My my,posters are awfully dogmatic about life ending at material death.
One wonders at the "scientific" evidence for such "certainty" — Ambrosia

Life ending at death is less of a scientific matter and more of a semantic matter. At least initially.

Life ending at death is less of a scientific matter and more of a semantic matter. At least initially. — bert1

That depends on how one defines "death". True death is not the cessation of cardiac function, and the flat line on the EKG monitor; such hearts are regularly caused to resume their functioning with the application of electric impulse to the torso. True death has occurred when the brain has died, and cellular metabolism has ceased. You are correct in stating that semantics fail us here...

By inference. We presume that others are just like ourselves. I think it’s a perfectly valid presumption. ‘I know how you must feel…’ ‘I can’t imagine how you must feel…’ and other such statements are intelligible statements.

I can't remember the context of what you're referring to, but ya, I agree (I can't find where I said that). This is why solipsism doesn't have a good argument.

That depends on how one defines "death". True death is not the cessation of cardiac function, and the flat line on the EKG monitor; such hearts are regularly caused to resume their functioning with the application of electric impulse to the torso. True death has occurred when the brain has died, and cellular metabolism has ceased. You are correct in stating that semantics fail us here... — Michael Zwingli

Semantics don't fail us here, mostly in here we're talking about clinical death. You can sometimes be brought back from clinical death. Moreover, with reference to an NDE, it's a near death experience, obviously you didn't die in the absolute sense. Doctors often use the word death in reference to those who have been brought back, it's perfectly acceptable.

Doctors often use the word death in reference to those who have been brought back, it's perfectly acceptable. — Sam26

Agreed, but I still maintain that the English wordstock fails us here. In order to have a precise philosophical discussion about this, it would seem to be helpful to have a variety of terms describing the various senses attributable to the word "death", just as it is helpful to the Inuit people to have many different terms in their language to describe the differing senses attributable to the English word "snow".

with reference to an NDE, it's a near death experience, obviously you didn't die in the absolute sense. — Sam26

This is precisely my point, assuming that you are arguing for the existence of "the human soul". If our subject is, indeed, a near death experience, and not an intance of death (as I have defined that above), then any "soul" present within the corporeal person could never have separated itself from the body to have the experiences claimed by the attestors. This means that if a subject/patient has been "brought back", as they romantically say, then that subject never in fact died, any extant soul never left the body, and the only explanation for any phenomenon of perception is explained by the "stimulated dream thesis", or if you like, the "perceptive dream occurrence" which I have described above. See what I mean?

I'm not too keen on using the word soul in reference to NDEs. I prefer consciousness, but I know what you mean. I'm not religious, so I prefer not to use that word.

I'm not too keen on using the word soul in reference to NDEs. I prefer consciousness, but I know what you mean. I'm not religious, so I prefer not to use that word. — Sam26

This would seem to simplify the matter exponentially...sorry for reading into your thesis. If there is no incorporeal part in play, then it must be that the subject retained a level of consciousness. Because the subject of a NDE never died, he or she retained a minimized level of consciousness, which allowed him or her to percieve dialogue and other sounds as they experienced a dream like state in which they "hovered" over the scene, and incorporate these perceptions mentally into a unified whole. Make sense?

The dead, however, present as being utterly devoid of consciousness. This goes beyond reflex action or stimulatory response...one can tell when the brain has died, and cellular metabolism has ceased. From this state, this "death", there appears in my experience to be no regaining of any level of consciousness whatsoever. — Michael Zwingli

Yes, that might be true from your perspective when it comes to you appraising the mental state of other people. But can you speak meaningfully and authoritatively about past cases of your own unconsciousness? what empirical criteria are you using in this case? Is it really possible for you to infer necessary conditions for the existence of your own mind via analogical reasoning from your understanding of the necessary conditions for other minds?

Actually the awareness of those who have an NDE is not dreamlike. In fact, most of them say that it's more real than what they normally experience. It's a heightened awareness. Many say that this reality seems dumbed down by comparison, as if it were dreamlike. This is interesting because you would expect, especially if the brain/body was shutting down, that reality would be fading, not becoming more vivid.

Actually the awareness of those who have an NDE is not dreamlike. In fact, most of them say that it's more real than what they normally experience. It's a heightened awareness. — Sam26

I don't mean to imply that this phenomenon is a dream as we have in sleep, but rather a dreamlike experience or another phenomenon akin to a dream...in the same genus as a dream, but of a different species. The sense of heightened awareness is probably attributable to the adrenaline which is certainly flooding the subject's circulatory system, in any case.

you would expect, especially if the brain/body was shutting down, that reality would be fading, not becoming more vivid. — Sam26

The brain does a whole lot of filtering of sensory input. If some of those filters start to fail...

