Do you think Lalatos’ approach to the logical proof is consistent with the later Wittgenstein? — Joshs

See my comments above regarding Feyerabend. The issue you raise has been of interest to me for the last forty years, and remains unresolved.

Lakatos' research programs are comparable to Wittgenstein's word games. Both are interactions between what we say, what we do and what happens next. Feyerabend was to ba a student of Wittgesntein's but moved to Popper after Witti's death. Feyerabend's criticism of Lakatos migh be applied to Wittgenstein's language games, if Wittgenstein had adopted some normative approach.

SO this potentially comes back to asking if logic is normative. I'm thinking that it isn't. That is, it sets out what we can think, but does not set out what we ought think.

Why are such things considered as being a problem of logic, rather than a problem of the particular premises that are being used?

It's not clear how something can be a problem of logic itself, when it can more easily be explained by certain concepts being internally incoherent.

See my comments above regarding Feyerabend. The issue you raise has been of interest to me for the last forty years, and remains unresolved. — Banno

Yes, I read them, and I agree with what you wrote:

scientific progress does not result from a more or less algorithmic method - induction, falsification and so one - but is instead the result of certain sorts of liberal social interaction - of moral and aesthetic choice. — Banno

Did you ever see this comment Lakatos supposedly made to British philosopher Donald Gillies? “Wittgenstein was the biggest philosophical fraud of the twentieth century".

This would seem to support the idea that Wittgenstein would be more sympathetic to Feyerabend than Lakatos on the grounding of logic.

Also the truth value of linguistic statements and propositions depend on time, subjectivity and geographical location and many other conditions in the real world. For simple examples,

It is morning.
(If it was said in the morning, then it is true. But in the afternoon, it is false.)

I am Elvis Presley.
(If Elvis Presley said it, then it is true. Anyone else said it, false)

It is late summer.
(In the Northern hemisphere, it is true. In Southern hemisphere locations, it is false)

etc etc

Is it not the main reason why Logical Positivism failed? They tried to reduce the world, language and all its objects into logic, and were trying to represent and resolve all the worldly problems using Logical Analysis. But the world, its objects and language are far more rich and complicated for that to work.

...incoherent. — baker

...and you are doing logic.

Wittgenstein was the biggest philosophical fraud of the twentieth century". — Joshs

That was from here, it seems, although no explanation is given. Lakatos perhaps disliked pokers.

Prima facie Popper, and his defender Lakatos, might fall into the logical monist camp; Wittgenstein into the logical pluralist camp. But oddly Russell is here using Lakatos to defend the pluralist camp. Things we can only guess.

Paradigms, research projects, language games, conceptual schema, and so on, treat aspects of language as discrete entities. The extent to which these might be incommensurate is an interesting topic for discussion.

I suppose that those who think logic normative might be more incline to think of conceptual schema as discreet and incommensurable. I think they are neither.

Seems to me that these issues are treated by indexicals.

Seems to me that these issues are treated by indexicals. — Banno

That link is really substantive material for the topic. Thanks. :up:

:wink: I don't think I was doing us a favour in linking to it. It shows how complex the issue is. The salient bit, in reply to your comment, is that indexicals are not ambiguous. Time, place, tense, and so on are within the scope of logic, and so do not count against the analysis of language in logical terms.

My post was purely from guemory (guessed memory), so it had very little content. But the link content will give me multi dimensional insights. It is all about learning for me. If I were not right, then happy stand to be corrected any time. :smile:

Cheers.

I suppose that those who think logic normative might be more incline to think of conceptual schema as discreet and incommensurable. I think they are neither. — Banno

Could you give examples of a treatment of schemes as discrete and incommensurable vs non-discrete and commensurable?

Were Lakatos' research projects incommensurable? My recollection is that they were, but I'm not sure without looking it up. The classic example of incommensurable paradigms is from The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Feyerabend at first takes a strong approach to incommensurability, but later disavows it. Davidson argues, I think quite convincingly, in On the very idea of a conceptual scheme, that the notion of incommensurability is unreasonable.

