I can decide who and who not to respond to. — Wayfarer

No one's disputing that. Mainly I'm intrigued by your thought processes, but I do think it's a little impolite of you to post your condemnations of whole swathes of the population (scientists, materialists, positivists etc) if you know in advance don't intend to actually pursue that line of discussion. If you've no intention of engaging with positivists, or materialists then it's little more than boorish jeering to keep posting about how we're all wrong about everything.

If you've no intention of engaging with positivists, or materialists then it's little more than boorish jeering to keep posting about how we're all wrong about everything. — Isaac

Fair point. I am trying not to throw grenades, I used to do it a lot more. The thing is that modern culture, generally, presumes that the ‘scientific worldview’ is normative, kind of the arbiter of what is considered real. It is more like an undercurrent a lot of the time. My whole interest in philosophy started with counter-culturalism - I didn’t perceive it as being philosophy at all to begin with, but trying to understand what the popular Eastern teachers and books were pointing at. Plus I think I had a pre-disposition from early on in life - always had an instinctive sense about it. But when you call it out as ‘materialism’, it sounds accusative, when really it’s not. It’s trying to grapple with those elements in secular culture, when what I’m interested in is something altogether else.

When I was an undergraduate, the two books that aggravated me the most were A J Ayer’s Language Truth and Logic, and B F Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Eventually I majored in religious studies, which I stress was not theology or divinity but history of religious ideas. I did two years of undergrad philosophy and later in life began to appreciate the idea of the ‘perennial philosophy’ as represented in the classical Western tradition.

(Hey listen to this track. It’s the best single I’ve ever heard. It’s also about enlightenment.)

it's little more than boorish jeering to keep posting about how we're all wrong about everything. — Isaac

Besides, I don’t acknowledge doing that. Generally don’t think I can be accused of being discourteous although plainly my views are at odds with many others.

Interesting background, thanks.

As you may know, I'm a research psychologist. Although I'm retired now, I spent the vast majority of my career on beliefs and the factors which affect their formation, strength, defence...etc (particularly social factors). So you and I have perhaps a significant overlap in interests (though not in music it seems - waaay to pop-ish for my tastes, but I appreciate the exposure nonetheless).

My version -

...of course, Sonny really is blind, so they're talking about actual eyes and actual seeing...but you get the point.

Generally don’t think I can be accused of being discourteous although plainly my views are at odds with many others. — Wayfarer

I wasn't imputing your intentions. I was pointing out the consequences.

If you say "materialists have missed the point / got this wrong", that can be taken one of two ways.

Either you're presenting your view for discussion, or you're just jeering at materialists {"what a bunch of losers to have got it so wrong, am-I-right"}. If, in response to the materialists defence, you say "I don't discuss with materialists", the effect is to render your comment of the latter type, regardless of your intention. Not discussing the issue is as good an indicator that you didn't raise the matter for discussion as one could get.

By refusing to discuss the arguments, you appear to be taking the position that either eliminative materialists are wrong beyond question (which is, you'll forgive, more than a little dogmatic), or the position that eliminative materialism is not of interest to you (in which case, why keep bringing it up?). Do you see the problem?

It's not about which posts you reply to, it's about which debates you engage in. If the eliminate materialism debate doesn't interest you, then it might give less of a mixed message if didn't keep starting them. If it does interest you, but not the actual responses of the eliminative materialists themselves, then it's not really 'debate' you're interested in, is it? Difficult to understand the purpose of the post, if not for debate.

Conclusion: Thoughts are neither matter nor energy.

In other words, thoughts are nonphysical. — TheMadFool

I fully agree. I would like to make this more "real" by adding that while thought has no mass or wave length, it can create wave length and affect the phhysical universe. It is not and does not contain motion. It contains an image of mass, energy and motion. In this sense, it can be said that it is a "kind of energy", but which is not part of the physical universe.

Question: Is mind also nonphysical? If I see triangular objects (nonphysical things) popping out of a machine (the brain), there must be something triangular in that machine (the mind must be nonphysical). — TheMadFool

I can't answer staightly to this. Mind can be defined and described in different ways and in general it is something much more complicated than thought. It is easier to examine and describe functions, capabilities and in general parts of it separately.

I'm a research psychologist — Isaac

When “folk psychology” is spoken to you, what best describes what you hear, in a narrower sense of the term?

