I have read all or some of many of your threads. Discussion after discussion, post after post, paragraph after paragraph, word after word. Long posts that finally boil down to just one argument.

[1] It is immoral to make decisions for another person without their agreement.
[2] Before they are born, children are non-existent persons.
[3] It is impossible to obtain agreement from a non-existent person.
[4] Therefore, it is immoral to cause children to be born. — T Clark

I think that is not charitable that everything I've written boils down to the consent argument. Agreement is actually one I don't use too often. Rather, just the more simple axiom that "It's not good (wrong) to create unnecessary (not for amelioration of a greater for lesser suffering for that person), non-trivial burdens/impositions/harms on someone else's behalf". To boil that down even further, it would be of the deontological variety, similar to Kant's second formulation of not using people, and treating individuals (that could be born) as ends in themselves rather than a massless aggregate utility-producers of possibly bringing a better situation in the world (if that's even possible info to obtain).

Response to 1 - We make decisions for other people, especially children, all the time without their approval. We take them to the doctor; make them take medicine; make them have operations; make them go to school; punish them for bad behavior....

Response to 2 - Non-existent persons are not persons.

Response to 3 - Even if non-existent children were persons, the power of consent for children resides in their parents. — T Clark

See above... Those are Ameliorations.. The child is already born and would be a dereliction of duty as a parent to not prevent greater harm.

unnecessary (not for amelioration of a greater for lesser suffering for that person) — schopenhauer1

That’s what you meant by unnecessary? That’s ridiculous though. You remember the life guard example right? In that example, by this definition, waking up the life guard would be “unnecessary suffering” and so would be wrong. Since the suffering alleviated is not the lifeguard’s.

Clearly you think imposing on one for the good of another is fine sometimes.

non-trivial — schopenhauer1

That’s really where the core of the disagreement lies. Everyone agrees that imposing too much is wrong (true by definition). The disagreement is whether or not life is too much.

But to whom does that matter? Certainly, not the non-existent being, as that makes no sense. — schopenhauer1

This also applies to (1) in exactly, precisely, the same way.

1) A person is not born, and a person is not imposed upon — schopenhauer1

This is not a good thing, as there is no one it is good for.

It’s as good as imposing traffic laws on a planet with no inhabitants.

That’s what you meant by unnecessary? That’s ridiculous though. You remember the life guard example right? In that example, by this definition, waking up the life guard would be “unnecessary suffering” and so would be wrong. Since the suffering alleviated is not the lifeguard’s. — khaled

Then see "non-trivial". Next.

That’s really where the core of the disagreement lies. — khaled

I guess when we are arguing, yes.

This also applies to (1) in exactly, precisely, the same way. — khaled

Not sure what you mean. No one exists yet to need amelioration.

This is not a good thing, as there is no one it is good for.

It’s as good as imposing traffic laws on a planet with no inhabitants. — khaled

You are actually making my argument. No person, means no goods of life. That no one is harmed is good though.. The only way around this, is that you deny conditional states like "could have happened". You could bite that bullet if you want.

I think that is not charitable that everything I've written boils down to the consent argument. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps I am wrong, but I don't see how that makes me uncharitable.

It's not good (wrong) to create unnecessary (not for amelioration of a greater for lesser suffering for that person), non-trivial burdens/impositions/harms on someone else's behalf — schopenhauer1

I don't see how that argument is different from my summary in any significant way.

similar to Kant's second formulation of not using people, and treating individuals as ends in themselves. — schopenhauer1

This is your judgement of prospective parents motivations. Based on my own experience, both as a parent and observer of other parents, it's not correct for most of us. If you were to make the statement that having children solely for one's own personal gratification is immoral, I'd be more open to agreement, or at least negotiations.

But to whom does that matter? Certainly, not the non-existent being, as that makes no sense — schopenhauer1

That could be the same for 1 too. Don't you think?

So there is some asymmetry here between 1 and 2 where 1 seems waited as more important to consider than 2 — schopenhauer1

But why 1 is more important than 2?

