written down in a variety of fonts.

If I call: "Isaac! Isaac!" I haven't called two persons, or two different names, just one name repeated twice.

Asserting it doesn't constitute an argument. You agreed that the word (binomial) 'New York' is a name. There are seven such words on that page so it follows that there are seven names on that page also. Nowhere is it given that there is one of anything on that page, that's the case you want to make, but instead of arguing for it you keep resorting to simply asserting it.

You agreed that the word (binomial) 'New York's is a name. There are seven such words on that page so it follows that there are seven names on that page also — Isaac

You are using confused concepts.

"New York" is a place name composed of two words: the word "New" and the word "York".

There are 14 words written on that page, 7 instances of "New" and 7 instances of "York". So there are 7 instances of the name "New York" on the page. Not 7 different names. The city of New York doesn't have one name in Cherif and another in Sans Cherif and another in Gothic and another in Arial. It is one name for one city.

The point is that a single concept such as "New York" can be written several times on a page, in many different ways. Likewise, I suspect that the same concept can be written on neurons in many different ways.

"New York" is a place name composed of two words: the word "New" and the word "York". — Olivier5

That's what a binomial is. I labelled it as such a few posts ago. It's irrelevant to the issue. Had you chosen Boston, we could have simply used 'word'.

there are 7 instances of the name "New York" on the page. Not 7 different names. — Olivier5

You're just asserting again. Do you understand the concept of making a case? I already know what you think, you've made that quite clear already. There's a unity called 'the name'. I want to know why you think that, not just twenty different ways of telling me that you think that.

What you interpret as 'what exists', is always that which can be made an object - which is why you think of it as 'stuff'. — Wayfarer

If what you're talking about is not 'what exists', 'objects', 'stuff', etc, then what you're saying is not in disagreement with anything I'm saying. I'm only talking about what kind of things, stuff, objects, etc, exist. There can be forms, patterns, organizations, structures, etc, to those things, objects, that stuff, etc, that exists; and in that sense, those forms, patterns, organizations, structures exist too, but not as different kind of things, objects, or stuff, just as forms, patterns, etc, of that one kind of stuff.

And when you really get down to my own view on things, in an important sense there isn't really any "stuff" at all; there is only form, only structure, and in saying that there's "only one kind of stuff" I'm really saying that all forms and structures are in principle trans-formable into each other; all of the apparent different "kinds of stuff" are just different forms of the same one kind of stuff, at which point there's not really any point in talking about "kinds of stuff" anymore, just about forms. The only point of talking about kinds of stuff is to discuss whether or not (stuff or things or objects or whatever of) one form can be trans-formed into (whatever of) a different form, e.g. can a bunch of quarks and electrons etc get transformed somehow over billions of years into a thinking experiencing human being, or not? If changing the form can't get you from one kind of whatever to another kind of whatever, then it's implied that there's something besides form "underlying", or "sub-standing" if you will, the difference between the whatevers; some sort of different kinds of sub-stance. If there's only one kind of substance, we needn't ever talk about it, as in...

I note that you have not even tried to express the map-territory relation in monist language. — Olivier5

I expressed the map-territory relationship in a way that didn't require talking about different kinds of substances or properties, which is thus completely compatible with ontological monism. There isn't any specifically "monist language": monist language is just ordinary language.

I also note you sport yourself as a panpsychic, which I take as being the dualist view where tables have thoughts — Olivier5

Panpsychism as I formulate it is not dualist in the ontological sense under discussion here. There's not different kinds of stuff or things, nor even different kinds of properties (like mental and material) of the same kind of stuff or things.

There's just two perspectives to take on any thing interacting with any other thing: as the thing being experienced, the object, or as the thing doing the experiencing, the subject; which on my account is identical with the thing doing something (every experiential property of a thing is just a propensity of that thing to do certain behaviors when interacted with in certain ways), or the thing being done-unto (every experience of something else is just that something else doing some behavior to you). Every thing can both do, and be done unto; and so can both be experienced, or experience.

