Three hours, no bites.

What do you think......nobody knows, or nobody cares?

I'll bite. Practical knowledge, and the man's recognition that while practical knowledge could not be the last word, that no one (yet) had said the last word. Which he thereupon set out to do.

Would it be, if one can see it, touch it and hear it via the sense organs, then the object is empirical. If the object is in the language as words, or in the mind as concepts, but not perceivable via senses, then it is transcendental? Sounds crude and obvious I know. Just guessing.

transcendental characteristics of phenomenal objects — charles ferraro

My brain froze when I was told I can't bring up the noumenon.

can't bring up the noumenon. — Valentinus

ah ok. then it couldn't be the sense-able objects ...

Having another go - could it be the causes?
If there are causal explanations, then empirical.
If no causal, then transcendental ???

To put that in a more Kantian way is to say that "objects" are a result of our perception and cognition of what we encounter in experience. If you were "given" these objects as themselves, you wouldn't have to go to all the trouble of distinguishing pure reason from the practical.

Have you read any Kant?
I am not asking to be intimidating but to know how to reply.

Watch the trap.

Fundamental epistemic criteria.

Ground. What comes first, not last.

Have you read any Kant?
I am not asking to be intimidating but to know how to reply. — Valentinus

Yes, just a little introduction.
I am planning to read something more substantial.

Intuition?

The deep dive is to just go ahead and read The Critique of Pure Reason. It is not a three hour tour.

The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics assumes you have read that but addresses some of the general topics brought up most often in recent (the last 100 years or so) of academic discussion in response.

Will go with the CPR then. Thanks for your info and advice. Much appreciated.

Watch the trap. Fundamental epistemic criteria (FEC). Ground. What comes first, not last. — Mww

(Ty. Hmm, and other noises.) Well, there's logical ground and temporal ground. I'm thinking empirical ground is a third. Which is to say that ground isn't necessarily first - or that both (first and ground) need to be defined. Nor is the question clear: it fails to clarify whether criteria ground knowledge, or knowledge criteria - and again it helps to define both.

Axiomatic for me is that for there to be knowledge, there must be that which is known, and that "assembled" such as to be recognizable as something knowable, then judged to be knowable, thus known. And from this two different sets both being callable as criteria. The first gathering, assembling, presenting; the second judging. It would seem that consciousness must follow - came after - the judgment.

It seems tempting to say the judgment is the "FEC," but unless the presentation is sensible to the judgment, the judgment has nothing to judge. So it must seem the FEC lies in the ability to assemble and present.

So my answer is that while the FEC may seem to lie in the assessment by the consciousness that knowledge is before (in front of) it, the "F" takes it back behind the curtain.

Or another way. When does Chinese food become Chines food? Not when served to an appreciative diner who says, "Yummy! Chinese food!" For at least for that judgment, it must already be Chinese food. And so it seems it becomes that which it is when assembled to be that which it is.

Or another way. The FEC is having a properly working brain supporting a properly working mind.

If a characteristic of phenomenal objects exhibits ABSOLUTE NECESSITY and STRICT UNIVERSALITY, then that characteristic is transcendental.

A transcendental characteristic MUST be exhibited by ALL phenomenal objects with no exceptions, because the human mind, which is the original source of the transcendental characteristic, must bestow it upon all phenomenal objects in the very process of knowing them.

If a characteristic of phenomenal objects exhibits only LIMITED NECESSITY and RESTRICTED UNIVERSALITY, then that characteristic is empirical.

An empirical characteristic is exhibited by only SOME phenomenal objects, but not others. The human mind is not the source of the empirical characteristic and it does not bestow the empirical characteristic upon any phenomenal objects.

F" takes it back behind the curtain. — tim wood

Never mind. I see now Charles has something else in mind.

I was going to guess space and time.

I believe the terms a priori and a posteriori cover that.

The mind bestows all upon the noumena, but the relationship between the mind apart from phenomena to the noumena of the world is the question Reinhold, Fitche, and the other Germans tried to work out after Kant laid the foundation down for them.

The human mind does not bestow all upon the noumena because it is impossible for the human mind to step outside of itself to see itself doing this.

Then why didn't you say so??

It sees itself bestow necessity and universality on noumena. Whether the noumena of us is the noumena of the world is the Pandora box question opened by little Kant way back then

By the way, are Plato's Forms/Ideas transcendental or empirical?

They are not empirical but are either the noumena of the world or the noumena of our minds. In either case they are transcendental

The human mind only encounters phenomenal objects and, retroactively, it ASSUMES that it contributes to them those characteristics which are necessary and strictly universal.

For example, the Idea or Form of an Elm Tree or of a Tiger has nothing absolutely necessary or strictly universal about it. As species, their existence is just as possible as their non-existence. Also, both Ideas/Forms do not apply to all phenomenal entities without exception. For this reason, they are empirical, not transcendental. They are not products of our minds.

I think you mean transcendent.

Yes the Ideas/Forms are in things and in the mind. But is that all there is or is there true matter?

If a characteristic of phenomenal objects exhibits ABSOLUTE NECESSITY and STRICT UNIVERSALITY, then that characteristic is transcendental. — charles ferraro

What are some examples of this case?

distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental characteristics of phenomenal objects — charles ferraro

Phenomena are “the undetermined objects of empirical intuition.” (A20/B34)

The empirical characteristics of any intuition is the matter of the object that affects sensibility, and is called sensation.

Phenomenal objects of intuition have no transcendental characteristics; they are undetermined.

“Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind.” (A50/B74)

Absolute necessity and strict universality are transcendental principles contained in a priori cognitions. Undetermined objects of empirical intuition....phenomenal objects....are not a priori cognitions, therefore do not themselves exhibit these principles as characteristics.

The transcendental in phenomena, is “that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations” (A21/B35). The transcendental in phenomenon is not a characteristic of it, but merely represents the conditions under which the content and its arrangement are related.

The fundamental epistemic criterion (properly, criteria) of phenomenal objects rests in how they are treated by the human system of pure reason, therefore the criteria does not reside in the characteristics they have, but in the determining conditions by which they are known.

Kantian transcendentalism is more a methodological justification for, and less a rational characteristic of, speculative metaphysics.

Not that anybody cares..........

Excellent summary of the matter.