In general I get your point but for me that question can never be valid since it has no practical use. It can never happen so what to discuss about??

Life is given to all of us without asking. But the "fair" thing for that is that you can also choose to end it whenever you want. It would be totally unfair only if you couldn't.

This is your judgement of prospective parents motivations. Based on my own experience, both as a parent and observer of other parents, it's not correct for most of us. If you were to make the statement that having children solely for one's own personal gratification is immoral, I'd be more open to agreement, or at least negotiations. — T Clark

Haha, I do like your use of "negotiations" there :). But another thing people seem to think is that I am trying to personalize this. I don't go around shaming pregnant people or anything. In other words, I don't think parents are trying to be malicious. I think it's wrong to procreate, but I don't think it's out of bad intent or think them horrible people. Rather I see it as just not fully understanding the extent of the unnecessary, non-trivial burdens put upon another person.

The child is already born and would be a dereliction of duty as a parent to not prevent greater harm. — schopenhauer1

If you think the only motivation or justification for a parent's action is to "prevent greater harm," you are wrong.

I guess when we are arguing, yes. — schopenhauer1

Not just us. Again, everyone agrees you shouldn’t impose non trivial suffering on others. They just disagree on how much of an imposition life is.

You are actually making my argument. No person, means no goods of life. That no one is harmed is good though.. — schopenhauer1

No. I’m not.

Not sure what you mean. — schopenhauer1

What I said. You make it sound like (1) is a good thing while (2) isn’t a bad thing by virtue of there being no one that (2) is bad for. Well, again, there is no one that (1) is good for.

Pick a consistent basis. Either you’re looking at it from the perspective of “How would this affect an existent person” or from the perspective of “How would this affect a non existent” (it wouldn’t). So either both neutral, or: no suffering = good and no pleasure = bad.

Rather I see it as just not fully understanding the extent of the unnecessary, non-trivial burdens put upon another person. — schopenhauer1

And I see your position as exaggerating those.

Anyways goodnight. I’ll respond in the morning if it seems like there will be new grounds.

That could be the same for 1 too. Don't you think? — dimosthenis9

Same response. Do you think conditionals exist? "Could" something happen that did not? Harm was prevented which was good. Good was prevented, but how is that bad or good if there's no one there to care? There seems to be an asymmetry where prevented bad that could have happened is good. Prevented good, not so much a bad thing (or good).

But why 1 is more important than 2? — dimosthenis9

Same response.

In general I get your point but for me that question can never be valid since it has no practical use. It can never happen so what to discuss about?? — dimosthenis9

Perhaps not all of society, but just because a majority of people do something (or don't do it) does that make it right?

Life is given to all of us without asking. But the "fair" thing for that is that you can also choose to end it whenever you want. It would be totally unfair only if you couldn't. — dimosthenis9

That's a fallacy.. What if you never wanted to have the option be to live life or do the generally painful, scary thing of killing yourself? That is the whole point of my last thread about not having an option for no option.

But another thing people seem to think is that I am trying to personalize this. I don't go around shaming pregnant people or anything. In other words, I don't think parents are trying to be malicious. I think it's wrong to procreate, but I don't think it's out of bad intent or think them horrible people. — schopenhauer1

I never thought you would shame prospective parents or that you think they are horrible people. On the other hand, you do question their intent. Your argument about using children for one's own personal gratification shows that.

Since when is it that when we can’t ask for consent, we assume it is given? — khaled

Ask how??? To an unborn kid? What are you talking about? No you can't ask. Simply as that. If you know a way to ask for an unborn child for permission then please enlighten us all. So yes it's totally parents decision. He/she is the creator either you like it or not.

Let’s assume that a couple has hidden genes that would result in their child having a terrible illness. We’re talking, missing eyes, broken limbs, broken organs, etc. Do you think it’s fine for that couple to have that kid?

