Good is not a thing you are. It's a thing you do. — Kamala Khan (Marvel)

Kamala Khan's beliefs about morality seem a bit muddled. A virtuous person is something you are but then she bounces back in the second sentence. A rather interesting pair of sentences I must say.

The virtue ethicist's eternal question: How will a virtuous person act in this situation (whatever it is)?

The virtues? What are they? All I know is that the highest virtue is wisdom but wisdom is like a double-edged sword as far as I can tell - both being good and bad, pro tos kairon, can be "wise."

There are two Greek terms that are fundamental to virtue ethics. Neither has a single word for word translation. The first is arête. It is often translated as virtue but does not have the meaning that virtue has come to carry. It means excellence. Human virtue is the attainment of the highest of what we are by nature capable of.

The second term is related to the first. Phronesis is translated as practical wisdom, prudence, discernment. The greater the excellence of a human being the more capable they are of assessing a situation and acting in a way that is wise.

We are by nature social animals. Phronesis it then not simply a matter of deciding what is best for me to the exclusion of others. My choices and actions must take into consideration the good of others.

And the third, eunoia, the good will.

:up: :up:

An interpretation of 'virtue ethics' (re: Philippa Foot, Martha Nussbaum) in a Spinozist-Peircean sense:

Moral character (ethos) consists of habits of eusocial judgment (phronesis).

Virtues (arete) are adaptive skills acquired and developed through applying them in various practices (praxes) which gradually habitualize and thereby, in positive feedback loops, are reinforced by moral character (ethos).

Flourishing, or reduction of self-immiserating habits (eudaimonia) is the 'categorical imperative' (telos) of moral character (ethos).

In sum: inhabiting a habitat with others (from etymology of ethos) is cultivated by exercising eusocial habits through adaptive conduct contra maladaptive conduct (agon).

An interpretation of 'virtue ethics' (re: Philippa Foot, Martha Nussbaum) in a Spinozist-Peircean sense:
Moral character (ethos) consists of habits of eusocial judgment (phronesis).

Virtues (arete) are adaptive skills acquired and developed through applying them in various practices (praxes) which gradually habitualize and thereby, in positive feedback loops, are reinforced by moral character (ethos).

Flourishing, or reduction of self-immiserating habits (eudaimonia) is the 'categorical imperative' (telos) of moral character (ethos).
In sum: inhabiting a habitat with others (from etymology of ethos) is cultivated by exercising eusocial habits through adaptive conduct contra maladaptive conduct (agon). — 180 Proof

Basically, it all boils down to, wisdom although yours is a more detailed examination of morality as it relates to wisdom. :up:

And the third, eunoia, the good will. — tim wood

I would like to hear more. It raises some questions.

Should one have good will toward his enemies? Doesn't phronesis include the ability to discern between those who have good will to us and those who are our enemies?

Most people consider virtue ethics as an ethical system opposed by to consequentialism, deontology, and consequentialism. — Hello Human

I would prefer to quote exactly the definition of "virtual ethics" from a standard reference, rather saying what most people consider? Because, besides avoiding making some mistake (e.g. you mention "consequentialism" twice!:smile:), you are raising questions such as "Is this a fact?" and "Who are these people?" Because people in general don't give a damn about such things! :smile:

So, here is what the "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" says about the subject: "Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism)."
Close enough to what you described but more correct! :smile:

Then, regarding the title of your topic, "Virtue ethics as a subfield of ethics", the word "subfield" is evidently wrong, based on the above description.

virtue ethics tries to answer the question "how do we ought to be ?" while consequentialism, deontologism deontology and other views on ethics tries to answer the question "what do we ought to do ?" — Hello Human

True, the last two are based on "doing things" while the first on "being things". But there is no separating line between the two, and "being something" also implies or defines a consequent behavior. E.g. being "charitable" and "benevolent" (virtual ethics) also means engaging in --i.e. doing-- things involving charity and benevolent, doesn't it? Because being those things without doing anything, without demonstrating in action, means nothing.
In short, ethics always imply and involves action. Even not doing something is a behavior.

