My position on normative ethics is (aretaic) negative utilitarianism, wherein 'harm suffering misery' of members of any sentient species (at minimum) are consider 'moral facts' — 180 Proof

Suffering may be observable and obvious, but how does suffering constitute a moral fact? A moral fact is an invariable law, not a subjective experience like suffering, harm, misery, etc. - even though I concede that it is a fact that people suffer.

'moral facts' (that is, facts which entail reducing or preventing increases of them). — 180 Proof

It might be a fact that certain actions will increase or decrease suffering, but how are these moral facts? They do not provide an objective moral criterion, even if they tell us what to do given we accept that suffering is wrong.

The answers here are the same in large part because the criterion proposed in objectively grounded. Harm is the objective moral fact at issue: objective because it is specie member-invariant — 180 Proof

I'm not sure what you're saying here. If you mean harm/suffering is invariant between members of the same species that isn't true. One person's suffering often cannot be compared to another's.

The answers here are the same in large part because the criterion proposed in objectively grounded. — 180 Proof

It seems to me none of this is objectively grounded.

The answers here are the same in large part because the criterion proposed in objectively grounded. Harm is the objective moral fact at issue: objective because it is specie member-invariant; moral because it entails a meliorative (helping) response; fact because it indicates a natural species defect that when stressed risks dysfunction or worse. — 180 Proof

1. Only insofar as it increases harm to someone.
2. ditto
3. ditto — 180 Proof

The system works in the sense it can be applied. But, I can't suppose the outcome of your criteria. I don't want to assume to know and the matter be led off track. Feel free to supply any missing necessary details. My guess is all three answers won't be the same. To me destroying things that express beauty are at least an intrinsic harm to the possible increase in the quality of life they produce.

It delivered the worst humans have ever done. Slavery, Genocide, Illegal Downloading... — Cheshire

This is a bit too silly.

People didn't enslave others because they believed the rightness or wrongness of it was relative, that doesn't even make sense as an explanation (as Isaac has pointed out). They did it because they believed that their superiority over the races they enslaved and their God-given right to do with the natural world as they pleased were objectively true and irrefutable. Same goes for genocide. I'm not sure illegal downloading, the odd one out in the list, causes much suffering at all.

How? No one seems to be presenting a mechanism connecting objectivity of morals to people being somehow unable to act or form beliefs contrary to them — Isaac

I'm glad the assumptions are being put to the test. I had largely taken it for granted that relativism is bad because, just cause..

No, I was focusing on your claim that there are just evil
people doing evil things. That is a quintessentially theological notion. Even if you don’t think of yourself believing in God, you clearly believe in Good( which is what defines as evil as what it is) , and for many theologians and philosophers this amounts to the same thing as God. — Joshs

I think that there might be some moral facts, and that maybe good can exist, but I have no faith in the matter. That would be the most important difference between my view and a theologian's.

Whether or not an action is objectively wrong is different from an action being right/wrong independent of the actor/situation. Moral absolutism says an action is intrinsically wrong regardless of the ends or actor, whereas an objective morality entails that ethical norms are not up to interpretation; they are laws like any other that one can simply point to. — ToothyMaw

I think we might disagree semantically, but the understanding of the implications seems to be the same. The opinion of the actor isn't a determining factor in the result; regarding the right or wrongness.

I think we might disagree semantically, but the understanding of the implications seems to be the same. The opinion of the actor isn't a determining factor in the result. — Cheshire

Yes, but it is more difficult to justify an objective morality than an absolute morality it seems to me. If you just want the act to be right regardless of opinion absolute morality satisfies that without you needing to prove that moral facts exist.

Yes, I get that, but on one side you have justified beliefs, and on the other totally unjustified. There is no symmetry except in terms of zeal perhaps. So I do not find it to be a useful comparison. — ToothyMaw

Perhaps it would help to examine your assumptions. Seems like you are missing the point. Hitler thought what he was doing was good - engaged in righteous foundational work for a new epoch of human greatness that would be celebrated for 1000 years. It's you that's determining what's justified and what is 'totally unjustified'. You don't find it a useful comparison because it looks like you can't see the perspectivism inherent in this matter.

I think that there might be some moral facts, and that maybe good can exist, but I have no faith in the matter. That would be the most important difference between my view and a theologian's. — ToothyMaw

What you just wrote is quite similar to the postmodern perspective of ‘religion after religion’ philosophers like John Caputo and Simon Critchley.

Perhaps it would help to examine your assumptions. Seems like you are missing the point. Hitler thought what he was doing was good - engaged in righteous foundational work for a new epoch of human greatness. It's you that's determining what's justified and what is totally unjustified. You don't find it a useful comparison because it looks like you can't see the perspectivism inherent in this matter. — Tom Storm

No, I see what you are saying, I just don't see why it matters. And it isn't a matter of perspective which beliefs are justified in this case - one belief is based in science whereas the other in something else entirely. Surely that makes a difference?

