My ex-girlfriend wrote lowercase a without it joining at the top such that I read it as a u. Others could clearly see it as an a. Finding a bunch of A in different fonts we're all familiar with isn't going to interrogate much. Finding a bunch of corrupted A might be more telling. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah. Also context matters. What we're prepared to treat as an A depends on the context it's placed in. Take NASA's logo, for example. The 'A's are just bent lines. We wouldn't accepted that as an A on it's own, but in the context of a logo, we do. We change our treatment of the image depending on the context.

What I've been trying (and failing), to get across in my recent posts is the idea that these things, like universals and even categories, are post hoc constructions. The are subsequent to the actual treatment or not of the image as an A. We first treat it as an A (for a collection of highly contextual reasons, many of which are subconscious), then, on reflection we tell ourselves a simpler story that this acceptance was because of some universal ideal, or category membership. In reality we're often surprised by what we're willing to accept as an A, as reading your ex's writing no doubt shows!

The content of the set defined by {the concept of the singular letter A} is made of all conceivable glyphs that could qualify as an A.

The same tends to be true of universals: in practice they have hazy boundaries, and those boundaries vary across people — Olivier5

Then they're not universals are they?

Universals are a class of mind-independent entities — IEP - Universals

(I've been encouraged to learn that Ernst Mayr, who is considered a giant of 20th century biology, is likewise not reductionist. He says In The growth of biological thought , that 'the discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of non-living material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’) — Wayfarer

I don't see how that's an anti-reductionist claim. That's a difference in form and consequent function between living and non-living things, which of course there is, that's the most obvious kind of difference between those things. The reductionist view is that if you modeled all of the chemicals involved in DNA arranged in just the right way, you would model everything there is to model about DNA, and nothing would be missing. An anti-reductionist view in turn would be a claim that DNA isn't made of just chemicals arranged in the right way, but that there's something else besides that involved. What is that something else, and why do we need to suppose it exists, or equivalently, what noticeable difference in the world does its existence make?

Form is what life is about. Whether you use these or those molecules of water makes no actual difference, but the form is what 'matters'. — Olivier5

I agree with that, but there are people who don't, and the disagreement between us and them is the subject at hand here. There are people, like Chalmers, who think that even if you had some matter in the exact form of a human, which consequently functions exactly like a human, there's still an open question of whether or not it's "really conscious", even though it does all of the functional stuff like thinking, believing, feeling, perceiving, and sensing. E.g. if you've got a thing that looks just like a human and points its eyes around at things and is able to interact with the world in a normal human way including reporting on the things its eyes see and what it interprets those signals to mean and what states of the world it takes to be the case on account of all that... people like Chalmers say that there's still a question as to whether such a thing really experiences anything, or if it just behaves as if it does.

My kind of panpsychism is the view that whatever metaphysical difference there may be between just behaving as if you have experiences and actually having experiences, that metaphysical quality (which Chalmers et al call "phenomenal consciousness") is already present everywhere, so all you have to do is get some matter into the right form and thus function and it already has whatever else is metaphysically needed to experience things the way a human does. It's that form and thus function that's actually important; the metaphysical capacity to "experience things" in some sense transcending that functionality is a trivial quality that's already everywhere and so can't distinguish between anything.

Some are more universal than others. Think of numbers for instance.

people like Chalmers say that there's still a question as to whether such a thing really experiences anything, or if it just behaves as if it does. — Pfhorrest

And other people worry about the sex of angels...

I got news for Chalmers. Philosophical zombies cannot possibly exist. The mind is not facultative, it is a necessary element of a functional biological human being, which MIGHT BE precisely why it exists in every single human being we've come across so far... And when human beings go into coma, they often die.

that metaphysical quality (which Chalmers et al call "phenomenal consciousness") is already present everywhere, so all you have to do to get some matter into the right form and thus function and it already has whatever else is metaphysically needed to experience things the way a human does. — Pfhorrest

I would say that the right form and thus function IS what determines phenomenal consciousness, and that the mystery is: what kind of form generates consciousness and what kind of form doesn't?

