It's not just to limit someone's freedom like that. — Wheatley

What is "It's" here?

Limiting someone's freedom to just three options: x, y, and z.

Limiting someone's freedom to just three options: x, y, and z. — Wheatley

So the point is with birth, there can never be an option to opt-out. Is this just?

So the point is with birth, there can never be an option to opt-out. Is this just? — schopenhauer1

Birth can be an accident. Should we limit sexual intercourse?

I'll make as many babies as I want. :cool:

Your question only makes sense only if humans are individual organisms that can act unconstrained (though not wholly detrrmined by) by their species biology. And we can't. Biology 101. Thus, antinatality is mostly a pathological aberration like clinical depression or Tourett Syndrome; where it's a deliberate stance, such as in my case, it's (mostly) a matter of moral luck when one achieves it. — 180 Proof

I guess my response is the same as to darth's here:

I can maybe agree with that. What is your own justification for that? What I don't get is wanting a child is a discursive, deliberative thought. It is not an immediate need, nor even something as compelling as pleasure or the aversion/reflex away from pain. The statement, "I want a car" and "I want a baby" are absolutely the same as far as I see. One does not have any more unconscious pull than another. The wanting of something is simply the wanting of something.

I guess you can make the case that the "heat of the moment" outweighed the thought for whether or not to have a baby, but with the ubiquity of all sorts of birth control, this isn't as big a deal either.

So really, it is more of a cultural and personal want than a universal biological drive.. unless you want to argue that wanting anything is a drive itself, but then we are speaking about wants and not this specific wants.. Wants then can be mitigated like all other wants.. I want this Ferrari but I cannot afford it, best not try to buy it. I want X but... — schopenhauer1

So not sure what Biology 101 would have to do with procreating other than accidents which can be highly reduced in the modern world. Even then, we can still deliberate. There is no, reflexive, instinctual driven, no way to stop it, breeding season.

Birth can be an accident. Should we limit sexual intercourse? — Wheatley

Not necessarily. Just the risk it leads to birth which is reasonably manageable for many people.

I advocate sex seduction...

And planned parenthood.

So not sure what Biology 101 would have to do with procreating ... — schopenhauer1

:roll: wtf.

1) The same may apply.. People can report one thing and experience another, — schopenhauer1

But you think it applies to one and not the other. Why? That's the question I'm asking you.

You trust people's reports when it comes to surprise parties but not life, why is that?

A surprise party lasts a certain duration with a set period of time. Life itself is a lifetime obviously. — schopenhauer1

A lifetime is a "certain duration with a set period of time". The only difference here is length.

You cannot compare the two. — schopenhauer1

You can't just keep stating this, you have to explain why you cannot compare the two. So far the only difference you outlined is the length of imposition which shouldn't be relevant (see next paragraph).

Again, I don't believe this is analogous to life itself because of the vast difference in duration — schopenhauer1

Irrelevant. The point of the surprise party example isn't to say "Surprise parties are ok so life is ok". That would be a stupid argument. The point is to show that acts that don't relieve any harm, while having a chance of causing harm, can still be ok to do. That's all I'm trying to argue.

And SINCE this is the case (again, you agree that surprise parties are ok even though they don't relieve harm, and can cause it), you have no objective basis for arguing that life is too much of an imposition. That's what I'm arguing, not that "It's ok to impose life" but "You have no objective (true of everyone) justification to say that it's not ok to impose life".

and the fact that one is one experience while the other is a lifetime of all experiences. — schopenhauer1

A surprise party is not a unitary experience. It's a duration full of experiences just like life is, just much shorter. This is not a real difference. Again, the only difference you pointed out is length.

Enduring and "finding it a thing they must endure" is almost the same as the experience and the report later of the experience so this is just restating what we are arguing as far as I see. — schopenhauer1

I'm saying that people's reports of their experiences should be the thing you take into account when you are trying to examine the quality of others' experiences.

You are claiming that no, these reports can be wrong, and that life is objectively "a minor inconvenience or a terrible burden for everyone". That would be a tenable position, if you didn't also take people's word for it when it comes to surprise parties with no explanation as to why you treat them differently. Length is not a factor when it comes to the degree to which the reports align with the lived experience.

But I would agree that a particular event of a surprise party might align the experience and report as good. — schopenhauer1

But life doesn't?

Being that this is disanalogous to life itself, being that life is the sum of all experiences — schopenhauer1

The differences that make it disanalogous are:

vast difference in duration and the fact that one is one experience while the other is a lifetime of all experiences. — schopenhauer1

Which one of those explains why the report is not to be trusted in the case of life? I don't see how either should be relevant (one isn't a real difference). It's like saying: "His report shouldn't be trusted because he has red hair while the other witnesses had black hair."

Even if this was correct, one major difference is I am not forcing the ice cream on others. — schopenhauer1

Irrelevant. Point I was making was purely about how extent arguments are not objective. Do you agree about that at least?

At least if you are going to be talking of extent, try to make an analogy of things that are daily X set of multiple experiences that are continuous and non-stop until death — schopenhauer1

See below.

But it does, especially if we are talking about an extent argument. — schopenhauer1

No it doesn't. Because I'm not saying "Surprise parties are ok so life is ok". I'm not arguing for natalism. I'm arguing you have no objective basis by which to push your belief. Yours is exactly as valid as natalism at best. For this argument to work, I would need to point out that you are making an extent argument. Which you are. And you haven't provided any basis for why your analysis of "bad enough" is any more "correct" than a natalist's.

Because I can probably agree that actual lived experience and reported experience are more aligned in the case of surprise parties. — schopenhauer1

You can't just arbitrarily agree that in one case the lived and the reported experiences are aligned and in the other case they aren't. Why are they not aligned in the case of life? Duration? How is that relevant?