By refusing to discuss the arguments, you appear to be taking the position that either eliminative materialists are wrong beyond question (which is, you'll forgive, more than a little dogmatic), or the position that eliminative materialism is not of interest to you (in which case, why keep bringing it up?). Do you see the problem? — Isaac

Yes, I do see the point, although there are often grounds for a kind of 'mutual exasperation' in such discussions. There's the expectation that if you're going to criticize the role of science in culture, then you ought to have a good scientific reason for so doing. Allied with that, the expectation that if you do pursue that line of thought, then you must prefer to 'get your information from burning bushes' (I was actually told this recently).

Case in point is that I do think eliminative materialism is unquestionably wrong (and I'm not alone in that). It's an example of the self-reinforcing tendency in this kind of theory - it purports to be 'scientific', although actually it's not, because there's no way of demonstrating it scientifically, it's not a theory about anything objective. But it will only admit criticisms that it will agree are based on scientific premisses. That's the sense in which it is self-reinforcing.

Eliminative materialism exists due to the fact that the intrinsically subjective nature of conscious experience or existence, is out-of-scope for objective explanation as a matter of principle. So it means that conscious experience can't be accomodated within the supposedly comprehensive conceptual framework provided by the natural or objective sciences; it's an anomaly right in the middle of human nature, and must, therefore, be eliminated. Basically what it's arguing is that, if the mind is real in its own right, and not explicable in terms of physical principles, then materialism must be false. But rather that draw that conclusion, which I think is the obviously correct one, Dennet devises arguments, mainly based on evolutionary theory, that are, as one critic said, so preposterous as to verge on the deranged.

And this is something that critics of Dennett have been saying for 50 years - but none of it counts. He simply ignores the criticism, dismisses it as hand-waving. If no criticism can ever really be made, then who is being 'dogmatic'?

Also want to clarify that where I think the problem lies is not with science - for instance, I have zero regard for climate-change denial, anti-vaccination, or creationism - but in taking science as being authoritative with respect to human identity or the human condition.

Obviously 'the human condition' is a sweeping term, but it contains many elements that are - well, let's say, the subject of the Humanities department, rather than the Science department. This was actually one of the major concerns of Wittgenstein's philosophy, according to this essay by his biographer, which describes his criticism of 'scientism'

If the eliminate materialism debate doesn't interest you, then it might give less of a mixed message if didn't keep starting them. — Isaac

I presume this is missing the subject 'you didn't keep starting them'. I haven't started many of such threads, but I will often weigh in, usually when the opinion is expressed that humans 'are an arrangement of atoms' and are therefore understandable, in principle, in terms ultimately reducible to physical laws (in other words, physicalism). Again, it's a presumption, often not stated explicitly, but a kind of undercurrent or background to many conversations. And I even understand how this framework must seem obvious to a lot of people, because, as I was told, to question it is 'to believe in burning bushes'. There is the implication that either you accept the authority of science in all such questions, or you're a 'woo-merchant', as I'm regularly called, (even by yourself!) But, I am glad we have had this exchange of views, and I thank you for it.

:clap:

When “folk psychology” is spoken to you, what best describes what you hear, in a narrower sense of the term? — Mww

As I was arguing in one of the other threads about psychology (I can't remember if it was the "All psychologists are Nazis", or the "Psychology killed Jesus" thread, one of the enlightening, well-informed and balanced discussions we've had recently), we all have a whole slew of psychological theories. You have a model of how someone will respond given a particular set of circumstances, including yourself. That's what I understand to be 'folk psychology'. It's usually not far off the mark, we've been doing it for millennia after all.

there are often grounds for a kind of 'mutual exasperation' in such discussions. — Wayfarer

Indeed. This will probably be another such, but I'll come back on a few of the points you've raised. After all, that the point of this place.

There's the expectation that if you're going to criticize the role of science in culture, then you ought to have a good scientific reason for so doing. Allied with that, the expectation that if you do pursue that line of thought, then you must prefer to 'get your information from burning bushes' (I was actually told this recently). — Wayfarer

I think this is true, but what I experience is the less common, but annoying - 'if you don't agree with the 'woo' you must be cold robotic positivist with no philosophical understanding'. The cliches work in both directions.

