Hopefully I don’t sound like I am going off topic but take the example of mob psychology and how a large group of people can encourage bad behavior in individual or encourage to behave differently. — SteveMinjares

It's technically raising the matter of relative morality, but ascribing it to an imagined subset. So, on topic but with a white nationalist sorta subtext vibe. If you are looking for honest impressions of the text presented.

:up: :ok:

1. Is it Morally wrong to destroy a beautiful painting?
2. What if no one would have ever seen it?
3. What if you painted it? — Cheshire

1. It is immoral and without further qualification it is impermissible.
2. It is immoral and without further qualification it is impermissible.
3. It is immoral and permissible.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540198 (re: moral facts: suffering sapients)

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/572299 (re: consequences for future suffering) — 180 Proof

These were so interesting to read. It comes to my mind two different points of view: Søne Kierkegaard (the concept of anxiety) and Schopenhauer (his concept of “weeping” as one of the purest emotions in human behavior)

How much would you pay to suffer versus how much would you pay not to suffer?

Good question. To be honest, I would not pay anything to “not suffer” because probably this emotion is one of which makes us so original (Kierkegaard).
I can’t estimate in money how much I should suffer along my life. But a considerable load to keep me up in my progress as an individual.
The people are full of weaknesses.

Interesting. Schopenhauer has had some influence on my thinking, but Kierkegaard not so much (certainly not positively). Despite them both, however, I'm concerned with gratuitous, or avoidable, suffering (misery, harm) – not suffering per se as an ineliminable fact as S & K conceive – and how we might prevent increasing and/or reducing gratuitious suffering of ourselves by helping others do the same.

Well, if I have to be a failure than I'm pleased that it's in performative rhetoric.

how we might prevent increasing and/or reducing gratuitious suffering of ourselves by helping others do the same. — 180 Proof

:up: :100:

as an ineliminable fact as S & K conceive — 180 Proof

They impacted me exactly in this way. I guess this happened because I read some of Kierkegaard when I was having a difficult period of time so their theories helped me out as a “life jacket” because I remember seeing everybody so happy except me.
Then, I discovered this authors saying quotes like

The anxiety is intense when the person is most original — Kierkegaard.

and completely changing the view of my life or at least understanding that is completely reasonable suffer or the act of suffering.

I understand.

Good question. To be honest, I would not pay anything to “not suffer”... — javi2541997

Really? I regularly pay for food for some reason. Hopefully, I can learn to transcend that practice. Or at least pretend to

Food is so necessary to our lives that we have to pay some money to get the average calories per day and then have the body ready.
But, there are some aspects which makes us being totally humans: uncertainty, sadness, pain, weeping, etc...
I would never pay for quitting those emotions. The opposite is becoming a robot or just a program. I understand it is quite miserable when we are living an experience like these emotions are meant to but thanks to this, philosophy and other knowledge development is when start to flourish

I see morality as a reaction to how things were/are. We're dissatisfied (dukkha) with the status quo and in that sense it's objective - there are certain facts/truths we're most displeased with.

From dukkha, arises a wish for how things can be; the so-called oughts. On that score, opinions are divided. Some believe we ought not outlaw homosexuality, others believe we should; some are of the view that eating pork is permissible, others eschew pork. There are many mutually contradictory moral injunctions to keep ethical philosophers busy for a centuries I suppose, trying to bring them all under one coherent system/theory.

Now, it's tempting to say that this proves morality is subjective - one possible explanation for differences of such kind. However, if you ask people following different moral systems - theistic, utilitarian, deontological, virtue ethics, etc. - you'll find that all of them are convinced and insist that their own systems are objective. In other words, though their are multiple systems on what is right and wrong, giving us the impression that morality is subjective, the fact that all such systems asssert that they're objective indicates a desire for if not that there is objective morality. It's just like debates/discussions on forums. Everyone wants to be right (objective) despite the fact that all are in disagreement (subjective).

In conclusion, how the world is is the objective side to morality and we desire to be as objective as possible with regard to how the world ought to be.