Again, it's a meta-ethics thing about where it fits into the world of phenomena. — schopenhauer1

Not what I'm asking.

However, to the point of "objectivity", you may be referring more to "universality in belief" — schopenhauer1

This is what I'm asking. As highlighted by:

I mean objective as in: True of everybody. — khaled

Perhaps there are universal appeals to wrongs- things like murder and theft. — schopenhauer1

Yes but those are all type arguments. Murder is wrong. Period. And murder is: Killing innocents. There is no "Too much murder is wrong". Every single instance is wrong. That's why you can make universal appeals like these.

But in your case you want to use: "Imposing on others is wrong" to make a universal appeal relating to childbirth. That would be fine. Except you don't think imposing on others is always wrong ex: Surprise parties. So it's more like "Imposing on others too much is wrong". Now you have no basis to make a universal appeal. Unless you can show that your estimation of "too much" is more correct than that of a natalist somehow.

No, because as repeated over and over, the analogy is dis-analogous. — schopenhauer1

Not in a way that matters. What does the length of the experience have to do with the accuracy of the reports? Do people tend to report long experiences favorably or something? I'd say it's the opposite of that if anything.

But you think it applies to one and not the other. Why? That's the question I'm asking you.

You trust people's reports when it comes to surprise parties but not life, why is that? — khaled

No, what I am saying that because a surprise party is one defined event, and not a course of day, a week, a month, a year, a decade, a lifetime, it can indeed align more closely with the report.

A lifetime is a "certain duration with a set period of time". The only difference here is length. — khaled

Indeed and that makes a difference.

You can't just keep stating this, you have to explain why you cannot compare the two. So far the only difference you outlined is the length of imposition which shouldn't be relevant (see next paragraph). — khaled

Irrelevant. The point of the surprise party example isn't to say "Surprise parties are ok so life is ok". That would be a stupid argument. — khaled

Phew.

The point is to show that acts that don't relieve any harm, while having a chance of causing harm, can still be ok to do. That's all I'm trying to argue. — khaled

I can be a Kantian non-nuanced person and say that all things which might cause harm are not okay. I am willing to be more nuanced and say that an event with short duration with extremely minimal costs of imposition are acceptable, hence why this doesn't compare which you keep insisting it does. You have only shown a specific event with extremely minimal cost of imposition is not an imposition. That isn't saying much.

And SINCE this is the case (again, you agree that surprise parties are ok even though they don't relieve harm, and can cause it), you have no objective basis for arguing that life is too much of an imposition. That's what I'm arguing, not that "It's ok to impose life" but "You have no objective (true of everyone) justification to say that it's not ok to impose life". — khaled

It's not okay to impose a long duration of impositions on someone, despite the fact that discreet events of very minimal chance of impositions can occur in a lifetime of a person.

A surprise party is not a unitary experience. It's a duration full of experiences just like life is, just much shorter. This is not a real difference. Again, the only difference you pointed out is length. — khaled

I just don't accept this as analogous to all of life. The amount of impositions is so minimal and non-pervasive that it would be intellectually dishonest to claim it is. So disanalagous again. There must be some kind of fallacy here of mistaking the specific for the more general.

You are claiming that no, these reports can be wrong, and that life is objectively "a minor inconvenience or a terrible burden for everyone". That would be a tenable position, if you didn't also take people's word for it when it comes to surprise parties with no explanation as to why you treat them differently. Length is not a factor when it comes to the degree to which the reports align with the lived experience. — khaled

I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this then because your argument revolves a lot on this analogy holding and I don't think they are the same due to the pervasive nature of a lifetime of possible and actual burdens.

Which one of those explains why the report is not to be trusted in the case of life? I don't see how either should be relevant (one isn't a real difference). It's like saying: "His report shouldn't be trusted because he has red hair while the other witnesses had black hair." — khaled

I'm not sure why longer duration with more perpetual, pervasive, and frequent impositions is not computing and is translated as arbitrary for you.

Irrelevant. Point I was making was purely about how extent arguments are not objective. Do you agree about that at least? — khaled

Forcing a burden on someone unnecessarily, do you think that is bad? That helps answer our disagreement perhaps. And you will say, not everyone will think "it" is bad. And then we will argue what "it" is. You will say report, I will say lived experience and we are back at square one. So where is this going to go but in circles with how we are arguing right now?

No it doesn't. Because I'm not saying "Surprise parties are ok so life is ok". I'm not arguing for natalism. I'm arguing you have no objective basis by which to push your belief. Yours is exactly as valid as natalism at best. For this argument to work, I would need to point out that you are making an extent argument. Which you are. And you haven't provided any basis for why your analysis of "bad enough" is any more "correct" than a natalist's. — khaled

Then this goes back to my meta-argument for ethics in the first place.

You can't just arbitrarily agree that in one case the lived and the reported experiences are aligned and in the other case they aren't. Why are they not aligned in the case of life? Duration? How is that relevant? — khaled

Because surprise parties are general happy experiences. And if it isn't.. then you are unintentionally arguing in my camp. I'm actually trying to placate your view here that surprise parties are almost universally seen as good. I can go along with this and perhaps the lived experience is aligned with the report in surprise parties. That to me doesn't have much relevance when discussing every experience of life itself, as I have said ad nauseum now.