But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be. Panpsychism like this -- the view that everything always has that je ne sais qua that a philosophical zombie is supposed to lack -- is just the only remaining option after you rule out the options that either (1) no such thing as consciousness in that sense actually exists, and (2) some kind of fundamentally irreducible magic makes it come fully into being for certain things but not at all for others, rather than just taking different forms in some things than others.

I expect you might want to call that a "dualist view", but not every distinction between two facets or aspects or whatever (like form and substance) constitutes a kind of "dualism".

I already know what you think, you've made that quite clear already. — Isaac

Alrighty, tell me what you think then. Are you saying that the city of New York has many different names?

Material stuff which could not exist without those forms. — Wayfarer

Sure.

So they’re prior to matter — Wayfarer

I don't know what "prior" means here. Are we talking about a timeline? I don't think it makes sense to ask when "triangle", the structure, started existing for it to be prior to any triangular object.

and they’re not physical in nature. — Wayfarer

Again, we call sound waves physical even though sound waves are a pattern of air and patterns don't have mass. Again, seems to me the disagreement is mainly whether or not to call these structures physical, not actually a disagreement over their nature.

They don’t have to exist - things do the hard work of existing - but things depend on them for existence. — Wayfarer

Sure.

So, they don't exist as a substance (holder of properties), and things do the hard work of existing as substances, while conforming to certain structures. I would call that physicalism. Considering it includes one substance (physical stuff) conforming to certain structures (which are not a separate substance)

I expect you might want to call that a "dualist view", but not every distinction between two facets or aspects or whatever (like form and substance) constitutes a kind of "dualism". — Pfhorrest

:up:

Thanks for the cheerleading, Proof. Much appreciated.

Alrighty, tell me what you think then. Are you saying that the city of New York has many different names? — Olivier5

I've already given my account. We commonly say that 'New York' has one name, but it is a façon de parler, what we really have is multidudinous instances all of which are similar enough for our purposes. No additional entities required. I'm an Occham's razor kind of guy when it comes to ontology. I don't like to bring things into existence that don't seem necessary. The words (concepts, forms, ideals...whatever) as written, or in each individual mind seem to necessarily exist. There are seven of them on that page you posted. I don't see why a new entity, the unity 'the name's needs to be reified. It's sufficient that the seven necessary objects are similar.

But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be. — Pfhorrest

That is a rather strange definition of "experience", as equal to the difference between a real entity and a fictional one.

How does that definition apply to panpsychic tables? Let me guess:

The table's experience is whatever the supposed difference between a real table and a fully functional replica of a table who is "not actually conscious" (a zombie table) is supposed to be.

Now that makes a lot of sense...

We commonly say that 'New York' has one name, but it is a façon de parler, what we really have is multidudinous instances all of which are similar enough for our purposes. — Isaac

We commonly say so because if we didn't, if we thought that New York has many different names that all share enough similarity, then our life would be far more complicated. We would have to define the boundaries of that similitude. Because we CAN recognised the same name New York written in seven different fonts on that pic I posted. So we would need another explanation of our recognizing New York than the common sense one (=it's the same mental concepts or "ideal mental forms", e.g. letters / words / name but simply written in different fonts, tweaking the shapes of the graphic symbols in a purely aesthetic manner, for the fun or beauty of it).

Now what would such a rival explanation be? Where would the boundaries of the "New York" similitude lie? What would it take for a scribble on a page to NOT be recognised as meaning "New York"?

if we thought that New York has many different names that all share enough similarity, then our life would be far more complicated. — Olivier5

Why?

We would have to define the boundaries of that similitude. — Olivier5

Why? We don't have to define the boundaries of similitude to understand "stand roughly here", nor do we doubt that high stakes poker is excluded from the definition of 'game' when instructed to "play a 'game' with the children".

We deal quite easily with nouns and names whose definitional boundaries are fuzzy at the edges.

we CAN recognised the same name New York written in seven different fonts on that pic I posted. So we would need another explanation of our recognizing New York than the common sense one — Olivier5

Labelling your own preferred position as 'the common sense one' is a cheap trick. We're talking about ontology here, there's no common sense account at all.