The idea that having kids is always fine at all times is silly, even to non antinatalists — khaled

The only silly thing here is your argument. Who talked about such cases as you mention? Of course not it isn't right. When you know that your kid will face serious illness, it's not right at all to have it.But we don't talk about that cases obviously. Pfffff...

That's a fallacy.. What if you never wanted to have the option be to live life or do the generally painful, scary thing of killing yourself? — schopenhauer1

My point is that is totally useless, imo at least, to discuss issues that can never happen. You simply can't decide for life. It is given to you. The decision isn't made by us. At least I find it fair that you were given the option to end it. For me it balances the non asking life.

Harm was prevented which was good. Good was prevented, but how is that bad or good if there's no one there to care? There seems to be an asymmetry where prevented bad that could have happened is good. Prevented good, not so much a bad thing (or good). — schopenhauer1

Good that was prevented is bad. You can't claim that preventing harm is good but preventing good then who cares?Either you will say that prevented harm also who cares.. Or preventing good is bad. You can't have it all.

I never thought you would shame prospective parents or that you think they are horrible people. On the other hand, you do question their intent. Your argument about using children for one's own personal gratification shows that. — T Clark

No, not that either. My remark about utility-producers is more towards philosophical arguments like the one Khaled seems to propose which is that the child would bring more positive utility, so is permissible. I think most parents don't think like that. Rather, they think along the lines of the role of being a parent, cultural expectation, for family who wants to see legacy or grandchildren, giving purpose, and something to do, someone to care for, etc etc. Thus, to them, I can see why they think it is justified. It doesn't look at the arguments I am proposing. To be fair, arguments like mine Benatar, or anyone that questions the wrongness of procreation are not usually entertained by most people. I mean, most people don't think about things in a detailed, philosophically robust way anyways, when it comes to a lot of decisions, as far as I see. It's only when one is purposefully trying to think that way, that maybe these types of thoughts start entering the picture. Even then, actually acting on conclusions one comes up with abstractly, may not necessarily happen.

My point is that is totally useless, imo at least, to discuss issues that can never happen. You simply can't decide for life. It is given to you. The decision isn't made by us. At least I find it fair that you were given the option to end it. For me it balances the non asking life. — dimosthenis9

You are misinterpreting what I'm saying, then. You can discuss issues of deciding for others. So, a parent "could" make a decision for another person, but decides this is not right to do so, since the decision to "never be born" would never be an option once the parent actually goes through and has a child. By not having a child, this unjust situation of "no option" isn't even relevant. One situation brings an injustice (born with no "no option" excepting the very difficult prospect of slow suicide through passive starvation/depredation or faster means of suicide) and one situation simply doesn't (not having the child).Similarly, one situation brings about a lifetime of having to "deal with" (impositions, burdens) and one doesn't.

Good that was prevented is bad. You can't claim that preventing harm is good but preventing good then who cares?Either you will say that prevented harm also who cares.. Or preventing good is bad. You can't have it all. — dimosthenis9

Harm that is prevented seems asymmetrical to good that is prevented. If a harm is avoided (that could have happened), is this not a good thing? If good was prevented, it would only be bad if someone was there to exist to be deprived of it.. An actual person existing doesn't seem to affect the goodness of a possible harm that was prevented though. That seems always good, no matter what. It's good as a state of affairs, whereas the state of affairs of "no good happening" seems to only matter in the relative sense of a person needing to be deprived of it to begin with.

Pick a consistent basis. Either you’re looking at it from the perspective of “How would this affect an existent person” or from the perspective of “How would this affect a non existent” (it wouldn’t). So either both neutral, or: no suffering = good and no pleasure = bad. — khaled

I think this actually ends up being a conversation around the use of language. Do you believe conditionals exist? Something can happen, but does not, for example?

So in this case, there has to be a possibility for bad to happen. If there is no possibility for bad, then it is as you say neutral. If there is a possibility, that in some way, "bad" can happen, and does not, that is good. Certainly, even you have argued that you cannot take "bad states of affairs not happening" off the table just because someone isn't born to realize this. I remember you giving all sorts of gruesome examples to show this isn't true.