Yes but those are all type arguments. Murder is wrong. Period. And murder is: Killing innocents. There is no "Too much murder is wrong". Every single instance is wrong. That's why you can make universal appeals like these. — khaled

Okay sure, but I have given various examples of things that were not seen as wrong in the past and have become considered wrong today. I think I have explained to you my meta-ethical idea that ethics can evolve over time. You seem to think that if it does not convince people AT THIS TIME, it must be not right. What is your foundation for this claim? And if it's not, then you have to bite the bullet and say murder and theft is not wrong unless a majority say it is, cause now you are truly just saying right and wrong is whatever the majority says it is.

But in your case you want to use: "Imposing on others is wrong" to make a universal appeal relating to childbirth. That would be fine. Except you don't think imposing on others is always wrong ex: Surprise parties. So it's more like "Imposing on others too much is wrong". Now you have no basis to make a universal appeal. Unless you can show that your estimation of "too much" is more correct than that of a natalist somehow. — khaled

Then the goal of the person who sees the extent as too much is to convince the other that it is indeed too much. If it is not convincing so be it. You are not convinced. For a sociopath, it would be impossible for him to perhaps see how it is wrong to murder, but he is still wrong to murder. I am not comparing the two but showing an example for how in so-called "universal" cases, people might not convinced its wrong. There was Hitler and Stalin etc. who thought of their own objectives more than millions of peoples lives as more important. The instinct to say "murder is universally wrong" is not held by everyone either.

No, what I am saying that because a surprise party is one defined event, and not a course of day, a week, a month, a year, a decade, a lifetime, it can indeed align more closely with the report. — schopenhauer1

Ah, so the longer the period, supposedly the less accurate the predictions. Where is your evidence for this? You can't just claim it out of the blue.

What if the party lasted a week, suddenly not accurate anymore?

Indeed and that makes a difference. — schopenhauer1

Not until you explain why you believe it does. Where is your evidence that the longer the period, the less accurate the predictions are?

I can be a Kantian non-nuanced person and say that all things which might cause harm are not okay. — schopenhauer1

Well, this would mean literally nothing is okay, and the fact that you're doing something right now shows you can't hold that position with your current beliefs.

I am willing to be more nuanced and say that an event with short duration with extremely minimal costs of imposition are acceptable — schopenhauer1

This isn't any better. You have no reason to say that life is long enough and that its impositions are not minimal enough. You can't establish that objectively. One can easily consistently hold that life is not long enough and not a big enough imposition to be unacceptable in the general case.

You still have no objective basis to push your belief.

The amount of impositions is so minimal and non-pervasive that it would be intellectually dishonest to claim it is. So disanalagous again. — schopenhauer1

You understand how analogies work right? I can't provide you with an example of an imposition that is lifelong, and just as much of an imposition as life, because that would just be life. All analogies will be different in magnitude from the originals but have the same properties. That's what an analogy is.

I'm not sure why longer duration with more perpetual, pervasive, and frequent impositions is not computing and is translated as arbitrary for you. — schopenhauer1

Because you haven't shown how either affect predictions. You want to make a claim that longer durations make us see the experience through rose tinted glasses. You have provided no support for this. So it remains an arbitrary claim until you do.

Length is not a factor when it comes to the degree to which the reports align with the lived experience.
— khaled

I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this — schopenhauer1

I'm assuming this is what you mean we have to "agree to disagree on". I disagree. You've made a claim without evidence. That people generally embellish long experiences in a positive light and don't do so with shorter ones. You need to provide evidence for this. Then your position may have some objective legitimacy.

Forcing a burden on someone unnecessarily, do you think that is bad? — schopenhauer1

Depends on the extent of the burden compared to how likely it is the "burden" is enjoyed. Slavery? Bad. Surprise parties? Good.

This is your position as well.

Right, so it is a (what you call) extent argument I am making, at this point. That is to say, starting life for someone else is sufficiently meeting a threshold that is crossed to make it a violation and thus wrong. — schopenhauer1

This assumes there is a threshold, and it's not a simple yes/no question.

You will say report, I will say lived experience and we are back at square one. So where is this going to go but in circles with how we are arguing right now? — schopenhauer1

This is the problem. We both say report. Because that's all we have access to!

You think that the lived experience is what matters, but how do we get at what this lived experience was like? Well, only thing we can do is ask the experiencer correct? Except in one case (life) you think their reports should be dismissed and that life is objectively neutral to bad, but in the other (surprise parties) you think their reports are accurate. This is an arbitrary belief that you have to provide evidence for.

What we disagree on currently is how trustworthy the reports are. I say they're trustworthy, you seem to arbitrarily decide they are not when it fits your argument.

Then this goes back to my meta-argument for ethics in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Again, I'm not asking you to:

make my argument "THE ARGUMENT" because it is an argument. It is not a chair. It is not the laws of gravity, etc. — schopenhauer1

I'm showing you that there is no reason your belief should be universalized although you seem to think it has that kind of justification

However, to the point of "objectivity", you may be referring more to "universality in belief" which you seem to refer back to over and over for why antinatalism is wrong. — schopenhauer1

(Note: again, I'm not arguing antinatalism is wrong. I'm arguing that you have no objective (true of everyone) way to show it's right)

Because surprise parties are general happy experiences. — schopenhauer1

So is life. According to the reports. Which you choose not to trust without giving any reason as to why they shouldn't be trusted. "It's too long" is not a reason until you explain what length has to do with the accuracy.

That to me doesn't have much relevance when discussing every experience of life itself, as I have said ad nauseum now. — schopenhauer1

Which is arbitrary. Why is it that in the case of life our reports are inaccurate while for surprise parties they're not? I agree they're dissimilar in many aspects, but you have to still show instead of arbitrarily claiming, that one of those aspects results in inaccurate reports in the one case and accurate ones in the other.

