Mmm, I would say that the world is the totality of perception, whether one knows or does not know the factual quality of something.

the world is the totality of perception — Heister Eggcart

Perception of what?

Potential.

That would require magic, not omniscience. Potential is an object of thought, not perception.

this is essentially saying another way that the totality of facts is that and only that what an omniscient being can perceive. — Question

You hd best fill in the gaps if you want to proceed.

There is no mention of perception in "The world is the totality of facts". So it must be introduced by some other assumption. What is your hidden assumption?

This can go about two way's and Wittgenstein choose the rather treacherous/fallacious path of solipsism in the Tractatus and with it private languages if I dare say so. The other path he could have taken is to assert a dichotomy between the self and an object but instead encapsulated both in language by saying that the limits of my language are the limits of my world (as if one could not learn a new word or fact), and the rest of the Tractatus would have fallen apart in my opinion.

I think the Investigations show's that solipsism was the wrong path to take.

There are obviously infinite modalities to states of affairs and the world, after all, is not two dimensional.

The world just is. Facts are something we create from our intersection with the world as part of forming knowledge. Facts are a knowledge construct, even though they are about the world. But they are not the world, as if facts could exist independent of any minds.

I don't follow that.

Where does perception fit? Especially since the term does not appear in the Tractates.

Perception doesn't fit in with solipsism in the Tractatus, is what I'm saying.
Marchesk explained the issue.

Facts are a knowledge construct, even though they are about the world. But they are not the world, as if facts could exist independent of any minds. — Marchesk

I think I detect a change in your overall take on this from the Marchesky of yore. (Of course, I could be wrong).

This bit?

The world just is. Facts are something we create from our intersection with the world as part of forming knowledge. — Marchesk

That's just the ambiguity in English of "fact". Witti is very clear in setting out facts as distinct from statements of fact. Marchesk is just backtracking on that distinction.

I would say that the world is the totality of perception — Heister Eggcart

Facts are a knowledge construct, even though they are about the world. But they are not the world, as if facts could exist independent of any minds. — Marchesk

Nonsense solipsism

eh?

The world is the totality of things.

The world is the totality of things. — quine

The world is a totality of fields?

I'm not sure if people can look past through the profundity of this statement; but, this is essentially saying another way that the totality of facts is that and only that what an omniscient being can perceive. — Question

Inspired by the recent thread on Zeno's paradox, I shall prove that no "totality of facts" can exist:

Let T be the set of all facts T={t1, t2, t3, ...}

Consider, further all subsets of T, which are the elements of the power set of T, P(T) :

{}
{t1} {t2} {t3} ...
{t1, t2} {t1, t3} ...

To each element of the power set there will correspond a fact, which we construct like this:

t1 $\notin$ {}
t1 $\in$ {t1}
...
t1 $\in$ {t1, t2, t3, t4}
t1 $\notin$ {t2, t3, t4, t5}
...

Of course, there is nothing special about t1, a set of facts can be constructed similarly with any tn.

By constructing our new set of facts, we have a set with as many members as there are in the power set P(T). But, by Cantor's power set theorem, P(T) is always strictly larger than T.

Thus there are more facts than members of T, therefore no "totality of facts" can exist QED.

Thus there are more facts than members of T, therefore no "totality of facts" can exist QED. — tom

You've only shown there to be no infinite and denumerable totality of facts. There could still be a finite, or a non-denumerable, totality of facts. At any rate, that would not be ruled out on the basis of such a proof.

You've only shown there to be no infinite and denumerable totality of facts. There could still be a finite, or a non-denumerable, totality of facts. At any rate, that would not be ruled out on the basis of such a proof. — Pierre-Normand

Does Cantor's theorem not work for finite sets? I thought there was a well known relation between the cardinalities of a set and its power set?

As for uncountable sets, I'm pretty sure that Cantor proved that P(T) is always bigger.

The world is the totality of things. — quine

This is clearly not true. A computer is a logical space, which behavior is dictated by logical facts. Ask Turing. And as per the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle, the world is the totality of facts, not things.

This is clearly not true. A computer is a logical space, which behavior is dictated by logical facts. Ask Turing. And as per the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle, the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Question

But I've just proved there is no such thing as the totality of facts, and while doing so I have respected the CDT-Principle.

That really depends on the facts of physics. Your proof is a perversion of Zeno's paradox as you state.

If it were true, then no physical law can be said to be absolute in all instances, which I doubt to be true. Every problem would be a super-task, at least any non-localized problem.

That really depends on the facts of physics. Your proof is a perversion of Zeno's paradox as you state. — Question

Nothing to do with Zeno's paradox. It's taking the power set and Cantor's theorem, as I explained.

And, if supertasks exist, then the CTD-principle is false.

This is clearly not true. A computer is a logical space, which behavior is dictated by logical facts. Ask Turing. And as per the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle, the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Question

But a computer is actually a physical device that we invented to do logical things with. You have to have electromagnetism and atoms to make an electronic computer. The whole logical space, boolean algebra, and programming are all abstractions on top of the actual physicality of the machine.

But, those 'things' act in concert as logical facts.

It's nonsense to say that a tree doesn't falls in the forest if nobody is there to witness it, it just does.

It's nonsense to say that a tree doesn't falls in the forest if nobody is there to witness it, it just does. — Question

Sure, and a computer moves electricity (or light) around when nobody is around to witness it.

If the world is the totality of perception (i.e. mind-dependent) as opposed to fact (i.e. mind-independent) than the world began, so to speak, at the advent of consciousness, which is absurd.

Mind-dependence doesn't mean that Ancient Egyptians and Velociraptors did not also exist.

Love the argument, Tom; but I have to say I agree with Pierre-Normand that what you have shown is that the totality of facts is uncountable, not that it is impossible.

Does the fact that the universe have a totality of facts that are intelligible via the PoSR, mean in any way that it is self contained, consistent, and provable?

Love the argument, Tom; but I have to say I agree with Pierre-Normand that what you have shown is that the totality of facts is uncountable, not that it is impossible. — Banno

But if something is uncountable, then by definition, counting it is impossible; and if counting it is impossible, then by definition, it is infinite; and if it is infinite, then by definition it is impossible. Just ask Metaphysician Undercover. :-}