This seems to be confused; it supposes that features of people are not 'objective features of the world.' — The Great Whatever

They are, but not in the sense that is meant by moral realism. Perhaps a better phrasing would be "impersonal features of the world".

Again, the question of which objective features of the world make a thing moral is irrelevant to the more basic question.

It's not. It's what distinguishes it from various forms of moral anti-realism. If moral claims are made true by the verdict of some "moral legislature" then something like relativism, ideal observer theory, or divine command theory would be the case, depending on the nature of this authority.

You seem to think that it is simply a trichotomy of realism, error theory, and noncognitivism, but that's just not the case. There are meta-ethical positions that accept that there are moral facts but that are not realist.

Moral claims can be made using natural language, and they're just as truth-evaluable as any other sort of claim.

So how do we evaluate the truth of moral claims? What sort of things would verify or falsify or in some lesser sense support or oppose claims like "it is wrong to steal" or "you ought not steal"?

Are you an anti-realist about the claims of human psychology? Are facts about human psychology established by 'impersonal features of the world?'

Are you an anti-realist about the claims of human psychology? Are facts about human psychology established by 'impersonal features of the world?' — The Great Whatever

I don't understand the point of the question. What it means to be an anti-realist about the claims of human psychology (whatever that would be) is not necessarily what it means to be an anti-realist about moral claims.

A moral realist won't accept that claims like "it is wrong to steal" are made true by the decisions or attitudes of some person or group of people. They will say that some feature of the act itself (or consequence) is what makes it true. They might be a naturalist and reduce this moral feature to some empirical feature like doing harm or they might be a non-naturalist and claim that moral goodness (or wrongness) is a non-empirical feature that is recognised via intuition, or possibly reason.

What it means to be an anti-realist about the claims of human psychology (whatever that would be) is not necessarily what it means to be an anti-realist about moral claims. — Michael

This seems to me an idiosyncratic definition of moral realism. What is your source on it?

If you have an idiosyncratic view on the matter, that's fine, but then, it's not what I was addressing.

A moral realist won't accept that claims like "it is wrong to steal" are made true by the decisions or attitudes of some person or group of people. They will say that some feature of the act itself (or consequence) is what makes it true. They might be a naturalist and reduce this moral feature to some empirical feature like doing harm or they might be a non-naturalist and claim that moral goodness (or wrongness) is a non-empirical feature that is recognised via intuition, or possibly reason. — Michael

The notion that facts having to do with people are somehow exempt from being 'real' in the sense in which realism of any sort is interested seems to me mistaken. Features of an act itself obviously have to do with people and their actions as well. Surely we don't want to say that morality and its grounding has nothing to do with people and their actions: that's precisely what morality is (at least in large part) about.

Those were the two points I thought significant that were raised in the thread. I didn't pluck them from the aether.

You don't think that there are a lot of people that aren't sure whether they should eat or not just because they're hungry? Check yo privilege. Some of us want to stay pretty. I definitely have much less indecision about whether or not I should torture, steal, or lie when I feel like it than whether I ought to eat.

The notion that facts having to do with people are somehow exempt from being 'real' in the sense in which realism of any sort is interested seems to me mistaken. — The Great Whatever

Anti-realism isn't un-realism. This persistent belief that if you're an anti-realist about X then you think that X isn't real is mistaken.

Features of an act itself obviously have to do with people and their actions as well. Surely we don't want to say that morality and its grounding has nothing to do with people and their actions: that's precisely what morality is (at least in large part) about.

I didn't say it has nothing to do with people. I said that the moral realist will argue that something about the act of stealing (which includes its affect on people) is what makes the claim "it is wrong to steal" true. They wouldn't accept – unlike when it comes to matters of the law – that the claim is made true by the verdict of some relevant moral authority, or that whether or not the claim is true is relative to particular individuals or cultures, depending on their attitudes to the act.

I didn't say it has nothing to do with people. I said that the moral realist will argue that something about the act of stealing (which includes its affect on people) is what makes the claim "it is wrong to steal" true. They wouldn't accept – unlike when it comes to matters of the law – that the claim is made true by the verdict of some relevant moral authority, or that whether or not the claim is true is relative to particular individuals or cultures. — Michael

I think you have an idiosyncratic interpretation of what moral realism is, so this conversation isn't fruitful. I can let shmik answer for whether he was seeking arguments for moral realism in this more restricted sense.

