I don't follow.

Whether brains are physical objects or the mental activity of another mind (as, say, Berkeley would maintain) is left open by their existence being potentially illusory. That is, we could be dreaming brains exist and there are none in reality consistent with Berkelian idealism. As such, I don't see how physicalism per se is challenged by what I have said. — Bartricks

Oh! Thank god you read my post. My point is that the only thing anyone can be certain of is that they have minds (the thinker); everything else, the material/physical world, could be an illusion à la Cartesian deus deceptor and brains in vats.

My point is that the only thing anyone can be certain of is that they have minds (the thinker) — TheMadFool

I don't think that's true - we can be certain of more than that.

everything else, the material/physical world, could be an illusion à la Cartesian deus deceptor and brains in vats. — TheMadFool

But you said that this was the essence of the problem for physicalism (which I take to be equivalent to materialism). That was the bit I didn't understand. How is it the essence of the problem for physicalism? Does physicalism, to be plausible, need to be indubitable?

Very good point.... any ideas?

I don't think that's true - we can be certain of more than that. — Bartricks

Like what?

Does physicalism, to be plausible, need to be indubitable? — Bartricks

Yes, it affirms that all is physical, a statement of absolute certainty. It has no room for doubt but that's exactly what's introduced with Descartes' deus deceptor and Harmann's brain in a vat.

Like what? — TheMadFool

Reasons. I think I have reason to believe I am thinking, and that I have reason to believe that thoughts cannot exist absent a mind to think them, and reason to think that I, a mind, exist. But then if I have reason to think those things, and reason to think them true with certainty, then I have as much if not more reason to think reasons exist. And thus reasons exist with complete certainty.

Yes, it affirms that all is physical, a statement of absolute certainty. It has no room for doubt but that's exactly what's introduced with Descartes' deus deceptor and Harmann's brain in a vat. — TheMadFool

No, a view can be true and not believed. And a view can be true and not believed with certainty.

I do not believe materialism is true. But the fact that we can doubt the reports of our senses is not evidence that materialism is false. For we can doubt the reports of our senses even if materialism is false, and there's no special reason to think our senses would be indubitable if materialism were true (I mean, why would they be?).

But anyway, this is now getting off topic. The mind is not the brain regardless of whether brains are material objects or something else. If they are material objects - that is, if they are extended in space - then our minds are clearly not identical with them, for our minds seem to have no properties in common and thus are about as far from being them as it is possible to be. And if they are not extended in space - that is, if brains are not material substances, but bundles of ideas in the mind of God (as Berkeley believed), then our minds are not them either, for our minds are not bundles of ideas, but objects that have ideas.

Those who believe that our minds are our brains invariably have no argument for that view - they just assume it because they are fashion victims and that is the current intellectual fashion - or they have appalling arguments (see Murky above).

Reasons. I think I have reason to believe I am thinking, and that I have reason to believe that thoughts cannot exist absent a mind to think them, and reason to think that I, a mind, exist. But then if I have reason to think those things, and reason to think them true with certainty, then I have as much if not more reason to think reasons exist. And thus reasons exist with complete certainty. — Bartricks

Reasons are mind-stuff. To be certain that reasons exist entails that you be certain that you have/are a mind.

No, a view can be true and not believed. And a view can be true and not believed with certainty.

I do not believe materialism is true. But the fact that we can doubt the reports of our senses is not evidence that materialism is false. For we can doubt the reports of our senses even if materialism is false, and there's no special reason to think our senses would be indubitable if materialism were true (I mean, why would they be?).

But anyway, this is now getting off topic. The mind is not the brain regardless of whether brains are material objects or something else. If they are material objects - that is, if they are extended in space - then our minds are clearly not identical with them, for our minds seem to have no properties in common and thus are about as far from being them as it is possible to be. And if they are not extended in space - that is, if brains are not material substances, but bundles of ideas in the mind of God (as Berkeley believed), then our minds are not them either, for our minds are not bundles of ideas, but objects that have ideas.

Those who believe that our minds are our brains invariably have no argument for that view - they just assume it because they are fashion victims and that is the current intellectual fashion - or they have appalling arguments (see Murky above). — Bartricks

:ok:

The very strong relationship between human brain function and what human beings experience is undeniable. However almost nothing follows from this regarding the philosophy of mind. It is consistent with even the most extreme of metaphysical positions, for example, substance dualism.

