Ask Nagase — 180 Proof

Page redirect, huh?

Brazil's a covid hotspot. I hope Nagase's alive & well. He taught me a coupla things, one being, as I was just beginning my foray into logic, that what I was struggling with was only baby logic, his words. I instantly realized I had a long way to go, a long, long way to go. How deep is the rabbit hole? God knows, I'm still falling...

Page 1 of this thread.

Page 1 of this thread. — 180 Proof

So, I was close to nailing it but missed by a mile. :grin:

Sure. — emancipate

A materialistic view on the universe?

First, I would like to dispute that "fallibilism" is any better criteria of significance than verificationism, or even that it is mainstream today. It is true that most popular accounts of the scientific method mention Popper in this regard, but these accounts do not reflect mainstream thinking in the philosophy of science. If anything, mainstream philosophy of science today has largely abandoned the search for criteria of demarcation ... — Nagase

I am not certain that 'what is mainstream today in philosophy of science' means anything, but the fact that the debate has moved on may simply indicate that Popper's falsifiability prevailed over the LPs' verification formulation. Popper (on science) is basically a pessimistic LP: he says scientific theories are never verified, but can be falsified by empirical data. This is not exactly the way it works 'in the lab', but as a logical framework for the relationship between theories and facts, it solves a lot of problems, eg it cuts through Hempel's ravens paradox like a hot knife in butter.

I much appreciate the rest of your post, the historical part.

Enlighten me! Im thinking about it but it doesnt click. — Prishon

I encountered that expression in this article, although I had previously read about Gilson here and tracked down the book it refers to, The Unity of Philosophical Experience.

So the idea that the whole movement foundered because of an obvious logical inconsistency is just bizarre (and even more bizarre when one considers that its members were all logical proficient). — Nagase

An excellent post.

If logical positivism had been able to mount a better defence against its critics, the outcome would presumably have been quite different. Perhaps one would not need to dig so deep to find evidence of its impact on our present thinking, for one thing.

So we might take care not to suppose that the reasons for its fading were independent of its inconsistencies.

Just want to say thanks for your erudite and educational posts!

Metaphysics will never die. — Corvus

Fortunately, though, metaphysicians always will.

Fortunately, though, metaphysicians always will. — Ciceronianus

Why is it fortunate?

Why is it fortunate? — Corvus

The comment was more a riposte to the claim that "Metaphysics will never die" than anything else. I'm one who questions the value of metaphysics generally. It isn't clear to me that it consists of anything but speculation, and it seems speculation to no effect. There's nothing wrong with speculation to no effect in itself, of course, but the fact that it may always take place and thereby never "die" doesn't strike me as something of note, or something to be celebrated or to take pride in. And the fact metaphysicians will, like all of us, die at least provides a certainty and reliability otherwise lacking in metaphysics.

I'm one who questions the value of metaphysics generally. It isn't clear to me that it consists of anything but speculation, and it seems speculation to no effect. — Ciceronianus

I agree it is speculative but do think that metaphysics affect us. I think of it as the axiomatics of our thoughts: the core, fundamental principles allowing for various types of thoughts to unfold from their combination. Philosophers have called them a priori, fundamental intuitions, or absolute presuppositions... Ideas like: there is a me, and a space around me, other people in it, a time that flows only one way, various objects, causality, meaning, etc.

Some of these axiomatics are better than other in that they solve problems. Science, as posted by @180 Proof, is metaphysics that works (generally). I agree with that, while of course others may disagree. Religion is another form of metaphysics, and some think it works and others disagree.

What seems certain to me is that those metaphysics that succeed value life, people, other species, and knowledge, and freedom, while those who fail value war, or obscurantism, or hatred, for instance. So there are differences between different metaphysical speculations, and there are consequences.

When Ryle was made Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, he commented that a chair in metaphysics is like a chair in infectious diseases: your remit is to fight it not promote it.