All sorts of other schemes can be found.

“

The classic example of incommensurable paradigms is from The Structure of Scientific Revolutions — Banno

Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability evolved over time.

“Since 1962 Kuhn's concept of incommensurability has undergone a process of transformation. His current account of incommensurability has little in common with his original account of it. Originally, incommensurability was a relation of methodological, observational and conceptual disparity between paradigms. Later Kuhn restricted the notion to the semantical sphere and assimilated it to the indeterminacy of translation. Recently he has developed an account of it as localized translation failure between subsets of terms employed by theories.”(H. Sankey)

Putnam had this to say about Kuhn’s changing notions:

“In more recent work one finds him expressing admiration for the work of Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmuller. The notion of incommensurability still appears in his writing, but now it seems to signify nothing more than intertheoretic meaning change, as opposed to uninterpretability. According to Sneed and Stegmiiller, who build on ideas that go back to Carnap, the theoretical terms in a theory' refer to complex logical constructions out of the set of models of that theory, which in turn depend on an open set of "intended applications." I shall not go into details. But one point is worth mentioning: When two theories Con-flict, then, although the common theoretical terms generally have dif-ferent meanings and a different reference on the Sneed-Stegmiiller account (that is what "incommensurability" becomes), that does not mean that there is no "common language" in which one can say what the theoretical terms of both theories refer to.

In fact, if we have avail-able the "old terms," that is, the terms which existed in the language prior to the introduction of the specific new terms characteristic of the two theories, and enough set-theoretic vocabulary, we can express the empirical claim of both theories, and we can say what the admis-sible models of both theories are. Kuhn still maintains that we cannot interpret the term phlogiston in the language that present-day scientists use; but what this in fact means is that we must use a highly indirect mode of interpretation, which involves describing the entire phlogiston theory, its set of intended applications, and its set of admissible models in order to say what phlogiston means. A serious residual difficulty still faces Kuhn: he has long maintained that the meaning of old terms (say, observa-tion terms) is altered when new theories are constructed.

But the whole assumption of Sneed and Stegmiiller is precisely that this is not the case. Their sets of admissible models are well defined only if we can assume that the old terms have fixed meanings which are not altered by theory construction. It is precisely the aim of neopositivism to view scientific theories as constructed in levels in such a way that the terms of one level may depend for their meaning on the terms of a lower level, but not vice versa. Neopositivism denies that there is a two-way dependence between observation terms and theoretical terms, whereas Kuhn has long agreed with Quine that the dependence goes both ways. Even if I cannot make full sense of Kuhn's current position, I think that I have said enough to indicate the general nature of the development.

This might be summed up in three stages. Stage 1: There is a doctrine of radical incommensurability, that is, impossibility of interpretation. Stage 2: The doctrine is softened. We can, it turns out, say something about theories which are incommensurable with our own, and we can use some notions (justification, rationality) across paradigm changes. Stage 3: Something which is thought to be better than interpretation is embraced and propounded, namely, the structural description of theories.”(Realism with a Human Face)

Personally, I support Lyotard’s differend.

As Gallagher describes the problem with Robert’s ‘conversation of manikins’,

“ The conversation of mankind fails as a model of postmodern hermeneutics not only because it is a
metadiscourse and worthy of our incredulity, but because it hides exclusionary rules beneath a rhetoric of inclusion. The overarching conversation of mankind aspires to resolve all differends.
But by requiring what is genuinely incommensurable (i.e., incommensurable with the conversation itself) to be voiced within the conversation, it denies it expression and helps to constitute it as a differend at the same time that it disguises it as a litigation. The very attempt to include something which cannot be included makes the conversation of mankind a terrorist conversation.
This is one of the issues between Lyotard and Rorty.”

Sure. Incommensurability is indefensible, so those who propound it soon backtrack. Feyerabend did the same.