This also becomes a discussion around perspective. To be "meta meta".. we can say that if no person exists, no values can be assessed in the first place. But then we get all sorts of cruel outcomes and justifications. We can do anything that affects a future person because they don't exist yet. Once someone knows what "bad" and "good" are, yes, then evaluations of "bad" and "good" come into play.

So there is a way that we are crossing perspectives here...
Highest perspective: Someone needs to exist in the first place for evaluations THEMSELVES to matter. (This is where you are).

Lower perspective: Assuming, people exist who can evaluate good or bad in the FIRST PLACE..
An actual person (that is being affected) does not need to exist in order for prevention of harm to be good. An actual person (that is being affected) does need to exist for prevention of good to be bad.

So basically, then you ask, "What makes suffering so bad compared to the non-existent good"? That is where axiologies basically stop. You either agree imposing harm on another is wrong (if it's unnecessary and non-trivial) or not. That harmful burdens and suffering is not good, and thus not good to enact on another. Happiness may be "good", but not enacting it seems to not matter in a moral sense in the same way not enacting harm is. No harm seems to be more important than no happy.

And yes, I agree you may agree even then that unnecessary burdens, and non-trivial harms are bad to impose on another, but it depends on the degree at which it is not permissible. You think the burdens and impositions are not non-trivial "enough" to be considered impermissible. Alternatively, our definitions of "trivial" may be different. I will go back to things like Willy Wonka's limited choices, and the Exploited Worker, and that is not even discussing agreed-upon, contingent (non-structural yet likely) harms such as physical ailments, accidents, disasters, and the rest.

One situation brings an injustice (born with no "no option" excepting the very difficult prospect of slow suicide through passive starvation/depredation or faster means of suicide) and one situation simply doesn't (not having the child). — schopenhauer1

But all these assumptions end up supposing that a child will have a life of suffer. What if a child mends to live a great life full of happiness.My decision not to have it, how you say that it brings just?? Since you deprive a "0" to live a great life before returning to "0".Is that a good thing?? And If I was an unborn child and had the" option" I would vote "hell yes!".

You say since we can't ask the child the fair thing is not to have it! That already includes the hypothesis that the child will answer "no"!
So assuming" no " is fine but assuming" yes" is bad and unethical??

Anyway I repeat to you that the "unjust" argument is solved for me with the suicide option. And if Antinatalists want also just for parents well they have it too!Also the parent that "shouldn't have the kid" gets "punished" having to suffer the loss of his kid for the rest of his life.

Harm that is prevented seems asymmetrical to good that is prevented. If a harm is avoided (that could have happened), is this not a good thing? If good was prevented, it would only be bad if someone was there to exist to be deprived of it.. An actual person existing doesn't seem to affect the goodness of a possible harm that was prevented though. That seems always good, no matter what. It's good as a state of affairs, whereas the state of affairs of "no good happening" seems to only matter in the relative sense of a person needing to be deprived of it to begin with — schopenhauer1

Let's agree we disagree on that. I really can't understand why you make that distinction. I understand your arguments but really I can't accept them. Why you find that asymmetry and the way you "measure" it, I can't agree on that. So better to stop arguing about that,i think,and move on.

Anyway I repeat to you that the "unjust" argument is solved for me with the suicide option. And if Antinatalists want also just for parents well they have it too!Also the parent that "shouldn't have the kid" gets "punished" having to suffer the loss of his kid for the rest of his life. — dimosthenis9

Other people not being happy because they cannot enact unwanted harms/burdens on another, shouldn't matter. An extreme case would be someone who gets pleasure if they get to harm someone. Why should that be permissible? I am not saying parents are trying to do this, but life brings with it non-trivial harm, so that ends up being the case, because life is known to be the condition for which harms take place (obviously).