It appears morality is probably closer to other types of information than we realize. Which means we are correct about a lot of it and mistaken about some of it and which is which isn't always obvious. I'm not looking to lay out a prescriptive framework. I think that is where talk about human suffering really applies. Instead I was hoping to isolate a common thread in all acts that could be seen as immoral. Or point to some fundamental element.

Reading over W's lecture addresses a point that it is part of our innate framework. In a legal sense morality can be seen as a measure for sanity. Here W is correct if he is implying we might be limited if the question is how do you describe sanity to some one. But, I think I've narrowed it down to a matter of value and permissibility.(with a lot of help from anyone willing to take credit)

I think every immoral act includes a reduction in value. The value of even the human condition in it's present state in the same sense a vandal devalues a car with a key. It is the only answer I've found for the OP that seems to fit without a struggle. It also accounts for the difference in perception of morality. We value things differently so once outside the measurement of human suffering the question of projecting beliefs about values onto the world creates room for a subjective type of morality.

In support of this I'd point to the way prisoners guide their institutional society. The primary rule among criminals is the maintaining of a level of respect and enforcing it; demanding it. To me this says that preventing others who are believed to be immoral actors from devaluing you is the primary way to guard against immoral acts. It is a proactive defense based on innate understanding.

Secondary to value is the observation that some things are immoral and we are allowed to do them anyway. Here I think a lot of confusion could be resolved. It explains how people come to do things that seemed reasonable at the moment, but that they later regret. It suggests an explanation exist for rationalized immorality and other fluid elements. But, this is mostly just me riffing on some ideas. Objective morality exists if value exists and we act as if it does; even suffering correlates to value otherwise extortion wouldn't work.

Food is so necessary to our lives that we have to pay some money to get the average calories per day and then have the body ready. — javi2541997

You would ignore that consuming food is a response to hunger in order to maintain some position held dear.

But, there are some aspects which makes us being totally humans: uncertainty, sadness, pain, weeping, etc...
I would never pay for quitting those emotions. The opposite is becoming a robot or just a program. — javi2541997

How much not to hit you with a hammer? I'd clear my checking if the fellow looked angry enough. Eliminating the ability to suffer is a different, but perhaps confusable matter.

I understand it is quite miserable when we are living an experience like these emotions are meant to but thanks to this, philosophy and other knowledge development is when start to flourish — javi2541997

I think we are discussing similar words in different contexts.

You would ignore that consuming food is a response to hunger in order to maintain some position held dear. — Cheshire

If I don’t do so I die of starvation... see how weak we are.

How much not to hit you with a hammer? — Cheshire

True. It is not necessary being so pessimistic because it can be unhealthy. I think inside anyone’s realism can be some pessimism to handle to. But everything in a responsible measure to not end up harming ourselves or even worse, suicidal thoughts.
I think one of the objectives of Kierkegaard was to show the people that living with suffering was accurate and we do not have to avoid it until is so miserable leading with it.

I think we are discussing similar words in different contexts. — Cheshire

I feel the same :up:

Thanks! It's always nice to find I'm at least wandering down a path others see as well. I do intend on at least reading over the lecture on the ethics. What little I've gleamed is he seems like a secular phenomenologist. I read a stack of paper produced by Hegel and could only tell you he wants to see what God sees in order to make sense of things to humans. I think Einstein's approach of accounting for what things look like from the subjective and then explaining it from the objective was the reconciliation phenomenology required. Thanks again for the references; I'll look forward to seeing what the developed form of my objection entails. — Cheshire

I am reading Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit fully for the first time now. Always put this off because he requires work and time. The reason why he is important to me is because I want to understand Derrida, and this brings phenomenology into play, for one has to altogether stop thinking as an empirical scientist, and regard the thing before you as an "eidetic construct". Intuitively, one has to turn affairs around completely, and there is little desire to do this when analytic philosophers are so dominant and adamant in their rejection of existential thinking.
The extraordinary result of getting immersed in all this is one can read with understanding interpretations of the world that have foundational insights.
Einstein read Kant when he was 13, so he was no niave realist. But phenomenology has only one conclusion, and that is deconstruction. Soo interesting, Derrida is.
that Lecture on Ethics needs the Tractatus to see where gets his insistence on the division between sense and nonsense.