Bartricks is an annoying fuck, but I think he is basically right about this.

EDIT: however, the question of where thinking happens remains. And I think 'in the brain' remains a possibility, even if thoughts are not identical with some brain functions.

Only for outsiders thinking takes place in the brain. For the one who perceives the thinking it takes place in another realm.

Of one thing we can be certain - minds. We can't disprove that there are no minds for to attempt to do so requires a mind, kinda like shooting oneself in the foot.

Of one thing we can't be certain - matter & energy. They could be illusions generated by the mind. There's no contradiction if we assume matter & energy are illusory.

Certain: mind; Uncertain: matter & energy

Of one thing we can be certain - minds. We can't disprove that there are no minds for to attempt to do so requires a mind, kinda like shooting oneself in the foot. — TheMadFool

I'm sure now: minds don't exist. Disproving a mind doesn't require a mind.

You've proven nothing but demonstrated how brains can support strange ideas. You have a brain that functions. What you call mind is the normal functioning of your brain. You and Bartricks are mezmerized by the word mind. No physical matter? Get real. Why should anyone take you seriously?

Certain: mind; Uncertain: matter & energy — TheMadFool

You know when you comment you self document your own ineptitude. It's just ridiculous.
And how did you and Bartricks get sucked into Bishop Berkeley's world of ass-backwardism? Maybe that was your wrong turn.

↪TheMadFool You've proven nothing but demonstrated how brains can support strange ideas. You have a brain that functions. What you call mind is the normal functioning of your brain. You and Bartricks are mezmerized by the word mind. No physical matter? Get real. Why should anyone take you seriously?

Certain: mind; Uncertain: matter & energy
— TheMadFool

You know when you comment you self document your own ineptitude. It's just ridiculous.
And how did you and Bartricks get sucked into Bishop Berkeley's world of ass-backwardism? Maybe that was your wrong turn. — Mark Nyquist

Perhaps you'll feel more comfortable with the physicalist version of the skepticism advocated by René Descartes :point: Gilbert Harman's brain in a vat.

Remember, you're getting closer to the truth - you've taken the physical world save your brain out of the equation. Take one step more and you're in Cartesian wonderland. Good luck!

And why do you think I would want your references?

And why do you think I would want your references? — Mark Nyquist

I don't have an appropriate response to that.

Perhaps there's a good argument out there that has "therefore, my mind is my brain" as its conclusion - but if there is, I haven't heard it yet. — Bartricks

Usually people say “mental states are brain states” not “my mind is my brain”.

Here’s an attempt at the former:

1- Every physical effect has sufficient physical cause (can be derived from conservation laws)
2- Mental states are not physical
3- Therefore of the two, only brain states can bring about physical effects
4- Mental states bring about physical effects
5- Therefore, Mental states are brain states

I have already responded to some comments, saying that I will not comment back on them, since this is just a poll. I didn't expected that there would have been so many of them. So, I decided to respond to some of them.

There are comments of the kind "Where else?" or just indicating obvious things, like e.g. respiration takes place in the lungs, or showing some sarcasm, or just saying nothing, actually. Just voting "Yes" in these cases, would be enough.

On the other hand, there are some responses, much fewer unfortunately, that show a thinking about the subject. These are worth mentioning. I bring them all together in here, in order of appearance, so that they can be easily examined and compared. (Note that I still don't comment on them. I only acknowledge them as valuable, i.e. as viewpoints, as having something to say. Also, I don't always include whole posts but only parts of them. You know what to do to read a whole post. (Just click on the person's name.)

***

Before we can determine whether thinking takes place in the brain, we have to first establish the brain exists outside the mind. — RogueAI

The prevailing model is of course that thought is caused by brain tissue, and the natural conclusion is that these thoughts are within this tissue somehow or to some extent. Intuition makes this claim nebulous however, so do any models (as opposed to spiritual ideas) exist that account for how thought might happen beyond the brain, or is this uncharted territory? — Enrique

No, thinking does not take place in the brain. It takes place in the 'mind'. Thoughts are mental states - states of mind. They are not brain states. — Bartricks

If someone breaks your arm/leg with a club, you can still think but if the club makes contact with your head (brain) with sufficient force, your thinking stops. So, I guess, the brain inside our skulls does the thinking. — TheMadFool

There is the theory of embodied cognition, which suggests that cognitive processes are not limited to the brain but draw from aspects of the entire body. — Hermeticus

Yes, it does, but where the "ideas" that make up the whole process of "Thinking" from its conception to its conclusion come from, that is another discussion. — Gus Lamarch

***

These only are the responses to the topic --not parts of discussions between persons on the subject-- up to now, which contained a viewpoint ...

