Thanks. Still, just because that’s how I understand it, doesn’t mean that’s how The Good Professor meant it to be understood. I wish, but I don’t know.

Space and Time, the Forms of Sensible Intuition, and the Categories of the Understanding.

Space and Time, the Forms of Sensible Intuition, and the Categories of the Understanding. — charles ferraro

I think I said "Intuition" somewhere. Would Cause qualify too? You never perceive causes via senses, but postulate them?

Stage I

Phenomenal objects, by their very definition, i.e., as phenomenal, must first be experienced in a spatio-temporal context contributed to them with necessity and strict universality by human sensibility. If a phenomenal object is not situated in this necessary and strictly universal spatio-temporal context, then it is impossible for it to be intuited by the senses; i.e., it cannot be sensed.

Stage II

The above having been accomplished, the sensed phenomenal object, in order to also be a phenomenal object known by the understanding, must undergo several syntheses accomplished by the categories of the human understanding, each of which is also necessary and strictly universal.

Cause, or Cause and Effect, is one of Kant's Categories of the Understanding. Kant asserted there were twelve such categories.

Cause, or Cause and Effect, is one of Kant's Categories of the Understanding. Kant asserted there were twelve such categories. — charles ferraro

I used to think space and time was the condition for all perceptions in Kant, and cause and effect were something to do with the transcendental world. But wasn't too sure. Interesting stuff. Thanks for your confirmation.

So can we say that objects in themselves could be perceived by us through our space/time intuitions had it not been for transcendental additions we necessarily make to them (causality, ect,)?

Phenomenal objects, by their very definition, i.e., as phenomenal, must first be experienced in a spatio-temporal context — charles ferraro

Stage 1. Close enough. Closer examination reveals inconsistencies, but.....close enough.

Stage 2. Again, close enough. The synthesis is not done by the categories; it is done by the intellectual imagination which relates the categories to phenomena, as a reproductive judgement.

The principles of strict universality and absolute necessity refer to the general human condition, whereby every human cognitive system operates in exactly the same way. These principles do not represent characteristics of phenomena, but are only the inherent characteristics of the system by which phenomena are possible entirely a priori, given an intuitive/discursive system of knowledge.

One more incidental: universality is not a category, as is necessity, which serves as further support for the rejection of strict universality as a condition of sensed objects and thereby a transcendental characteristic, or criterion, of phenomena. Necessity, yes; universality.....ehhhhhh, not so much.

Or, better yet, I suppose, I don’t see the need for it. I mean, absolute necessity refers to the spatial-temporal context, as you call it, but what would universality refer to, that necessity hasn’t already?

Universality is talked much about by Kant's successors

Agreed. The OP, however, specifies Kantian fundamentals. People been elaborating on them ever since, to be sure.

can we say that objects in themselves could be perceived by us through our space/time intuitions had it not been for transcendental additions we necessarily make to them — Gregory

Yes, and no. Perceived, but not by us, because our space-time intuitions prevent it. Only a non-representational, non-intuitive system might perceive things-in-themselves as such, but......how would we ever be able to tell? Dolphins might, whales, any given alien system....who knows? We wouldn’t understand them no matter what.

Very interesting. Kant truly started philosophy imo

Kant truly started philosophy imo — Gregory

The Platonists will certainly jump all over you up for that. Any of the pre-Socratics, too, maybe. But even they must grant that he single-handedly caused a paradigm shift in how metaphysical philosophy is done.

The OP, however, specifies Kantian fundamentals. People been elaborating on them ever since, to be sure. — Mww

Kant had his intuitions and his guiding imagination. The imagination was governed by understanding the the higher power of reason/intellect. (knowledge was gained from all the above)

The successors of Kant went from Reinhold to Fitche to Schelling to Hegel to Schopenhauer. They all thought there were aspects of intellect that Kant failed to take into consideration and so they tried to build on Kant with newer, more exotic ideas. I think all their attempts are great but they do not contradict what Kant laid down. Their many pages and arguments return back to what Kant said every time

The Platonists will certainly jump all over you up for that. — Mww

I've never thought of Platonist as Kantian but maybe they are. Does...:

Matter=phenomena

and

Ideas=noumena?

I loosely think this way but I wonder if they are an exact correlation.

And did Kant read Plato?

And did Kant read Plato? — Gregory

There is a section in CPR where Plato’s specific terminology is advocated as being taken as Plato intended. And holding the logic chair at Konisberg for years, one would suppose he was well-read in classical Greek generally.