1. Is it Morally wrong to destroy a beautiful painting?
2. What if no one would have ever seen it?
3. What if you painted it? — Cheshire

1. Depends on the audience. If they care or not

2. Then there is no empathy for the painting and it becomes irrelevant. No attachment no reason to be moral.

3. That answers the second question. There needs to be an audience for morality to matter. Have someone to be accountable.

It appears morality is probably closer to other types of information than we realize. Which means we are correct about a lot of it and mistaken about some of it and which is which isn't always obvious. I'm not looking to lay out a prescriptive framework. I think that is where talk about human suffering really applies. Instead I was hoping to isolate a common thread in all acts that could be seen as immoral. Or point to some fundamental element. — Cheshire

I understand. This is what I wished to convey. There are two parts to this issue:

1. Sometimes there's agreement on the oughts e.g. theistic morality, utilitarianism, and deontology agree that murder/lying is wrong but, here's where it gets interesting, for entirely different reasons. It's like doing science - we have hard data (people don't want to murder/lie) but there are competing hypotheses (Bentham's, Jesus', Kant's, etc.) as to why that's the case. It's not a perfect match of course but there's a resemblance between moral theorizing and scientific hypothesizing that jumps out at you.

I don't know how far this is an accurate description of this state of affairs but it's as if we know what we should do but we don't know why? This makes for an intriguing possibility - morality is more of an intuition than a well-considered stance towards our fellow humans, animals, and life as a whole.

When I say intuition I don't mean to imply that morality has no rational foundation though. Intuitions are flashes of insight - they're, to me, necessarily giant leaps forward in thought and if one can jump like Hulk of Marvel comics fame can, all that the rational mind can see is where the Hulk (morality) leapt from (what is) and where the Hulk landed (ought). The intermediate steps are shrouded in mystery and our task is to find out what they are.

This squares with my own thoughts on morality being too far ahead of its time - take a look at our bodies and do a survey psychology and we discover that both our bodies and minds are ill-equipped/poorly-designed for morality to say nothing of the fact that the universe is utterly indifferent to our moral concerns.

It bears mentioning that morality is a product of the mind, that part of the mind that's capable of intuition & reason, the other parts being simply (the more animal-like parts) obstacles I mentioned above.

2. Other times we disagree on the oughts. This needs no explanation; after all, it's the biggest issue in morality. Why do we have different opinions on what is good and acceptable and what is bad and unacceptable. This is the Gordian knot and how do we solve it? If that's impossible how do we make sense of it.

I'll answer the second question because it's easier and helps us find closure. Every moral theory (theistic, utilitarianism, etc.) concur on some oughts (see 1 above) but there's a lot of dissonance on other oughts. In my humble opinion, the congruence in re oughts is due to what's common to these various theories and what's incongruent with respect to oughts is best attributes to the uniqueness (what's not common) of each.

As I said morality is likely an intuition and we haven't yet figured out their rational basis, the reasons for why we should be good.

An intriguing possibility that we might need to consider is these seemingly "different" moral theories could be different aspects of one single moral theory. You know, like how people, before Newton, thought that different forces were at play for an apple falling from a tree and for the heavenly motion of the planets. As it turned out, both were one and the same force - gravity. That many moral oughts are common to these apparently distinct moral theories suggests this might be the case.

Wittgenstein, it seems, was misled by superficial differences in morality - he failed to consider that there might be an underlying principle that connects an apple's fall and the revolution of the planets.

I'm split on the matter. It is like philosophy splits into an activity of inspiring a new frame of reference or old fashion rigorous debates concerning over simplifications that parade as knowledge. Both seem like healthy mental activities; but I'm still attached to the perhaps naive idea that philosophy can still discover things. Like, it will be needed to make sense of things. In order to do that we need cooperation; and I'm sure that would even have to be argued for first. Holding argumentation over content brought us the flat earth society. I don't think there is perfect point of view or language that is going to transcend the bias of confrontation. However, I do think there is a way around it. Namely, every disagreement implies some other fact that must also be in disagreement. Once philosophers are in opposition they can then seek to agree laterally. Discover the mutual implied disagreement. Has anyone pitched that idea yet?