Sure. Incommensurability is indefensible, so those who propound it soon backtrack. Feyerabend did the same. — Banno

I do have problems with Davidson’s argument against incommensurability of schemes. For one thing , memory is reconstructive. There is no veridical past to re-access and compare with the present. To do so is already to be dealing with a re-interpretation. As regards the translation of concepts not only between languages but within a given language, if one wants to argue that general agreement on what is the case is always possible , then I would assent to that as long as this must be a pragmatic agreement. More importantly, I would add that in many cases , such as political polarization , agreement may be theoretically possible , but for all intents and purposes is impossible. This is because there can be no translation from one political camp to another without an enormously difficult work of transformation and expansion of political concepts in order to glimpse the opposing political viewpoint in a way that is recognizable to the other side of the conflict.

memory is reconstructive — Joshs

Hmm. I have difficulty seeing why this is a problem for Davidson. Where does memory fit in his argument?

Hmm. I have difficulty seeing why this is a problem for Davidson. Where does memory fit in his argument? — Banno

Actually, I was thinking more of Putnam here. Davidson wants us to believe the idea of a conceptual
scheme presupposes a dualism of scheme and an uninterpreted reality. It doesn’t. Reference doesn’t have to be made to ‘the way things really are’ , only to pragmatic differences in behavior. If we impute to the other an incommensurable scheme, we are anticipating a whole range of behaviors on the r part of the other that we are unable to make sense of in the way we can with someone who shares our scheme. Thus the notion of conceptual scheme validates itself via the behavior over time of the person who we claim holds this scheme.
To unmuddy things a bit , we could rename conceptual scheme ingrained habits of thought. We would also have to assume that Davidson’s suggestion of locating a shared background of beliefs would fail miserably in dealing with anything but the most superficial level of thought. As we have learned in our current polarized world , differences in political worldview are sweeping in the areas of thought that they encompass.

Good reply.

Reference doesn’t have to be made to ‘the way things really are’ , only to pragmatic differences in behavior. — Joshs

Hmm. Does Davidson assume that? Or are you saying he accuse his antagonists of so doing? Frankly I agree there is a crisis of relevance in Davidson, but I am not sufficiently familiar with Lyotard’s writings; I'll remedy that.

Reference doesn’t have to be made to ‘the way things really are’ , only to pragmatic differences in behavior.
— Joshs

Hmm. Does Davidson assume that? Or are you saying he accuse his antagonists of so doing? — Banno

He argues that that the assumption of ‘conceptual scheme’ requires the above presumption:

“ In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth -quite the contrary Given the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get con­ceptual relativity, and truth relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by the board.”( On the very idea of …)

horses for courses — bongo fury

What is a good horse for a course (logic for a discourse)? Not, one might naively assume, one whose principles allow inference to exactly all the sentences that are said in the discourse? Or which agree with all the inferential steps or patterns that are claimed in the discourse? Although that does rather sound like G Russell's view.

I'm not clear whether the view tends to arise from the narrower example of proving a logic sound or complete for a perfectly determined 'discourse', as here:



... where the 'discourse' on the left contains no controversies. Everyone is agreed (no diagrams are denying), in this example, that if everyone loves themselves then everyone loves someone. That would be a principle that needs including in a suitable logic for the discourse. The maths, complicated enough even for such an ideal discourse, is about determining which other principles (LEM, LNC etc) are also required: either for their own sake, or in order to save others from apparent threats like 'explosion' etc.

In informal discourse, by contrast, we are generally faced with controversies, and the usual, classical logic is clearly valued for its ability to help us take sides. Which side to take, which sentences to save, it never tells. But it shows up some combinations as being either mutually compatible or not so. The compatibility is of course relative to the chosen logic, the chosen set of laws. We choose a logic which we hope will, by showing up compatibilities and incompatibilities (relative to it), have a positive influence on our choices to save and reject.

