You don't seem to be grasping the issue. The body only exists as an arrangement of parts, you said so yourself, above. — Metaphysician Undercover
At Banno’s suggestion I am starting a thread on Plato’s Phaedo. — Fooloso4
Saying that the soul is like a harmony, or attunement, is to assume that there is such a thing as "the soul" which is being talked about. — Metaphysician Undercover
... our soul is as it were, a blend and tuning of these very things, whenever, that is, they're blended with one another in a beautiful and measured way. (86c)
Simmias could have insisted that there is no such thing as the soul, — Metaphysician Undercover
The surviving texts of the Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus indicate that ... the soul was life and a harmony of physical elements. As such the soul passed away when certain arrangements of these elements ceased to exist.[53]
Therefore the thing which directs the parts is necessarily prior to the body — Metaphysician Undercover
... which would also be composed of an arrangement of parts, ad infinitum. — Metaphysician Undercover
The question of the soul is the very thing that will be the focus of the discussion, but argument is made that at death the soul is alone by itself. It is simply accepted from the start as a given. — Fooloso4
A reborn soul is one that has previously died. It exists in Hades as a dead soul. — Fooloso4
Socrates shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”.
"Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. "(75a)
It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. — Fooloso4
The other problem with the cycle of opposites argument is that obviously the living come from the living. — Fooloso4
Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchanging. More to the point, Socrates talks about such things as the corruption of the soul "polluted and impure" (81b) and the soul of a human being becoming the soul of an ass or some other animal or insect. (82a-b) So, the claim that the soul is unchanging is questionable at the least. — Fooloso4
The snow does not retreat, it melts. — Fooloso4
"The fact is,” said he, “in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea." — 103e
The failure of the arguments does not mean that the soul is not immortal, it simply means that Socrates has not shown that it is. He says it is worth the risk of believing that it is, but if the philosopher seeks truth she does not settle for a belief. What the soul is and what its fate may be remains unknown. — Fooloso4
Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they must be conformed to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity. That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must undergo perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.
We cannot say that the fundamental parts are bodies because we do not understand what these parts are. — Metaphysician Undercover
And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we [Simmias, Echecrates, etc.] believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements (86b – c).
In Socrates' culture, belief in the soul was generally accepted, so was axiomatic, one might say. — Wayfarer
'Dead soul' is an oxymoron. — Wayfarer
. If the soul was alive then it would not be true that living things come from dead things.the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died ... living people are born again from those who have died ... living people are born from the dead
Stepping outside the framework of strict textual intepretation, consider that the concept of 'equal' represents a fundamental breakthrough in the development of abstract consciousness and reason. — Wayfarer
Number, on the other hand, is not composed of parts (or any parts other than numbers) and neither goes into or out of existence (hence, 'imperishable'.) — Wayfarer
I take this to mean that although snow melts, wherever snow exists, it instantiates 'the idea of cold', because it has the form of the idea of cold. — Wayfarer
I accept that many people will find the idea of the soul archaic and anachronistic and that these arguments will fail to persuade them otherwise. Indeed there's a lot of people who think Plato has been superseded, that it's all ancient history. — Wayfarer
If so then more and less and same also represents a fundamental breakthrough in the development of abstract consciousness and reason. Only it may not be so abstract. It is something that can be seen. It is a practical skill. Primates can count. — Fooloso4
See Jacob Klein's "Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra". — Fooloso4
According to Simmias' argument there is nothing prior to the body that directs its parts. The body is self-organizing. — Fooloso4
Right, and that is the problem with your argument. Not only do you assume that all the parts together must be arranged, but for the same reason each of the parts individually must be arranged. If the soul arranges all of the parts together what arranges each of the individual parts? It can't be the soul because then the soul would be the cause of the body. — Fooloso4
I see an ontological distinction between humans and animals - not on account of 'special creation', as I fully accept the evolutionary account of human origins, but because of the ability of the human to see beyond the sensable. — Wayfarer
I have started on that, courtesy of your previous recommendation. — Wayfarer
My remarks about Plato and 'this secular age' were not directed at you in particular, it's a general observation. — Wayfarer
I understand that our interpretations are at odds, but I have appreciated the opportunity of explaining my approach. — Wayfarer
These two ideas, that there is such a thing as the soul, and that each part of the body is itself a "self-organizing" entity, is what Socrates demonstrates are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover
The argument leads to the conclusion that the soul must be prior to the body — Metaphysician Undercover
“… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)
But it is necessary that you have different opinions as long as this thought of yours sticks around - that a tuning is a composite thing and a soul a sort of tuning composed of bodily elements tensed like strings. (92b).
