The footnotes are indicating that is from the preface. I also added the "material meaning" quote (which I think is also from the preface) in showing that Kant is speaking of the world in a brand new way that was revolutionary from how people spoke of it prior to him. This is phenomenology

Kant claims that transcendental realism entails empirical idealism; which is basically an external world Cartesian skepticism. — darthbarracuda

Can you explain why Kant makes this claim? What is empirical idealism and why would transcendental realism entail it? Is empirical idealism the proposed "God's eye view"?

The common prejudice of transcendental realism is that it confuses representations (appearances) with things-in-themselves. The transcendental realist takes the spatio-temporality of objects' externality to entail the independence of these objects from the subjective conditions of human knowledge; they hold that space and time are aspects of objects as they are in themselves. In other words, they conflate the transcendental sense of actuality with the empirical sense. — darthbarracuda

What is the justification for there being a confusion? I can imagine that naivie/direct realists would deny there was one, and say that of course appearances are how things are, taking into account the necessary details of the environment (lighting conditions or what not), and the limits of our sensory organs.

Thus transcendental idealism holds that objects in space and time have no independent existence from us in this manner (of space and time). It is not the claim that objects have no independent existence from us, but that such an existence cannot be attributed to them in the manner in which they are represented (in space and time, the forms or conditions of human sensibility). — darthbarracuda

I've always wondered why there is a leap to saying the objects cannot have an existence as represented by us, such as extension in space and time. If the objects have an independent existence, and this existence is related somehow to human sensibility, then why can't that be some form of spacetime?

I didn’t look there, but found it since.

Thanks.

Can you explain why Kant makes this claim? What is empirical idealism and why would transcendental realism entail it? Is empirical idealism the proposed "God's eye view"? — Marchesk

I take empirical idealism to mean that we are only acquainted with the private data of our own minds. There is no reference to inter-subjectivity. Transcendental realism entails empirical idealism because it doesn't give any good explanation as to how we possess any knowledge at all. As I understand it, this basically means the our representations could be arbitrary and have absolutely no ground. Kant introduces a priori forms and concepts and by doing so gives grounding to knowledge, not of the thing-in-itself but of a shared, intersubjective world of experience.

I think Allison has more to say about empirical idealism later in the book. I don't know if I completely understand it either.

The theocentric "God's eye view" is the transcendental realist idea of a mind that is an infinitely-amplified version of our own mind, which is able to perceive objects as they "really are" in space and time. It's the difference between seeing only part of the picture and seeing all of the picture.

What is the justification for there being a confusion? I can imagine that naivie/direct realists would deny there was one, and say that of course appearances are how things are, taking into account the necessary details of the environment (lighting conditions or what not), and the limits of our sensory organs. — Marchesk

It's not just secondary-like properties that could be smoothed out under better conditions for perception, or if you possessed that God's eye point of view. It's more about there being nothing in common between the thing in itself and an appearance as it appears in space and time. Space and time are taken to be meaningful only when predicated on appearances; they are meaningless when applied to the thing in itself.

I've always wondered why there is a leap to saying the objects cannot have an existence as represented by us, such as extension in space and time. If the objects have an independent existence, and this existence is related somehow to human sensibility, then why can't that be some form of spacetime? — Marchesk

Also here I believe Allison devotes a chapter to discussing how we are to make sense of the notion of a transcendental thing in itself. For now I will say that, according to Kant, it is a condition of human sensibility to view objects as distinguished from themselves and the self as existing in space. Perhaps it is the case that we cannot help but imagine the thing in itself as existing in space, but all that points to is the way in which human sensibility is and not the way the thing in itself is.

Transcendental realism entails empirical idealism because it doesn't give any good explanation as to how we possess any knowledge at all. As I understand it, this basically means the our representations could be arbitrary and have absolutely no ground. Kant introduces a priori forms and concepts and by doing so gives grounding to knowledge, not of the thing-in-itself but of a shared, intersubjective world of experience. — darthbarracuda

So one can see this as a response to Humean skepticism. Hume said that causality is not given to us in perception, but rather is a habit of mind. Kant's response would be that causality is one of the necessary grounds of knowledge. We can't say whether the things in themselves are causal, but the things in experience are structured that way. Thus causality, like space and time, is an empirical necessity.

The point of Kant's critique of Hume is that in the former's position does not allow matter to suddenly act bizzare while for Hume this could happen at any time. Kant has his own mind as a guarantee for the sanity of existence

So the sun will keep coming up tomorrow and the day after and so on because or minds must structure experience that way? Let us hope that the thing in itself complies with this.

The

Kent's assumption is that the thing in itself will confirm to the mind

I take empirical idealism to mean that we are only acquainted with the private data of our own minds. — darthbarracuda

Empirical idealism, to me, sounds like a contradictory concept. Empirical means from out in the material world, and idealism means from within mind. But maybe that is what Kant wanted to say. Perception requires the both, i.e. data from the external world which enters the mind of the perceiver.