If it is possible for human beings to have any moral knowledge — Hello Human

What is "moral knowledge"? Know what is good and bad? Know the 10 commandments? Know about the moral teachings of a wise man or a saint?

I would like to hear more. It raises some questions.

Should one have good will toward his enemies? Doesn't phronesis include the ability to discern between those who have good will to us and those who are our enemies? — Fooloso4

Nothing radical, just straight-up Aristotle. The good man makes a good speech, and among the ways to tell are his manifesting αρέτε, φρονέσις, ευνοία, good character, good judgment, good will. (Rhetoric, 1378a - 6.)

Nothing radical, just straight-up Aristotle. The good man makes a good speech, and among the ways to tell are his manifesting αρέτε, φρονέισις, ευνοία, good character, good judgment, good will. (Rhetoric, 1378a - 6.) — tim wood

This is the other passage I thought you might be referring to. Rhetoric is about what is said, not what is done. In order to be persuasive he must give the impression of possessing αρέτε, φρονέισις, ευνοία.
Whether or not he does is not at issue, except to the extent that the audience might question whether he does.

Rhetoric is about what is said, not what is done — Fooloso4

Rhetoric is about getting things done, and getting not your agreement, but your assent. Which implies, and as a practical matter means, participation.

When Odysseus say to Achilleus (Iliad, ix - 247), "Up then!" He not demonstrating, he's exhorting. He wants Achilleus to get up and fight and is trying to persuade him to do just that.

The virtues? What are they? All I know is that the highest virtue is wisdom but wisdom is like a double-edged sword as far as I can tell - both being good and bad, pro tos kairon, can be "wise." — TheMadFool

I would like to hear more. It raises some questions.

Should one have good will toward his enemies? Doesn't phronesis include the ability to discern between those who have good will to us and those who are our enemies? — Fooloso4

The two of us are in two minds about the same issue. Is wisdom morally neutral? Not, according to a philosopher who defined wisdom as that which is both true and good. Speaking for myself, I feel moral philosophies like utilitarianism which sanctions evil means to achieve good ends, the only type of moral ambiguity I'm willing to tolerate, are a cop-out; they fail to be, well, imaginative/creative enough, preferring to take the easy way out. Anybody can do that, believe that the ends justify the means; it takes a real genius and an outstanding moral character to always opt for good means for good ends. Such a person, it seems, hasn't been born yet or, the more probable reason, we're just too lazy.

Rhetoric is about getting things done, — tim wood

The passage is not about how one lives. It is about how one appears to be in order to persuade. One need not have good will, only give the impression of having good will.

Is wisdom morally neutral? — TheMadFool

Is it wise to treat your enemies as you would your friends?

Is wisdom morally neutral?
— TheMadFool

Is it wise to treat your enemies as you would your friends? — Fooloso4

Is it? I'm not sure.

A virtue is a personal attribute.

Virtue ethics is about developing ethical personal attributes. The list usually includes things such as integrity, honesty, courage, fairness.

Deontological ethics is following rules.

Consequential ethics is about looking at the results of one's actions. — Banno

A problem with the discipline of virtue ethics is that it does not operate with a definitive list of virtues.

Why not consider obedience to be a virtue? Many people consider obedience to be a crucial virtue.

Quidquid agis, prudenter agas et respice finem. Looking at the results of one's actions has also been considered a virtue.


I don't understand, and maybe you can explain, whence the usual distinction between the various theories of ethics. Because to me, they all seem to be about virtues, it's just that the prioritization of particular virtues differs from one ethics theory to another.

An interpretation of 'virtue ethics' (re: Philippa Foot, Martha Nussbaum) in a Spinozist-Peircean sense:
Moral character (ethos) consists of habits of eusocial judgment (phronesis).

Virtues (arete) are adaptive skills acquired and developed through applying them in various practices (praxes) which gradually habitualize and thereby, in positive feedback loops, are reinforced by moral character (ethos).