The reductionist view is that if you modeled all of the chemicals involved in DNA arranged in just the right way, you would model everything there is to model about DNA, and nothing would be missing. An anti-reductionist view in turn would be a claim that DNA isn't made of just chemicals arranged in the right way, but that there's something else besides that involved. What is that something else, and why do we need to suppose it exists, or equivalently, what noticeable difference in the world does its existence make? — Pfhorrest

Memory, like the quote said. As Mayr says, DNA basically preserves the whole history of evolution in a single DNA molecule. There’s nothing corresponding to that in inorganic matter. That faculty leads to the ability to maintain homeostasis, heal, grow, reproduce, and evolve, and to act intentionally, which no inorganic matter does.

what noticeable difference in the world does its existence make? — Pfhorrest

The presence of living things, which as far as science can discern, after having scanned the universe for decades looking for it, is an exceptionally rare phenomenon, even if you take it for granted.

There are people, like Chalmers, who think that even if you had some matter in the exact form of a human, which consequently functions exactly like a human, there's still an open question of whether or not it's "really conscious", even though it does all of the functional stuff like thinking, — Pfhorrest

if there were such machines with the organs and shape of a monkey or of some other non-rational animal, we would have no way of discovering that they are not the same as these animals. But if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — René Descartes, Discourse on Method

Published in 1637, and true to this day.

Memory, like the quote said. As Mayr says, DNA basically preserves the whole history of evolution in a single DNA molecule. There’s nothing corresponding to that in inorganic matter. — Wayfarer

An inorganic security camera can sit around for ages keeping a record of the things that happened in front of it.

I expect you'll object that a human built that camera for that purpose, but that's irrelevant to reductionism. Is there some nonphysical aspect to the camera itself that enables it to keep such records, or is it just physical matter in the right form to perform that function? How that matter got into that form is a separate question.

it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do

[...]

even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others — René Descartes, Discourse on Method

So he asserts, without argument besides "it's unimaginable".

In any case, it's beside the point, because Chalmers et al are talking about whether, even if you could completely replicate the behavior of a human in the way Descartes asserts you couldn't, that would be enough to say for sure that the thing is definitely conscious in the way a human is.

If you think that a device like a camera is an analogy for DNA or for human intelligence, then there's no point discussing it, as it just seems obviously inept, as far as I'm concerned. ‘DNA stores information - so does a camera!’ ‘Humans see things - cameras photograph them! What’s the difference?’ I give up.

I've never heard anyone in day-to-day language talk about the ideal mental concept of the letter 'A'. — Isaac

I'm actually with Olivier for once on this one. Maybe 'A' isn't a good example. What about "triangle". We clearly talk about the "ideal triangle" all the time in math, not any particular triangle. We even talk about shapes that don't exist, like a tesseract (4D equivalent of a cube). We can come up with properties relating to the ideal triangle, though no triangle that ever exists will be the ideal triangle. And we spend a whole lot of time and effort studying the properties of these forms.

Same can be said for "square" or "polynomial function" or "algorithm". Literally all of mathematics and computer science discusses these forms which are not material (in that they have no mass).

:ok:

Maybe 'A' isn't a good example. What about "triangle". — khaled

You are probably right that for scientists, it is best to use examples from mathematics.

What about "triangle". We clearly talk about the "ideal triangle" all the time in math, not any particular triangle. — khaled

Oliver is currently 'talking about' the ideal 'A', so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes?

We can come up with properties relating to the ideal triangle, though no triangle that ever exists will be the ideal triangle. — khaled

We can come up with imaginary triangles, yes. I'm not seeing how this proves that they are the 'ideal' triangle against which all shapes are compared to determine the correct name.

___

Maybe it would help if you could tell me some properties of this ideal triangle.

About how mental models design and define our life:

Oliver is currently 'talking about' the ideal 'A', so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes? — Isaac

My name isn't actually "Oliver". It is "Olivier", which is the correct French spelling. In my opinion, that correct French spelling does exist, somehow, as does the correct English spelling "Oliver", as does the mistake of confusing one for the other. But maybe that's just me.