Another contradiction in the CPR seems, the concept of space. Space is normally regarded as part of the external world, but in Kant, space is a priori schema in mind. It is presupposed for all perception of the objects in the material world. NKS says that space is being added when perception occurs. How can there be two types of space? One in the material world and one in the mind of perception, although they are different kinds. Could we not just say, there is just one type of space, and it is the one in the material world?

Empirical means from out in the material world — Corvus

Not at all. Empiricism is a claim about the source of knowledge as primarily sensory (as distinct from say, first principles a la Descartes). It does not necessarily entail the existence of a 'material world'. Only that, whatever there 'is' - ideal or otherwise - we come to know it though the experience of our senses. It is about the relation between a knowing being, and that which is to be known, and not the relata themselves. In the SEP for example:

The Empiricism Thesis: We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/#Empi

--

Also, great thread.

Not at all. Empiricism is a claim about the source of knowledge as primarily sensory (as distinct from say, first principles a la Descartes). It does not necessarily entail the existence of a 'material world'. Only that, whatever there 'is' - ideal or otherwise - we come to know it though the experience of our senses. It is about the relation between a knowing being, and that which is to be known, and not the relata themselves. In the SEP for example:

The Empiricism Thesis: We have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/#Empi — StreetlightX

Great point.

I used to think in terms of, how can sense experience ever happen without the material world? It will be just empty space we will be facing and staring. Shouldn't empiricism suppose the existence of the external world, and base it as the source of the all sensory data? But you are right on the points. I will read the link article, and mull it over. Thanks.

I thought about it, and this is what I feel.
If you say, the origin of knowledge is the sensory organs, then it would be like saying, the origin of photographic images are the lens of cameras, which may sounds not wrong, but not meaningful either.
The photographic images are the copy the objects in the external world, and the external world's objects are the origin of the images sounds correct.

And if you say, the external world does not exist, because without the sensory organs we cannot perceive anything or all we get is just illusion, then you are a sceptic. If you say, the external world do exist regardless of the sensory organs and all the illusions we get, then you are a realist. But in both occasions, you are an empiricist.

If you say, the origin of knowledge is the sensory organs, then it would be like saying, the origin of photographic images are the lens of cameras, which may sounds not wrong, but not meaningful either. — Corvus

Just to be clear, to say that the 'origin of knowledge' is the sensory organs, is to distinguish it from other possible ways of coming to know things (specifically, again, rationalism). To use your metaphor, it's to say that the origin of photos are cameras and not tape recorders (the sensory, and not the intellect). This is why it is meaningful. In each case it's the relation between the knowing subject and what is to be known that is at stake. If you're talking about the relata - as you are in your response - you've missed the point. Empiricism answers the question of how we come to know the world, not what the world is. It is an issue of epistemology, not ontology.

Sure. Great points. Thanks. :fire: :up:

On empirical idealism:

The human cognitive system is inherently logical, therefore, for any this, the negation of it is given immediately in that. Kant grounds the human system as necessarily representational, the external part by means of the a priori architecture of space and time, whereas the negation of it, in the form of transcendental realism, grounds the human system as non-representational, insofar as the object and its appearance are the same thing, hence not conditioned by intuitions of space and time, those conceived as belonging to the objects in themselves.

An empirical idealist, then, is merely the transcendental realist who labors under the illusion of explaining the existence of a thing, conditioned only by two necessarily infinite, content-less conceptions, a contradiction. In short, the one properly institutes space and time as necessary conditions for the reality of objects, while the other improperly institutes space and time as necessary properties in the existence of objects. As paraphrased from A491/B519.
——————

On the presumed dual nature of space and time:

The “objective validity/empirical reality” of space and time are noted. However, transcendental ideality of space and time, insofar as they are both mediate concepts given from understanding but which can only be represented by the category “Quantity”, re: “an infinite given magnitude” and not any real object, and, they are immediate intuitions a priori insofar as they are presupposed in the affect upon a subject that perceives, thereby establishing the rules for the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions, which in turn, is the possibility of experience itself. As paraphrased from “...SS 3: Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space....”, B41.

The “objective validity/empirical reality” regards the use of intuitions as conditions; the transcendental ideality regards the derivation of them from pure reason alone.
—————

In Kant.....

.....the origin of knowledge is not perception; it is understanding. That which is before the synthesis of intuition to conception, is not in our awareness, thus does not ground knowledge, which is always a conscious judgement with respect to the possible logical certainty of those relations. As well, the synthesis of conceptions to each other, involving no intuitions, therefore no perceptions at all, and of which we are perfectly aware as a conscious judgement with apodeitic logical certainty, insofar as those relations are of our own construction, is the source of a priori knowledge.