Okay sure, but I have given various examples of things that were not seen as wrong in the past and have become considered wrong today. I think I have explained to you my meta-ethical idea that ethics can evolve over time. — schopenhauer1

No one disagrees there. What I disagree with is your belief that this is such a case where having children is something acceptable now that we will come to see as wrong later. It's unsupported.

And a very important point: ALL of these ethical evolutions were evolutions that took the form of type statements. Murder is wrong, not "too much murder is wrong". Slavery is wrong not "too much slavery is wrong". Yours takes the form of "too much imposition is wrong" which is already a (basically) universally held principle. You cannot get "having children is wrong" out of that as any more than a personal conclusion. At the same level as "Eating white chocolate is bad" because it's too sweet. It's not an objective statement, it's entirely personal, and depends on your definition of "too sweet".

You seem to think that if it does not convince people AT THIS TIME, it must be not right. — schopenhauer1

False. I'm not arguing it's not right. I'm arguing you have no basis for thinking it will eventually be right. And so no reason to push it. It's on the same level as: "Eating white chocolate is bad" because it's too sweet. In other words, that the natalist position is just as valid.

This is the 3rd or 4th time I've made it clear I'm not arguing for natalism. I'm arguing that your belief that antinatalism is superior in any objective (again, universality of belief not whatever else you thought it was) sense is unfounded.

Then the goal of the person who sees the extent as too much is to convince the other that it is indeed too much. — schopenhauer1

There is no meaning to "It is indeed too much". You are claiming that there is some objective measure of the "right extent" of imposition. Is there an objective measure of the "right extent" of sweetness?

The instinct to say "murder is universally wrong" is not held by everyone either. — schopenhauer1

But the person that believes it has a claim to objectivity. He can respond "actually murder is wrong because anything the prematurely and unjustly ends life without consent is wrong and murder is that". If anyone believes in the first premise, and that murder fits that category, they will agree it is wrong.

There is no equivalent for antinatalism. "Imposing on people is wrong"? well, you don't believe that (surprise parties). It's "Imposing on people too much is wrong". Literally everyone agrees with you there. And not everyone is an antinatalist. Because what is "too much" is personal. It's again like "Eating things that are too sweet is bad". Everyone agrees, yet they eat different foods,and none think that they're more "correct" than the others in doing so. But you seem to for some reason.

Both "murder is wrong" and "having children is wrong" are not universally held. But the difference is for the first, if the premises are true the conclusion is true, giving a way to objectivity if you hold that the premises are true of everyone. For the second, even if the premise is true of everyone the conclusion doesn't necessarily follow. Meaning that those who believe in the the second, have no reason to think it applies to everyone. They will disagree with people that think "Imposing on people too much is wrong" is false, but outside of that, they have no justification to claim that they're right as long as that first premise is shared.

Ah, so the longer the period, supposedly the less accurate the predictions. Where is your evidence for this? You can't just claim it out of the blue.

What if the party lasted a week, suddenly not accurate anymore? — khaled

I was agreeing with you that a surprise party is generally considered a good experience. So in this case (generally), the lived experience matches the reported experience. Like if someone had their favorite food, and right after you asked, "Did you like that food?". Believe it or not, I can believe the person is truly reporting they liked the food. However, the optimism bias would indeed be absurd if we only applied it to times when people are generally actually happy about something. It is about going through a series of events during a longer duration and cherry-picking the good ones, when it comes time to reporting for various reasons I have mentioned.

Not until you explain why you believe it does. Where is your evidence that the longer the period, the less accurate the predictions are? — khaled

It's just the function of studying the optimism bias.. It is over a long duration. It's not a poll of likes and dislikes right after an event. "Did you like this event that you prefer?" Well, shit, of course! I guess optimism bias is debunked, someone reported they liked a surprise party when they generally like parties and surprises by their friends who planned a party on their behalf!

OB is often pointed to as an evolutionary adaptation to cope with difficult situations, so is about a multitude of events that pass through a life and how one is filtering it.

Well, this would mean literally nothing is okay, and the fact that you're doing something right now shows you can't hold that position with your current beliefs. — khaled

I'm not. I am saying, I am being more nuanced than a rigid Kantian who would say something like, "If a murderer asks where the victim is hiding, I cannot lie". That lacks nuance.

This isn't any better. You have no reason to say that life is long enough and that its impositions are not minimal enough. You can't establish that objectively. One can easily consistently hold that life is not long enough and not a big enough imposition to be unacceptable in the general case.

You still have no objective basis to push your belief. — khaled

I believe this is like saying, "If I break someone's arm, someone MIGHT not mind it because I haven't surveyed everyone". There are some things which are known entities like that life contains a certain amount of lived experience that is harm, suffering, negative. It's like, I am even giving you the surprise party example as a given of something almost universally liked. I'm not going to ask you to "prove" it because it's a known. It would be uncharitable and in this kind of argument to even make you give me data on surprise parties. I will go with it. Hell I can even deny that people like surprise parties all together and will not concede this is a good example unless you get me surveys from certain scientific sources! Otherwise, I will not entertain it. Period!

You understand how analogies work right? I can't provide you with an example of an imposition that is lifelong, and just as much of an imposition as life, because that would just be life. All analogies will be different in magnitude from the originals but have the same properties. That's what an analogy is. — khaled

Yes, but when the analogy does not hold, it really can't be used as a counter-example, because it is not actually showing the case. Again, this is some sort of specific general fallacy. At time one, the football team is pumped.. Throughout the game, they get pummeled and frustrated and generally are not happy. At any point during that longer duration, they might have had various negative experiences. If you just interviewed the team at the beginning of the game, you would have thought their experience that game day was great.