Let's agree with disagree on that. I really can't understand why you make that distinction. I understand your arguments but really I can't accept them. Why you find that asymmetry and the way you "measure" it, I can't agree on that. So better to stop arguing about that,i think,and move on. — dimosthenis9

I thought my reply to Khaled is relevant here too:
So basically, then you ask, "What makes suffering so bad compared to the non-existent good"? That is where axiologies basically stop. You either agree imposing harm on another is wrong (if it's unnecessary and non-trivial) or not- hat harmful burdens and suffering is not good, and thus not good to enact on another. Happiness may be "good", but not enacting it seems to not matter. No harm seems to be more important than no happy.

life is known to be the condition for which harms take place (obviously). — schopenhauer1

Now I get why you and me disagree then. I think you just mentioned the "root" here.
For me that's ONLY how humans has made life seem. And how they think about it.
My cosmo theory is very different than yours. Life is a joke! Even a bad joke is nothing more than a joke!
And now your nickname makes more sense to me. No offense here, just telling you what I exactly thought when I read that.

Happiness may be "good", but not enacting it seems to not matter. No harm seems to be more important than no happy. — schopenhauer1

But why?? Why seems like that?! And as you keep writing "seems!"." Seems" means "not sure" also. Anyway we keep repeating the same things here.

"What makes suffering so bad compared to the non-existent good"? That is where axiologies basically stop. — schopenhauer1

That's exactly my question.
And since "axiologies stop" , that's another evidence that you can never be sure about the harm-good assumption you make.

Now I get why you and me disagree then. I think you just mentioned the "root" here.
For me that's ONLY how humans has made life seem. And how they think about it.
My cosmo theory is very different than yours. Life is a joke! Even a bad joke is nothing more than a joke!
And now your nickname makes more sense to me. No offense here, just telling you what I exactly thought when I read that. — dimosthenis9

To take an extreme case.. someone in utter pain isn't going to necessarily be able to wave such things away.. One has to eat.. etc. Joke assume easy-to-deal-with and light. Surely, someone must find ways to live in the word, lest they die (they must "deal with" inescapably lest they die by starvation). Surely, contingent, harmful events might happen to someone as well. Structural and contingent harms happen..That's no joke.

But why?? Why seems like that?! And as you keep writing "seems!"." Seems" means "not sure" also. Anyway we keep repeating the same things here. — dimosthenis9

Because we are talking about other people, imposing non-trivial burdens on others is overlooking the other person's dignity. This isn't the case with happiness-bringing.

someone in utter pain isn't going to necessarily be able to wave such things away.. One has to eat.. etc. Joke assume easy-to-deal-with and light. Surely, someone must find ways to live in the word, lest they die (they must "deal with" inescapably lest they die by starvation). Surely, contingent, harmful events might happen to someone as well. Structural and contingent harms happen..That's no joke. — schopenhauer1

Why you think that a person who suffers (and there might be probably billions as we are talking) don't kill himself?? Cause they STILL answer "yes" to life. Life to most people is much more preferable than "nothing","0", even if they suffer!

This isn't the case with happiness-bringing. — schopenhauer1

It is the exact same for me!
We will never agree on that. Let's face it. It's OK. Not saying that I m surely right and you are wrong. We just think different on that.

Lower perspective: Assuming, people exist who can evaluate good or bad in the FIRST PLACE..
An actual person (that is being affected) does not need to exist in order for prevention of harm to be good. An actual person (that is being affected) does need to exist for prevention of good to be bad. — schopenhauer1

Yup. Nice summary.

You either agree imposing harm on another is wrong (if it's unnecessary and non-trivial) or not. — schopenhauer1

Agreed that imposing too much harm is wrong.

That harmful burdens and suffering is not good, and thus not good to enact on another. Happiness may be "good", but not enacting it seems to not matter in a moral sense in the same way not enacting harm is. — schopenhauer1

But, and I hate to bring this up again, this would be insufficient. You think surprise parties are ok. So you do sometimes think that the amount of good created can trump the harm inflicted making an act neutral. I’d say maybe there are situations that make it obligatory even, but I haven’t tested that idea extensively.