Just as an example, one of the historical bulwarks of moral realism is command theory, which does accept that certain things are immoral because an authority says they are.

Just as an example, one of the historical bulwarks of moral realism is command theory, which does accept that certain things are immoral because an authority says they are. — The Great Whatever

By command theory do you mean something like divine command theory or prescriptivism? Because as per the breakdown here, the former is a type of subjectivism and the latter a type of noncognitivism.

Interesting – I think that's a counterintuitive classification, but okay, I can't prevent people from drawing classifications as they please.

In any case, I think we've resolved that this issue is verbal, right?

Agreed.

Okay, but I just want to understand your position. Is your position that it's not wrong to torture children, but that you pretend that it's wrong to torture them for convenience? — The Great Whatever

My position is that the common conception of morality is that morality is an objective and mind-independent source of guidelines for living, and that the moral anti-realist rejects this. Perhaps morality is a social phenomenon grounded in agreement and compromise.

I dislike the term "convenience" as it makes it seem like I don't have any emotional investment in morality when in fact I do. It's just that I don't think there's anything more to morality other than impulses from the unconscious and agreement between members of a society. These sorts of things can nevertheless be quite causally powerful, but nevertheless fail to qualify for "moral realism".

This is contradictory. What makes us moral if not that which grounds morality? — Thorongil

I meant morality in the realist sense is groundless. It doesn't exist.

It's not incoherent, but it's also not binding. If you believe it's a fiction, then you're acting, it's easy enough just to turn around and say, OK I don't actually believe it. — Wayfarer

Right, exactly. "Technically" speaking I don't actually "believe" it, but for all purposes I do because I act as though I do. It's practical, conventional, and comfortable to have morality instead of constantly reminding yourself that nothing actually matters in the end. Especially in situations where you have to make a choice, since error theory doesn't just magically transport you elsewhere where you don't have to make choices anymore. Something has to guide our action, and I find that phenomenologically-based morality does this quite well and is more robust and dependable than both moral realism and egoism.

So is the idea "if there is an objective X, we can't disagree about X?"

But that's nonsense, right? — The Great Whatever

Sure, but that we can so profoundly disagree about what's right and wrong in many cases, particularly across cultures is what makes it questionable. It's different than some ordinary fact that we can have consensus on. Let's take slavery as an example. It's just as bad as torturing children, yet it has been defended vigorously by various cultures and individuals over time. It's even been claimed that slavery was objectively moral, in that God ordained slaves to be in that position in life.

The notion that facts having to do with people are somehow exempt from being 'real' in the sense in which realism of any sort is interested seems to me mistaken. Features of an act itself obviously have to do with people and their actions as well. Surely we don't want to say that morality and its grounding has nothing to do with people and their actions: that's precisely what morality is (at least in large part) about. — The Great Whatever

Yeah but the same can be applied to aesthetics, and the case for realism qua aesthetics is even less well supported than morality. It seems quite clear that a lot of what human beings find tasteful, interesting or beautiful is particular to human idiosyncrasies, and is not some objective feature of the world.

As an example, say we end up using Mars to dump all our trash on until it becomes an ugly, smelly planet by human standards. Is it ugly to the universe? Is it ugly to some alien creature that feasts off trash?

Back to morality. Would aliens find torturing human children to be immoral? Maybe, but maybe it would depend on their culture and what it means for aliens to conceive. Would the universe care about us torturing kids? It doesn't seem like the universe cares at all what kind of bad things go down. It's not even a proper question to ask.

So then, morality, like aesthetics, is dependent on human values, which are not objective. They're particular to us. They don't exist independent of us, unless you want to argue God or Platonism.

Just to put this out there for everyone, as a counter to TGW's claim that torturing children is objectively wrong because presumably everyone agrees, consider the institution of slavery throughout history, particularly in the Americas.