Thus Popper and Lakatos are rightly fixated on counter-examples, which are signs of incompatibility. At least one of these three will have to be rejected or revised:

• All polyhedra are Eulerian
• x is a polyhedron
• x isn't Eulerian

Lakatos investigates all the choices, to see better what's at stake. But he is completely satisfied with ordinary logic as a test of compatibility. Nowhere does a paradox, superficial or deep, tempt him to bring a more exotic (stronger or weaker) logic on board. Paradoxes are to be resolved by better understanding the vagaries and ambiguities of, and subsequent clarifications and alterations to the reference of, (specific occurrences of) terms such as x, polyhedron and Eulerian.

I suggest it's worth noticing how people so often feel the opposite duty: e.g.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/550407
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/566367

Which (hey, we must need a more fancy logic) is an attitude that maybe G Russell would identify as pluralist (and my protesting in those places "please not" as correspondingly monist), I'm not sure. I think I protest only because people are seeing logic as a means of revelation, instead of a (standard of) discipline. Reforming premises to meet present standards of compatibility should be tried before reforming the standards to allow all the premises.

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality — G Russell

I would rather say that it (the principle, the discipline) must be feasible and/or appropriate for imposing in complete generality. Which of course it can't be. Witness art and poetry. Horses for courses.

Still, going with G Russell's flow, what's the analogy with ordinary counterexamples? Is it, e.g.,

• All natural discourse makes conjunction introduction intuitive
• SOLO is convincing as natural discourse
• SOLO makes conjunction introduction unintuitive

?

80

Ok, that's got me thinking.

SO this potentially comes back to asking if logic is normative. I'm thinking that it isn't. That is, it sets out what we can think, but does not set out what we ought think. — Banno

I think the evidence shows that you have this backward. Often people think illogically. So thinking is definitely not contained by logic. We can, and do think in ways far outside of logic (yours truly being your living example). So if logic gives any directional influence to thinking, it must be normative.

Take the No True Scottsman fallacy, for example. In most cases of it, which concern terms that denote national, racial, political, ideological, or religious identity, what is actually going in is an equivocation, because terms that denote national, racial, political, ideological, or religious identity are complex, multilayered, thus, internally incoherent.

You right here, Bongo? Not following your point.

choosing logical pluralism over logical monism leads to more fruitful discussions. — Banno

:up: I second that if only because it frees us from being tied down to one normative system of thinking. Never realized that there could be more than one way to think purposively towards the truth. I guess the old adage - there's more than one way to skin a cat - has to be taken seriously.

The whole idea of rejecting classical logic provides a fresh perspective on madness/idiocy - they're simply different schemes of logic neither better nor worse than what has been shoved down our throats as logical orthodoxa.

I'm just wondering though how such variants of classical logic or even completely novel systems thereof look like if applied in everyday life - I recall Gillian Russell cautioning that logicians are extremely reluctant to make their systems weak; unfortunately, she doesn't clarify the term in the lecture.

Logical nihilism reminds me of the law paradox: There is one law and that law is there are no laws.

I want to put logical nihilism into practice but not just for the heck of it; I want to blur the line between sense and nonsense, between sanity and insanity, between wisdom and foolery, between affirmation and negation, :lol:

I guess what I really mean is I want to be myself - TheMadFool :lol:

Logical nihilism reminds me of the law paradox: There is one law and that law is there are no laws. — TheMadFool

Unrelated but I never understood how statements like this are paradoxical. Just add a “except this one” at the end and the paradox is resolved.

I'm glad it's not just me. I never got that either. It crops up everywhere as if it were a law of nature, and yet I've never heard anyone explain why it's a problem.

Like "Nothing is really 'true' (except this statement)".
...

All that's really happening is that a claim is being made about a grouping of entities into two sets; one containing a single unique case, and one containing 'all the others'. I can't see anything which would prima facie make that impossible, or even improbable.

Unrelated but I never understood how statements like this are paradoxical. Just add a “except this one” at the end and the paradox is resolved. — khaled

But I didn't!

99% of the time people say such things they mean to add "except this one" at the end. It's just less poetic so they don't.

Socrates said "All I know is that I know nothing" and didn't see any paradoxes because it was clear to his listeners that what he meant literally was "All I know is that I know nothing except this"