The comment was more a riposte to the claim that "Metaphysics will never die" than anything else. I'm one who questions the value of metaphysics generally. It isn't clear to me that it consists of anything but speculation, and it seems speculation to no effect. There's nothing wrong with speculation to no effect in itself, of course, but the fact that it may always take place and thereby never "die" doesn't strike me as something of note, or something to be celebrated or to take pride in. And the fact metaphysicians will, like all of us, die at least provides a certainty and reliability otherwise lacking in metaphysics. — Ciceronianus

I am not a metaphysician, but I feel it is a good subject. Of course there are different definitions of Metaphysics. Some people seem to equate Metaphysics with some religious or esoteric topics, which I think is wrong.

Metaphysics is a frame of critique to view all existence in the universe for its essence aided by logic and reasoning. It could be looked as speculative, but not always. With the clearer conclusions obtained from the Metaphysical analysis, one can make decisions, take actions, or move on to further investigations and studies. That is a very active and practical subject, nothing like speculative. For instance, I wouldn't take any scientific or any non scientific claims seriously unless it had been through metaphysical analysis and investigations.

As long as human cultures exist, there will always be metaphysics. That is what I meant by "Metaphysics will never die."

Logical Positivism is important too. I don't believe that they have faded away. I feel it is still a very significant, practical, useful and interesting school of thoughts albeit of some minor criticisms from some people. It is just a usual course for all philosophical branches and schools going through sometime in their existence.

What did 'speculative' add to 'metaphysics' before it was like adding 'infectious' to 'disease'? When it wasn't part of an insult? Who coined it? Kant?

I don't get it, because I'd have thought that metaphysics starts from the assumption that all the physics is settled, so there are no speculations to deal with.

Perhaps I'm confusing 'speculation' with 'empirical conjecture'? How should I not?

This is to be added to the list of things I wish I had said.

Science, as posted by 180 Proof, is metaphysics that works (generally). I agree with that, while of course others may disagree. Religion is another form of metaphysics, and some think it works and others disagree. What seems certain to me is that those that succeed value life, and people, and other species, and knowledge, and freedom, while those who fail value war, or obscurantism, or hatred, for instance. So there are differences between different metaphysical speculations, and there are consequences. — Olivier5

It strikes me that metaphysics, though it may purport to explain (or question) why science or other things "work", doesn't "work" itself. Merely to claim that other things like science or religion "work" provides no support for metaphysics, though.

It strikes me that metaphysics, though it may purport to explain (or question) why science or other things "work", doesn't "work" itself. Merely to claim that other things like science or religion "work" provides no support for metaphysics, though. — Ciceronianus

Metaphysics is really no more than one pole of an abstract-concrete continuum that runs through all modes of thought and culture. Within science intself there is more and less applied thinking , more and less
theoretical and meta-theoretical. Metaphysics as it is practiced in particular by continental philosophers is just their attempt to achieve an ‘ultra-meta’ perspective. If you think getting too theoretical muddies the waters you can always climb down from the perch and immerse yourself in the details.

I'd have thought that metaphysics starts from the assumption that all the physics is settled, so there are no speculations to deal with. — bongo fury

The ‘ meta’ is the formal synthetic framework which organizes the understanding of ‘physis’( nature ).
It need make no claims for a particular content of science being settled or unsettled.
As far as it’s speculative role, this term began fashionable after Hegel. His dialectic was interpreted as explaining the movement of natural
and cultural history without recourse to empirical evidence. Thus it was speculative rather than empirical.

It strikes me that metaphysics, though it may purport to explain (or question) why science or other things "work", doesn't "work" itself. Merely to claim that other things like science or religion "work" provides no support for metaphysics, though. — Ciceronianus

It seems to me that everyone operates or rather thinks based on certain assumptions, whether they are conscious about it or not, and that being conscious of one's basic credo is better than not being so.

Science, as posted by 180 Proof, is metaphysics that works (generally). I agree with that, while of course others may disagree. — Olivier5

Except that science doesn’t have a single definition , it is a historical development with a changing understanding of itself, undergirded by a changing metaphysical outlook.
So the question isn’t whether science works , but how the way it purportedly works changes along with changing metaphysical frameworks. The notion that science simply ‘works’ itself presupposes a particular metaphysics of science, one that is now undergoing transformation.

science doesn’t have a single definition , it is a historical development with a changing understanding of itself, undergirded by a changing metaphysical outlook — Joshs

Correct, although the changes were not that significant in my view, mere adaptations of the same basic empirico-rationalist framework. It's not a 'transformation' by any stretch, rather it's a slow and gradual evolution. In any case, the point was that a certain type of metaphysics underwrite science, which you seem to agree with.