Because you haven't shown how either affect predictions. You want to make a claim that longer durations make us see the experience through rose tinted glasses. You have provided no support for this. So it remains an arbitrary claim until you do. — khaled

Because you are picking one positive experience and saying, "This is like life" instead of a steady stream of a variety of daily experiences. I don't have to prove that that is the case which makes this disanalogous. Life isn't a stream of surprise party experiences. If I have to prove this, then I am done debating this. There is some sort of justification fallacy where every word I use can be asked for justification. At some point you have to have a foundation of agreement. Life has a variety of experiences. Yes.

I'm assuming this is what you mean we have to "agree to disagree on". I disagree. You've made a claim without evidence. That people generally embellish long experiences in a positive light and don't do so with shorter ones. You need to provide evidence for this. Then your position may have some objective legitimacy. — khaled

I mean, I don't get your gripe now. Are you trying to say that the events of the surprise party can have many negatives that people aren't reporting? That could be a possibility, but I am already telling you that most likely the events will be positive for events people generally like. I'm not sold that it works as an analogy. Perhaps if you want to elaborate what happens at a particular surprise party, we can analyze that as a case of possible optimism bias, but I am willing to say that generally the lived experience of things people like match their report.

Depends on the extent of the burden compared to how likely it is the "burden" is enjoyed. Slavery? Bad. Surprise parties? Good.

This is your position as well. — khaled

Indeed. So we agree on something and there is a basis for a real understanding. Our difference is that often there are negative events (maybe not conditions of slavery) that people encounter but do overlook because there is an optimism bias. The lived experience is disrupted from the reported one.

You think that the lived experience is what matters, but how do we get at what this lived experience was like? Well, only thing we can do is ask the experiencer correct? Except in one case (life) you think their reports should be dismissed and that life is objectively neutral to bad, but in the other (surprise parties) you think their reports are accurate. This is an arbitrary belief that you have to provide evidence for.

What we disagree on currently is how trustworthy the reports are. I say they're trustworthy, you seem to arbitrarily decide they are not when it fits your argument. — khaled

If you want me to say that even the surprise party recipient isn't trustworthy, I mean that may be the case. Maybe throughout the course of the day he had a bunch of negative experiences and then reported otherwise. However, I think that most experiences during a surprise party are already positive and thus would accurately be reporting that. However, I am not going to discount that if there were mostly negative experiences, it is a possibility that someone might report otherwise. That could happen, but since I believe the experiences in the party to already be of a positive nature, this doesn't happen much because the lived experiences are already positive. I am not trying to argue that.

(Note: again, I'm not arguing antinatalism is wrong. I'm arguing that you have no objective (true of everyone) way to show it's right) — khaled

I'm not going to throw you articles if that's what you want. It is a psychological claim that this is the case that I am saying I think has validity and further proves a case where humans have a tendency to overlook, under report, etc. If you don't find it compelling, then do some research and see. I don't have the time to go over every article and parse that with you.. Justification regress. If you want, let me block off the rest of my life to scour every article because khaled doesn't find my argument compelling on an internet forum.

Which is arbitrary. Why is it that in the case of life our reports are inaccurate while for surprise parties they're not? I agree they're dissimilar in many aspects, but you have to still show instead of arbitrarily claiming, that one of those aspects results in inaccurate reports in the one case and accurate ones in the other. — khaled

Over and over I am saying because that surprise parties generally is an experience people like. I can agree that someone who did not have a good time, could also do the same thing as people do for life in general but then, ok then, that is going on there as well. However, if someone likes ice cream, gets ice cream, and you ask, "how was the ice cream", and they say "good", I'm not going to argue he is wrong! However, if the person had ice cream, tripped, spilled it on himself, did a bunch of other things throughout the day positive and negative, he might report something different.. Then aggregated over a period of time.. All of a sudden someone asks "Binary answer, Yes/No life".. that is a difference and it does have to do with an aggregate of many experiences being crammed into a binary question.

False. I'm not arguing it's not right. I'm arguing you have no basis for thinking it will eventually be right. And so no reason to push it. It's on the same level as: "Eating white chocolate is bad" because it's too sweet. In other words, that the natalist position is just as valid.

This is the 3rd or 4th time I've made it clear I'm not arguing for natalism. I'm arguing that your belief that antinatalism is superior in any objective (again, universality of belief not whatever else you thought it was) sense is unfounded. — khaled

And I am saying for the 3rd of 4th time, I don't even believe ethics works like that! IT either convinces or doesn't', period. It doesn't have universality, not prima facie at least. It is compelling or not compelling.

There is no meaning to "It is indeed too much". You are claiming that there is some objective measure of the "right extent" of imposition. Is there an objective measure of the "right extent" of sweetness? — khaled

I am trying to figure out what exactly that extent is, but let me answer something you said here to elucidate in general:

Because what is "too much" is personal. It's again like "Eating things that are too sweet is bad". Everyone agrees, yet they eat different foods,and none think that they're more "correct" than the others in doing so. But you seem to for some reason.

Both "murder is wrong" and "having children is wrong" are not universally held. But the difference is for the first, if the premises are true the conclusion is true, giving a way to objectivity if you hold that the premises are true of everyone. For the second, even if the premise is true of everyone the conclusion doesn't necessarily follow. Meaning that those who believe in the the second, have no reason to think it applies to everyone. They will disagree with people that think "Imposing on people too much is wrong" is false, but outside of that, they have no justification to claim that they're right as long as that first premise is shared. — khaled

But this works on both arguments. So we both agree:
1) People can deny the premise and thus never universally hold an ethic.