I've been wanting to make a tread about inferences to other minds for ages. — bert1

I know just how you feel.

I'm not too keen on using the word soul in reference to NDEs. I prefer consciousness, but I know what you mean. I'm not religious, so I prefer not to use that word. — Sam26

I am not convinced that you fully understand my meaning. Please indulge me while I explicate my assertion that no, consciousness indeed cannot survive the body, given the parameters which you have indicated for the discussion.

The abstract noun "consciousness" refers not to any object or thing, but rather to a condition or set of circumstances experienced by some object. Since the experiential condition described by "consciousness" is that of awareness of the outer world, which is to say, of a subjective reality, the object experiencing consciousness is a living being possessed of a mind, which mind is composed of intellectual and affective dimensions; the object in question is a rational and emotional living being. The important thing to keep in mind regarding this, is that "consciousness" is not a thing which can exist independently of an object

In the case of a near death experience, the rational/emotional living being in question can but be either the physical person in distress, or some incorporeal aspect of that person which is able to live and experience consciousness independently of that physical person, i.e. the "soul", or whatever else you want to call it (ghost, spirit, astral body, dadada...) That is, the only alternative to the corporeal person (the man) experiencing consciousness, is the incorporeal person (the man's soul, ghost, etc.) experiencing consciousness. You have stated, however, that you do not want to consider the concept of the human soul, or whatever else I might wish to call the incorporeal aspect of the human person, within this discussion. The soul is thusly removed from consideration. This leaves us only with the living, corporeal, physical person to experience consciousness.

This is where the argument fails.The wording of your original question is, "can concsiousness survive the body?" Since English "survive" is composed of Latin "super" (above, over, beyond) + "vivere" (to live), and so "to survive" means "to live beyond". This renders your original question, "can consciousness live beyond the body?" With your restriction of the living physical person as the only object which can experience the condition of awareness called "consciousness" in your model, the answer must be that with the death of the physical body, consciousness is annihilated. In the case of a "near death experience", consciousness has not "survived" (lived beyond) the body, because the body has never died.

This would appear to be the end of the discussion, as all available options have been considered, unless I have misunderstood your thesis.

In thinking about this thread this morning, I came to realize that the title thereof does not actually reflect the main question and thrust of the thread, which involves whether so-called "near death experiences" can evidence consiousness surviving, "living beyond", bodily death. They (quite obviously) cannot. My somewhat spare logical arguments for both that question and the question suggested by the thread title follow.

As pertains s to the question "can consciousness survive the body?", the argument is as follows:

(A) Consciousness only exists when there is an object to experience it, a "conscious host";
(B) said object, in the instant case the human body, must be alive in order to experience consciousness, an thereby be a "conscious host";
(C) therefore, consciousness can neither exist apart from nor "live beyond", which is to say "survive" the death of, the human body.

As pertains to the question "can the occurrence of near death experiences evidence consciousness suviving bodily death?", apparently the true thrust of this thread, the argument is as follows:

(A) An event can only evidence consciousness surviving the body if death of the body attends said event;
(B) "near death experiences" do not involve death of the body;
(C) therefore, "near death experiences" can not evidence consciousness surviving the death of the body.

If panpsychism is real, and I can't see why it's not, then consciousness is eternal. Even death is a kind of consciousness.

If panpsychism is real, and I can't see why it's not, then consciousness is eternal. Even death is a kind of consciousness. — Thunderballs

I admit to being highly influenced by logical positivism, but even if I weren't, I think that I would have tremendous difficulty with the panpsychic suggestion. I simply see no evidence for an "anima mundi", and this lack of evidence is why I think we should all be sceptical...why we should consider pansychism not to be real. Panpsychism did not arise out of observation. Rather, it was begotten by earlier animistic and pantheistic belief systems (the idea that there is a "spirit" or a "god" within everything), themselves born simply of superstition, and which themselves could not be sustained within the context of ancient cultural development. As a result, panpsychism developed and was maintained within our cultures without there ever being any evidence therefore. I have ever been impressed that Bertrand Russell seemed to subscribe to a sort of panpsychicm, he who refused a belief in deity for lack of evidence.

I simply see no evidence for an "anima mundi" — Michael Zwingli

What about you feeling, percept, your emotions, thoughts, ideas, dreams. You are aware of all. How can this be if all matter were just matter? Devoid of content? Don't you think psycheless matter is an abstraction, taking out its most important ingredient? Of course a stone is not conscious, but how can the stuff you eat turn into your consciousness if it didn't had itself a (very rudimentary) piece of soul? Maybe pansoulism is a better word.