I do think eliminative materialism is unquestionably wrong (and I'm not alone in that). It's an example of the self-reinforcing tendency in this kind of theory - it purports to be 'scientific', although actually it's not, because there's no way of demonstrating it scientifically, it's not a theory about anything objective. — Wayfarer

I don't find this to be the case. The extent to which I'm an eliminative materialist is entirely a model-based one. I think it's a good default position and the arguments I make for it are entirely pragmatic. I don't, nor would ever, claim that it can be supported on 'scientific' grounds. I think you over group non-woo ans science. They're not the same. What I detest about 'woo' is pretence, not anti-science. I don't care much about anti-scientific thinking. What I care about is people trying to get power over others by claiming to have 'secret' knowledge that only the enlightened can access, and all that bullshit. I don't just mean organised religion here. It goes all the way from the Pope, to some guy on the internet with a condescending "you wouldn't understand unless you've read...". It's all power plays and they piss me off (hence the occasional rant). If anyone came on claiming the Lord of the Rings was all true somehow I'd have no truck with them at all - believe what you like, just don't claim that only the enlightened can then talk to Frodo.

Eliminative materialism exists due to the fact that the intrinsically subjective nature of conscious experience or existence, is out-of-scope for objective explanation as a matter of principle. — Wayfarer

No. This is taking the way the world seems to you to be the way the world actually is. It seems to you as if consciousness was intrinsically subjective, it does not seem that way to others. Eliminative materialism doesn't agree with you about the intrinsic subjectivity and then rule it out of scope. It disagrees with you about the intrinsic subjectivity (or about it's nature, anyway).

This was the whole point I was making in the other thread. You claim that conscious experience is intrinsically subjective as a fact about what is the case. Yet you've derived this 'fact' by introspection alone...using your conscious experience of existence...the very thing you just argued was intrinsically subjective...So how exactly does it deliver you facts about the world which you can claim apply to others. It's just your story, the way things seem to you to be. It's not a description of the way the world is because, as 'science' has proven, measurements of the way the world is are observer dependant.

this is something that critics of Dennett have been saying for 50 years - but none of it counts. He simply ignores the criticism, dismisses it as hand-waving. If no criticism can ever really be made, then who is being 'dogmatic'? — Wayfarer

See, now this is an example of the problematic arguing style we started out with. Obviously critics of Dennett criticise him. It's tautologically true. It's not an argument in itself to say "some people disagree". Dennett is a Philosopher who is not only just as well educated as his critics, but has won awards for his work. He obviously does not 'hand waive' away criticisms. It seems to you that he does because you don't find the counter-arguments compelling, but again, the way things seem to you is not the way things actually are. Your conscious experience is unavoidably 'observer dependant' and does not simply deliver you an unfiltered understanding of the what is the case.

Also want to clarify that where I think the problem lies is not with science - for instance, I have zero regard for climate-change denial, anti-vaccination, or creationism - but in taking science as being authoritative with respect to human identity or the human condition. — Wayfarer

Again, I would have the same issue. Science is far too under-informed to be authoritative about something as vast as human identity and theories are too underdetermined by the data anyway, even if we had all the data in the world. The point is...so is any other approach.

I will often weigh in, usually when the opinion is expressed that humans 'are an arrangement of atoms' and are therefore understandable, in principle, in terms ultimately reducible to physical laws (in other words, physicalism). — Wayfarer

And it's good that you do. That's the great thing about these places, we get to hear from people with all sorts of perspectives. It just seemed a little unfair to weigh in as if your insight was worth hearing, but then when others try to explain why they think differently you say "I'm not interested". Seems a little one-sided is all, but I understand you don't necessarily mean it that way, I gather your intention from your earlier...

The thing is that modern culture, generally, presumes that the ‘scientific worldview’ is normative, kind of the arbiter of what is considered real. It is more like an undercurrent a lot of the time. — Wayfarer

I'd just say, take a look at the responses...

, for example. You're not David here. The crowd are cheerleading for your team, not mine, Dennett's the bogeyman, Nagel the enlightened sage...etc

It's just your story, the way things seem to you to be. — Isaac

:lol:

The extent to which I'm an eliminative materialist is entirely a model-based one. — Isaac

How do models arise in an eliminative materialist model?

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

How do models arise in an eliminative materialist model? — Olivier5

The definition I'm using of eliminative materialism is the SEP one...

Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist and have no role to play in a mature science of the mind. — SEP (my bolding)

So models arise in the same way as they might in most approaches to cognition. They're a named model of a neural network. Some people have kittens about models of models. If you're one of those then I can't help you I'm afraid.

So models arise in the same way as they might in most approaches to cognition. — Isaac

And how would that be, if you don't mind explaining?

And how would that be, if you don't mind explaining? — Olivier5

A model is just relation between the data from sensory receptors and the behaviour appropriate to it to reduce the uncertainty involved in any interaction. The models refine themselves by means of pursuing a minimum entropy gradient of fit between them and the external stimuli they're a model of.