The case of the premise of murder and antinatalism can be the same as well, you are just being very narrow in your degree/extent with murder. Murder is a set of things.. There's death, killing, accidental death, killing with intent, killing under some mitigating circumstance, 1st degree, 2nd degree, etc. etc. There are extents to even this event. One that gets it to being considered "murder" and one that defines to what degree the murder took. Only the process of law deems it as "agreed upon" and that is basically a social agreement. But see, now we are back to the majority argument that you claim not to be making. The universality devolves into social construction. I can imagine a society who values non-imposition as a very important rule and thus antinatalism becomes a principle constructed over time in a long process over many years and becomes ingrained where degrees are defined etc.

If imposing burdens on someone else is wrong, then there is a basis here. We are now arguing:
1) Are burdens underreported?
2) Are burdens okay to give to someone if someone accepts the burden?
3) Are all burdens of this nature in #2?
4) How much of the burdens are not of the nature of #2 and are unwanted (but possibly reported as wanted)?

As an aside, I cannot keep up these long conversations. I just don't have the time, so if we can consolidate these, it would be much appreciated as we are basically repeating the same things over and over anyways.

However, the optimism bias would indeed be absurd if we only applied it to times when people are generally actually happy about something. It is about going through a series of events during a longer duration and cherry-picking the good ones — schopenhauer1

What makes you think this isn’t what the surprise party recipient is doing? Cherry picking good experiences. Why do you trust he’s reporting accurately but the person giving an opinion on life must not be.

We agree OB exists. But you say it’s active in some scenarios and not in others as it suits the argument. Anyone who thinks life is good? OB. Anyone who enjoys surprise parties? Not OB. Arbitrary.

I believe this is like saying, "If I break someone's arm, someone MIGHT not mind it because I haven't surveyed everyone" — schopenhauer1

No it’s more than that. it’s “Although I think X is unethical, I have no basis for telling someone who disagrees it is”. people can agree that too much imposition is wrong without being AN.

Because you are picking one positive experience and saying, "This is like life" instead of a steady stream of a variety of daily experiences. — schopenhauer1

A surprise party is a steady stream of experiences not all of which are necessarily positive.

Life has a variety of experiences. Yes. — schopenhauer1

So does a surprise party. And similarly people report that they generally enjoy it and that most experiences are positive for them. A minority hates surprise parties (including me ironically). A minority hates life.

I mean, I don't get your gripe now. Are you trying to say that the events of the surprise party can have many negatives that people aren't reporting? — schopenhauer1

Yes. I’m printing out that you choose to believe a surprise party is not subject to OB but life is. Arbitrarily. You need to explain why you think so.

Our difference is that often there are negative events (maybe not conditions of slavery) that people encounter but do overlook because there is an optimism bias. The lived experience is disrupted from the reported one. — schopenhauer1

I don’t deny OB. I have a problem with you selectively using it though. Either both life and surprise parties are subject to OB, or neither is. Otherwise explain why one is and the other isn’t.

However, I think that most experiences during a surprise party are already positive and thus would accurately be reporting that. — schopenhauer1

You’ve been doing something weird the entire reply. You’ve been pretending like you’re privy to how an experience felt for a stranger. So a surprise party is positive both in experience and report. But life is positive only in report and not in experience.

How did you come to this conclusion? What did you do to discover that life is not good in experience. You don’t trust the reports (arbitrarily), so how did you find out what others are feeling. Same with surprise parties. What did you do to discover that they’re good experiences?

It’s not:
1- Life is an inconvenience or terrible burden
2- People report that it’s good
3- The reports are not to be trusted

As there is no way you get premise 1 for anyone but yourself. But we’re talking from a general case here. You can’t get that life is bad generally without asking people what they think, which means you must choose to trust the reports FIRST then CONCLUDE whether or not the experience is good. Not the other way around.

It’s:
1- People’s reports of life are untrustworthy
2- People report it’s good
3- Life is an inconvenience or terrible burden.

But then how did you get 1? You arbitrarily chose to distrust reports about life but to trust reports about surprise parties. Is this because of the following psychological claim?

It is a psychological claim that this is the case that I am saying I think has validity and further proves a case where humans have a tendency to overlook, under report, etc. — schopenhauer1

Then where did you get the claim from? Just to be clear: the claim is that OB only applies to long experiences and not short ones. And you think it has validity, but refuse to provide evidence. Ok, let me at least ask you, is there any more justification behind this belief other than that you think it’s true?

If you want, let me block off the rest of my life to scour every article because khaled doesn't find my argument compelling on an internet forum. — schopenhauer1

Well it should only take a minute if you actually had a source to support your belief so I’m assuming you don’t.
It seems you came to the conclusion first, then decided to ask your interlocutor to do the research to prove it for you not knowing if such research even exists. An interesting strategy.

If you don't find it compelling, then do some research and see. — schopenhauer1

You instead want khaled to pause HIS life to search for a source to support YOUR arbitrary claim? Nah.

IT either convinces or doesn't', period. It doesn't have universality, not prima facie at least. It is compelling or not compelling. — schopenhauer1

So you think the natalist’s position is just as valid?

Murder is a set of things.. There's death, killing, accidental death, killing with intent, killing under some mitigating circumstance, 1st degree, 2nd degree — schopenhauer1

Not really. Accidental death is manslaughter. Intent is required for murder. And having a mitigating circumstance doesn’t make murder any less wrong, but does make the killer less culpable. Also, First and second degree murder are both wrong. Because remember: Murder is wrong. Extent doesn’t matter. All of the differences above are used for deciding punishment, not for deciding whether the act was wrong.

For AN, as you argued it, everyone can agree with the premise and not reach the conclusion.

