1. Understanding denotes conceptual reflection (i.e. metacognition) by which knowing is distinct from, and contextualized by, not knowing. — 180 Proof
2. Knowledge denotes (A) proven proficiency, (B) accurate description, (C) well-tested explanation or (D) a combination of two or three of kinds of knowing. And information is merely the contents (i.e. disambiguated / aggregated data) of which descriptions consist. In other words, oversimply put, knowledge is form and information is (descriptive) content. — 180 Proof
(My "picked brain's" usages, Fool, which might not be dictionary standard.) — 180 Proof
My own thinking on knowledge is that it is different from information in the sense of it being about a connection with the information and ideas in some kind of meaningful way. I believe that it is connected with understanding, because it involves being able to make use of what one has learned. Understanding may be something which we think we have, but I am not sure that it is that simple because it is about whether we are able to make use of what we consider to be our knowledge, and apply to the experiences which test our capabilities. In a way, my own view of understanding is related to the concept of insight. I think that it is a kind of deeper level of knowledge based on being able to reflect on the ideas which we have and take them on board to live in a greater conscious and responsible way. I am not sure that I am fully able to live with insightful awareness, but I am seeking to be able to do so. — Jack Cummins
Kant proposed that our minds impose empirical limits a priori on our concepts and therefore that non-empirical speculations (i.e. metaphysical ideas) cannot be known by us but only believed as matters of faith (e.g. "God, freedom, immortality"). Read Kant's Prolegomena of Any Future Metaphysics.I believe that Kant thought that there were limitations of how much we can really know about metaphysics, apart from by means of intuition and a priori logic. — Jack Cummins
I was just reading your comments and, yes, my question does involve the semantics of what we mean by the idea of 'knowing'. I believe that Kant thought that there were limitations of how much we can really know about metaphysics, apart from by means of intuition and a priori logic. Jung made his famous television broadcast, saying that he did not believe in God, but rather , 'I know', based on the direct experience of God in dreams and other personal experiences. However, I am sure that many people would challenge his use of the idea of such knowledge as reliable.
One aspect which I think about is how science gives us findings which are used to build theories, but the theories are interpretations, which may be modified at some point. But, most of all theories are only models, and, thereby, only partial pictures of reality or 'truth'. — Jack Cummins
I don't find a tension in these ideas. But I do have a "metaphysical itch", so that may be why. I could imagine a different intelligent species from us being able to cognize the world in a deeper manner, perhaps perceiving more than we could, in some respects. So I don't see a problem with this idea in principle — Manuel
But I'm attracted to the idea that there is a grounding of the effects in nature that are non-representational in nature, which we can't access. A bit like trying to understand how the brain works by thinking about it.
So I entirely concede that I may be masquerading here, at least in part. — Manuel
QM constitutes a theory. 'Many-worlds' or 'hidden variables' or 'collapse of the wavefunction by observation' are interpretations of QM. In other words: a theory (science) is a good explanation from which unique predictions can be made and tested; an interpretation (philosophy), on the other hand, derives from a theory what it presupposes about reality or the conditions which make some theory possible. (Read K. Popper or P. Feyerabend or D. Deutsch.)... science gives us findings which are used to build theories, but thetheories are interpretations... — Jack Cummins
:up:Maybe people like Quine, Strawson and Kripke could be considered important.
But I don't think they had the breadth of the classical pragmatists, who lived only a few decades before these. — Manuel
Well, as Freddy says ...I come from the perspective of thinking about building systems of knowledge, but, perhaps, such a way of thinking is not relevant in philosophy any longer — Jack Cummins
To my mind, as I've said before elsewhere, philosophy is not theoretical, does not produce knowledge but instead reasons towards more probative questions and inquiries, proposes only 'interpretations of knowledge' rather than knowledge itself (pace Kant et al) and contemplates speculative ideas (i.e. creates thought-experiments) while exposing, even dis-solving, grammatical / semantic confusions which block discourse or derail dialectics. Philosophy is performative, like e.g. music or theatre or martial arts, not propositional in the way histories or sciences are propositional.I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. the will to a system is a lack of integrity. — Twilight of the Idols
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