What about you feeling, percept, your emotions, thoughts, ideas, dreams. You are aware of all. How can this be if all matter were just matter? Devoid of content? — Thunderballs

All reason and emotion are the product of the intellectual and affective dimensions of my mind, respectively, and so all the product of bioelectrical and biochemical processes within my animate body, primarily my brain. By means of my sensory organs, I am able to discern and so become subjectively aware of the various aspects of objective reality, including objects both animate and inanimate. By the activity of my nervous system, I can then think thoughts about these awarenesses, and feel emotions in response to them.

All reason and emotion are the product of the intellectual and affective dimensions of my mind, — Michael Zwingli

Don't yòu think it's the other way round?

Don't yòu think it's the other way round? — Thunderballs

Haha, perhaps you are right...that would appear to be true! Thanks for the thought check! Even so, the physical mechanisms causing the thoughts and emotions remain the same, in my view.

Do you have Swiss consciousness? Somehow your name sounds Swiss. Like meusli.

well, I rather think my consciousness is shaped by my being American, as well as by other things, more than it is by my ancestry, but yes, I do have Schwizerdutsch (in Standard German Schweizerdeutsch) ancestry on my paternal side, and Italian on the maternal. You might be familiar with the sixteenth century (?) Protestant "reformer" with the same surname as myself, Ulrich Zwingli. I myself was raised Roman Catholic, though, at the stern insistence of my mother's family. I suppose that old Ulrich would be horrified to discover that his latter day namesake had become an atheist.

First, that testimonial evidence is a valid way of justifying one's conclusions, and moreover, one's beliefs. Most of what we know comes from the testimony of others. Thus, it's a way of attaining knowledge. — Sam26

"Someone said so" is not in general an adequate justification for an inference or belief.

Testimony can be a way of "attaining knowledge". It can also be a way of falling into error and confusion. The outcome depends on the testimony, and it depends on one's ability to sort reliable testimony from unreliable testimony.

Second, since the argument will be based on testimonial evidence, and given that testimonial evidence is notoriously weak, what criteria makes testimonial evidence strong? — Sam26

The credibility of the witness. The plausibility of the claim.

But how do we assess these two factors?

Third, if testimonial evidence is of something out of the ordinary, say extraterrestrials or something mystical, then it would seem to follow that the evidence would require a higher standard than what is generally required of good testimonial evidence. — Sam26

Something along those lines would seem fitting.

I suppose at some threshold the implausibility of the claim begins to undermine the credibility of the witness. As we approach that threshold, we become increasingly disposed to discount the claim, absent something in addition to support it.

Fourth, since the argument falls under the category of metaphysics, how do we understand what is meant by reality? — Sam26

It seems to me that when we use the word "reality" as a noun, with a capital R so to speak, we mean something like this: the whole world, all existence, whatever is in fact the case for all time and all place, or whatever "dimensions" or parameters we should name alongside or instead of time and place, regardless of whether it is known or unknown, knowable or unknowable.

I suppose we may also speak (affirmatively or negatively) of the "reality" of an assertion or an intention -- did the speaker really mean it, did he mean it wholeheartedly and sincerely, was he holding something back, was he lying. Likewise, we might speak of the "reality" of a perception, or even of appearances in general.

What other sorts of example of this (small r) use of the term might we list?

How should we say the "small r" uses are related to the "big R" use? Is there a more conventional pair of labels for these uses?

I prefer to analyze ordinary sayings like "The Tooth Fairy isn't real", "The Tooth Fairy doesn't exist", and "There's no such thing as The Tooth Fairy" as shorthand or placeholders for more sophisticated assessments. Something like "The Tooth Fairy is the name of a (mere) creature of fiction that serves as the locus for a set of cultural practices". In my preferred usage, creatures of fiction count among the "real things", the "things that exist", though they exist (merely) as creatures of fiction. So I interpret an ordinary-language dispute about whether The Tooth Fairy exists, as a dispute about whether The Tooth Fairy is a (mere) creature of fiction.