There are other examples. Some cultures have practiced human sacrifice, probably as a sacrifice to their gods. Then there's female circumcision, untouchable class distinctions, conquest by war, and many other abominable practices that were seen as justifiable and even good. There's probably even been some offering of children as a sacrifice, given a couple references in the Old Testament.

And then there's how the Spartans treated their kids to toughen them up, which might be considered as a form of torture to modern values.

I think the moral realism/anti-realism debate can be approached in a different angle: moral realists typically believe moral truths can be discovered, whereas moral anti-realists typically believe moral truths are (in a certain qualified sense) invented. But just because something is invented doesn't mean it's useless - in fact inventions are generally useful by nature.

think the moral realism/anti-realism debate can be approached in a different angle: moral realists typically believe moral truths can be discovered — darthbarracuda

But where are they discovered from? Nature is no guide to moral behavior, plus the whole is-ought distinction. It's left to human culture, and human cultures vary quite a bit. Individuals and groups within a culture often disagree a lot on what's moral.

So to TGW's point that disagreement doesn't mean there's not an objective reality, this is true. However, we have no justification for thinking so, because we can't know it. I think it goes farther than that, actually. Moral values only exist in social groups, and social groups disagree on what's moral, therefore there is no real standard.

Of course I don't think it is wrong to torture children, if I did I wouldn't have made this thread.

I would view moral realism in what you call the restricted sense from your conversation with Michael.

Moral realists hold that they are saying a fact. Being against moral realism is not the same as psychopathy. To assess my psychopathy it what would be relevant to look at my attitudes towards people not whether I hold that there are true normative facts about human interaction.

But where are they discovered from? Nature is no guide to moral behavior, plus the whole is-ought distinction. It's left to human culture, and human cultures vary quite a bit. Individuals and groups within a culture often disagree a lot on what's moral. — Marchesk

Exactly why I believe naturalism is insufficient grounds to justify moral realism.

Isn't it about whether you feel guilty or not when you do wrong things? How can you ever feel contrite if you don't think anything is ever really wrong?

Yeah but the same can be applied to aesthetics, and the case for realism qua aesthetics is even less well supported than morality. — Marchesk

I'm not sure about this. It seems to me that certain things are beautiful and others less so, or not. Isn't this a kind of realism about aesthetics? Certainly I don't think my beholding them makes them beautiful, rather I appreciate that they are (and others can too).

It's different than some ordinary fact that we can have consensus on. Let's take slavery as an example. It's just as bad as torturing children, yet it has been defended vigorously by various cultures and individuals over time. — Marchesk

So, is the idea that if people defend different sides of an issue, there's no objective truth to the matter?

There are other examples. Some cultures have practiced human sacrifice, probably as a sacrifice to their gods. Then there's female circumcision, untouchable class distinctions, conquest by war, and many other abominable practices that were seen as justifiable and even good. There's probably even been some offering of children as a sacrifice, given a couple references in the Old Testament.

And then there's how the Spartans treated their kids to toughen them up, which might be considered as a form of torture to modern values. — Marchesk

Yeah, but all those things are wrong, right?

Back to morality. Would aliens find torturing human children to be immoral? — Marchesk

This is interesting, because the construction 'find torturing children immoral' sounds like nonsense to me. You don't find things immoral, any more than you find them, say, made of glass. You can think something is immoral, sure, but then you can think anything.

Of course I don't think it is wrong to torture children — shmik

OK, so you don't think it's wrong to torture children. I'm not sure, then, if we can come to understanding on this point, since I'm not sure how I'd convince you of something like that, which I take to be so obvious.

'm not sure about this. It seems to me that certain things are beautiful and others less so, or not. Isn't this a kind of realism about aesthetics? Certainly I don't think my beholding them makes them beautiful, rather I appreciate that they are (and others can too). — The Great Whatever

You behold them as beautiful because of the kind of creature and individual you are, not because they are beautiful. A turkey vulture likely finds the smell of dead carcasses to be intoxicating. Humans find it revolting. But okay, that's a different topic.

It is interesting how in the past you have defending radical subjectivism, and I've defended realism about the world, yet here we are totally the opposite side.

To me the whole question is a non issue. I don't hold that there is something about the world that makes killing children wrong.

Do you hold that saying 'it is wrong to torture children' is synonymous with 'its repulsive to torture children'?

