Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject.
It often turns out that we are wrong in our claims to know, but how would that work with having a pain, or any sensation we're having? — Sam26
It appears that Wittgenstein's private language argument is about, all things considered, the subjective nature of consciousness and how that bears on language. — TheMadFool
Wittgenstein then claims, for the private language user, the only possible means by which fae can know that fae is using a word/sign in that private language correctly is to consult oneself and that's problematic for the simple reason that whatever seems/is thought to be correct will be taken as correct. The notion of correct usage becomes meaningless as the verificatory process is, at the end of the day, circular: If you're unsure whether a word/sign is being used correctly by you, how can you ask yourself to check whether a word/sign is being used correctly by you? — TheMadFool
So we can't say, "I know that I see a red coffee cup", or "I know that I had a dream last night of my teeth falling out while addressing an audience in my underwear as a tsunami approached"? — Marchesk
That seems to undermine empiricism. Of course we know things based on having experiences. Sensations make up those experiences. — Marchesk
others are justified in their knowledge of your pain, but you’re not. You don’t justify to yourself that you’re in pain. This is senseless. — Sam26
But the social begins even prior to the interpersonal understood this way. Between I and myself there is a social , an other that intervenes the moment I point to an experience. This sociality doesnt require the presence of other ‘persons’ to participate in the game. The game is already underfoot between ‘I’ and myself. — Joshs
My take is that it's not so much about the "nature or consciousness," but about the nature of language against the backdrop of consciousness. But ya, there is definitely something to be said about consciousness when analyzing Wittgenstein's comments over all. However, it seems to be more of an aside. It would be interesting though to study consciousness through Wittgenstein's eyes. — Sam26
I think we agree here, except for the idea that it's circular. I'm not sure about that, you may be correct though, but it depends on how the argument is framed. — Sam26
My reaction to this, is that the word social, as you're using it, is not a normal use of the word. Social contexts require other people, we don't refer to the "I and myself," as something social. Besides what's the difference between the "I' and "myself," it seems to me you're describing the same person, viz., you. — Sam26
I don't see how a 'pain' can be justified. A pain is experienced... — Shawn
Why the talk about 'justification' when this fact of being in pain can be discerned from behavior? — Shawn
What work does "I know" do? — Ennui Elucidator
What work does "I know" do? — Ennui Elucidator
For them self is not an entity, it is a constantly transforming interaction with world. They abandon the idea of outer and inner. The self is always outside of itself , coming back to itself from the world. To the extent that my use of social isn’t ‘normal’ it is not because it denies immediate expose use to an outside , an alterity , the foreign and the empirical, but because it is claiming such an exposure is more restricted to interaction with other ‘persons’. — Joshs
others are justified in their knowledge of your pain, but you’re not. You don’t justify to yourself that you’re in pain. This is senseless. — Sam26
Wittgenstein then claims, for the private language user, the only possible means by which fae can know that fae is using a word/sign in that private language correctly is to consult oneself and that's problematic for the simple reason that whatever seems/is thought to be correct will be taken as correct. The notion of correct usage becomes meaningless as the verificatory process is, at the end of the day, circular: — TheMadFool
Why the talk about 'justification' when this fact of being in pain can be discerned from behavior? — Shawn
For them self is not an entity, it is a constantly transforming interaction with world. They abandon the idea of outer and inner. The self is always outside of itself , coming back to itself from the world. — Joshs
Personally I find all this in implied/suggested by Wittgenstein. If meaning is outside, part of the world, then the 'internal monologue' is not longer either internal or a monologue in a strong sense. — Zugzwang
Unfortunately, the same can’t be said for Wittgenstein, and I think this moralism is implied in his work. — Joshs
Now you meet the same person again and by chance you are wearing the same thing. The person says, "You look good in that." You respond, "Ha. The last time you said that was in my dreams." The person responds, "Why do you think you were dreaming?" And you respond "I know I was dreaming."
What work does "I know" do? — Ennui Elucidator
Unfortunately, the same can’t be said for Wittgenstein, and I think this moralism is implied in his work. — Joshs
It also seems to me that language games are vulnerable to Heidegger’s depiction of Das Man — Joshs
this would be discourse as a flattened sharing rather than Heidegger’s account of authentic discourse as oriented toward one’s ownmost possibilities. — Joshs
For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression (PI 245)."
I would be interested in what others think of this passage. What would be in between pain and the expression of pain? Is there something there that could be referenced? I would think not. I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at. What is it that he's trying to get us to think about? — Sam26
You gotta use words when you talk to me, words you didn't define (if you define your own new jargon, it's in terms of the one we were thrown into.) — Zugzwang
Why do you say that the notion of correct usage becomes meaningless? As Sam26 says, the verification is not circular. The individual applies one's own criteria and makes the judgement of "correct". Isn't that how any judgement of "correct" is made, by an individual applying what is believed to be the relevant criteria? Where's the problem? What makes such a judgement meaningless? — Metaphysician Undercover
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