***

Aditional responses after Sep 8, 2021:

Begs the question: Where is a human brain? If thinking "takes place" in it, it must be somewhere, but to be somehere presupposes meaningful spatial designations and these are groundless, every one, in the final determination. — Constance

My view is brain supports mental content and mental content is a sort of virtual world that you might call mind. — Mark Nyquist

@Alkis Piskas

If someone breaks your arm/leg with a club, you can still think but if the club makes contact with your head (brain) with sufficient force, your thinking stops. So, I guess, the brain inside our skulls does the thinking. — TheMadFool

Dumbo thinks it's the feather that makes him fly but no, it isn't. Likewise, we think it's the brain that thinks but...

we think it's the brain that thinks but... — TheMadFool

But what? Please copmplete your thought. I like to know your opinion. BTW, in your first comment (which I quoted in my "collection" of responses) you stated "So, I guess, the brain inside our skulls does the thinking." Are you revising or questioning your view?

While Bartricks is right about the poor inference from correlation to identity, I do think it is probably right that the human brain is what does the thinking in human brains. But that's hardly surprising, as the brain is the brain. Just as what does the thinking in a rock is the rock. The grammar is very leading here, and hard to resist. Anything ending in '-ing' is doing something, carrying out a function. So it has to be the kind of thing that can do something. A brain is that kind of thing. Nothing follows from that about 'consciousness', which is a noun not a verb.

But on what basis do you think this? You have agreed that we cannot go from 'a is correlated to b, therefore a is b' and presumably would agree that 'a causes b, therefore a is b' is fallacious too. So on what grounds do you think your mind is your brain?

As ever, your argument is flagrantly question begging.
Minds causally interact with the sensible world. That much seems clear to everyone. But if the sensible world is physical and the mental realm is not, then that interaction demonstrates that the non physical can and does causally interact with the physical.
So you need first to establish that the mind is physical otherwise you have no non question begging evidence that physical events can only have physical causes.
Incidentally, the more basic claim that you are appealing to is that causation only occurs between objects of the same kind. That claim, if true - and I am sceptical - would still not show minds to be brains. Rather, it would show brains to be mental. That is, it would get you to idealism about the sensible realm, not materialism about the mental realm. Why? Because minds and their contents exist with the utmost certainty and it would be irrational to reduce the more certain to the less.
But anyway, you are clearly bound in a little nut of naturalism and won't be able to follow reason out of it.

then that interaction demonstrates that the non physical can and does causally interact with the physical. — Bartricks

No, Bartricks, you are obviously wrong. The mind you identify as non-physical is clearly physical or it couldn't interact with the physical. So we are back to brain (and not mind) and the burden of proof for mind is still on you. Maybe more so since mind as you described appears to be a fallacy.

Again with the confidence. You're not classically trained, right? So get a big hot humble pie and stuff the whole thing in your mouth and let me take you to school.

The issue is whether the mind is a physical thing or not. So that means one is not entitled to just assume it is one or the other at the outset. Arguments are needed. And this:

The mind is physical.
Therefore the mind is physical

is shit. (And it would be shit even if one put in lots of ---- and >s, which i say because I know you think they do important work). Valid. But shit.

So, until a positive case is provided, it is an open question whether the mind is physical or not. And thus the fact that there appears to be causation between the mind and the sensible (I say 'sensible' rather than 'physical' because whether the sensible is physical is also debatable and this issue - the issue of what the mind is and what it can interact with - can bear on it) cannot be taken to constitute evidence that the mind is a sensible object until we have established that the mind is sensible rather than immaterial. For if the mind is immaterial - a possibility that has not been foreclosed - then the evidence of interaction would be evidence of interaction between immaterial and sensible.

Is there evidence that the mind is immaterial? Yes.

Is there any countervailing evidence that the mind is material? No.

Is there causal interaction between the mind and the sensible world? Manifestly

Therefore, there is evidence that the immaterial causally interacts with the sensible world.

Is the sensible world a physical world?

Well, if one kind of object can only causally interact with objects of the same kind, then no - the sensible world must be a mental world, not a physical world.