You behold them as beautiful because of the kind of creature and individual you are, — Marchesk

I don't deny this, but isn't this true of anything? I behold rocks as solid because of the sort of creature I am, right?

I don't think the two are synonymous, although a decent person is probably repulsed by wrong things generally.

'Repulsive' can be relativized to groups or individuals – 'repulsive to me,' 'repulsive to humans,' etc. I understand what this relativization means: it means that whatever is repulsive to x produces repulsion/revulsion in x (which is itself just a fact about the world). I'm not sure what 'wrong to me,' etc. would mean (is that grammatical?), other than something like 'I think x is wrong.'

Yeh that's part of my issue. I'm unwilling to take on the metaphysical commitments that I think are necessary to say that 'X is wrong'. Repulsive is as far as I can go.

If for you there it is so obvious that there is something more - then yeh, it doesn't fit with my outlook as I said in my OP.

Do you think that you are wrong about certain moral facts? Wrong in a way that isn't caused just by lack of information on a topic.

Do you think that you are wrong about certain moral facts? Wrong in a way that isn't caused just by lack of information on a topic. — shmik

Yes, but only because I generally believe in my own epistemic faultiness. Because of the nature of belief, I can't pick out any single moral belief I have that's wrong (else I wouldn't believe it).

Yeh that's part of my issue. I'm unwilling to take on the metaphysical commitments that I think are necessary to say that 'X is wrong'. Repulsive is as far as I can go. — shmik

So when people say torturing children is wrong, you don't agree with them?

That seems like an unusual position to me.

Yes, but only because I generally believe in my own epistemic faultiness. Because of the nature of belief, I can't pick out any single moral belief I have that's wrong (else I wouldn't believe it). — The Great Whatever

So let's say you have a specific belief - maybe torturing children is wrong - then you find out that it isn't true although you still feel that torturing children is wrong. Is that a possibility or are your moral convictions such that they are entirely based on their own self evidence such that to find out one of your beliefs is untrue is the same as finding it self evidently untrue.

So when people say torturing children is wrong, you don't agree with them? — The Great Whatever

To me this conversation is similar to if you said to me, 'torturing children is wrong because it's against the bible'. When I respond that I don't believe in the bible's authority you think its strange that I'm OK with torturing children.

You seem to want to say that 'torturing children is wrong' without a 'because'. For me that doesn't make any sense. That gap between my aversion to the thought of it (torturing children), and it being a fact is insurmountable to me.

If someone says to me torturing children is wrong - I would likely say one a 3 things.
1. Nothing is wrong.
2. The way we use moral language barely makes any sense. Traditionally there was a reason that made something wrong, whether divine command or that it was somehow bad for our flourishing. Once we divorced our moral language from those reasons it stops referring to anything.
3. Yes it is horrible.

So let's say you have a specific belief - maybe torturing children is wrong - then you find out that it isn't true. Is that a possibility — shmik

Sure, but I don't think it's likely.

Haven't you ever changed your mind about something?

When I respond that I don't believe in the bible's authority you think its strange that I'm OK with killing children. — shmik

But I've invoked no authority at all. You have said yourself that you don't think torturing children is wrong. I'm just pointing out that that's an odd belief, and I'm not sure how to convince you otherwise.

You seem to want to say that 'torturing children is wrong' without a 'because'. For me that doesn't make any sense. That gap between by reaction to the thought of it, and it being a fact is insurmountable to me. — shmik

Do all statements of fact require a 'because?'

If someone says to me torturing children is wrong - I would likely say one a 3 things. — shmik

Wouldn't a more reasonable response be to say, 'you're right?'

So, is the idea that if people defend different sides of an issue, there's no objective truth to the matter? — The Great Whatever

For morality and aesthetics, I would say yes, because we have no other way of determining their truth than what people find moral or beautiful.

It's different with empirical or mathematical claims, because we do have means to investigate independent of what one group or another thinks. There are still some people who remain convinced the world is flat, but they're simply wrong. This is easily shown.

But if we have two cultures, where one thinks that torturing kids in some situations is moral, and the other disagrees, then what independent means is their to determine who's right?