What you just wrote is quite similar to the postmodern perspective of ‘religion after religion’ philosophers like John Caputo and Simon Critchley. — Joshs

That was unintended.

My point was that I think you would find their work interesting and I’m betting you would relate to it. They reject just about all of the traditional trappings of religion: the trinity, a personal God, ritual, etc.

And it isn't a matter of perspective which beliefs are justified in this case - one belief is based in science whereas the other in something else entirely. Surely that makes a difference? — ToothyMaw

You are raising a separate matter - the justification of beliefs - I have not touched upon that. Morality is not a science. Remember too that Hitler based his ideas on 'race science' and eugenics and was supported by many highly educated academics and scientists. The science card is by no means straight forward either.

Good point. I agree.



I was talking to Tom, I know you meant that.

Well, since you quote everything but what you're asking about – and by your less than charitable reading of what you did quote – it's fair to assume you're looking for an ticky-tack argument and not a discussion. I can't help you with that.

Then you're not a negative utilitarian as I claim to be when I prefaced my answers.

If it could be argued coherently that they shouldn't do it because of some sort of absolute morality then maybe it could be stopped, however. — ToothyMaw

Again. How?

We find a book clearly written by God called "All the Morals" and in it is a passage which say "FGM is immoral". People who want to do FGM say "Well we're Immoral then" and carry on.

You're not saying anything about why people would stop doing something on finding out (or being convinced) that it was objectively or absolutely immoral. What is it about a thing's status in this magic Book of Immoral Things, or whatever, that makes people not do the things that are in it?

Not only are they worried about what’s morally permissible, their actions are bound by a strict moral justification. See Mein Kampf or the old and new testament But I get what you’re saying. In committing genocide they are rejecting one set of moral precepts
in favor of another. — Joshs

Sometimes. I think there are also cases where the narrative these people use is "Morals don't apply to me" or "morality is nonsense" etc. There are all sorts of available narratives, but yes, some grander purpose narrative is often chosen which they would see as 'moral'. Hopefully the point still carries. There's simply no status an action could be labelled with that would prevent people from deriving an alternative narrative within which doing the thing anyway was justified.

I had largely taken it for granted that relativism is bad because, just cause.. — Cheshire

Yes. You're not alone, clearly.

... why would it matter if morality was objective or not? Objectively wrong, or subjectively wrong, they don't care either way. Neither force people to do what's right. — Isaac

Same with laws: why bother with legistlating or just punishment since "neither force people to do what's right?" — 180 Proof

Well laws have both social and penal consequences for disobeying, yes? This is the point I'm trying to steer toward. If an objective morality had any power to persuade people to act in accordance with it, then that power would be, like laws, social peer pressure. But then objectivity is not required. Popularity is sufficient.

Laws themselves are not absolute. They change over the years and are different in different countries. Are we immoral in the UK for letting our young adults drink at 18 instead of 21?

It's the normative force that matters in getting people to behave, not the objectivity. Good social narratives, positive role-models, being valued by your community... all worth a hundred times more than an appeal to a supposedly objective fact about the world that people would happily disagree with no matter what the evidence.

I firmly believe things are right or wrong apart from who does them. But, I can't account for how this could be; because every case seems to be about an observer. — Cheshire

I think the problem is, that moral issues are by nature beyond what is simply 'objective'. Objectivity is fine to determine what is the case with respect to some quantifiable or measurable state of affairs, or where there is a basis of inter-subjective judgement. Examples would include jurisprudence, history, and other such subjects, where judgement is required, but is able to be referenced to a body of external knowledge, such as torts, or historical records, or export testimony, or peer review, and so on. In those cases, objectivity is certainly an attainable and worthy criterion.

But the problem is, moral judgements seem to require some criteria beyond what can be established with respect to specific subjects or domains of analysis. I think this is because they are bound up with very basic judgements about the nature of existence and the meaning of human agency. Consequently, they're grounded in very broad and general principles.

Although I'm not a Wittgenstein scholar, I sometimes cite these passages from his Tractatus:

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world
everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no
value exists--and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any
value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what
happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is
accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since
if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.


6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.


6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is
transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.4312 .... The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside
space and time. (It is certainly not the solution of any problems of
natural science that is required.)

Of course, the famous conclusion of this passage, and indeed the whole work, is 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'. Regardless, I think those passages are useful for asking why the question about the source of moral values is such a difficult one.

