Making decisions relative to an emotion alone isn't as reliable. When decisions are large enough people have to put forward some type of reasoning or risk being seen derelict of a duty for due diligence. — Cheshire

Right you are. But you are swaying from the decision made on a moral basis. If logic is at the top of the list, and morality is at the bottom, then the reasons put forward would be the real ones. instead of saying that we are waging a war for the glory of god or for the embetterment of mankind, we would say we are waging a war to satisfy the greed of our leaders at the cost of many of our compatriot's death, suffering, maiming, mutilating and damaging psychologiclally. I guess that would not go down so well would it.

So logic is the trigger for wars, and ideology is the lie that covers the real reason to make sure the war will happen.

That's just it. You could ask a number of things, and they could answer a number of things. — god must be atheist

Well, if I can approach a problem that shows a moral judgement can be reasoned from a neutral position; then it contradicts the notion that morality of a win is side dependent.

How do you distinguish between an emotional reaction and moral calculation? If I am angry, does that mean some one did something wrong?

But wouldn't production naturally slow down if people weren't buying things and there was no tremendous military industrial complex draining the economy — ToothyMaw

Yes, production would slow down, workers would lose their jobs, and would buy even less. Less bought, production would plummet deeper down. Bunch of workers fired again. ETC. This is the prescription for the overproduction crisis, and this was the reason behind the Great Depression.

Well, if I can approach a problem that shows a moral judgement can be reasoned from a neutral position; then it contradicts the notion that morality of a win is side dependent. — Cheshire

That's just it; my examples showed that there is no neutral side in some moral questions. By the multitude of answers to the multitude of questions I aimed to demonstrate that any rationalization can be fabricated to support one's position.

So then it would be bad to reign in the military-industrial complex?

What if we just organized a vigorous infrastructure revitalization plan? Maybe that would drain enough to avoid the overproduction crisis?

How do you distinguish between an emotional reaction and moral calculation? If I am angry, does that mean some one did something wrong? — Cheshire

All moral calculations contain some emotional reaction, but not all emotional reactions are part of moral calculations.

That's just it; my examples showed that there is no neutral side in some moral questions. By the multitude of answers to the multitude of questions I aimed to demonstrate that any rationalization can be fabricated to support one's position. — god must be atheist

You are implying they are all equally valid?

What if we just organized a vigorous infrastructure revitalization plan? Maybe that would drain enough to avoid the overproduction crisis? — ToothyMaw

You are absolutely right! In fact, in minor depressions this is the described practice by economists. The great highways, the damns, the huge infrastructure works are done in times when production is low. These activities suck up the work force, so employment levels go higher, and the economy recovers.

All moral calculations contain some emotional reaction, but not all emotional reactions are part of moral calculations. — god must be atheist

Ok, what else is contained in a moral calculation.

You are implying they are all equally valid? — Cheshire

I don't like that question, because it shows to me you haven't been getting my point.

They are equally valid in two groups: valid for one group with one set of answers, and valid for the other group with a different set of answers. The validity is decided on whom the answer vindicates morally. To one group those questions will be valid that morally vindicate them; to the other group, conversely so.

There is no objective morality in the world of voluntary morals. This is the point of my paper as well. You actually took exception to my mentioning that in only one sentence in the paper. You wanted to see more of that, but to me it has always been clear. I did not want to clutter the paper with proving already accepted truths.

To you and to some others in this thread it may be not self-evident, that morals are never absolute and objective. Just think of cannibalism and burning witches at the stakes. Some cultures foster it, some cultures are abhorred by it. Voluntary (acquired) morals are not pervasive over all cultures. That's very much one of the points in my paper.

Ok, what else is contained in a moral calculation. — Cheshire

I am talking voluntary moral calculations.
- peer induced moral values
- whether the actor accepts them or not
- if the actor does not accept and internalilze them, then there is no moral calculation
- if the actor accepts them then most acts are straightforward
- acts become not straightforward when an accepted and internalized voluntary moral contradicts other internalized morals -- this is the only time of conflict, when the person will act to the outside world unpredictably, and according to the actor, as he sees how he or she makes the decision, weighing the pros and cons between two choices.

They are equally valid in two groups: valid for one group with one set of answers, and valid for the other group with a different set of answers. The validity is decided on whom the answer vindicates morally. To one group those questions will be valid that morally vindicate them; to the other group, conversely so. — god must be atheist

Wouldn't this dissolve the meaning of the word "bias". We recognize the degree to which a person's interest can mistakenly be injected into their perception. It's the reason some decisions are made best by a neutral party. A bias decision shouldn't be as equally valid as an unbiased decision.