Science is more likely to be explained in sociological than metaphysical terms nowadays - pretty much since Feyerabend's criticism of Popper's program.

But sometimes the claims by Science could be muddled with jargons, contradictions and illusory hypotheses, and the only way to find them out is Metaphysical investigation and analysis.

Thanks Josh.

The ‘meta’ is the formal synthetic framework which organizes the understanding of ‘physis’ (nature). — Joshs

If that's an is, and not an ought to be, then... is, since when?

It need make no claims for a particular content of science being settled or unsettled. — Joshs

True, I was ruminating on an arguable ought. A normative gloss. To maximise charity to the most uses.

As far as its speculative role, this term became fashionable after Hegel. — Joshs

Ah! Interesting, thanks. Any examples?

His dialectic was interpreted as explaining the movement of natural and cultural history without recourse to empirical evidence. — Joshs

Don't understand.

Science is more likely to be explained in sociological than metaphysical terms nowadays — Banno

There is room for more than one understanding of science, but even a sociological account would be grounded in some sort of metaphysics or another. One might ignore metaphysics but not dispense of it.

The ‘meta’ is the formal synthetic framework which organizes the understanding of ‘physis’ (nature).
— Joshs

If that's an is, and not an ought to be, then... is, since when? — bongo fury

Since the Greeks?

His dialectic was interpreted as explaining the movement of natural and cultural history without recourse to empirical evidence.
— Joshs

Don't understand. — bongo fury

Speculative dialectics deservedly got a bad rep when philosophers decided they no longer needed to bother studying actual contingent circumstances of human life in its sociological, political and anthropological aspects. Instead, they could apply a one- size -fits -all Hegelian scheme of dialectical stages onto whatever aspect of human history they wanted to focus on, revealing its supposed necessity and inevitability. This is why it was important for Marx to ground the dialectic in material circumstances.

the point was that a certain type of metaphysics underwrite science, which you seem to agree with. — Olivier5

Galilean and Newtonian physics can be argued to be consistent with the rationalist metaphysics of Descartes and Spinoza. The hypothetico-deductive method proposed by Bacon in this period was a philosophy a scientific method that arose out of rationalism.
The idealistic metaphysics ushered in by Kant and Hegel
has been suggested as a grounding for Relativity and quantum physics. The philosophy of science that is embraced by modern physics is typically that of Popper, who was an adherent of Kantian idealism. Postmodern metaphysics ( or anti-metaphysics) has its parallel in the philosophy of science of Kuhn and Feyerabend, which critiques the Kantian and Popperian model.
So you see we have at least three distinct metaphysical eras ( and we could divide them up into many more) that accompanies the history of science from the 1600’s to today.

we have at least three distinct metaphysical eras ( and we could divide them up into many more) that accompanies the history of science from the 1600’s to today. — Joshs

Yes well, one could argue endlessly with the details of the story but the broad outline isn't too far off. To me the main actual changes in the credo inherited from the humanists, Descartes, Spinoza and co were the introduction of the numena/phenomena distingo by Kant, and of inderterminism by Popper (belatedly, as a patch for QM). And yet, many rejected and still reject those innovations and remain "crudely Spinozean" (e.g. determinist) to this day.

Since the Greeks? — Joshs

I doubt it. Any examples of Greeks using 'meta' that way? I keep hearing that for a long time it only connected to 'physical' with reference to cataloguing of Aristotle's books?

Speculative dialectics deservedly got a bad rep when... — Joshs

That wasn't the question. The question was how, why or when did 'speculative' enter the lexicon. Interesting though to see it joined to 'dialectics'. Is/was that common? Examples please. If so then perhaps your theory, that 'speculative' meant 'fanciful' in relation to Hegel's historicising, gets some traction. In that case it never

wasn't part of an insult? — bongo fury

As far as its speculative role, this term became fashionable after Hegel.
— Joshs

Ah! Interesting, :party: thanks. Any examples? — bongo fury