Matter=phenomena and Ideas=noumena? — Gregory

This is Platonic, in that phenomena are matter and form. Matter is from sensation, but form resides a priori in the mind, in contradistinction to Plato, who held that form as well as matter are both external. Kant did this in order to refute Hume, who denied a priori pure reason, and the only way to prove the possibility of it, is to move form from the external to the internal, thereby making it the sole discretion of the mind, more properly, pure reason, thus having nothing whatsoever to do with matter. That which has nothing to do with matter can have nothing to do with experience, and that which has nothing to do with experience, is a priori. But moving it was not enough; he still had to justify the move, which he did by proving that the logical ground of the science mathematics, given certain conditions, is necessarily a priori.

An idea, in Kant-speak, is “a concept formed from notions a priori and transcending the possibility of experience, that is, for which no corresponding objects can be given by sensibility" (A327/B384). From that it could be said that noumena are ideas, because noumena can be concepts formed from notions a priori. But noumena come from the concepts of understanding, whereas ideas come from the concepts of reason. There’s much more to it, but....you know....nutshell.....so to speak.

If the world is put in relation with the mind, then the result can be correctly stated by saying the mind (subjectivity) and its object are really the same. But it is also true to say they are in themselves different. These are both correct and incorrect! Paradox? Trying to express these matters perfectly is impossible in (normal) communicative language, but as Wittgenstein said about the world and self: "everything is open, nothing is hidden".

[reply="Gregory;566

I beg to disagree. Also, in this regard, read Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Focus especially on Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's confusing use of terminology.

By definition, a phenomenal object of empirical intuition must exhibit spatio-temporal (transcendental) characteristics (be determined by the forms of human sensibility) in order for it to be both phenomenal and objective.

By definition, a non-phenomenal object of empirical intuition, does not exhibit spatio-temporal (transcendental) characteristics (is undetermined by the forms of human sensibility) and, therefore, is neither phenomenal, nor objective.

Question: Does a Platonic Idea become a phenomenal object of empirical intuition (get instantiated, as they say) only after it is determined (processed) by the spatio-temporal forms of human sensibility?

Is the noumena in our minds (subjective), outside us (objective), or both, or neither? I wonder about this a lot. "The mind as concept realizes it too is the universal, is one totality returned into itself, whose distinctions are equally this totality and the object" writes Hegel

Regarding Kant and Plato, The Critique of Judgment discusses the origin of life in the section upon Teleological judgments. There is a very interesting part where evolution is recognized as possible from an a priori standpoint but experience is said to suggest that the situation is more like the perspective established in the dialogue of Philebus, where the source of of things points more to the existence of an intelligence as part of the cause rather than whatever not having that might mean.

Yet he also says in the work that we see purpose in the world with judgment just as we follow morality with practical reason, but all the same pure reason can prove none of it

I am not sure how you are presenting that observation as a response to mine. Kant did not ask that the CPR prove what he believed as a Christian.
Or are you contesting that view?
EDIT: Wait, I should have just have expressed the first thought. Too much presumption involved with the latter.

There are two different meanings that can be given to the phrase "outside the mind" when used in the context of Kant's CPR. Let me try to explain.

The human mind can be said to create a three-dimensional space WITHIN ITSELF wherein it can project and visualize the phenomenal objects of sensible intuition. Such a space "appears" to be outside the mind, but it and the phenomenal objects it contains always remain wholly within the mind. It and its objects are transcendental, not transcendent.

The human mind also tries to conceive of a space located completely outside of itself. Such an impossible space, if it existed, and whatever existed in it, would be wholly outside the mind. It, and whatever existed in it, would be transcendent, not transcendental; the purported realm of noumena or things-in-themselves.

These are both correct and incorrect! Paradox? — Gregory

Kant says the “sure sign of sagacity and wisdom”, is to refrain from asking questions for which there is no rational answer. In other words, frame inquiries in such a manner as to prevent the inception of paradoxes.

"The mind as concept realizes it too is the universal, is one totality returned into itself, whose distinctions are equally this totality and the object" writes Hegel — Gregory

That, is probably what Schopenhauer was talking about, when he said this:

“....still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and stupid Hegel...”
(WWR, v2, App, pg8, 1818, in Haldane/Kemp, 1884)

I mean....really? A concept that realizes??? If mind as concept, what makes it so?

Schop was pretty harsh, but still......

I beg to disagree. — charles ferraro

As you wish. It’s your thread.

CJ is an even tougher read than CPR. I’m ok with the aesthetic part, probably from its ground in CPR, but don’t find much favor with the teleological.

Sorry Mww! My "I beg to disagree" was actually meant to only address Gregory's concerns about noumena. I didn't mean for you to be referenced.

All good.

For Hegel there is mind as receptive and mind as concept. At least read one of his books before you criticize, geez