On the other hand, if one kind of object can causally interact with objects of a different kind, then possibly the sensible world is physical and causal interaction is taking place between the immaterial and the physical.

There. That's called reasoning. It's what I'm trained to do

It takes place in the nose, of course.

otherwise you have no non question begging evidence that physical events can only have physical causes. — Bartricks

So your objection is premise 1.

So you need first to establish that the mind is physical — Bartricks

If it affects the physical it had to be physical. Because that’s how people define “physical”. Not by mass, not by velocity, but by being able to cause a physical change. If it causes a physical effect it falls in the domain of physics. That’s why it’s called physics.

Electromagnetic waves don’t have mass and are physical for example.

That’s if you think the mind is some sort of substance.

Why? Because minds and their contents exist with the utmost certainty and it would be irrational to reduce the more certain to the less. — Bartricks

I’m not reducing minds to brains. I’m reducing mental states to brain states.

Anger is a state your brain is in, not a state your mind is in. Mind doesn’t need to be a substance for its uses to make sense. “He stormed out because he was angry” makes sense when “angry” is treated as a physical state. Anger doesn’t need to be a magical non physical event pushing anything.

It’s when you treat “angry” as a state of another thing, “mind” then you run into the issue of how all of these scientists seemed to have completely missed this magical thing that affects the physical world so strongly. If there existed a thing called a “mind” that had causal impact then surely we would’ve detected it by now no? It wouldn’t be a first for us to infer the existence of things without mass (electromagnetic waves for example) based purely on their effects.

But it seems there is no need for an extra thing called a mind, as our bodies seem to follow the same rules as the rest of the universe without any anomalous physical observations that can be attributed to a mind doing something. So either minds don’t exist, or they’re some combination of physical things we discovered (an electromagnetic wave, etc).

This seems like it’ll just be another round of a whole lot of vitriol, since we’re treading the same ground again. If I don’t see anything original in the reply I’m not responding.

Very good point.... any ideas? — Daniel

The epistemological process, that is, the act of developing a conceptual perception about existence, needs a substantiation through another field composed only of ideas - metaphysics - which are captured by the Ego - the "belonging to oneself", therefore , that which makes Man take for himself an idea - Eigenheit - transl. "Ownness" - - - of "Being", therefore, ideas are "the epistemological power of "belonging" to Being, in the perception of the limitation of existence, and awareness of the infinity of metaphysics".

Something can only be "real", if, beforehand, it was "Ideal", but something can only be "ideal", if it has become part of the "Ownness" of existence.

So your objection is premise 1. — khaled

I didn't mention any of the premises of your argument as your argument is poorly formed, semi gibberish. It also contains a premise that contradicts the conclusion (you assert that mental states are not physical and then conclude that they are! Jeez). My advice, which you will ignore of course, is to stick to this form:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

And then simply pile them up.

I'll just do it for you, as that'll save time. Here's what you should have said:

1. If an event is physical, then it has a physical cause
2. Mental events are physical
3. Therefore, mental events have physical causes

Now that it has been properly laid out - and of course, the confusion that infects your 'argument' is such that you can deny that any proper argument I lay out on your behalf was not the argument you were trying to express - it is clear that premise 2 is question begging. That is, it presupposes that minds are physical and so renders the argument impotent to 'show' that minds are physical.

Alternatively one might argue like this (this argument, at least, is not question begging):

1. Events of one kind have causes of the same kind
2. Mental events cause sensible events
3. Therefore, mental events and sensible events are events of the same kind

Now I think premise 1 of that argument is false, but I am willing to accept that it might be true as some undoubtedly have the rational intuition that it is, else the so-called problem of interaction would never have been considered a problem. So, for the sake of argument alone, I am willing to accept premise 1 of that argument. And premise 2 is clearly true.

However, in order to get from the conclusion of that argument to the conclusion that mental events are physical events (and thus that minds are physical things), one would need to stipulate that sensible events are physical events. And the problem with that is that, in light of the conclusion of the above argument, we now have no evidence they are, and stunningly good evidence they are not.