I don't like that question, because it shows to me you haven't been getting my point. — god must be atheist

I was simply verifying your point. Proclaiming all positions equal simply because they are positions is rather bold. You did verify it in a qualified sense, so I wasn't too far off the trail. Is it an immoral question, because of how you feel? Why not?

:lol:

So where does that even leave us? — ToothyMaw

I think those who're concerned about moral systems are really concerned about influence, not rightness, They already seem to have a pretty robust (if net even a little dogmatic) opinion about what's right, what they're looking for is a stick with which to beat their opponents. The hope is that absolute morality will be such a stick. If saying "you shouldn't walk past the homeless" isn't working, maybe "you absolutely shouldn't walk past the homeless, I proved it" will. At the end of the day, they just don't want people walking past the homeless.

The trouble is that people don't make their decisions on the basis of what some philosopher says (even 'philosopher' with a small 'p', and even when that philosopher is themselves). Most rationalisations are post hoc, the decision's already been made and the rational argument is engaged to try and support it. Moral decisions are at the most extreme end. The gut feelings which viscerally repulse us from harming the innocent child aren't going to be overridden any time soon by the results of a parlour game like philosophy.

It's easy enough to get people to behave more morally - make sure they feel welcomed and valued in some social group and then set the membership criteria of that group as consistent moral behaviour (whatever your chosen brand of 'moral' is). It doesn't matter that you can't work out exactly what is right in certain edge cases because their being edge cases precisely means that there's no clear right or wrong. The problem is not the unresolved dilemmas, it's the inability to live with them.

Seems contradictory. If anything can be framed by how much suffering it causes, then it seems to follow that every metric can be converted. All that's required is to measure the suffering caused by it's valence. — Isaac

The OP is available for confounding this demonstration. — Cheshire

I don't see how. Smashing the painting would be morally wrong. It would be wrong because doing so would make you the kind of person who could destroy beautiful things without revulsion and removing that revulsion which prevents you from doing so could lead to suffering in future as you're no longer held back when feeling the urge to destroy something. Many beautiful things give value to society and cause suffering when they're lost. It's the same argument against things like torturing androids, or showing violent films to children. No one is harmed, at the time but the consequences of removing the barriers to such behaviour present a risk of harm in the future.

I'm not saying this is necessarily an absolute truth, with regards to the painting. I'm just showing how your instincts about moral actions can be framed in terms of suffering even when there's no subject to suffer at the time. Many moral duties are about cultivating good moral sense to protect people from harm later on, they're not necessarily about harm at the time.

I don't see how. Smashing the painting would be morally wrong. It would be wrong because doing so would make you the kind of person who could destroy beautiful things without revulsion and removing that revulsion which prevents you from doing so could lead to suffering in future as you're no longer held back when feeling the urge to destroy something. — Isaac

I think this is a valid response. I could argue we have to reach a little to get to suffering, but it's well within reason. Thanks for the direct analysis.

Is it an immoral question, because of how you feel? Why not? — Cheshire

The question I did not like because it showed you did not get my point. I never said because it was immoral. I never said because how it made me feel. I did not like it because -- you know. Because it revealed that you did not get my point.

I said so, and then you had to go and invent a number of OTHER reasons -- none of which were indicated or hinted at -- why I may not have liked that question.

If any of those invented concerns were the real reason why I did not like your question, I either would have said so, or admitted to them. But I don't admit to them, because... because the reason I did not like your question was that it revealed you did not get my point.

There is no objective morality plane and simple

No, but it's not morality either, which involves how we ought to act toward each other. If there's no other (either in one's reality, or in one's calculus) then there's no moral question to answer. — Isaac

So you wouldn't consider, for example, masturbation a moral issue?

So you wouldn't consider, for example, masturbation a moral issue? — baker

As I said...

Many moral duties are about cultivating good moral sense to protect people from harm later on, they're not necessarily about harm at the time. — Isaac

... I don't doubt that if someone wanted to make a moral case against (or for) masturbation, they would have no trouble framing it in terms of future harms.

There is no objective morality plane and simple — MAYAEL

Hitchen's Razor applies here.

The question I did not like because it showed you did not get my point. I never said because it was immoral. I never said because how it made me feel. I did not like it because -- you know. Because it revealed that you did not get my point. — god must be atheist

It seems to me you didn't like the question, because it implied I questioned the conclusion. Your point was to demonstrate that different people may assert different positions concerning the same 'moral' event. You proceed to show how each person's position is valid to them; and suppose they are justified in this validity. Simply, because it follows from their particular bias's surrounding the event.