Wittgenstein, it seems, was misled by superficial differences in morality - he failed to consider that there might be an underlying principle that connects an apple's fall and the revolution of the planets. — TheMadFool

Wittgenstein's failing, if you ask me, was that, and this refers to the Tractatus, in ethics and aesthetics, he considered language to be suitable for designating empirical matters, but thought metaethical, metaaesthetic Good and Bad to be nonsense. So, you put the Good in view, music or falling in love, and then note its parts, features, the "states of affairs" then, he says, there is this residual that cannot be spoken: the Good of it. Weird, I grant you, this Good, but: it is no less sewn into the fabric of existence than empirical facts. It CAN be spoken, but speech (logic) is with all things qualitatively different from the actualities of the world (he gets this from Kierkegaard, whom he adored).
Why not talk about the Good and the Bad of ethics? Sure, no one can "see" these, but their presence is undeniable. (What does one actually "see" anyway? We speak here of sensory intuition. But doesn't one intuit the bad of pain with not equal, but more lively sense of it??
W is a bit maddening, for his line drawn between what is and is not nonsense set the stage for analytic philosophy's positivistic outlook. And has become just boring and irrelevant.

Wittgenstein's failing, if you ask me, was that, and this refers to the Tractatus, in ethics and aesthetics, he considered language to be suitable for designating empirical matters, but thought metaethical, metaaesthetic Good and Bad to be nonsense. So, you put the Good in view, music or falling in love, and then note its parts, features, the "states of affairs" then, he says, there is this residual that cannot be spoken: the Good of it. Weird, I grant you, this Good, but: it is no less sewn into the fabric of existence than empirical facts. It CAN be spoken, but speech (logic) is with all things qualitatively different from the actualities of the world (he gets this from Kierkegaard, whom he adored). — Constance

Indeed, anything meta necessarily involves essence. Thus, I believe, Wittgenstein's unwillingness to discuss such matters.

Pando (Tree)

A group of 47,000 [individual] Quaking Aspen (Populus tremuloides) trees (nicknamed "Pando") in the Wasatch Mountains, Utah, United States, has been shown to be a single clone connected by the root system. — Wikipedia

We have to dig deeper to find the essence which Wittgenstein believes (mistakenly?) doesn't exist.

We have to dig deeper to find the essence which Wittgenstein believes (mistakenly?) doesn't exist. — TheMadFool

He looks exclusively to logic and the necessary conditions it imposes on knowledge. This will not allow the world to "speak" and mostly, he is right about this. Do you know the color yellow? If you do, then you can say so, like knowing what a bank teller is. But no saying so, no knowing. Wittgenstein and Derrida are close here, in the way logic and language have no application in basic questions about actuality. But in the end, and Wittgenstien knew this well, it is Hamlet who wins the day, for "There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

things are right or wrong apart from who does them. — Cheshire

if youre alone on an island there is no morality

its nothing but fairness between people

everything is subjective relative and objective simultaneously

if youre alone on an island there is no morality — hope

Thoughtfully disagree, you can still harm anything you value, it's just permissible to harm your own things.

its nothing but fairness between people — hope

Yes, this is the innate understanding of morality and ethics. It's how the court knows you are sane.

everything is subjective relative and objective simultaneously — hope

Yep. As far as I can tell participatory realism is the way to go.

it's just permissible to harm your own things. — Cheshire

then its not immoral

if your alone on an island everything is a-moral

because there is no morality outside of the human minds interpretation of human behavior

reality is meaningless

then its not immoral — hope

The subjective experience is of "not immoral".

if your alone on an island everything is a-moral — hope

The

and objective simultaneously — hope

is immoral but permissible. We are allowed to do some immoral things; which is how people screw up in the moment.

We are allowed to do some immoral things; which how people screw up in the moment. — Cheshire

Everything the mind can think about is relative to point of view.

The mind is bound by point of view and will never escape it.

It's and omnipresent and eternal limitation.

It's something. We've done well to infer here and there. How else would we know there is a limitation.

How else would we know there is a limitation. — Cheshire

Consciousness is intrinsically self reflective. The mind uses consciousness like a mirror to see itself. Which then allows it to alter itself. Otherwise we would all be eternally insane.