Flourishing, or reduction of self-immiserating habits (eudaimonia) is the 'categorical imperative' (telos) of moral character (ethos).
In sum: inhabiting a habitat with others (from etymology of ethos) is cultivated by exercising eusocial habits through adaptive conduct contra maladaptive conduct (agon). — 180 Proof

You do realize that the above description can be applied to obedience?

Obedience is eusocial, adaptive. It helps people flourish.

In my native language, we have a saying: Kdor ne uboga, ga tepe nadloga. 'He who doesn't obey gets himself into trouble.'

Obedience is eusocial, adaptive. It helps people flourish.

In my native language, we have a saying: Kdor ne uboga, ga tepe nadloga. 'He who doesn't obey gets himself into trouble.' — baker

Obedience certainly can function in this way. But obedience itself is an ambiguous term. Consider obedience under the Taliban versus obedience under Joe Biden.

In most circumstances, he who doesn't obey and gets caught gets himself into trouble. Or he who is is without status and doesn't obey gets himself into trouble.

Taken out of context, you can apply anything to anything else. :roll:

Is ethics what I say it is? — tim wood

No, it's what I say it is.

That follows directly from

The core of ethics is what will I do now. — Banno

it does not operate with a definitive list of virtues. — baker

Yeah it does. See Nusbaum for my preferred list.

If your point is that the list is not agreed on universally, then sure; you have to choose.

There's something fundamental about ethics that needs attention here. Direction of fit.

When you sat that the cat is on the mat, you seek to modify your words to match the world.

When you say that the cat ought be on the mat, you seek to modify the world to match your words.

The direction of fit is reversed.

This is the simple difference in use that sits behind the mooted is/ought distinction.

Forgetting that this is how language is used is Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy.

And it's a fundamental problem for those who seek to somehow derive universally applicable moral principles.

If so, then what does "improvement" mean or imply?

By the standard developing along with the improvement. — Banno

I wonder if you see your problem?

See my comments regarding direction of fit, immediately above. Expecting a universal law here is a mistake.

One chooses to improve some aspects and not others. Others will judge. The question is, what virtues will you choose? It's up for discussion. But there is overwhelming agreement on certain virtues.

Everyone loves a rule book.

I've personally found this thread helpful. I'll check out Nusbaum. Cheers.

direction of fit, — Banno

Irrelevant.

Expecting a universal law here is a mistake. — Banno

Straw man.

But there is overwhelming agreement on certain virtues. — Banno

But based on or in what? Either it's capricious, arbitrary, relative, or, it's grounded in something more solid and substantial than itself, out of which it may be developed and derived. I nominate reason, not being the first to do so.

What have you got?

Irrelevant — tim wood

You will not see what is going on here unless you grasp the relevance of direction of fit.

Straw man — tim wood

...really?

But based on or in what? — tim wood

See how you demand a base? There's the problem. Virtue ethics bootstraps. It's a process, not a rule.

Have a look at Nusbaum's capabilities.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach/

I'm thinking you'll see the benefits in the capabilities approach to virtue ethics, since your roll is the improvement for those in your charge - as is mine. It drops all the theoretical garbage and gets on with the task at hand.

I was drawn to it by the need for a critique of Singer's attitude towards disability. Something that might be worthy of a thread.

Virtue ethics bootstraps.... It's a process, not a rule. — Banno

No rules, no reason(s), no logic, no steps, no consequences, no intentions, no preferences? Just process ex nihilo?

I don't hold your argument all wrong, rather that it's blind to both that it presupposes, and what it presupposes. I just happen to think the picture is incomplete without account of those.

improvement — Banno

By what standard? How would you know what (an) improvement is? (In terms of Banno's argument?)

In an iterative process, it won't matter where you start, the process will lead you in the right direction.

By what standard? How would you know what (an) improvement is? (In terms of Banno's argument?) — tim wood

You sound like a broken record.

Who chooses what is to count as an improvement, and what is not? This is where we came in:

The core of ethics is what will I do now. The consequences of your actions should be taken into account; but they are not entirely within your control. While being consistent is a consideration, it seems dubious that some rule could be both known ahead of time and yet applicable in all circumstances, so one will need to judge whatever rule one chooses to apply. — Banno