how do you account for such individuals? Are they wrong? — Marchesk
Or because other human beings have similar aesthetic tastes? How do you get from people having aesthetic experiences to the object being aesthetically pleasing independent (real) of anyone? — Marchesk
If they thought that, then clearly they're wrong. — The Great Whatever
What makes them wrong, though? Because the rest of us say so? — Marchesk
That's the problem. There is no way to objectively determine that it's wrong. — Marchesk
Is there a difference between determining something and objectively determining something? Clearly I can determine it, and so can you, since we already did. — The Great Whatever
We happen to be in agreement that torturing kids is wrong. But I'm sure we can find moral issues that we will strongly disagree with. What then? — Marchesk
It's not incoherent, but it's also not binding. If you believe it's a fiction, then you're acting, it's easy enough just to turn around and say, OK I don't actually believe it.
— Wayfarer
Right, exactly. "Technically" speaking I don't actually "believe" it, but for all purposes I do because I act as though I do. It's practical, conventional, and comfortable to have morality instead of constantly reminding yourself that nothing actually matters in the end. Especially in situations where you have to make a choice, since error theory doesn't just magically transport you elsewhere where you don't have to make choices anymore. Something has to guide our action, and I find that phenomenologically-based morality does this quite well and is more robust and dependable than both moral realism and egoism. — darthbarracuda
What about stealing office stationary? Underpaying staff? Freeloading on your neighbour's WIFI because they didn't change their default password? The fact that nearly everyone will agree that it's wrong to torture children doesn't actually cast much light on the actual moral issues one really will encounter day to day. — Wayfarer
. So to repeat a question I asked earlier, how do we evaluate the truth of moral claims? What sort of things would verify or falsify or in some lesser sense support or oppose claims like "it is wrong to steal" or "you ought not steal"? Is it an empirical matter? Rational? Intuitive? The answer might shed light on the meta-ethical question as well. — Michael
I am very dubious about 'the trolley problem' because of its artificiality. I suppose as a classroom exercise it's useful for focussing the mind on the issues involved. But in real life, again, we're not generally going to face anything like that choice. — Wayfarer
I imagine situations of that kind crop up during war. Do we bomb the munitions factory even though civilians are working there? Should we sacrifice a few to save more? — Michael
Do you think there are any truths about human subjective nature? You know, things like people don't (generally) like to be used, objectified, raped, thieved from, tortured, bullied, deceived, humiliated, and so on? — John
Sure, those things are true. — shmik
The statement "Torturing children is wrong" is ambiguous. It can mean torturing children is wrong in general, or it can mean torturing children is always wrong. — Baden
This seems similar to me to our realization of an external world; which I have never been able to convince myself is a matter of mere inference; even though when strictly considered,from a "purely rational" perspective, it seems as though it must be. See, even here, here I am speaking of "our realization of an external world", as if I could ever know such a thing! And yet.... — John
I've always been somewhat at a loss when talking about moral realism. To a large degree it just doesn't fit with my outlook on the world. It not so much that the arguments against realism are convincing as much as none of the arguments for it are. I guess from my perspective I wander, why would there be ways in which we should act - in the realist sense.
Have any of you heard some convincing arguments for realism.
For social facts, the attitude that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomenon … Part of being a cocktail party is being thought to be a cocktail party; part of being a war is being thought to be a war. This is a remarkable feature of social facts; it has no analogue among physical facts. (Searle 1995, 33–34)
It looks like we have a vastly different view of some of these issues.If one can speak objectively of human subjectivity, then it seems to follow that there is something generic about it. One might say that the contents of awareness are always unique, such contents including a sense of self and personal preferences, yet the container is everywhere the same -awareness is the same whether it is yours or mine.
If such is the truth, it is not directly experienced, but inferred; I do not feel your pain, but your pain is as real as mine. I do not need to be told that I ought to avoid my own pain, because it is within my direct awareness, but the need to avoid your pain emerges indirectly from the understanding that we are not as separate as immediate experience suggests.
If your point of view is as real and as significant as my point of view, for all that I have no access to yours, then my obligation to you is equal to my obligation to myself. Of course it is unnatural to talk about obligation to oneself, because it is automatic - 'when hungry I eat, when thirsty I drink'. The understanding that your hunger and thirst are just as significant as mine is the foundation of obligation to another.
It is as if you are a limb that is numb to me, and I am a limb that is numb to you, and morality is the truth that if you damage a limb, you are damaging yourself, for all that you do not feel anything. — unenlightened
I don't think of consciousness is a container and definitely the difference between people is much more than the so called contents of consciousness. — shmik
There is a large gap between caring and feeling of obligation towards others and moral realism. — shmik
Significance is always significance to something, to a being, to a process, to a god. There is no abstract significance which allows us to equate each persons point of view. — shmik
I don't see how you can be definite about what you are not conscious of. But of course there is much one is not conscious of that varies from person to person, habit, neurology, the state of their gut bacteria. There is much of the world one is not conscious of too. I don't think we disagree about that.
Don't get hung up about 'container'. It is just a convenient shorthand. Shall we say that to be conscious is to be the 'centre' of an 'experiential world? If that is an acceptable locution, then we can replace 'container' with 'centrality' and 'contents of consciousness' with 'experiential world'. — unenlightened
I'd be grateful if you could explain the gap, because I don't see it. The nearest I can get is that morality as pontificated in prescriptions and proscriptions is a poor substitute for the weakness of caring about others. Because I don't actually feel your pain, I don't tend to care about it as much as my own, but this is merely a limitation of my senses - shortsightedness. Morality simply reminds me that you are sensitive too. — unenlightened
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