I can imagine a society who values non-imposition as a very important rule and thus antinatalism becomes a principle constructed over time in a long process over many years and becomes ingrained where degrees are defined etc. — schopenhauer1

That’s… literally impossible. You can’t have a society of antinatalists. It’s going to die out in a generation. And how do you define the “degrees of imposition”. All you can do if you want any objectivity is define the properties that make an imposition bad. For instance “Impositions that last longer than 30 years are wrong”. But it’s up to you to come up with a definition in that case that doesn’t contradict with your other beliefs which you haven’t done.

1) Are burdens underreported? — schopenhauer1

Sometimes, but I don’t know the rules. You seem to know for a fact that they’re underreported for life and not for surprise parties though. Care to prove that?

2) Are burdens okay to give to someone if someone accepts the burden? — schopenhauer1

I think so, but that’s irrelevant for now. I’ve been arguing as if I also think the experiencing self is what matters.

3) Are all burdens of this nature in #2? — schopenhauer1

Well if they’re in a good state of mind yes.

4) How much of the burdens are not of the nature of #2 and are unwanted — schopenhauer1

How many unaccepted burdens are unwanted? All of them?

I tried to make it a bit shorter this time.

I tried to make it a bit shorter this time. — khaled

Don't have time. Consolidate your thoughts please, and I will reply. Take the main arguments put them in a condensed paragraph. Every statement doesn't have to be parsed and I'm not into that right now. Call me what you will, but I don't need to do the tit-for-tat on every sentence. Let's just get our main arguments and stop repeating the same things.

The statement, "I want a car" and "I want a baby" are absolutely the same as far as I see. One does not have any more unconscious pull than another. The wanting of something is simply the wanting of something. — schopenhauer1

I think this probably the key point here. You don't see the pull of having kids. OK. But most people do, for whatever reason. Certainly cultural indoctrination has a lot to do here, with cities being population farms and all that. But people were procreating long before civilization. There is an instinctual aspect to it. For what reason would a hunter-gatherer have offspring, their own material benefit? Hardly, because it's just another mouth to feed. Infanticide and presumably abortions were quite common back then.

Probably a more interesting question would be to ask why people have children, and whether there can be a substitute for doing so. I remain unconvinced that there is something that can fill that need for a child that so many people have.

1) Are burdens underreported?
— schopenhauer1

Sometimes, but I don’t know the rules. You seem to know for a fact that they’re underreported for life and not for surprise parties though. Care to prove that?

2) Are burdens okay to give to someone if someone accepts the burden?
— schopenhauer1

I think so, but that’s irrelevant for now. I’ve been arguing as if I also think the experiencing self is what matters.

3) Are all burdens of this nature in #2?
— schopenhauer1

Well if they’re in a good state of mind yes.

4) How much of the burdens are not of the nature of #2 and are unwanted
— schopenhauer1

How many unaccepted burdens are unwanted? All of them? — khaled

For those.

And my main argument is:

Your position is inconsistent for you think that OB applies only to life and not surprise parties because of some unidentified psychological principle that you have no support for that you instead ask me to research and prove for you. Both are impositions. Either OB applies to both, or neither. Otherwise explain why it applies to one but not the other.

Also:

I believe this is like saying, "If I break someone's arm, someone MIGHT not mind it because I haven't surveyed everyone"
— schopenhauer1

No it’s more than that. it’s “Although I think X is unethical, I have no basis for telling someone who disagrees it is”. people can agree that too much imposition is wrong without being AN. — khaled

I think this probably the key point here. You don't see the pull of having kids. OK. But most people do, for whatever reason. Certainly cultural indoctrination has a lot to do here, with cities being population farms and all that. But people were procreating long before civilization. There is an instinctual aspect to it. For what reason would a hunter-gatherer have offspring, their own material benefit? Hardly, because it's just another mouth to feed. Infanticide and presumably abortions were quite common back then.

Probably a more interesting question would be to ask why people have children, and whether there can be a substitute for doing so. I remain unconvinced that there is something that can fill that need for a child that so many people have. — darthbarracuda

To the discussion about the morality of having children, the needs of the parent are irrelevant, since one's own needs are never sufficient to justify an action that involves other individuals. To argue otherwise would lead to a predictable slippery slope.

That isn't to say that the question isn't interesting.

Maybe it is instinctual, but doesn't that essentially mean people have children because they are incapable of reasoned thought in that regard?

There is an instinctual aspect to it. For what reason would a hunter-gatherer have offspring, their own material benefit? Hardly, because it's just another mouth to feed. Infanticide and presumably abortions were quite common back then.

Probably a more interesting question would be to ask why people have children, and whether there can be a substitute for doing so. I remain unconvinced that there is something that can fill that need for a child that so many people have. — darthbarracuda

Maybe it is instinctual, but doesn't that essentially mean people have children because they are incapable of reasoned thought in that regard? — Tzeentch

So not sure what Biology 101 would have to do with procreating ...
— schopenhauer1
:roll: wtf. — 180 Proof

So my deeper argument here is the claim of instinctual. I guess, what counts as "instinct"? The thought, "I want a baby because X" doesn't seem like an instinct. It does seem like a preference though. Because the preference is tied to a biological phenomenon it may be people are mixing up the preference for an instinct. An instinct to me involves things like automatic responses to stimuli. Many animals go through estrus, have sex, have offspring, and that is that. There was no thought from the animal, "I want a child so that I can fulfill a need" or "This child represents the love between me and my partner and I want a little version of the mix of the two". These are all complex thoughts that are combinations of ideas people patch together from preferences. It doesn't seem like something like an automatic response to certain ingrained stimuli. People also often throw around things like females' propensity to produce hormones after childbirth that might bring about general happy feelings towards the child or whatnot, but that is after childbirth not before and also mixed up as it does have to do with childbirth but not the before/during procreation part.