Point is: You yourself don’t believe in the asymmetry “It’s wrong to do something that risks harming someone no matter how much pleasure that could bring as enacting pleasure is not a duty”

I will go back to things like Willy Wonka's limited choices, and the Exploited Worker, and that is not even discussing agreed-upon, contingent (non-structural yet likely) harms such as physical ailments, accidents, disasters, and the rest. — schopenhauer1

This would’ve been a point in our last discussion but I got tired and deleted it. Yes, do please go back to those examples. Show me how you can derive that Willy wonka’s forced game is a non trivial imposition, without referring in any way to the victims opinions of their situation. I just don’t see how you “objectively” measure how bad an imposition is with no reference to the person being imposed upon. What’s the “set of features” that go into making an imposition non trivial? A certain duration? A certain number of work hours?

Of course not it isn't right. — dimosthenis9

Ok, at least you don’t have a ridiculous position. Though it seems to me there is a contradiction between here:

Where exactly is the problem? Why his choice is wrong and yours is right??
My point is the same as I wrote before: it is NOT a matter of right or wrong. — dimosthenis9

And here:

Of course not it isn't right. When you know that your kid will face serious illness, it's not right at all to have it. — dimosthenis9

How is it not right sometimes and also not a matter of right and wrong?

We will never agree on that. Let's face it. It's OK. Not saying that I m surely right and you are wrong. We just think different on that. — dimosthenis9

Just food for thought. I don’t agree with shope either:

Is someone who can afford to give 100 dollars to charity but chooses not to as bad as someone who steals 100 dollars?

Because that seems like it’d follow if you believe that bringing about happiness is as important as not harming. I’m not quite made up on the issue but I do think they’re comparable.

It's wrong to have more than two children. Once only a milion people walked the Earth. Nowadays more than 7000 times as many. Compare with other mamals. Earth has food enough for every one but more than 2 children will make the population explode on a local and global scale.

someone in utter pain isn't going to necessarily be able to wave such things away.. One has to eat.. etc. Joke assume easy-to-deal-with and light. Surely, someone must find ways to live in the word, lest they die (they must "deal with" inescapably lest they die by starvation). Surely, contingent, harmful events might happen to someone as well. Structural and contingent harms happen..That's no joke.
— schopenhauer1

Why you think that a person who suffers (and there might be probably billions as we are talking) don't kill himself?? Cause they STILL answer "yes" to life. Life to most people is much more preferable than "nothing","0", even if they suffer! — dimosthenis9

Many people are fearing suicide. Something of that fear could be evolutionary fear of death (this was "good" for selfish gene in human history). Something comes from upbringing and religions. Some religions, at least, are saying that if you do suicide, that is wrong and you are going to Hell. On the other hand, many people think their (possible) close ones, and don´t make suicide because they think it´s too much grief for their loved ones. So is quite understandable that many people, who suffer and are willing to die, don´t make suicide.

Point is: You yourself don’t believe in the asymmetry “It’s wrong to do something that risks harming someone no matter how much pleasure that could bring as enacting pleasure is not a duty” — khaled

Well, a lot of this has to do with a distinction that Benatar makes, and I think appropriately, between starting a life and continuing a life. This is why a lot of analogies don't compare apples to apples. But, this also involves our difference between deontology and utilitarianism. When starting a life.. What matters here always, if we are not using them, is the person whose life we are starting. In this framework, the asymmetry of not starting harm and not starting happiness becomes much more highlighted. In light of that person would not be harmed (which is good) and that person would not have happiness (neutral), that makes sense. However, once alive, there might be a case that after already being born, that preventing happiness, when one can for someone, with minimal cost to oneself, would seem to be some sort of morally worthy act. However, I am not sure if it is obligatory as the harm is. And even in the harm realm (after being born), ameliorations abound. We are always compromising and having to do minimal harms (sometimes trivial sometimes non-trivial), because just to survive, often we must do this. Sometimes just minimal mitigations are all you can do after the birth decision. The birth decision however, is different in that no mitigation needs take place. One can fully prevent the unnecessary, non-trivial harm.

