Just so, and how I "appreciate" the selbst and its translation. — tim wood
“The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. On this account we call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, which apply a priori to objects - a conclusion which general logic cannot establish.” — Kant
Questions..... — darthbarracuda
We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics, physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought. Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and public examination. — Kant
According to Schopenhauer, there is a difference between an object-in-itself and a thing-in-itself. There is no object-in-itself. An object is always an object for a subject. An object is really a representation of an object. On the other hand, a thing-in-itself, for Kant, is completely unknown. It cannot be spoken of at all without employing categories (pure concepts of the understanding). A thing-in-itself is that which appears to an observer when the observer experiences a representation .
Kant altered his first edition to: claim that the spatially external thing-in-itself causes sensations in the sense organs of the knowing subject.
Kant tried to explain how: a perceived object, not mere raw sensation, is given to the mind by sensibility (sensation, space, and time), and how the human understanding produces an experienced object by thinking twelve categories.
Kant doesn't explain how something external causes sensation in a sense organ.
He didn't explain whether the object of experience (the object of knowledge which is the result of the application of the categories) is a perceptual representation or an abstract concept.
He mixed up the perceptible and the abstract so that an absurd hybrid of the two resulted.
There is a contradiction between the object experienced by the senses and the object experienced by the understanding.
Kant claims that representation of an object occurs both through reception of one or more of the five senses, and through the activity of the understanding's twelve categories.
Sensation and understanding are separate and distinct abilities. Yet, for Kant, an object is known through each of them. This contradiction is the source of the obscurity of the Transcendental
Logic.
Kant's incorrect triple distinction:
Representation (given to one or more of the 5 senses, and to the sensibilities of space and time)
Object that is represented (thought through the 12 categories)
Thing-in-itself (cannot be known).
Schopenhauer claimed that Kant's represented object is false. The true distinction is only between the representation and the thing-in-itself. For Schopenhauer, the law of causality, which relates only to the representation and not to the thing-in-itself, is the real and only form of the understanding. The other 11 categories are therefore unnecessary because there is no represented object to be thought through them.
Kant sometimes spoke of the thing-in-itself as though it was an object that caused changes in a subject's senses. Schopenhauer affirmed that the thing-in-itself was totally different from phenomena and therefore had nothing to do with causality or being an object for a subject.
Excessive fondness for symmetry:
Origin of Kant's Transcendental Logic:
As pure intuitions (in the Transcendental Aesthetic) were the basis of empirical intuitions,
pure concepts (in the Transcendental Logic) were made the basis of empirical concepts.
As the Transcendental Aesthetic was the a priori basis of mathematics,
the Transcendental Logic was made the a priori basis of logic.
After discovering empirical perception is based on two forms of a priori perception (space and time), Kant tried to demonstrate that empirical knowledge is based on an analogous a priori knowledge (categories).
Schemata
He went too far when he claimed that the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories) are analogous to a schema of empirically acquired concepts.
A schema of empirical perception is a sketchy, imagined perception. Thus, a schema is the mere imagined form or outline, so to speak, of a real perception. It is related to an empirical abstract concept to show that the concept is not mere word-play but has indeed been based on real perceptions. These perceptions are the actual, material content of the empirical abstract concept.
A schema of pure concepts is supposed to be a pure perception. There is supposed to be a schema for each of the pure concepts (categories). Kant overlooked the fact that these pure concepts, being pure, have no perceptual content. They gain this content from empirical perception. Kant's schemata of pure concepts are entirely undemonstrable and are a merely arbitrary assumption. This demonstrates Kant's purposeful intention to find a pure, a priori analogical basis for every empirical, a posteriori mental activity.
Judgments/categories
Derived all philosophical knowledge from the table of judgments.
Made the table of categories the basis for every assertion about the physical and the metaphysical.
Derived pure concepts of the understanding (categories) from reason. But the Transcendental Analytic was supposed to reference only the sensibility of the sense organs and also the mind's way of understanding objects. It was not supposed to be concerned with reason.
Categories of quantity were based on judgments of quantity. But these judgments relate to reason, not understanding. They involve logical inclusion or exclusion of concepts with each other, as follows:
Universal judgment: All A are x; Particular judgment: Some A are x; Singular judgment: This one A is x.
Note: The word "quantity" was poorly chosen to designate mutual relations between abstract concepts.