Which produces a bit of a hole in the system. We intuitively know a bias opinion is more likely to be in error. But, the idea you are putting forward suggests otherwise. Specifically, the notion that one's emotional reaction to a decision validates one's position. Which is absurd and demonstrated by the questions I asked. But, you couldn't point this out because it follows from the idea you are putting forward.

If any of those invented concerns were the real reason why I did not like your question, I either would have said so, or admitted to them. But I don't admit to them, because... because the reason I did not like your question was that it revealed you did not get my point. — god must be atheist

You've said "did not get my point" a suspicious number of times. I asked if you meant they were all equally valid, which you confirmed. Which is not what, not getting a point means. It's like pontificating from a position that has no authority. I suppose that makes the activity less offensive .

1. In general, yes. You are harming those who would have otherwise enjoyed and benefitted from the painting. And you are harming the painter, who invested part of their life in the creation.
2. In this case, you are only harming yourself. If you hate the painting, destroy it.
3. Here only the first harm of 1. applies, not necessarily the second.

Morality can be objective as you like, presuming you accept axoims: i.e. harming others is bad. In this way it is as objective as math.

1. In general, yes. You are harming those who would have otherwise enjoyed and benefitted from the painting. And you are harming the painter, who invested part of their life in the creation.
2. In this case, you are only harming yourself. If you hate the painting, destroy it.
3. Here only the first harm of 1. applies, not necessarily the second. — EdgarAllenDoh

Thanks for addressing the OP. It's strange to me; if I was watching this event I wouldn't be thinking about the people that would never see it or the painter. I believe I would consider the act immoral based on the direct injury to the object. I think a momentary faux personhood by virtue of it's ability to possess and deliver meaning would be the subject of harm. In your answer to number 2, you dropped the painter. I was wondering why. Number 3 seems consistent.

We know people can see other paintings and gleam comparable joy. If I can show that an immoral act can be against an object; then I've demonstrated an objective morality is more likely to exist?

Fake acct., I was trying to post an extra story in the story contest, haha.

It's strange to me; if I was watching this event I wouldn't be thinking about the people that would never see it or the painter. I believe I would consider the act immoral based on the direct injury to the object. I think a momentary faux personhood by virtue of it's ability to possess and deliver meaning would be the subject of harm. — Cheshire

Same.

I think the axiom I proposed is too narrow. Harming reservoirs of value is bad. Not just humans are reservoirs of values. Animals are, and the environment, and paintings.

In your answer to number 2, you dropped the painter. I was wondering why. — Cheshire

I guess I felt it is effectively destroyed for him, since he will never see it.

If I can show that an immoral act can be against an object; then I've demonstrated an objective morality is more likely to exist? — Cheshire

Sounds like a different meaning of "objective".

Harming reservoirs of value is bad. Not just humans are reservoirs of values. Animals are, and the environment, and paintings. — hypericin

:up: I very much appreciate this formulation. It crystallizes beautifully what I tried to express here. Thanks.

Sounds like a different meaning of "objective". — hypericin

It hints at being too literal. I meant the ability to establish morality without the perception of any person being injured. The painting is indifferent. Often, morality relies on the golden rules, suffering, means to ends, human relationships, etc. Here we've taken away the ability to measure a human reaction and still made a determination. So, it implies a person can act on the world in an immoral way. Ergo, morality exists beyond the human perception of it. It isn't something we made up in the sense that it isn't arbitrary; like the validity given to a preference.

If the answers to the questions proved to be contradictory, then it would make a case to the contrary. At least, that was the assumption in trying to produce a test. I did have to insert myself hypothetically in order to make the determination, so there's plenty of counter argument to be made.

Here we've taken away the ability to measure a human reaction and still made a determination. — Cheshire

The counterargument here is that values ultimately rest on the human, and (probably) animal. They do not have independent existence.

Could an object be beautiful if no one considered it so? Clearly not. So with value.

I firmly believe things are right or wrong apart from who does them. But, I can't account for how this could be; — Cheshire

If you're asking if there is something objective about an immoral act, I would say there is, viz., the harm done. So, for example, if I cut someone's arm off for no good reason, then I've committed an immoral act by definition. One can objectively see the harm done, viz., the arm severed from the body, the blood, the screams of pain, the pain of onlookers, etc., these objective components can be seen by any rational onlooker. The objective harm done in this example is clearly definable, and in most immoral acts the objective harm done is clearly observable. There are cases where the harm done is not so clear, and in those cases it may take more study to understand if harm has really be done, but it's clear to me that harm is a property of all immoral acts. This is not to say that whenever a harm is done that it's necessarily immoral, but only to say that all immoral acts have this property.

This only answers part of your question, but it's an important part.