Finally, people often mix up the desire for pleasure with the desire for procreation. One leads to the other, but one is not the other. To engage in sexual activity I would not say is instinctual as much as it is pleasurable and that pleasure is often sought after because its pleasurable. Often this can stem from many things.. Boredom, it feels good, it's more preferable than other things that don't feel as good, etc. But that's not necessarily instinct either. If for example, when the full moon came out, people could not help but hump the next person who walked by once he/she smelled their pheromones, then you might have a case for instinct or something like that... I am purposely being provocative here to illustrate what I mean by "instinct" versus something else (simply wanting something, often because it feels good at the time or because its a preference based on personality-based wants and desires like other wants and desires).

To the discussion about the morality of having children, the needs of the parent are irrelevant, since one's own needs are never sufficient to justify an action that involves other individuals. To argue otherwise would lead to a predictable slippery slope.

That isn't to say that the question isn't interesting. — Tzeentch

@darthbarracuda

So the only mitigation here is that amelioration of a greater harm with a lesser harm. A child getting a vaccination, for example. So procreation would be prefaced in my view as different than the vaccination scenario, because there is no amelioration. Procreation is a decision that was unnecessarily creating harmful scenarios where there were none. The vaccination is preventing a greater harm and imposition down the line from disease.

Another argument might retort that the child might lead to some sort of "greatest happiness overall in society" cause they would be a great scientist or something. That would mean that all that matters is the aggregate and like most AN, I don't think that ethical matters should be based on "because this will increase aggregate X". Overlooking the person this is being done to, because it can cause an increase in output, is overlooking the dignity of the person being affected for an impersonal thing. There has to be a ground at some point, and usually these are the grounds where its hard to go much further without simply shouting matches of "aggregate yes" and "person-affecting view yes" and just do this over and over.

since one's own needs are never sufficient to justify an action that involves other individuals. To argue otherwise would lead to a predictable slippery slope. — Tzeentch

No it wouldn't. One could simply treat one's own needs as just as valuable or less valuable as those of others. So don't do something to others that is harmful unless the alternative is equal or way greater harm onto yourself. That's a simple solution among countless others.

Never having the option not to opt makes the option to opt a superfluos option to opt for for the option not to opt for an option to opt for no options unless you always wanna have the option to opt for options you wanna make options to opt about.

Never having the option not to opt makes the option to opt a superfluos option to opt for for the option not to opt for an option to opt for no options unless you always wanna have the option to opt for options you wanna make options to opt about. — Prishon

Please stop spamming inane shit

Please stop spamming inane shit — emancipate

My shit worked. Provoking a reaction.

Your position is inconsistent for you think that OB applies only to life and not surprise parties because of some unidentified psychological principle that you have no support for that you instead ask me to research and prove for you. Both are impositions. Either OB applies to both, or neither. Otherwise explain why it applies to one but not the other. — khaled

My main point here is that OB can obtain in a surprise party, but it wouldn't be a surprise to me if the actual experience matches the report because often surprise parties have elements people like in it and so may not be reporting wrong if they say, "I like it". It here being a very discrete event in their life versus many hours experiencing things other than they like and then asking to report on a summary of their whole life.

However, there very well could also be cases of reporting what was not experienced.. You don't want an event that is "supposed" to be good to be reported as bad, so you go along and say, "Yes, I liked it", but you didn't.. That starts looking more like when you combine multiple life events.. Because life has more than events that we just like in it going on in the lived experience. Because the vent is so discrete, it becomes harder to analogize and becomes much more specific to the preference of a person's attitude towards that particular event.

However, now that I think of it, it may very well be the case, the the even as lived could have been a 6 on the person's scale (let's just say in their experience at the time) but when they recalled it many years later, it was like a 10.. That would be OB.

No it’s more than that. it’s “Although I think X is unethical, I have no basis for telling someone who disagrees it is”. people can agree that too much imposition is wrong without being AN. — khaled

If they believe too much imposition is wrong, then why not be AN? I think you mean they don't think life has enough imposition to be an AN. So I think this really does get to the heart of our debate. I am claiming impositions are often underreported and that often people are mistaken as to how much imposition there is imposed on them. Think of it this way.. At one point, a serf could have no right to land. That's because they were born without a title of some kind or their parents also didn't have land. The serf accepted the arrangement because well, "that's how it is". But at some point, maybe after the Black Plague, there was a movement against serfdom. The economic situation made them realize that their work had value and the situation of perpetual landlessness was unjust. Wait, what changed? Was it really that the serf's view was the only thing that changed the unjustness of serfdom or is there something unjust about serfdom?

when they recalled it many years later, it was like a 10.. That would be OB. — schopenhauer1

Just to clarify before this progresses too much further, what you're describing is not Optimism Bias (as in the psychological phenomena). Optimism bias is about expectations, not recollections.

As I've already explained (to the wall it seems), there is no such thing as experience which is not constructed, it simply does not exist. You are comparing two falsely distinguished entities. The experience at the time and the recollection of it later are both constructed in the same way by the same regions of the brain, one has no primacy over the other in any ontological sense.

there is no such thing as experience which is not constructed, — Isaac

What do you mean by this?

That doesn't quite work, because one's own evaluation of the harm done can be completely different from the evaluation of another, hence the slippery slope:

If I can judge for others what is harmful or not, then there is indeed no limit to the actions I can afford myself while still considering myself moral.

If, however, one comes to the sensible conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to judge what is good for others, then one will realize one must always tread carefully when imposing things on others, with all the implications that has for childbirth.

The appeal to instinct seems to me a weak one: animals are not moral agents.