Any examples of Greeks using 'meta' that way? I keep hearing that for a long time it only connected to 'physical' with reference to cataloguing of Aristotle's books? — bongo fury

“The term was invented by the 1st-century BCE head of Aristotle‘s Peripatetic school, Andronicus of Rhodes. Andronicus edited and arranged Aristotle’s works, giving the name Metaphysics (τα μετα τα φυσικα βιβλια), literally “the books beyond the physics,” perhaps the books to be read after reading Aristotle’s books on nature, which he called the Physics. The Greek for nature is physis, so metaphysical is also “beyond the natural.”

Aristotle never used the term metaphysics. For Plato, Aristotle’s master, the realm of abstract ideas was more “real” than that of physical. i.e., material or concrete, objects, because ideas can be more permanent (the Being of Parmenides), whereas material objects are constantly changing (the Becoming of Heraclitus).“

The question was how, why or when did 'speculative' enter the lexicon. Interesting though to see it joined to 'dialectics'. Is/was that common? Examples please. If so then perhaps your theory, that 'speculative' meant 'fanciful' in relation to Hegel's historicising, gets some traction. — bongo fury

Hegel regarded his dialectical method or “speculative mode of cognition” (PR §10) as the hallmark of his philosophy.

From Brittanica:

The Hegelian system, in which German idealism reached its fulfillment, claimed to provide a unitary solution to all of the problems of philosophy. It held that the speculative point of view, which transcends all particular and separate perspectives, must grasp the one truth, bringing back to its proper centre all of the problems of logic, of metaphysics (or the nature of Being), and of the philosophies of nature, law, history, and culture (artistic, religious, and philosophical). According to Hegel, this attitude is more than a formal method that remains extraneous to its own content; rather, it represents the actual development of the Absolute—of the all-embracing totality of reality—considered “as Subject and not merely as Substance” (i.e., as a conscious agent or Spirit and not merely as a real being). This Absolute, Hegel held, first puts forth (or posits) itself in the immediacy of its own inner consciousness and then negates this positing—expressing itself now in the particularity and determinateness of the factual elements of life and culture—and finally regains itself, through the negation of the former negation that had constituted the finite world.

Such a dialectical scheme (immediateness–alienation–negation of the negation) accomplished the self-resolution of the aforementioned problem areas—of logic, of metaphysics, and so on. This panoramic system thus had the merit of engaging philosophy in the consideration of all of the problems of history and culture, none of which could any longer be deemed foreign to its competence. At the same time, however, the system deprived all of the implicated elements and problems of their autonomy and particular authenticity, reducing them to symbolic manifestations of the one process, that of the Absolute Spirit’s quest for and conquest of its own self. Moreover, such a speculative mediation between opposites, when directed to the more impending problems of the time, such as those of religion and politics, led ultimately to the evasion of the most urgent and imperious ideological demands and was hardly able to escape the charge of ambiguity and opportunism.”

Aristotle never used the term metaphysics. — Joshs

Exactly. It was only a cataloguing thing. And our different preferred readings,

I'd have thought that metaphysics starts from the assumption that all the physics is settled, — bongo fury

and

The ‘meta’ is the formal synthetic framework which organizes the understanding of ‘physis’ (nature). — Joshs

must, both, depend on more recent precedent, if any.

As to my main question re 'speculative' we continue to make progress, and thanks again.

Hegel regarded his dialectical method or “speculative mode of cognition” (PR §10) as the hallmark of his philosophy. — Joshs

So to this,

When it wasn't part of an insult? Who coined it? — bongo fury

... the answer is Hegel (himself, not his detractors) and it seems he used 'speculative' (or a German word) in the sense of 'theoretical' that predated its (either word's) association with 'testing'. Leaving it prone to later criticism, which you alluded to.

The next question might be, who joined it explicitly to 'metaphysics' and did they mean to contrast it with 'practical metaphysics', with or without implying an insult?

Sticking with Hegel's "speculative mode of cognition", though, and wondering about the context, in English and possibly German (I'd need help again), I couldn't locate it here:

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/printrod.htm#PR10

Was that the place?

I never quite understood why logical positivism kinda faded out of existence and was taken over by a new methodology in science called fallibilism, so named after Popper established it as a better method than verification of conjectures or hypothesi.

In my opinion, it seems that when stating a hypothesis in science, we are guided by existing factual knowledge about the domain or field of study in question, and upon feeling quite confident that it is true with respect to existing knowledge, we attempt to design experiments that (and here I'm not sure) validate(?) or invalidate a hypothesis. — Shawn

I don't have the knowledge to talk much about science, but my reading of logical positivism comes down to the Tractatus and A.J. Ayer's book on language and logic, and J.L. Austin's essays in response and Wittgenstein's response to himself (and the Vienna Circle).

My understanding is that a referential or correspondence picture of language is not refuted by the later Witt nor Austin. The problem they both saw was that it is only a part of language and meaning. Austin will say there are more ways to be "true" than just a statement being true or false; Wittgenstein will discovery that there is a sense of logic (grammar) to every different part of our lives, not just one all-encompassing theory of meaning (as I believe @Seppo already pointed out).

However, even if we simply keep reference to a particular narrow area, there is still the motivation which drove LP, which I believe is alive and well (though in various forms). The certainty and universality; predictability and predetermination that we desire (to refute skepticism) is the criteria that drove LP. That ultimately limited it, but the desire remains as a constant temptation for philosophy (and humans). Wittgenstein attempts to tease out why we want this, but it still infects our understanding of communication, our politics, our vision of knowledge, and, I would think, our science (though, again, fuzzy there). All I can add to the science is something I read by Cavell in The Claim of Reason; he claims that the "factness" of a fact does not come from its correspondence with the "world". Its "sciencey-ness" of completeness, certainty, predictability, etc., comes from the method of science, how well it is done. Thus, we can have the solidity we imagine "the world" gives us, but still incorporate mistakes, changes in course, and even the kind of paradigm shifts which Kuhn discusses; "being wrong" does not crumble everything to the ground because the method of science is the constant thread.