I don't have to assume what your comments reveal. And in any case, my point about becoming more familiar with the discipline was just a repetition of what I had said earlier—namely, that it is the only response left when this sort of impasse arises. It's not an insult, but rather an admission that there's nothing else to say. But I see you have again chosen to focus on the parts of my response that bruised your ego rather than the substance. Given that, perhaps I should accept your own admission that you are not capable of responding fruitfully. So be it.

No, it seems to be your excessive focus on 'being right' that leads to you assume (again, and incorrectly) that my ego is bruised. It's your tendency to assume that you know where I am coming from and your patronizing tone which makes me feel a sense of the futility of responding. I'm just not interested in the kind of pedantic conversation you seem to be offering.

However, since you seem to be complaining that I didn't respond to the part of your previous post that had "substance" I will respond to that, as one last attempt to engage with your way of thinking.

My point from the beginning has not been that philosophy has, or can have, no practical applications, just that whatever applications it may be argued to have are not as obvious and unarguable as the applications of science to technology. For examples, the application of QM to electronics, Relativity Theory to GPS, microbiology to genetic engineering of crops, and so on; I mean, the possible list of direct and obvious applications of science is no doubt huge.

I don't know why you think that a posited pre-scientific existence of technology, even if true, (and I think that whether you counted it as true would depend on your definitions of the terms 'science' and 'technology') would qualify as an argument against obvious practical applications of science.

I would agree that any improvement of general thinking ability attributable to philosophy could count as a general contribution to human practical abilities, but not as a direct and obvious practical application. This difference in our ways of thinking about this may be simply due to our different interpretations of the term 'practical'. I also don't count 'living well', which is a term subject to an enormous range of different interpretations, as being a term that denotes a purely or obviously practical matter.

If you think that my thinking this way displays my "unfamiliarity with the discipline" (as though philosophy were a single well-defined discipline) rather than being merely due to different familiarities and interpretations than yours, then so be it. Conversely, I may think that you are only familiar with an excessively narrow ambit of the "discipline" such that it allows you jump to such an unwarranted conclusion. If we disagree on these accounts then we are going to have to be content to agree to disagree, because any further conversation will consist in talking past or insulting one another. For me this would just be a waste of time.

For sure, any thought may feed into the practical, but to say that is not the same as to say that it has direct and obvious practical applications, the way chemistry, physics, geology or genetics, for example, do. — John

If I may interject, I believe Russell held this position regarding his own profession of philosophy. The last chapter in his book "The Problems of Philosophy" talks directly about the value of philosophy. He criticizes the man who does not seek knowledge for its own sake (or at least does not respect this tradition), because they are perpetually locked into a tyranny of common sense.

He would agree with your assessment that philosophy is not meant to enhance the community (as do I). If any value is to be found in philosophy, it is what it can do to the individual; and any residual effects afterwards are seen as something to be appreciated, not expected.

Yes, but it's worth noting that science too is (ideally at least) practiced for its own sake and not for any practical benefits that may follow from its practice. If happiness comes from pursuing knowledge for its own sake, then PB would probably say that it therefore contributes to living well and so counts as a practical application. I think, as I must have already made obvious, that this is too broad a conception of "practical application".

If you and Russell agree with me in thinking this, then so much the worse for you, for it would seem that according to PB's position, this would show that you and Russell are both not sufficiently "familiar with the discipline" ;) .

I think the pursuit of knowledge should only be restricted by ethics. To hear people say there needs to be a practical aspect of philosophy is quite disappointing. (Y)

I think the pursuit of knowledge should only be restricted by ethics. To hear people say there needs to be a practical aspect of philosophy is quite disappointing. (Y) — darthbarracuda

Did you mean to write 'should not' here db?

No, I meant should. The ethical implications of research should be the only factor that decides whether or not a body of knowledge is worth pursuing.

I assume that you mean by "ethical implications" something like "implications for living well". According to the standpoint I have arguing against this would be synonymous with "practical implications", so it certainly seems you do want to separate the ethical from the practical, else your position would be self-contradictory.

In relation to regulating research on this basis (if that is what you mean) the question that comes up for me is whether we can know (always if not ever) beforehand just what the ethical implications of any research would be. The other question I have is whether by research you mean any and all kinds of research including, for example, historical, sociological, economic and philosophical inquiry.

In relation to regulating research on this basis (if that is what you mean) the question that comes up for me is whether we can know (always if not ever) beforehand just what the ethical implications of any research would be. — John

That's true. Hadn't considered that.

What I meant was that a person who studies archaeology simply to learn more about the ancient history of the earth's biological organisms would be perfectly justified in saying their job is worthwhile even if it does not give any "practical" gifts to society. But a sociopath who tortures mice in various ways to see how long mice can endure physical pain is not justified in saying their activities are worthwhile. They might be intellectual (the sociopath might actually be curious to know the survival rates of mice), but the method of inquiry is horribly unethical.

No, it seems to be your excessive focus on 'being right' that leads to you assume (again, and incorrectly) that my ego is bruised. — John

If I were focused on "being right," I wouldn't be admitting that my argumentative resources had run out on the issue. Instead, I'd be trying to bring new ones to bear. I do find it interesting, however, that you seem perfectly comfortable denying that I can infer anything about your attitudes from what you've written while simultaneously attempting to do the same based on what I've written (particularly given how many times you have misinterpreted my posts so far). Curious.