For this argument is a good one:

4. Mental events are immaterial events
5. Therefore, sensible events are immaterial events

Why do I say that it is a good one? Because there's evidence minds are immaterial - and thus that mental events are immaterial events - and no evidence that minds are material. Not that I know of, anyway. In other words, you need to deny 4 and insist that sensible events are physical events (which will then get you to the conclusion that mental events are physical events). But to do that you'd need evidence that mental events are not immaterial events - that is, you'd need evidence that minds are physical and not immaterial. You don't have any of those. I, by contrast, have a ton of arguments that 4 is true. 14 on the last count.

So, to be clear: I see no reason to think that events of one kind cannot cause events of a differnt kind. But even if there was reason to think that dubious premise true, it would not show that minds are physical, rather it would show that the sensible is mental.

If I don’t see anything original in the reply I’m not responding. — khaled

Oh boo hoo. There's nothing original in it, because there was nothing original in what you said and you just committed the same old mistakes.

et al

So basically, whether we define the mind as physical or nonphysical is arbitrary from a structural standpoint. Whatever the mind's substance is somehow affects a world at least partially comprised of sensible features. So what we seem to be lacking is an objective "ownness" that would mechanistically clarify the mind's substance, which is why the debate never seems to enter the domain of sciencelike thinking.

Are any of the posters at this forum capable of rendering intuitions about the nonphysical mind in scientific or more pointedly objective terms, or is this hopelessly elusive and futuristic at our stage of knowledge? Does phenomenology have anything to say about the subject that borders on objectivity?

Are any of the posters at this forum capable of rendering intuitions about the nonphysical mind in scientific or more pointedly objective terms, or is this hopelessly elusive and futuristic at our stage of knowledge? — Enrique

The scientific endeavor has taken a "linear" and "arbitrary" turn that does not appeal to me at all, and in large part is the cause of its never being taken as a fundamental basis of knowledge in all of human history - since the ancient Greeks - known as Pre-Socratics - to the moderns -. Don't get me wrong, I'm in no way taking a stand against scientific research and its methods; I simply criticize the arbitrary need of modern science to take on an air of quasi-religious dogma to all its theories and hypotheses.

The objectivity of science in essence has only shown us that subjectivity is the nature of the Universe.

So basically, whether we define the mind as physical or nonphysical is arbitrary from a structural standpoint. — Enrique

I don't follow you. Our minds clearly causally interact with the sensible world. That, by itself, doesn't tell us anything about what kind of a thing minds are.

Some assume - and I think that's all it is, an assumption, not a self-evident truth of reason - that things of one kind can only causally interact with things of the same kind.

But that too tells us nothing about what kind of a thing minds are. It just tells us that they can only causally interact with things of the same kind, and thus as our minds are causally interacting with a sensible world, it tells us only that the world is the causal product of a thing or things of the same kind as our own mind. But it does not tell us 'what' kind of thing that may be.

But if you consult your reason - and it is by consulting our reason that we find out about things - your reason will tell you things such as the following:

a) that your mind cannot be divided
b) that it makes no sense to wonder what your mind smells or tastes like, or what colour it has or what shape it has
c) that it makes no sense to wonder, in respect of a sensible thing - such as a mug or piece of cheese - what it thinks like (though it does make sense to wonder what it might taste like, or smell like, or what shape it has).
d) that your mind exists with certainty, whereas no sensible thing exists with the same certainty
e) that you are the same person - the same mind - you were when you were a child, even if every particle of your sensible body has changed in the interim
f) that you are morally valuable irrespective of any and all of your sensible features, and irrespective of whether you have any sensible features at all
g) that the wholesale destruction of your sensible body is something that will harm you, and at the same time to be harmed one needs to exist at the time of the harm
f) that you have free will, yet at the same time your reason tells you (does it not?) that you would lack free will if everything you thought desired and intended was the causal product of causes external to yourself.

These things and more besides our reason tells us. Tells me, anyway, and tells countless others for all such claims have been appealed to as premises in published arguments.

Yet consider: given what one's reason is saying about one's own mind, is it telling you that it is a sensible thing, or something else entirely? THe latter surely?

For just take divisibility for starters. Sensible things can be divided. Or at least, they can if they are physical things - that is, if they take up space. For anything that takes up some space can be divided in two. One can have half a mug, half a piece of cheese, half a molecule, and so on. But not half a mind. Well, if all things that are extended in space can, by their very nature, be divided and one's mind cannot be divided, then one's mind is not extended in space and is thus not a sensible object. (This venerable argument, versions of which can be found in Plato, Descartes and Berkeley among others, seems by itself sufficient to establish that the mind is immaterial, not material).