Where would the boundaries of the "New York" similitude lie? What would it take for a scribble on a page to NOT be recognised as meaning "New York"? — Olivier5

Are you suggesting that there exist no ambiguous cases? That there's no scribble I could make where some might read it as saying 'New York' and others might not? We do not need to define the boundaries of similitude. Core cases are used most of the time, edge cases are either ignored or simply remain ambiguous, unresolved. It's not an apocalyptic problem that some scribbles can only be ambiguousmy deciphered.

the common sense one (=it's the same mental concepts or "ideal mental forms", e.g. letters / words / name but simply written in different fonts, — Olivier5

A more complex and complete theory of typefaces and fonts exist, than the "common sense" one. A little detour via Wikipedia will convince you of that:

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Font

In metal typesetting, a font was a particular size, weight and style of a typeface. Each font was a matched set of type, with a piece (a "sort") for each glyph, and a typeface consisting of a range of fonts that shared an overall design.

In modern usage, with the advent of desktop publishing, "font" has come to be used as a synonym for "typeface" although a typical typeface (or 'font family') consists of a number of fonts.

For instance, the typeface "Bauer Bodoni" includes fonts "Regular", "Bold", "Italic" and Italic Bold and each of these exists in a variety of sizes. The term "font" is correctly applied to any one of these alone but may be seen used loosely to refer to the whole typeface. When used in computers, each style is in a separate digital "font file".

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Typeface
"Font family" redirects here.

A typeface is the design of lettering[1] that can include variations in size, weight (e.g. bold), slope (e.g. italic), width (e.g. condensed), and so on. Each of these variations of the typeface is a font.

There are thousands of different typefaces in existence, with new ones being developed constantly.

The art and craft of designing typefaces is called type design. Designers of typefaces are called type designers and are often employed by type foundries. In digital typography, type designers are sometimes also called font developers or font designers.

Every typeface is a collection of glyphs, each of which represents an individual letter, number, punctuation mark, or other symbol. The same glyph may be used for characters from different scripts, e.g. Roman uppercase A looks the same as Cyrillic uppercase А and Greek uppercase alpha. There are typefaces tailored for special applications, such as cartography, astrology or mathematics.

Nothing in that demonstrates a 'common sense' notion of reifying ideal mental forms, so I'm baffled as to why you went to the trouble. As if anything I wrote suggested I was oblivious to the idea that fonts exist.

Why? We don't have to define the boundaries of similitude to understand "stand roughly here", — Isaac

Actually we do, if we care to be understood we need to express ourselves clearly, and this means abiding to certain theoretical or practiced rules. What you write must be readable.

Labelling your own preferred position as 'the common sense one' is a cheap trick. We're talking about ontology here, there's no common sense account at all. — Isaac

I have addressed that in quoting Wikipedia above. There's a full blown typographic theory out there that underpins all modern written communications.

Are you suggesting that there exist no ambiguous cases? That there's no scribble I could make where some might read it as saying 'New York' and others might not? — Isaac

No. I am suggesting a test to your theory: a test on which it fails. It is not practical, it doesn't tell you how to write New York so that the reader understands New York. We cannot use it to think and express ourselves simply and clearly about typography and writing. Your similitude is empty blah, with no clear pragmatic application in the art of writing.

if we care to be understood we need to express ourselves clearly, and this means abiding to certain theoretical or practiced rules. — Olivier5

You've not answered the challenge that similitude gives sufficient clarity to be understood.

There's a full blown typographic theory out there that underpins all modern written communications. — Olivier5

So? Nothing in there mentions anything about reifying ideal forms.

It is not practical, it doesn't tell you how to write New York so that the reader understands New York. We cannot use it to think and express ourselves simply and clearly about typography and writing. — Olivier5

You've given no account of this failure.

Many fonts can be read as 'N' because they're all similar in ways close enough for the purpose.

In what way does that fail to explain fonts?

You've not answered the challenge that similitude gives sufficient clarity to be understood. — Isaac

You have not said what similitude means. It's a rather vague concept. W is similar to M but they are not the same letter.

Many fonts can be read as 'N' because they're all similar in ways close enough for the purpose. — Isaac

What is 'N' standing for in this sentence, if not the idea of the one and only letter 'N'?

