I agree. Actually, now that I'm thinking on it, I am not sure if it attacks the logical problem of evil. I hypothesize that one of the reasons the free will defense may be so popular is that it is meant to combat Mackie's version of the argument: namely, there is a logical possible world in which all moral agents pick the moral thing to do whenever faced with a moral situation. It bypasses the whole "obscure possibilities" deal the child analogy seeks to establish by attacking a type of evil we are very familiar with: the evil of other human beings. If this evil is unnecessary, then God's existence runs into a massive problem. The free will defense says that because of the nature of morally significant free will, such a world cannot be brought about by God, but can only be brought out by free agents.

Then again, I am not really sold on the whole free will defense either. Maybe it is better in the actual source material, but from what I've been taught and read about it online, I do not understand how it refutes the logical problem of evil without also including something questionable like open theism, which states that it is logically impossible for God to have divine foreknowledge of free will decisions. And I have a feeling that most theists, at least within mainstream Christianity and certain sects of other religions, would never admit to that.

There's no need for someone putting forward an argument from evil to be committed to a version which doesn't allow for fallibility. — Sapientia

That's all I'm asking for. Evil does not necessitate the nonexistence of god.

Evil does not necessitate the nonexistence of god. — TheMadFool

That is correct.

Unjustifiable evil, however, might. Even if it is not logically possible (debatable), it might practically be.

Evil, by definition, is never justifiable.

I never really used evil in that way. For example, the phrase "necessary evil" is completely useable in my books. However, definition issues are irrelevant. If evil is unjustifiable by definition, then I am not sure that evil and God are actually compatible- they might be, or they might not. It depends on a number of factors I do not think we have fully explored yet.

Omnibenevolence is a feature of the Abrahamic divinity. Combine that with omnipotence and you have a problem of evil.

But gods roamed the landscape of the human psyche long before Abraham. Many of them were assholes.

The word "god" in the problem of evil means the tri-omni god of classical theism. The second you redefine the word "god", the argument will obviously no longer apply.

True.

That's all I'm asking for. Evil does not necessitate the nonexistence of god. — TheMadFool

Okay, but that means that there could nevertheless be an extremely good reason for believing that God doesn't exist because evil exists; and that argument would be an argument from evil.

Okay, but that means that there could nevertheless be an extremely good reason for believing that God doesn't exist because evil exists; and that argument would be an argument from evil. — Sapientia

I agree.

I agree. — TheMadFool

Okay. Well, that's that settled then.

This is really an argument against any deductive argument, or at least against how they ought to be taken, rather than the argument from evil, specifically.