“But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning.”
(92c)
When the logic tells you that the soul must be the cause of the body ... — Metaphysician Undercover
t is what he argues against. He does this by changing the terms of the argument. His argument is based on a pre-existing soul, something that is not part of Simmias' argument. — Fooloso4
We can proceed from the premise of "harmony" to a need for something which directs and orders the parts ... — Metaphysician Undercover
First, there is no need for something to order the parts. If you assume that the parts together need to be ordered, then each part would also need to be ordered because each part of the body has an order. — Fooloso4
Second, in accord with Socrates' notion of Forms something is beautiful because of Beauty itself. Something is just because of the Just itself. Something is harmonious because of Harmony itself. Beauty itself is prior to some thing that is beautiful. The Just itself is prior to some thing being just. Harmony itself is prior to some thing being harmonious. In each case there is an arrangement of parts.
The question is, why did Socrates avoid his standard argument for Forms? It is an important question, one that we should not avoid. — Fooloso4
I don't see the point here. What you are referring to is the theory of participation, which I believe comes from the Pythagoreans. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, each part needs to be ordered, — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you think that the parts just happen to meet up, and decide amongst themselves, to join together in a unity? — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is with the active/passive relation. — Metaphysician Undercover
I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. (100e)
The source, or cause of activity must come from the Idea, or Form, rather than from the particular thing — Metaphysician Undercover
Plato finds justice in the city to consist in each part “having and doing its own,” and since the smaller is just like the larger, justice in the individual consists in each part of the psyche doing its own work.
The soul, according to his argument, brings life to the body. — Fooloso4
[His response to Simmias' argument is that you can't have it both ways. You can't have both the soul existing before the body and the soul being a harmony of the parts of the body.] — Fooloso4
Right. In this case the Form would be Harmony. Just as a beautiful body is beautiful by the Beautiful, the harmonious body is harmonious by the Harmonious. — Fooloso4
I think you are being taken for a ride. There is no "Form of Harmony". — Apollodorus
There is no “Form of Harmony” in Plato for the simple reason that what we call “harmonious” in Modern English, is “rightly-ordered” or “just” (depending on the context) in Plato. So, the corresponding Form would be Justice, not “Harmony” which does not exist.
In Plato, the proper functioning of a whole, be it a city or a human, is not harmony but justice or righteousness (dikaiosyne). Dikaiosyne is the state of the whole in which each part fulfills its function: — Apollodorus
Right, I think Fooloso4 is reaching for straws here, going outside the argument. and I don't see the point. — Metaphysician Undercover
… if he met a man who thought he understood harmony [literally, harmonikos]because he could strike the highest and lowest notes … (Phaedrus. 268d)
I don't think this is quite what he is saying. — Metaphysician Undercover
“… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.” (92a)
“... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease.” (95d)
“Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?
Cebes: A soul.” (105c)
That is the problematic perspective further analyzed to a great extent in the Timaeus. — Metaphysician Undercover
To say that there is a body first, and then life is put into it is not consistent with our observations of living things. — Metaphysician Undercover
… we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness [i.e. the properties of the four elements], and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed … Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?” (86b, 86d)
It is probable that as the eyes are fixed on astronomy, so the ears are fixed on harmonic movement, and these two kinds of knowledge are in a way akin, as the Pythagoreans say and we, Glaucon, agree ...
we'll inquire of the Pythagoreans what they mean about them ... (Republic 530d-e)
It isn't these men I mean but those whom we just now said we are going to question about harmony.
They do the same thing astronomers do. They seek the numbers in these heard accords and don't rise to problems, to the consideration of which numbers are concordant and which are not, and why in each case. (Republic 531c)
... the tuning is something invisible and bodiless and something altogether divine in the tuned lyre ... (Phaedo 86a)
we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness [i.e. the properties of the four elements], and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements (86b).
The soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in death (86d).
You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?”
“Certainly not, Socrates.” (92a – b)
“Well,” said he, “there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?”
