Claiming this to suggest self-hood as the theme of the dialogue hangs on a pretty slender thread. — Gary M Washburn
It is a dangerous matter, too, to assume Socrates is ever serious about drawing conclusions, other than to discourage them. — Gary M Washburn
All of which is fraught with often hidden baggage. — Gary M Washburn
It is not how we speak or think or understand each other. — Gary M Washburn
But convention has it that holding firm to convictions, or ultimately achieving convictions resistant to critique is a virtue and goal. — Gary M Washburn
I suppose it may seem an irony that I may seem convinced of this. — Gary M Washburn
But according to my Liddell and Scott, psyche is breath. Seeing spirit in it seems 'vaporous'. — Gary M Washburn
Hom. usage gives little support to the derivation from ψύχω 'blow, breathe'; “τὸν δὲ λίπε ψ.” Il.5.696 means 'his spirit left his body', and so λειποψυχέω means 'swoon', not 'become breathless'
Personal character was the engine of ideas, and Socrates found in this participation the engine of reality itself. — Gary M Washburn
The first is true independent of any instrument. The second is true of a particular instrument. The first is about the ratio of frequencies. The second about whether those relations are achieved on a particular instrument. — Fooloso4
In the Republic the problem is not between the parts of the body and the soul but which part of the soul. The answer is reason. In addition, appetites are treated as a part of the soul and not the body. The conflict is within the soul, not between soul and body. Also the soul in the Republic has parts but in the Phaedo it is denied that it has parts. — Fooloso4
By the end of the fifth century — the time of Socrates' death — soul is standardly thought and spoken of, for instance, as the distinguishing mark of living things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and that is responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of such virtues as courage and justice. Coming to philosophical theory, we first trace a development towards comprehensive articulation of a very broad conception of soul, according to which the soul is not only responsible for mental or psychological functions like thought, perception and desire, and is the bearer of moral qualities, but in some way or other accounts for all the vital functions that any living organism performs. This broad conception, which is clearly in close contact with ordinary Greek usage by that time, finds its fullest articulation in Aristotle's theory.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/ — Apollodorus
Was Soc. a Hindu? — Gary M Washburn
The harmony is the effect of, therefore caused by, the appropriate tuning. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the key point, what directs the tuning is the mind with some mathematical principles, and harmony is the result, or effect of that direction. — Metaphysician Undercover
The soul is more like the thing which does the directing, therefore the cause of the tuning, rather than the result of the tuning, the result being the harmony itself, which is produced. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you agree that Socrates' argument is that the soul is more like the thing which directs the parts — Metaphysician Undercover
if I take your meaning correctly — Gary M Washburn
if any of your comments were directed specifically at me, I suspect you have not understood me either. — Fooloso4
From this it could be inferred that you do not want me addressing you. — Gary M Washburn
I am not sure if this is intended as a criticism of what I said or if what I said is being pointed to in support of your claim about how we speak or think or understand each other. — Fooloso4
how do we suppose we understand each other at all? — Gary M Washburn
It's really bogus to suppose there is some lexical field that supports this. — Gary M Washburn
Exactly, but reason only works by division. — Gary M Washburn
to ignore the difference meant to be excluded — Gary M Washburn
What is it that you think is meant to be excluded here? — Fooloso4
The epistemological issue is that this principle of unity is not something that exists on the objective plane; it is not an object of perception; it can't be discerned objectively. It is conceptually nearer to 'harmony', as has been discussed in relation to the analogy of the lyre, in the sense that it is a consequence of the dynamic balance of a number of otherwise discrete factors to generate a (transcendent) whole, allegorically like the sounding of a chord (hence the allegory.) — Wayfarer
And Socrates said: “You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?”
“Certainly not, Socrates.”
Then Socrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: “Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point.
the allegory does not refer to the sound. — Apollodorus
Well, the difficulty is that if the soul is non-composite as Socrates says, then it cannot be a harmony. — Apollodorus
So, you don’t accept the idea of ‘the soul as the principle of unity’? — Wayfarer
On the one hand, by dividing Socrates into two, body and soul, Socrates himself cannot be found. On the other hand, the arguments for an immortal soul all fail, but further, the idea of an independent soul is incoherent. — Fooloso4
Known to ancient commentators by the title On the Soul, the dialogue presents no less than four arguments for the soul’s immortality.
Well, the difficulty is that if the soul is non-composite as Socrates says, then it cannot be a harmony. — Apollodorus
[Socrates] Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony (94e) … [Cebes] you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against (95a) his argument; so it seemed to me very remarkable that it could not withstand the first attack of your argument …. (95b)
… “I think, Cebes,” said he, “it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist …
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