Thanks for the cheerleading, Proof. Much appreciated. — Olivier5

I do really appreciate it, as I've been feeling rather unappreciated elsewhere in philosophy and life lately.

That is a rather strange definition of "experience", as equal to the difference between a real entity and a fictional one. — Olivier5

I'm not the one who started talking about that concept; look at Chalmers or Block for blame on that (though it certainly goes back even further than them).

I think the obvious answer to the question "even if you arranged some non-living matter into the exact form and function of a real human being, such that it walked around and talked and lived life like a real human, and even reported on mental states it supposedly had, might there still be something missing that's not accounted for just by the functionality?" is "basically no".

But other people say "yes". Those are the real dualists.

Some people say "I suppose there could be in concept, but there never would be, because..." and then give different reasons:

- either that even real humans don't have that whatever-else, that "phenomenal consciousness" or "first-person experience",

- or that some kind of magic always happens to give that whatever-else to things with the right function, out of nowhere, not built up from other forms of it,

- or else (like me) that that whatever-else is already everywhere, in different forms of course, and all that differs is the form and function of things, nothing ontological or otherwise metaphysical.

How does that definition apply to panpsychic tables? — Olivier5

The table is ontologically and otherwise metaphysically no different from a human being; whatever je ne se qua a real human would have and a philosophical zombie would lack, even tables (and rocks and atoms) already have that. What differs between a table and a human being is their functionality, and consequently the particular form of their experience, which like its behavior is nothing much to speak of for a table.

You have not said what similitude means. — Olivier5

The degree to which one entity shares properties with another.

W is similar to M but they are not the same letter. — Olivier5

Yes. W is not similar enough to M.

What is 'N' standing for in this sentence, if not the idea of the one and only letter 'N'? — Olivier5

Depends on the circumstances. Here it might be something I would refer to with the vocalisation something like 'en'. If you put serifs on that printed letter, I would still refer to it with the same vocalisation. If you made it all curly and fancy I may still do so. It would still be similar enough to other printed letters I've heard referred to that way. If, however, you put a fourth line on it to make it look more like M, it would cease to be similar enough. It would look more similar to printed letters I've heard referred to by the vocalisation 'em', so I'd be more likely to use that.

I don't know what "prior" means here. — khaled

Logically prior, i.e. must be real in order for matter to exist in the first place. In Platonic philosophy, forms don’t begin or cease to exist, which is what makes them transcendent with respect to phenomena; they don't come into and go out of existence, like phenomena do.

Again, we call sound waves physical even though sound waves are a pattern of air and patterns don't have mass. — khaled

Sound waves are physical for sure. But what about the probability wave? Are those waves physical? I think not. They're distributions of possibility, of potentials with different degrees of reality ¹.

I would call that physicalism. — khaled

No, I’m arguing for substance dualism. Physicalism believes that mind is a result of matter, the product of the material brain, whereas dualism believes that mind is the cause as much as the result. This is not necessarily a theistic belief, arguably, theism appropriated ideas of that kind that already were in circulation in their culture.

The only point of talking about kinds of stuff is to discuss whether or not (stuff or things or objects or whatever of) one form can be trans-formed into (whatever of) a different form, e.g. can a bunch of quarks and electrons etc get transformed somehow over billions of years into a thinking experiencing human being, or not? If changing the form can't get you from one kind of whatever to another kind of whatever, then it's implied that there's something besides form "underlying", or "sub-standing" if you will, the difference between the whatevers; some sort of different kinds of sub-stance. — Pfhorrest

Well, I think there is are ontological differences between minerals, plants, animals, and humans (rational minds) - therefore that there are different substances (in the philosophical sense). That you can’t account for life and mind in terms of physics and chemistry. (I've been encouraged to learn that Ernst Mayr, who is considered a giant of 20th century biology, is likewise not reductionist. He says In The growth of biological thought , that 'the discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of non-living material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’)

The 'something else' is obviously not something on the table of elements, then. In it's most primitive form, it manifests as homeostasis, the ability to maintain stability, to grow, heal, and reproduce. None of those characteristics are reducible to physics in this view.

it might be something I would refer to with the vocalisation something like 'en'. — Isaac

You can refer to it in many different ways, of course.