Categories of quality were based on judgments of quality. But these judgments also are related only to reason, not to understanding. Affirmation and denial are relations between concepts in a verbal judgment. They have nothing to do with perceptual reality for the understanding. Kant also included infinite judgments, but only for the sake of architectonic symmetry. They have no meaning in Kant's context.
The term "quality" was chosen because it has usually been opposed to "quantity." But here it means only affirmation and denial in a judgment.
The categorical relation (A is x) is simply the general connection of a subject concept with a predicate concept in a statement. It includes the hypothetical and disjunctive sub-relations. It also includes the judgments of quality (affirmation, negation) and judgments of quantity (inclusional relationships between concepts). Kant made separate categories from these sub-relations. He used indirect, abstract knowledge to analyze direct, perceptual knowledge.
Our certain knowledge of the physical persistence of substance, or the conservation of matter, is derived, by Kant, from the category of subsistence and inherence. But this is merely based on the connection of a linguistic subject with its predicate.
With judgments of relation, the hypothetical judgment (if A, then B) does not correspond only to the law of causality. This judgment is also associated with three other roots of the principle of sufficient reason. Abstract reasoning does not disclose the distinction between these four kinds of ground. Knowledge from perception is required.
reason of knowing (logical inference);
reason of acting (law of motivation);
reason of being (spatial and temporal relations, including the arithmetical sequences of numbers and the geometrical positions of points, lines, and surfaces).
Disjunctive judgments derive from the logical law of thought of the excluded middle (A is either A or not-A). This relates to reason, not to the understanding. For the purpose of symmetry, Kant asserted that the physical analog of this logical law was the category of community or reciprocal effect. However, it is the opposite, since the logical law refers to mutually exclusive predicates, not inclusive.
Schopenhauer asserted that there is no reciprocal effect. It is only a superfluous synonym for causality. For architectonic symmetry, Kant created a separate a priori function in the understanding for reciprocal effect. Actually, there is only an alternating succession of states, a chain of causes and effects.
Modal categories of possible, actual, and necessary are not special, original cognized forms. They are derived from the principle of sufficient reason (ground).
Possibility is a general, mental abstraction. It refers to abstract concepts, which are solely related to the ability to reason or logically infer.
There is no difference between actuality (existence) and necessity.
Necessity is a consequence from a given ground (reason).[2] — Critique of Kantian Philosophy Wikipedia Article
Kant says that knowledge a priori is that which is absolutely independent of all experience...... — darthbarracuda
......is it more like it having the possibility of being experienced which makes it empirical knowledge? — darthbarracuda
what is the difference between a sensation and an intuition (what more is there to an intuition other than sensation?), — darthbarracuda
In what way is a priori knowledge apodictic that makes it impossible for empirical knowledge to provide the same universality and necessity? — darthbarracuda
That 7 + 5 = 12 is a synthetic a priori true proposition is certainly plausible to me, but that it is necessarily and universally true that 7 + 5 = 12 is not. — darthbarracuda
For what reason do I have to believe that it may not be different in the future? — darthbarracuda
Why would Schopenhauer say only causality is a category of the mind. Kant admitted that the self is will ("free will) and since such is apart from space and time the relationship to the world from it is paradoxical — Gregory
You may recall that for Kant, whether or not time has a beginning or not is an antinomy: There are equally good reasons on both sides, and so the correct answer it to say that we just can't know and/or that the question somehow doesn't make sense. Temporal sequence only applies to phenomena, which depend on minds, so asking whether things in themselves are in an infinite or finite temporal series is attempting to use the concept of time outside of the realm in which it was developed, which is the realm of our experience. It does not follow from this that the Thing-In-Itself is atemporal, but simply that the Thing-In-Itself is not something we're in any position to make a judgment either way about. Compare to the question "Is God green?" You might say qua Maimonides that no, of course God is not green; colors apply to finite things. But neither can we positively say that God has the positive property of not being green, or not having color. Maybe He does have color, but in some higher way that we can't understand. We are in the same position regarding the Thing-In-Itself: by definition it's something we can't perceive or even really conceive of in its wholeness, in its essence, in its positive aspects.