“The former, decidedly, Socrates,” he replied (92c)
- D. Gallop, Phaedo, p. 91The word translated as ‘attunement’ (harmonia) is often given as ‘harmony’. But the associations of that word in modern music are misleading, and the forthcoming argument will focus mainly upon the tuned state of the instrument
The tuning is not the thing that is tuned. The tuning is the octave, 4th, and 5th, the ratios according to which the strings of a lyre are tuned. Analogously, the tuning of the parts of the body too is in accord with the proper ratios. Again, the tuning should not be confused with the body that is tuned. — Fooloso4
Harmonia here does not mean a harmony in the sense of melodious sound, but the state of the lyre, brought about by a combination of things, that enables it to produce a certain sound: — Apollodorus
I already explained how this interpretation is faulty. "The tuning" is the act which tunes. — Metaphysician Undercover
... the tuning is something invisible and bodiless and something altogether divine in the tuned lyre ... (Phaedo 86a)
You continually ignore Socrates' reference to the activity of the soul — Metaphysician Undercover
... our body is strung and held together by warm and cold and dry and wet and the like, our soul is, as it were, a blend and tuning of these very things, whenever, that is, they're blended with one another in a beautiful and measured way. (86c)
Harmonia here does not mean a harmony in the sense of melodious sound
It isn't these men I mean but those whom we just now said we are going to question [the Pythagoreans] about harmony.
They do the same thing astronomers do. They seek the numbers in these heard accords and don't rise to problems, to the consideration of which numbers are concordant and which are not, and why in each case. (Republic 531c)
Knowledge of harmonic movement is not auditory, in is intelligible, it is knowledge of the ratios. What all harmony, whether it is music or parts of the soul or body or city, has in common is proper proportions of the parts or elements. It is not just a mixture or an ordered arrangement, it is a properly proportioned arrangement, one with the correct ratio of parts. — Fooloso4
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philolaus/#HarLimiters and unlimiteds are not combined in a haphazard way but are subject to a “fitting together” or “harmonia,” which can be described mathematically. Philolaus’ primary example of such a harmonia of limiters and unlimiteds is a musical scale, in which the continuum of sound is limited according to whole number ratios, so that the octave, fifth, and fourth are defined by the ratios 2 : 1, 3 : 2 and 4 : 3, respectively.
Philolaus presented a medical theory in which there was a clear analogy between the birth of a human being and the birth of the cosmos. The embryo is conceived of as composed of the hot and then as drawing in cooling breath immediately upon birth, just as the cosmos begins with the heat of the central fire, which then draws in breath along with void and time from the unlimited. Philolaus posited a strict hierarchy of psychic faculties, which allows him to distinguish human beings from animals and plants. He probably believed that the transmigrating soul was a harmonious arrangement of physical elements located in the heart and that the body became ensouled when the proper balance of hot and cold was established by the breathing of the new-born infant.
Fragment 1:
…since these beginnings [i.e. limiters and unlimiteds] preexisted and were neither alike nor even related, it would not have been possible for them to be ordered, if a harmony had not come upon them… Like things and related things did not in addition require any harmony, but things that are unlike and not even related … it is necessary that such things be bonded together by a harmony, if they are going to be held in an order.
In Fragment 6a Philolaus goes on to describe this harmony and what he describes is a musical scale, the scale known as the Pythagorean diatonic, which was used later by Plato in the Timaeus in the construction of the world soul. This scale provides Philolaus’ only surviving explicit example of the bonding together of limiters and unlimiteds by a harmony.
In the case of the cosmos as a whole, as we have just seen in Fr. 6, Philolaus argues that three starting points must be assumed, limiters, unlimiteds, and harmony, as a third element to hold these two unlike elements together.
The tuning is not the act of tuning, it is the ratio of frequencies according to which something is tuned. — Fooloso4
The cause of the lyre being in tune is not the activity of tightened and slackens the strings. If I give you a lyre you cannot tune it unless you know the tuning, unless you know the ratio of frequencies. It is in accord with those ratios that the lyre is in tune. The cause of the lyre being in tune is Harmony. — Fooloso4
Whether the body requires something else acting on it is never discussed. — Fooloso4
Do you not grasp the "ing" suffix on "tuning"? — Metaphysician Undercover
...the tuning is something invisible and bodiless and something altogether divine in the tuned lyre ... (Phaedo 86a)
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/tuningnoun [ U ]
the way an instrument or a string on an instrument is tuned:
The tuning on this piano is awful.
However, there is still a need for an "efficient cause", as the source of activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Philolaus presented a medical theory in which there was a clear analogy between the birth of a human being and the birth of the cosmos. The embryo is conceived of as composed of the hot and then as drawing in cooling breath immediately upon birth, just as the cosmos begins with the heat of the central fire, which then draws in breath along with void and time from the unlimited.
In the case of the cosmos as a whole, as we have just seen in Fr. 6, Philolaus argues that three starting points must be assumed, limiters, unlimiteds, and harmony, as a third element to hold these two unlike elements together.
Nature (physis) in the world-order (cosmos) was fitted together out of things which are unlimited and out of things which are limiting, both the world-order as a whole and everything in it. (Fr. 1)
the requirement of something else acting on it is discussed, throughout 94 — Metaphysician Undercover
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