If correct spellings do not actually exist, thin wahatp thi fruck?

My name isn't actually "Oliver". It is "Olivier", — Olivier5

I do apologise. What disgraceful Anglocentrism on my part. Were we not only recently in this thread talking about how mental models filter what we see? I wasn't looking for the second 'i' so I didn't see it.

In my opinion, that correct French spelling does exist, somehow, as does the correct English spelling "Oliver". If correct spellings do not actually exist, thln whqp thi fruck? — Olivier5

As I've already outlined several times now, I can compare those words to the words I've learnt and see if they're sufficiently similar for my purposes. i don't require an ideal 'correct' word. As it stands, they actually are, since I know what you mean.

i don't require an ideal 'correct' word. — Isaac

You actually do need to know how to write e.g. "polysaccharides" correctly in order to be understood as saying "polysaccharides". If you write it as "pauleessakorrydz", nobody will understand what you mean.

Of course if you want just to produce art and poetry, that's another matter. "Pauleessakorrydz" has a certain beauty, as far as meaningless collections of letters go...

You actually do need to know how to write e.g. "polysaccharides" correctly in order to be understood as saying "polysaccharides". If you write it as "pauleessakorrydz", nobody will understand what you mean. — Olivier5

Indeed. So I can compare my attempt to my memory of all the other attempts I've seen and correct it until it looks similar enough to get by.

You don't need a memory of all the other attempts; you just need to know the one and only correct spelling of "polysaccharides".

You don't need a memory of all the other attempts; you just need to know the one and only correct spelling of "polysaccharides". — Olivier5

I didn't enumerate the other attempts needed. If my fellow student back at college told me the 'correct' spelling was 'polysacarides', how would I ever learn it wasn't?

Your computer spell check would normally tell you. Otherwise there are resources called dictionaries.

Your computer spell check would normally tell you. Otherwise there are resources called dictionaries — Olivier5

Are you suggesting that dictionaries are non-physical? They seem pretty physical to me. In fact they seem like they might contain exactly one of the real life physical words I might compare my attempt to in order to get it more likely to be accepted.

Dictionaries are physical objects, with a certain mass.

If you open one of them, and look inside, you will find pages, which are physical things too.

If you look at one page, you will find some scribblings on it; the scribblings too are physical. One could quantify the amount of ink used for instance.

If you have learnt your alphabet (a set of signs, i.e. non physical but conceptual) and are conversant in the language used, you may be able to decipher the meaning of some of the scribblings. Such meaning is conceptual rather than physical. The word "rose" might be written somewhere in the dictionary, but you won't find an actual rose in it.

And yes, it include a model of each word's correct spelling in terms of the one exact order of letters to be used, not some vague, ill-defined similitude.

And yes, it include a model of each word's correct spelling in terms of the one exact order of letters to be used, not some vague, ill-defined similitude. — Olivier5

OK, so talk me through the process. The people writing the dictionary access this non-physical universal concept-spelling.

a) why do they have access to it yet I have to look it up in a dictionary?

b) why does this non-physical universal change sometimes - like connexion became connection?

H';lkjdf 'kjvrq oijhsRGvw NDF KLcw opihjasetrrg óq23 serAFT'PA3 SDPOawkjjc? w435nmg24[-0vf5hj fd3q2=089fcq3 ser=r4tfm nw40 f0-s45 y=qwc- 9uybe5yh!!!


(edit: for those who do not happen to speak Isaac's similitude-based, approximately spelt and unconceivable language, the above means by-and-large : "if we jettison the idea of correct spelling, we might regret it some day" -- though it rolls down the tongue much better in the original!)

The same tends to be true of universals — Olivier5

By definition they _aren't_ idiosyncratic.