There could be no valid research as to measure that.Even if you could ask all people on earth and the majority told you they are happier, how can you be sure that they would tell the truth?. So stop that research thing. — dimosthenis9

Okay, so all surveys count for nothing. You should contact universities and tell their researchers to stop[ doing them. Witness statements to crimes count for nothing. They 'could' be telling a lie. Thousands of people say the mugger had a green cap on - but as far as you're concerned that's not good evidence that mugger had a green cap on. Goodness, how silly you are. No wonder you think having kids is morally fine.

We are also cleverer.
— Bartricks

Really?? No further comment... — dimosthenis9

But your comments support the claim.

Okay, so all surveys count for nothing. You should contact universities and tell their researchers to stop[ doing them. — Bartricks

That's what you understood from what I wrote??? Pfffff..

Goodness, how silly you are. No wonder you think having kids is morally fine. — Bartricks

Yeah I know. You didn't have kids. So you belong to "clever". I'm sure you have a research for that too.

You fail to understand simply logical things. I told you that these kind of researches can never be valid and you talk about witnesses and green cup shit.
You insist that having kids is wrong and you don't accept that it is a matter of choice simply. So what else to discuss with you? You rape logic.
Happiness can never be measured by one factor only (having kids or not). It's pure stupidity if you think that. Nothing else to say.

The consent argument is a good and highly respected argument.

It is default wrong to do something to someone else without their consent.

That doesn't mean it is 'always' wrong. It's easy to dream up cases where it is right to do something to someone else without their consent. But for that to help, you then need to argue that the cases in question are relevantly analogous to acts of procreation - and invariably they are not.

For instance, it is often right to do something to someone else without their consent if that's the only way to prevent that person from coming to a great and undeserved harm. That's why it's right forcibly to educate children - if one does not, then they will come to a great and undeserved harm: they'll grow up to be ignorant in a world in which being ignorant is incredibly dangerous (and they're likely to do stupid things such as, you know, have kids).

But the case is obviously not relevantly analogous to acts of procreation. The act of procreation is not an act necessary to prevent the person you propose creating from coming to a great undeserved harm, is it?! For clearly either people exist before they are born here, or they do not. If they do not, then there is no possible harm that an act of procreation rescues them from (and thus the act has the badmaker and not the relevant goodmaker....and so is wrong). And if they do, then you know nothing whatever about their situation and so you are not justified in bringing them here without their consent, for you may be making their situation considerably worse not better.

Note as well, life doesn't have to contain harms for this argument to go through. For instance, you are clearly not entitled to inject me with a drug you'll think I enjoy without my consent, and that remains true even if I really would enjoy it.

To make a good case against the consent argument for antinatalism, you'd need to locate some great harm that the act is needed to avert.

How is it not right sometimes and also not a matter of right and wrong? — khaled

Cause we talk about having kids or not in general. And not in specific cases. When you already know that your kid will face illness for sure , is it the same when you just assume that your kid might face suffering in its life?

First case's outcome is already known. So when you decide to make a kid and you already know that it will suffer of course it is wrong to have it. But that has nothing to do with the second case.
I see no contradiction here.

Is someone who can afford to give 100 dollars to charity but chooses not to as bad as someone who steals 100 dollars?

Because that seems like it’d follow if you believe that bringing about happiness is as important as not harming. I’m not quite made up on the issue but I do think they’re comparable. — khaled

I don't think that this example is similar to the case here. It's like you already assume that "stealing" (wrong) is the "having kid" case. So you lead the conclusion to your preference already.
Why then you don't consider as depriving happiness from an unborn kid a bad thing also?

I really can't understand how you and schopenhauer measure harm and happiness and you decide that harm counts more.