It's generated by both the membrane potentials of particular neuronal populations and by the probabilistic mechanisms of neuron firing rates.

Basically, there's a higher metabolic cost to the neuronal architecture which is repeatedly delivering unexpected information relative to that which is expected so neuronal populations tend to develop networks which predict the signals from those beneath them. Part of the way they do this is suppressing noise from lower cortices using backward acting connections, partly they prune synapses within their own cluster whose discontinuity is highest (those that fire at rates in conflict with those from signals of lower hierarchies).

The higher the hierarchies, the more collated the data is that they're dealing with ('My Kitchen Table', as opposed to 'edge';'shadow';'light' etc). So higher hierarchies model the causes of signals from lower hierarchies.

The end result is that sensory data and interoception data is filtered through a system of neuronal circuits which are passing a filtered and modulated version of that data on to hierarchies above them based on an expectation of the cause of the signal. A model.

That's what I understand to be 'folk psychology'. — Isaac

Cool. Sorta liked that new-wave disco/pop (shudderchokegag) song in ‘85..... “Everybody wants to rule the world”
—————

Also want to clarify that where I think the problem lies is not with science (...) but in taking science as being authoritative with respect to human identity or the human condition.
— Wayfarer

Science is far too under-informed to be authoritative about something as vast as human identity (...) The point is...so is any other approach. — Isaac

Wouldn’t that depend on what one deems authoritative? If science cannot tell me I’m “deeply wrong**” about some mental state, because it is “far too under-informed”, merely from some “ordinary common sense understanding**” of my mind, why can I not then say I am authorized, if my understanding of my mind is substantially more than ordinary?

I think I should go so far as to insist there is an approach by which my mind is granted its own authority, simply from the fact that it is completely self-informed. Even if the authority is limited to a singular domain, it is nonetheless authoritative in and for it.

Which leads me to wonder.....what are some but not all of the specific mental states the existence of which are said to be denied by modern E.M. advocates? Just because, following Quine, it is a fact demons don’t exist, insofar as physicalism successfully refutes some mental objects, how does that refutation make the mental state of thinking demons, non-existent? It seems the only reconciliation is to say thinking demons is not a mental state, which appears altogether quite contradictory, insofar as to refute a thing presupposes the thought of it.

While I agree some mental states can have “no role to play in a mature science of the mind**”, it seems pretty hard to deny that all mental states have a definitive role to play in human activities generally. I mean....if they didn’t, how would we ever be able to distinguish the advent of our own errors?
(**SEP article on eliminative materialism)

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

This sounds unfortunate. One's world (reality) consists much more than words (language). It also contains images, sounds, feelings, experiences, ... In fact, one's world gets limited only when one tries to put it in words. This is what we mean when we say "I can't explain it in words ..."

Be your own "Wittgenstein" and let him be himself! :)

It's generated by both the membrane potentials of particular neuronal populations and by the probabilistic mechanisms of neuron firing rates. — Isaac

So your eliminative materialist model is generated by neurons in your brain, like some sort of 'woo'?

Wouldn’t that depend on what one deems authoritative? If science cannot tell me I’m “deeply wrong**” about some mental state, because it is “far too under-informed”, merely from some “ordinary common sense understanding**” of my mind, why can I not then say I am authorized, if my understanding of my mind is substantially more than ordinary? — Mww

Ah. I personally wouldn't go as far as to say science can't tell you you're deeply wrong. I think there are places it can do that. If you were to suggest that you recognise your cup because it's 'essence' is detected by your brain directly, we can come up with a whole slew of experiments to show that you're 'deeply wrong' about that (by which I mean that you'd have to do an awful lot of wriggling to keep that model alongside a whole bunch of other models I'm betting you rely on). There's also a load of stages in between (which is where you and I seem to sit) where I think science strongly suggests things to be otherwise, but nonetheless, alternative models are still workable. Call it shallowly wrong. The only measure we have of anything being 'right' is the degree to which it hangs together with other things we believe. The main advantage science has is that it uses a lot of empirical data which is the sort of data we build our most treasured models about (mummy, food, tigers - you get the picture). The sort of system I think you use is also strongly based on hanging together, but perhaps only with itself, so great for you, but perhaps less useful for understanding others?

what are some but not all of the specific mental states the existence of which are said to be denied by modern E.M. advocates? — Mww