What you are saying is that "universals" are not as universal as we may think, their limits are hazy, which is true and indeed an important point in that the verification of universals by interviewing locators is never perfect. You can always find a guy who disagrees somewhere. — Olivier5

Yes, but more than this: we define demarcations of categories individually. Homogeneity of environment, pedagogy, similar objects of experience, and feedback help to make our models similar, while differences in experience and minor differences in hardware will ensure that no two models are identical. It's like DNA... yours is yours, individual enough to convict you of a crime, but similar enough to mine to make us the same kind of object.

Maybe it would help if you could tell me some properties of this ideal triangle. — Isaac

It has 3 vertices connected by 3 edges and all of them are perfectly straight. Nothing material fits that description. Yet the description itself is very important and is the subject of a lot of study.

The form of a triangle exists. It's not a new substance. But it exists.

so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes? — Isaac

Are you proposing that the idea of a triangle doesn't exist, and only real physical triangles exist?

What about "tesseract"? Does the idea of a tesseract exist? Or what about vector spaces with more than 3 dimensions? Does the idea of a vector space with more than 3 dimensions exist? If no, what are all these scientists and mathematicians talking about when they talk about shapes in 4D, 5D, etc?

We can come up with imaginary triangles, yes. — Isaac

In other words, the idea of "triangle" exists. What else is an imaginary triangle other than the idea of "triangle"?

I'm not seeing how this proves that they are the 'ideal' triangle against which all shapes are compared to determine the correct name. — Isaac

You can tell the difference between a triangle and a square right? How do you do that except by comparing with some ideal triangle/square?

And I would bet money you'd be able to tell the difference between a triangle and square without having ever seen a triangular or square object, just from the descriptions of a triangle and square as long as you know what "Vertex" and "Edge" mean. How do you explain the ability to do that, without referring to the idea of a triangle and square?

Point well taken.

I agree that much too much is made of "universals", that they are not as universal as they seem, and they only need to be sufficiently universal, or somewhat homogenous across individuals, not perfectly equal, like in your example of human DNA.

If we take a mathematical example, I think we can agree that the number Pi (singular) is not "physical" in the sense that it is not an individual thing out there that people can see or take in their hand, and that the number Pi is therefore an idea. But we can also agree that it is a very precisely defined idea that leaves very little room, if any, for personal interpretation. There is likely very little difference between what you conceive as Pi and what I conceive as Pi. Nevertheless, there will always be one guy or another out there who has a different conception, e.g. who thinks that Pi is equal to 3, or that it's a rational number.

Therefore the term "universal" is not really correct, even for Pi. I guess the word "concept" is better here, as it expresses the possibility of a personal or personalized concept, whereas a "universal" cannot logically be "personal".

This said, there still needs to be enough commonality between your meaning and my meaning of a given word for us to understand one another.

It has 3 vertices connected by 3 edges and all of them are perfectly straight. — khaled

So it's being on a plane is not a property of your ideal triangle? Would a non-euclidean object with those properties still be a triangle? What about shapes matching that description but in non-standard topologies? Because it's my understanding that each of those questions had to be answered by a small group of people as they arose. They could not simply derive the answers by comparing their new objects to some ideal form, they had to just make a choice. The answer didn't pre-exist as a form.

Nothing material fits that description. — khaled

So are we mis-naming the things we commonly call triangles? Or is what you're imagining not a triangle? If both the object you're imaging and the objects like my neckerchief are correctly called triangles the what is it that sets yours apart? On what grounds do you assign the object you're imagining special status among all the objects correctly named triangles?

Are you proposing that the idea of a triangle doesn't exist, and only real physical triangles exist? — khaled

I'm proposing that your idea of triangles exists (in several forms), as does mine. There's no 'The' idea of triangles. There's only yours, mine, everyone else's. Ideas similar enough for our purposes, kept that way by talking and practices. Same for tesseracts.

You can tell the difference between a triangle and a square right? How do you do that except by comparing with some ideal triangle/square? — khaled

I compare with my ideas of triangles/squares, different ones depending on the context. All, no doubt very similar to your ideas, since we share a culture, language community, biology etc.

But not the idea of a triangle/square since I've no evidence there is such a thing and plenty of evidence from developmental psychology that we use our own personal models to identity objects, not ethereal universal ones.