I'm a later Wittgensteinian when it comes to understanding words, that is, I don't believe there is a definition or theory that will cover every use of certain word (for example, words like real or reality). However, I don't believe Wittgenstein was correct in his assumption that the mystical can only be shown (prayer and meditation for example) and not talked about in terms of what's true or false. Wittgenstein believed this in his early and later philosophy, which is one of the reasons why he was against arguments for the existence of God. Although he was sympathetic to man's reach for the mystical, which is why he didn't agree with the logical positivists. — Sam26

I call myself a skeptic in the (Pyrrhonian) spirit of Sextus. I find a kindred view shifting in and out of focus when I read Wittgenstein's On Certainty. A few months ago I discovered this is an active niche in the academy.

See, e.g., Pritchard, "Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism", or Eichorn, "The Elusive Third Way: The Pyrrhonian Illumination in Wittgenstein's On Certainty"

I'm no scholar. But I'd agree that Wittgenstein often seems to overreach in drawing his boundary between sense and nonsense, and that such straining is exemplary of a repressive tendency typical of 20th-century naturalism. At least in many cases where Wittgenstein calls nonsense, the Pyrrhonist would merely suspend judgment. A different sort of quietism, a more inclusive peace, a more wholesome common ground.

"Someone said so" is not in general an adequate justification for an inference or belief. — Cabbage Farmer

Did at any point I make such a claim? You didn't pay close attention to what I said over the course of this thread. You are correct, that "someone saying this or that" is not in itself always sufficient to justify a belief. However, it depends on context, if you're in a class being taught by an expert in biology, that can be a justification for believing what the person is saying. Much of what we believe comes in the form of testimony from trusted people. When you read a book by an expert in a particular field of study, this is a form of testimonial evidence. You certainly aren't involved in the experiments of scientists, so you take their word for it. Obviously not all testimony is worth considering. It's a matter of knowing the difference between kinds of testimonial evidence.

Did at any point I make such a claim? — Sam26

Did I at any point suggest that you had made such a claim? I'm surprised to find you so quick to interpret such a straight answer as if it implied a disagreement.

I was simply picking up the theme you raised, not disagreeing with you. I was offering a clarification of a point you made after you invited "us to clarify several points". In offering my own humble clarification, I did not intend to imply that it was news to you.

You didn't pay close attention to what I said over the course of this thread. — Sam26

It's my custom to enter a thread by replying directly to the original post. Would you like to discuss this practice here, or perhaps in some other place? I'd prefer instead to restrict our discussion to the substantive themes you've raised, without getting bogged down in frivolous discourses on manners and protocols.

You are correct, that "someone saying this or that" is not in itself always sufficient to justify a belief. However, it depends on context, if you're in a class being taught by an expert in biology, that can be a justification for believing what the person is saying. Much of what we believe comes in the form of testimony from trusted people. When you read a book by an expert in a particular field of study, this is a form of testimonial evidence. You certainly aren't involved in the experiments of scientists, so you take their word for it. Obviously not all testimony is worth considering. It's a matter of knowing the difference between kinds of testimonial evidence. — Sam26

I agree that demonstrated expertise is one of the factors that typically supports the credibility of a witness. I agree that many common-sense beliefs about the world are supported by testimony. I agree, and stated in my initial response, that a lot depends on a judge's ability "to sort reliable testimony from unreliable testimony."

Who would deny such statements?

However, expertise does not always entail credibility of the witness, even in matters about which the witness has demonstrated expertise. For instance, we might have good reason to believe that an expert witness has often been found to be a liar, or to contradict themself from time to time -- like a bullshitting politician. We might have good reason to believe that the expert witness has often been immoderate in his certification of his own opinions when in fact they conflict with the opinions of other experts who possess equivalent credentials -- like a delusional fanatic. And of course the general reliability of a witness is not always sufficient to support their credibility in a given claim, nor to support the plausibility of the claim.

If you happen to have read any further than the first sentence of my previous reply, you might recall I suggested that:

at some threshold the implausibility of the claim begins to undermine the credibility of the witness. As we approach that threshold, we become increasingly disposed to discount the claim, absent something in addition to support it. — Cabbage Farmer

I offered this as a clarification of a point you had made:

if testimonial evidence is of something out of the ordinary, say extraterrestrials or something mystical, then it would seem to follow that the evidence would require a higher standard than what is generally required of good testimonial evidence — Sam26

Here again, my suggestion was offered as a clarification, not as a disagreement, my friend.

Now I wonder, do you agree with that suggestion I made in my attempt to clarify your point about a "higher standard" of evidence in "extraordinary" cases?

I mean, do you agree that the implausibility of a claim may tend to undermine the credibility of the witness who makes the claim? Do you agree that "extraordinary cases" like those you indicated typically involve claims that are considered prima facie "implausible", regardless of the general credibility and expertise of the witness who makes the claim; and that for this reason, something in addition to that testimony is typically required to support the claim in question?

bogged down in frivolous discourses on manners and protocols — Cabbage Farmer

:fire:

Sorry, I read that rather quickly, and didn't read it all. When I get a chance I'll read more closely. Life is getting in the way right now. I'm a bit busy with something else.