Schopenhauer thinks that Kant is in no position to decide this issue "by definition," and thinks he has other reasons (mystical and artistic experience, i.e. the verdict of genius, plus the philosophy of science considerations surrounding "force" belabored in our discussion) for thinking we can know some positive things about the Thing-In-Itself, but he still fundamentally doesn't give us a reason for insisting on its lack of plurality and hence its non-temporal, non-spatial status. So why does he insist on this? I think he's just adhering to the heuristic (Kant might call it a regulative principle of Reason) to seek simplicity/unity. Saying that ultimately existence is One is supposed to be more satisfying somehow than saying that it's irreducibly Many. It's somewhat ironic that Schopenhauer dismisses this principle when it comes to science (in his rejection of reductionism) only to assert such unity at the metaphysical level.
Setting that aside, and granting Schopenhauer the point about the Thing-In-Itself's unified, atemporal character, and granting him the (contentious) proposition that differentiation within the Thing-In-Itself (the Will) only happens because perceivers pop up to perceive some part of the Will, haven't we just pushed the antinomy back one level? Schopenhauer is able to answer the question "does time have a beginning of not" by saying "no, not on the level of representation, but yes, before the first perceiver, there was no time," but he is then faced with a similarly insoluble question: "How could the first perceiver perceive something unless there was something already there to perceive?" This is to ask "why the principium individuationis?" which is in Schopenhauer's system the tragic question of Being. — Mark Linsenmayer
Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up....”
**impure a priori knowledge, also considered as either intuition, metaphysically, or memory, psychologically. — Mww
Pure a priori knowledge, because it is being herein defined as absent any experience, must then be determined by something other than sensibility. And the only thing remaining after eliminating sensibility, is thought. Therefore, the theoretical ground is laid for deriving the possibility of pure a priori knowledge from understanding alone, which is the faculty of thought. — Mww
Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. — Mww
From the simplest analytical proposition, A = A, to the most complex abstract synthetical mathematical calculus, the proofs of all logical forms depend on empirical conditions. — Mww
The way in which pure a priori knowledge is apodeitic is becaiuse it arises from the understanding alone, an internal cognitive faculty, thereby granting sufficient causality for certainty, in that there is no other influence on it. That which arises from itself, cannot be other than it is, which holds the same value as truth, but truth restricted to the very domain from which it is given. — Mww
The question then becomes....does reason ever reach that state of affairs, and the Kantian speculative metaphysics proves it does not, and it cannot. — Mww
Sensation arises from the matter of objects and is the initiation of the process by which the system is going to determine how the object is to be known; intuitions are the forms to which the matter attains, whatever that objects may be. — Mww
Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions) — Mww
what is the difference between a sensation and an intuition (what more is there to an intuition other than sensation?), — darthbarracuda
does this basically mean that thought is always tied to sensibility, but is nevertheless different from it? — darthbarracuda
That does not mean that I can have pure a priori thoughts, though — darthbarracuda
meaning of these words: intuition, object, and representation. — darthbarracuda
“...Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition a priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also the universal condition a priori under which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself?...” — Mww
As there is no such thing as a triangle — tim wood
there might be triangular shapes all around all the day long, what it takes to recognize them as triangles is an internal intuition with which those experiences conform. — tim wood
we cannot say we know it as a thing in itself, which is already proven to be impossible, so it must be known in conjunction, not with its appearance from sensibility, but with its form from intuition, which we already have.... The proper conclusion is, then, that there must be a faculty of intuition a priori within us. — Mww
How could anything be understood absent the faculty of understanding — tim wood
if the CPR is intended to establish a ground for scientific thinking, which I think it is and does — tim wood
if the CPR is intended to establish a ground for scientific thinking (...) it is itself grounded in practical reason. — tim wood
Kant must have attributed to reason three fundamental conditions, for there are ....DUH!!!....three critiques, to wit:, theoretical (CPR), judicial (CofJ) and practical (CpR). Everydayman thinks more about his actions than about how he comes up with his actions, which implies practical reason has more importance overall than either of the other two conditional forms of reason. Nevertheless, given the two basic kinds of reason qua reason, pure and practical....
“.....To this question we have given a sufficient answer; for we have shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition from those of the latter, the law of the one does not affect the law of the other and that, consequently, both can exist together in independence of and without interference with each other....”
....I shall await your exposition as to how the one might be grounded in the other. — Mww
While I didn’t technically ask a question, I was querying Tim, as to how he thought the one grounded in the other. The quote merely relates to Tim’s assertion, as a preliminary reference. — Mww
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