My point from the beginning has not been that philosophy has, or can have, no practical applications, just that whatever applications it may be argued to have are not as obvious and unarguable as the applications of science to technology. — John

I have already acknowledged this. I will do it again now for what I think is the fourth time. But I deny that philosophy has no obvious applications, and I will also deny your new claim that the applications of science are unarguable. Leaving aside the "pedantic" point that everything is arguable, I think anything that can be said against the obviousness or unarguability of the applications of philosophy (and I will take this opportunity that I have only claimed that the applications of philosophy are—or at least ought to be—obvious and not that they are unarguable) can be said just as well against the obviousness or unarguability of the applications of science.

For examples, the application of QM to electronics, Relativity Theory to GPS, microbiology to genetic engineering of crops, and so on; I mean, the possible list of direct and obvious applications of science is no doubt huge. — John

These are clearly applications of science to technology. Are they obvious? I doubt that the average person realizes how QM has affected electronics, how relativity has affected GPS, and so on. So common knowledge must not be the measure of obviousness. This rather supports my contention that one might need to know quite a bit about philosophy to understand the "obviousness" of its applications. Thus I would return to my example of democracy, which would not and could not exist in the form it does today without philosophy.

I don't know why you think that a posited pre-scientific existence of technology, even if true, (and I think that whether you counted it as true would depend on your definitions of the terms 'science' and 'technology') would qualify as an argument against obvious practical applications of science. — John

I don't. I think it narrows the range of objections you can use against the claim that philosophy also has obvious implications. It's a fairly straightforward strategy: every time you make a claim against philosophy, I point out that the same point can be made against science; and every time you try to limit what sort of philosophy counts for the purposes of our discussion, I make sure that the same limitation applies to what we are counting as science.

I would agree that any improvement of general thinking ability attributable to philosophy could count as a general contribution to human practical abilities, but not as a direct and obvious practical application. — John

I see that you are once again moving the goalposts. "Direct" is yet another new addition to the claim you are trying to defend. I hereby reject this moving of the goalposts and insist on sticking to the original claim: that philosophy does not have obvious applications in a way that science does. As such, is your objection to the conjunction "direct and obvious" based on directness, obviousness, or both? If it is only based on directness, then we have entered into a different conversation.

This difference in our ways of thinking about this may be simply due to our different interpretations of the term 'practical'. I also don't count 'living well', which is a term subject to an enormous range of different interpretations, as being a term that denotes a purely or obviously practical matter. — John

In which case you are misusing the terms. You might as well go to a physics forum and insist that relativity is false only to reveal several posts later that you meant moral relativism. Because on a philosophy forum, saying that "living well" does not count as a practical matter is nearly as bad as talking about colorless green ideas sleeping furiously. (Please note that I said "nearly.")

If I may interject, I believe Russell held this position regarding his own profession of philosophy. — darthbarracuda

If you and Russell agree with me in thinking this, then so much the worse for you, for it would seem that according to PB's position, this would show that you and Russell are both not sufficiently "familiar with the discipline." — John

More misreading, I see. As darthbaraccuda explicitly noted, Russell was talking about the profession. I am not. Moreover, Russell's claim that we ought to seek knowledge for its own sake regardless of whether it has any practical applications is clearly consistent with the claim that it in fact has such applications (and even with the claim that such applications are obvious). Nor is my claim limited to community benefits. Russell recognizes a benefit to the individual that would fit quite well into the category of living well.

I have already acknowledged this. I will do it again now for what I think is the fourth time. But I deny that philosophy has no obvious applications, and I will also deny your new claim that the applications of science are unarguable — Postmodern Beatnik

The fact that Quantum theory has enabled the development of electronics is an example of a direct application of theory to practice and hence very obvious, and unarguably the case. The same can be said for Relativity theory and GPS, gene theory to genetic modification and I have no doubt there are plenty of other examples, but these examples suffice for the point.

Can you cite even a single example of such a direct and hence obvious practical application of any specific philosophical theory? If you can't then, so be it, that is all I have been arguing, despite your attempts to deflect the discussion onto other considerations, including my personal reactions.

I think it is rich that you claim that I have misread you; can you give an example of that? If you say that I have misread you in the sense that I haven't noticed that you agreed with my original point about the more obvious practical applications of science compared to philosophy then I don't know what you think we have been arguing about, since that was my only point.

Your claim that I am misusing the term "living well" is laughable. All terms are subject to interpretation; and "living well" would have to one of the more obvious examples. Just look at the multifarious ways in which people actually do choose to live to educate yourself about that. It's a cheap cop out to accuse your interlocutor of misusing terms, instead of providing an actual argument for the rightness of some specific usage you are purporting is the correct one. What is, in your opinion, the very specific meaning of "living well" that I am, according to you, not getting?

In your last paragraph you incorrectly accuse me of misreading. I think you should focus on your own reading; I wrote "If you and Russell agree with me...." I made no claim that Russell did agree with me.

You are treating the idea of practical application so broadly as to be able to easily, but I think vacuously, claim that we should think of living well as a practical matter.