If panpsychism is real, and I can't see why it's not, then consciousness is eternal. — Thunderballs

I’m pretty partial to this line of thought as well. If consciousness is intrinsic and all permeating, then it is the “grounds” for the rest of reality which you would simply come back to, and perhaps take form in another way… the mechanism and how this would exactly happen is definitely beyond me.

I mean, do you agree that the implausibility of a claim may tend to undermine the credibility of the witness who makes the claim? Do you agree that "extraordinary cases" like those you indicated typically involve claims that are considered prima facie "implausible", regardless of the general credibility and expertise of the witness who makes the claim; and that for this reason, something in addition to that testimony is typically required to support the claim in question? — Cabbage Farmer

Sorry it took so long to respond. I think we generally agree, with some clarifications, or maybe some disagreement. Yes, I do agree that generally "...the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility" of that claim. However, I don't think that because something seems implausible, that it follows that it is. Many discoveries have been overturned in science because people considered what most find implausible. So, there has to be the right kind of balance, we tend to get to invested in certain worldviews, which can impede new discoveries.

I do agree that more is needed than just a claim, i.e., we need some objective way to verify claims that seem implausible. I'm not sure you read my argument which was given further down on the first page, but I go into detail about what is needed to support my inductive argument, i.e., what drives good testimonial evidence.

Sorry it took so long to respond. — Sam26

I'm not one for deadlines. And I like space between turns. No worries.

I think we generally agree, with some clarifications, or maybe some disagreement. — Sam26

I agree. It's on the basis of that impression that I've sought to begin by getting a clearer view of where our respective outlooks on the concept of testimony may align or diverge. It's not clear to me to yet what either of us has to say on the subject. I have my own dispositions in the matter, but haven't spent much time sorting them out.

It's mind-boggling to consider the way the work of many minds coalesces in a single person's worldview through the medium of culture.

Yes, I do agree that generally "...the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility" of that claim. — Sam26

The point I was considering is that the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility of the witness who makes that claim. If the expert can't provide enough support to make the claim seem plausible, but persists in asserting the claim, this tends to count against the expert's credibility. The witness must be able to provide some reasonable account of the justification or basis for the claim, and that account must stand up to scrutiny. If it stands up to scrutiny, it's plausible. If it doesn't stand up to scrutiny, then on what grounds would the expert affirm it?

However, I don't think that because something seems implausible, that it follows that it is. — Sam26

Do you mean something like this:

The fact that a claim seems plausible to me or to anyone does not entail the claim is true. Likewise, the fact that a claim seems implausible to me or to anyone does not entail the claim is false.

Plausibility is always plausibility relative to some epistemic context. Our evaluation of the plausibility of a claim is in principle open to revision.

Many discoveries have been overturned in science because people considered what most find implausible. So, there has to be the right kind of balance, we tend to get to invested in certain worldviews, which can impede new discoveries. — Sam26

What's the right sort of balance?

There's always the problem of allocation of resources. There's always the problem of prioritization. It would be as disastrous for our global society as a whole, as it would be for any single person, to continually commit a significant share of resources to every conceivable investigation.

When I lose my eyeglasses or my house keys, I don't book a flight to every city on Earth to track them down. I look in a few places nearby, beginning with the most likely. Sometimes they don't turn up and I broaden the search. Occasionally I've found my keys still in the lock on the door. Once I found my eyeglasses in the refrigerator.

I do agree that more is needed than just a claim, i.e., we need some objective way to verify claims that seem implausible. — Sam26

Something's got to make the claim seem reasonable enough to warrant the time and other resources we spend considering it. There's something like a halting principle that disposes us to constrain our investigations to a range of reasonable alternatives -- in every case a quite narrow range compared to the infinite range of conceivable alternatives.

I'm not sure you read my argument which was given further down on the first page, but I go into detail about what is needed to support my inductive argument, i.e., what drives good testimonial evidence. — Sam26

I have read it. It seems our views on the evaluation of testimony may diverge as your argument proceeds. I hope to address that argument in subsequent comments.

I happen to be interested in the more general conversation about testimony. I also think it was insightful of you to have opened a conversation about near-death experiences with independent consideration of the topic of testimony. I agree it's a useful approach, and hope our subsequent conversation may benefit from these preliminary considerations.