And morals are normative, conformity is habituated in childhood through socialization which includes pedagogy. Having learned to conform to the prevailing morals of civil society (i.e. customs), the young are groomed for compliance with the legal framework (i.e. laws, policies) instituted to regulate the political sphere. Laws are often immoral and morals are often illegal, the fit is not always perfect, but each habituates (via ???) normative conduct and expectations in the overwhelming majority of people (mostly strangers) living together in any (urban) cosmopolity. Yes, of course, whether morality is 'objective' or 'subjective' matters mostly to philosophers, sophists and clergy – pedagogues (ideologues); that behaviors are either permissible or not however, matters to everyone else who lacks the leisure or inclination to reflect on whether morals (i.e. the permissible) are public customs or private preferences with which each one of us regulates 'self-control'.

whether morality 'objective' or 'subjective' matters mostly to philosophers, sophists and clergy – pedagogues (ideologues); that behaviors are either permissible or not however, matters to everyone else who lacks the leisure or inclination to reflect on whether morals (i.e. the permissible) are public customs or private preferences with which to each one regulates 'self-control'. — 180 Proof

Exactly. Basically the point I've been making here. Whether morals actually are objective, absolute, subjective, or relative matters not one jot when it comes to people following them. They will do so on the basis of a little bit of biology and a huge slice of enculturation. No matter what philosophers think.

Well, since you quote everything but the what you're asking about – and by your less than charitable reading of what you did quote – it's fair to assume you're looking for an ticky-tack argument and not a discussion. I can't help you with that. — 180 Proof

What would a charitable reading look like? And yes, I am looking for a discussion, I just think you made a poor case for objective morality, that's all - otherwise I actually think your views on ethics are pretty solid.

We find a book clearly written by God called "All the Morals" and in it is a passage which say "FGM is immoral". People who want to do FGM say "Well we're Immoral then" and carry on. — Isaac

At the very least we could justify implementing laws that prevent things like FGM if there were an absolute morality.

Furthermore, there is obviously a connection to what the vast majority of people believe is permissible and their philosophical assumptions - even if those assumptions are naïve. Most people, even if they don't know what the term "free choice" means, for example, have a concept of what it is - or so I've noticed in some of my discussions with people who don't read philosophy - and it contributes to their conception of moral culpability.

The same goes for morality I believe: people often act on their beliefs, or believe them justified and thus try to codify them, based on the belief that their morality is absolute - an assumption many people share. If enough people believe themselves to know that their shared morality is justified they may push to outlaw abhorrent practices such as FGM.

I, once again, acknowledge that while there is nothing to guarantee that an absolute/objective morality would prevent people from acting counter to said morality, moral relativism gives cover for horrible stuff.

↪Cheshire Then you're not a negative utilitarian as I claim to be when I prefaced my answers. — 180 Proof

I am at least to some degree. The reduction of suffering alone is the best guiding principle for a moral theory. I'm not sure how to measure this in the case I presented. I don't expect destroying art to cause any suffering, but it seems morally wrong to needlessly destroy something that has intrinsic value. I thought by isolating the matter between a single actor and an object I might be able to extract some further insight. I do appreciate your input regardless.

Whether morals actually are objective, absolute, subjective, or relative matters not one jot when it comes to people following them. They will do so on the basis of a little bit of biology and a huge slice of enculturation. No matter what philosophers think. — Isaac

There may be some truth to this but ethicists/bio-ethicists contribute disproportionately to the policies of organizations/corporations/government, and it matters whether or not they believe in an absolute morality. So it can be fruitful to search for an absolute morality imo.

Yes, but it is more difficult to justify an objective morality than an absolute morality it seems to me. If you just want the act to be right regardless of opinion absolute morality satisfies that without you needing to prove that moral facts exist. — ToothyMaw

The trouble I gather is the result of tossing out the context of an action. An objective morality would still examine an action within the context it takes place. It seems like it sterilizes the matter for the sake of maintaining the position. Plenty of artist have destroyed works for materials or even burned them for heat. Ignoring the context just doesn't seem reasonable.

An objective morality would still examine an action within the context it takes place. — Cheshire

Potentially, but not necessarily. There could be the law: "Do not steal", which has no context, as opposed to the law: "Do not steal on the Sabbath". Both could be objective.

Ignoring the context just doesn't seem reasonable. — Cheshire

Good point; If you still want to take into account context you need either objective laws that take into account context or some sort of relativism.

I firmly believe things are right or wrong apart from who does them. — Cheshire

Possibly many/most people have this belief.

But, I can't account for how this could be; because every case seems to be about an observer.

This is where you differ from the people above. A consequent moral objectivist would either not ask about the origins of morality, or would be certain of a particular source of it. Either way, he would not struggle how to account for objective morality.
It appears that you're not a consequent moral objectivist.

An objective morality would still examine an action within the context it takes place. It seems like it sterilizes the matter for the sake of maintaining the position. Plenty of artist have destroyed works for materials or even burned them for heat. Ignoring the context just doesn't seem reasonable. — Cheshire

Are you familiar with Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral reasoning?

According to this theory, people at different stages of moral reasoning reason differently about issues of morality. On a metalevel, this explains the differences between people and how the same person can reason differently about the same moral issue, in different times of their life.