Because I believe we can do far better than nominalism. — Olivier5
But non-eucledian triangles are still called triangles. — Isaac
It's not similar enough for their current purpose to the definitions the rest of their language community are using. — Isaac
No, not at all. I've demonstrated above that there is no such idea. Just several ideas which share common features. — Isaac
Triangles, letter 'A's, some multiple of similar objects, a city... these are all postulates, models of the causes of the sensations we receive. The same is true of thoughts. Thoughts are all recalled post hoc. ....
So when I talk about what 'ideas' really are, I mean to refer to a model of their hidden states. What causes the sensation that I'm possessed of an 'idea'. My model for that is that of neurons being in certain configurations and having reached threshold levels of activation — Isaac
I use my a priori methods of inference — Isaac
Like all naïve materialists, you are sawing the conceptual branch on which you sit. — Olivier5
When you understand a logical principle, or algorithm, say, to make a prediction, or solve some arcane mathematical conjecture - how can this be possibly be categorised as a ‘sensation’?
— Wayfarer
I thought I'd just explained that. 'Understanding' a thing is a post hoc model of the actual link between sensation and response. We can prove this by lesion experiments, as I've described. So one senses, by interoception, that one is possessed of an idea. You may be limited by thinking of senses as being just the five we're taught about in primary school. This is just a simplification for children. There's scores of 'senses'. — Isaac
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