And additionally, does the difference between the ontological commitment we make for Alaska or Pegasus only boil down to senses?

How is that true?

the human mind is so small that is forced to reduce reality down to abstract models, stories, maps, logics, etc....

the mind takes only the data that is required for our use and excludes the rest

this is what maps and stores and math etc... is. its an abstract reduction that is useable

words can point do actual sense data or to abstract mental things. as we communicate with other similar beings (humans) who share the same sense datas and or abstractions.

sense objects vs mental objects within total conscious reality

What do you think, @Banno?

What more does “Pegasus exists” or “Alaska exists” mean than “This has a place in what I have to say”?

What do you mean by that?

What are your ideas about the difference between stating factually that an entity exist through observation of empirical observations in nature rather than a stipulated literary fact about its existence, such as Pegasus and Alaska? — Shawn

Meinong's Jungle – subsistent objects and existent objects, respectively.

Sorry, but I'm still confused about what you mean by "this has a place".

I'd like to postulate that it seems to be true that when it comes down to ontological ascriptions in formal languages, with a 1 to 1 relation, then isn't it necessarily true that this is a correspondence theory of truth?

Whereas in natural languages, it seems that coherentism is more apt to assume as true?