.....empiricism is nothing but one of only two possible modes of thought, the other being a priori. All empiricism does, is legislate, and thus authorize, one type of cognition. The complementary nature of human cognition demands an empirical aspect, otherwise the a priori aspect, while undeniable for its internal construction, cannot be relieved of its illusory extension on the one hand, and is entirely insufficient for explaining affects on sensibility, on the other.

.....the thing-in-itself can never conform to the mind; that is precisely what it cannot do. If it did, or if it could, the entire Kantian transcendental treatise drops headlong into the metaphysical crapper. It may stand in such relation in other doctrines, but not in this one.

Anyway.....just sayin’.

which lies at the basis of all outer intuition. — Gregory

Small point. I doubt very much your author said that, please check and confirm or correct.

It's accurate

It's accurate — Gregory

"lies at the basis of these appearances". — Gregory

Well then, what does it mean? I can understand "lies at the base," or even "lies as the basis" although this problematic - maybe as a base. But "lies at the basis," non-standard English, means someone didn't know what he was saying or how to say it or both, or is working in a second language and might have benefited from a better editor.

I wondered too why he says basis instead of base. "Basis" is used several times so far and I'm on pg 70. But what I think it means is that we project space unto the thing-in-itself and time is the base of our internal life. So we have our projection of space out there and our inner sense and find that time enters space through our interaction with the world

I just realized that if time is a category of thought, then Kant can avoid Hume's inductive problem for empirical matters.

Michael Friedman? Which one? They all look good but formidable. Small point #2. It's been my experience too often that expositors of Kant at some or another point cannot resist "improving" on him, while pointing out his errors, usually involving often misreading, misunderstanding, some agenda, or just wishful thinking. But Friedman appears to be no mere expositor. Which the prefaces of his books at Amazon would seem to bear out.

So I won't - can't - gainsay your interpretation. But is it Kant?

And #3, fwiw and noted in other Kant threads, is that one of Kant's translators, Lewis Beck White iirc, observed that the more common locution in Kant is ding an sicht selbst, translated as thing in itself as it is in itself, an addition that imo makes a difference!

more common locution in Kant is ding an sicht selbst, translated as thing in itself as it is in itself, an addition that imo makes a difference! — tim wood

What does "as it is in itself" add to the thing-in-itself? The idea is the world independent of human cognition and perception. Whatever it is that gives rise to our existence and sensory impressions.

The world absent appearance, or the supersensible. Does, "as it is in itself", emphasize or add additional qualifications to that?

What does "as it is in itself" add to the thing-in-itself? — Marchesk

Imo, clarity. E.g., I might be considered a thing in itself: you might even consider me such. And the language might make you incautious as to what you think you might know about me - confusing what you think you know with something about me. But the "as it is in itself," one hopes, would stand as warning to take care as to what exactly the thing is, and exactly what might or might not constitute knowledge of it.

It's called Construction of Nature. It's not well written, lucid, and interesting that I can't recommend it enough

But the "as it is in itself," one hopes, would stand as warning to take care as to what exactly the thing is, and exactly what might or might not constitute knowledge of it. — tim wood

It doesn't seem on a Kantian view that one can have such knowledge. All knowledge is given as things appear to us, according to the categories of thought which structure appearances. Anything else is beyond knowledge.

Just so, and how I "appreciate" the selbst and its translation.

It may be in White, but it is so in NKS, 1929, reading along with Benno Erdmann, circa 1889, found in a translator’s footnote, at A491/B519.

I read somewhere that Kant claimed his ancestors came from Scotland, the land Hume was from, although Kant was most likely just German. He did have a fascination with empiricism and in his system he rejects innate ideas as understood by the rationalists

.....the thing-in-itself can never conform to the mind; that is precisely what it cannot do. If it did, or if it could, the entire Kantian transcendental treatise drops headlong into the metaphysical crapper. It may stand in such relation in other doctrines, but not in this one. — Mww

Does God belong to the thing-in-itself in Kant? Maybe yes maybe not. What type of objects actually are classed / regarded as the thing-in-itself? Or is the thing-in-itself supposed to be a concept of its own?

It’s only been four days since.......

The thing-in-itself is a real, physical, space/time thing,
— Mww

Any examples of them?
— Corvus

Yeah......every single thing there ever was or ever will be. All things are external to us, so exists in its own right. Exists as itself. Exists in-itself.

.......so if god is a space/time thing external to us, existing in its own right, then god is a thing-in-itself too, as far as we’re concerned. If not a thing, all god is, is an idea, an object of reason, the proverbial transcendental object. As far as we’re concerned.

On the other note, if the expression “god” is present as representation, than the conception from which it is given is necessarily present as understanding. The conception is an internal comprehension of a certain relation, “god” merely the expression of it.