I wouldn't want to speak for E.M advovates (sounds like a firm of solicitors), but for me things like qualia and 'experience'. I don't think there's anything it's 'like' to be me. Emotions as natural kinds (like anger and guilt) would also be on that list. But I think when we say we're 'remembering' something, for example, something is happening in the brain that answers to that general picture.

how does that refutation make the mental state of thinking demons, non-existent? It seems the only reconciliation is to say thinking demons is not a mental state, which appears altogether quite contradictory, insofar as to refute a thing presupposes the thought of it. — Mww

Yes. 'Thinking of...' is a tricky one. I'm comfortable with saying there's a mental state that could be called 'Thinking of ...', but it would have to be loose affiliation of states. I bet if you were 'thinking of' a daemon, you couldn't necessarily tell me how many toes it had, yet you'd surely say it had toes. One might be of the impression that when we 'think of' something we bring a picture of it to mind. That would be wrong, I think. Rather, we ready other parts of our mind in anticipation, we know the word for it, should we be called upon to speak it, we know the action for it (run, fight) should it actually appear, we know the things it's associated with... etc. I think it's more a linguistic problem than a psychological one. What answers to the word 'daemon' is just that which my use of the word will be understood in reference to, and that's a social enterprise, not an internal one.

it seems pretty hard to deny that all mental states have a definitive role to play in human activities generally. — Mww

Yeah, definitely. But note the complete absence of talk about qualia in normal life. It's an artefact of philosophers. The all too frequent framing of the debate about such things as being 'common sense' vs. 'science' is nonsense, common sense wouldn't touch qualia with a bargepole either.

So your eliminative materialist model is generated by neurons in your brain, like some sort of 'woo'? — Olivier5

Yes, that's right. The explanation I just wrote is like 'woo'. It's actually magic given only to humans by the great god Vishnu via the medium of dance, only known to those who''ve performed several rituals involving pentagrams and incense. Now that you've seen through it all, I'm really wishing I'd spent the last couple of decades of research siting in my armchair and having 'a bit of a think about it' so that I can really get down to the truth of the matter and brush all this 'woo' aside.

What's the difference between a person who looks around and concludes God must have made it happen, and a guy who looks around and concludes matter must have made it happen? Both develop a model, right?

I'm not part of a team nor do I agree with Wayfarer on everything. I just thought it was a well thought out reply. But likewise, I've got to give you credit for being so tenacious and articulate in the way you think about this topic. :up:

What's the difference between a person who looks around and concludes God must have made it happen, and a guy who looks around and concludes matter must have made it happen? Both develop a model, right? — Olivier5

Yes. The difference is in the quality of the model. If you have different criteria for what makes a good model, then different models are going to seem good to you. For many reasons, "God did it", seems useless to me - mainly because it doesn't give me anything by way of prediction and doesn't tie in with any other models (did God cause the pen to drop when I let go of it too?) - but others might like it.

I'm not part of a team nor do I agree with Wayfarer on everything. — Manuel

I know, I was just being facetious, my apologies.

I've got to give you credit for being so tenacious and articulate in the way you think about this topic. — Manuel

Cheers.

If you have different criteria for what makes a good model, then different models are going to seem good to you. — Isaac

Okay, so it all depends on what looks good to you.

It’s a story, the way things seem to be. That goes for anything anyone says here, apparently. Does make you wonder what the point of calling it a philosophy forum is, though.

This sounds unfortunate. One's world (reality) consists much more than words (language). It also contains images, sounds, feelings, experiences, ... In fact, one's world gets limited only when one tries to put it in words. This is what we mean when we say "I can't explain it in words ..."

Be your own "Wittgenstein" and let him be himself! :) — Alkis Piskas

What I meant to say was our world, i.e. our worldview, is determined by how many words (read concepts/ideas) we know/understand. In other words vocab is a good index of the richness of a life. For example if you don't know or don't recognize nautical terms it means your world is limited to land, you're what sailors call contemptuously a landlubber.

Okay, so it all depends on what looks good to you. — Olivier5

What's 'it' in that sentence?

What's 'it' in that sentence? — Isaac

Why, your eliminative materialist model generated by neurons in your brain. What else? If it looks good to your neurons, then it's good for you, but it doesn't look good to my neurons so it's not good for me.

Why, your eliminative materialist model generated by neurons in your brain. — Olivier5

So "it {your eliminative materialist model generated by neurons in your brain} all depends on what looks good to you"? Depends for what? the sentence doesn't even seem to make sense.