Right. So we can stop trusting telescopes that there really are more stars in the sky than we can see with the naked eye. — Benkei
I don't see what instrumentation has to do with this. — Metaphysician Undercover
All that matters is that the symbol, or representation, of that light is consistent - that the effect is always the same per the cause for that particular person. — Harry Hindu
What is interpreted? We might interpret the presence of a silver oval in our visual field as a round coin. But we don't get to interpret its presence, nor the coloured shape. In this sense seeing precedes interpretation.Seeing is a mode of interpretation as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
But we don't get to interpret its presence, nor the coloured shape. — jkop
If you consider that the coin consists of atoms and molecules, then ask yourself why do you see it as the presence of a single, coloured, shape, instead of individual molecules, or atoms. Interpretation is inherent within seeing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Human eyes can see millions of different shades of colour. This is not because there are millions of different wavelengths between 400 and 740. — Metaphysician Undercover
Benkei appears to be claiming that there is a truly objective "red", an ideal definition of red, and even to know this Platonic Form, through science. It is suggested that we should judge our inter-subjective interpretation against this Form. But I think Benkei derives this ideal in a faulty way. There may be such a Platonic Form of red, but Benkei has not described it. — Metaphysician Undercover
There isn't a Platonic Form, there's consensus on the wavelengths associated with colours when an object absorbs light and reflects light back. And I mean this in the sense of spectrum. The science is pretty clear on this. If we then "think" we see red, when in reality there are no colours emitting with a wavelenght between 622nm to 780nm, then we've been fooled by our very fallable perception.
A colour blind person (deuteranopia) sees purple as blue. He's wrong and so are you. Why are we comfortable with saying he's wrong? Because we understand his perception is "broken". Now what we have with the strawberries is a "broken" perception that is shared by most everyone due to the white-balancing we automatically apply due to high levels of teal in the picture. Very useful in everyday life, when moving from indoors and outdoors - for this particular picture it's a nuisance. — Benkei
there's consensus on the wavelengths associated with colours
This is the important point. There's an agreed consensus about what wavelengths are associated with what colours, but those wavelengths are not themselves those colours. The colour red is the sensory quality that is usually elicited by the stimulation of light with a wavelength of ~620–740nm, but that's it.
And there's no reason for it to be considered wrong (as opposed to just uncommon) for an organism to have such a sensory quality elicited by light of a different wavelength – or by stimulation of something other than light, e.g. in the case of synaesthesia. — Michael
If we define red as light with a wavelength between 620-740nm, then calling any light with a different wavelength "red" is wrong. By definition. — Benkei
The strawberries therefore appear red and we can even explain why but they aren't red.
Don't we need some consistency between individuals as well? This consistency gives us what some people call inter-subjectivity, which in some cases it is argued, qualifies as objectivity. It's interpretation. If we all agree as to the meaning of a particular word, then that word has "objective" meaning (in the sense of inter-subjective), though it might not have an ideal objective meaning in the sense of an independent Platonic Form. The independent Platonic Form could allow us to theoretically judge the inter-subjective meaning, if we had access to that Form.
Isn't this the same with colours? Seeing is a mode of interpretation as well. There is an inter-subjective meaning of "red" which provides us with the common meaning of the term. Benkei appears to be claiming that there is a truly objective "red", an ideal definition of red, and even to know this Platonic Form, through science. It is suggested that we should judge our inter-subjective interpretation against this Form. But I think Benkei derives this ideal in a faulty way. There may be such a Platonic Form of red, but Benkei has not described it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure. But that goes back to the question I asked before; does the "red" in "I see red strawberries" refer to that kind of light? I don't think so. When I say that I see red strawberries I'm not (either explicitly or implicitly) saying that I see that kind of light. So there's equivocation here. On the one hand we might use "red" to refer to that kind of light – and that's an ad hoc scientific stipulation – and on the other hand we might use "red" to refer to the qualitative aspect of seeing. — Michael
But that's just wrong, if by "red" you mean "light with a wavelength between 620-740nm", because those strawberries don't appear to reflect light with a wavelength between 620-740nm. That would be equivocation, based on the fact that most people ordinarily see things that reflect light with a wavelength between 620-740nm as being red. — Michael
What is the consensus on the wavelength associated with grey, white, or burgundy?There isn't a Platonic Form, there's consensus on the wavelengths associated with colours when an object absorbs light and reflects light back. — Benkei
True, but there are millions of different combinations of colors triggered by millions of different combinations of the strengths of the signals coming from the rods and cones in our eyes. It's no different from creating millions of different colors from just varying degrees of the three primary colorsHuman eyes can see millions of different shades of colour. This is not because there are millions of different wavelengths between 400 and 740. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't follow. I don't think I'm saying much else than the following analogy "the desert appeared to have an oasis and we even know why but there wasn't an oasis." — Benkei
I agree we can use the word "red" in different contexts but when we disagree on the redness of something, how are we going to arbitrate this question? I have no problem with you referring to the strawberries as appearing red but if we want to definitely answer the question whether they are red, we have to conclude they aren't irrespective of our subjective experiences of seeing. — Benkei
When we disagree on the redness of something, are we disagreeing on the wavelength of the light that is emitted/reflected by it or are we disagreeing on its appearance? If the former then, yes, there's an independent fact-of-the-matter. If the latter then, no, there isn't. — Michael
And I'd argue that we're disagreeing about the latter. We can both measure and agree upon the wavelength of the light but nonetheless disagree on its colour. Because although stimulation by the former is what elicits the experience of the latter, they're not the same thing. — Michael
So what would seeing its atoms and molecules be an interpretation of? — jkop
The presence of a single, coloured shape is set by the objective facts of seeing. Hence seeing precedes interpretation. — jkop
There isn't a Platonic Form, there's consensus on the wavelengths associated with colours when an object absorbs light and reflects light back. And I mean this in the sense of spectrum. The science is pretty clear on this. If we then "think" we see red, when in reality there are no colours emitting with a wavelenght between 622nm to 780nm, then we've been fooled by our very fallable perception. — Benkei
(Also the answer is a bit more subtle because the picture does emit light in that wavelength range of red as part of the white/gray areas but something is red or reddish due to a concentration of a particular spectrum of wavelength in a particular area but that is more about chromacity). — Benkei
I agree we can use the word "red" in different contexts but when we disagree on the redness of something, how are we going to arbitrate this question? I have no problem with you referring to the strawberries as appearing red but if we want to definitely answer the question whether they are red, we have to conclude they aren't irrespective of our subjective experiences of seeing. — Benkei
It all has to do with the mixtures of wavelengths, and how our eyes detect them. If red mixed with other colours, within a tiny pixel makes a colour called grey, then we are justified in saying "colour", in general, is a mixture of wavelengths. If mixing these grey pixels with certain blue pixels in a larger scale makes the colour red, then we are justified in saying that the strawberries are red. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said: I'm willing to have a spectrometer to have a last say on this. Are you? — Benkei
I agree they aren't the same thing. However, I don't believe we can arrive at two different answers. So when we search for an explanation as to why we disagree, we discover "red" is associated with a certain wavelength. — Benkei
The difference then is that I'm willing to say: "oops, I was wrong to interpret that as red" and you continue to maintain it's red.
By that token the sun still revolves around the earth and the illusionary oasis is really there. The latter with deadly consequences. — Benkei
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