If I had good reason to believe that there were lots of human-like AI robots and lots of p-zombies tooling around the Earth, I would go with a third choice, which you neglected to mention:You have two choices:
1. Declare that all 3 are conscious.
OR
2. Declare that all 3 are not conscious — TheMadFool
In keeping with my preceding assessment of your list of "declarations", I'd have to say the rest of your argument doesn't get off the ground.If 1, physicalism is true (p-zombies are impossible) BUT you'll have to concede AI is conscious and not just because they can mimic consciousness (pass the Turing test) but that AI is actually conscious.
If 2, physicalism is false (p-zombies are possible) BUT then you'll have to contend with the possibility that other people are p-zombies.
It's a dilemma: either AI is true consciousness OR other people could be p-zombies. — TheMadFool
What sort of functionalist definition do you have in mind? And do you mean the p-zombies, the Turing-They're conscious by a functionalist definition, aren't they? — frank
What sort of functionalist definition do you have in mind? And do you mean the p-zombies, the Turing-
AI, or both? — Cabbage Farmer
3. Suspend judgment on whether these seeming sentient beings are genuine sentient beings, p-zombies, or mere simulations. — Cabbage Farmer
I'd have to say the rest of your argument doesn't get off the ground. — Cabbage Farmer
I'm aware that sort of view has been fashionable among hard behaviorists, functionalists, computationalists, eliminative materialists, and their ilk. But I'm not sure all functionalists are committed to that sort of view.A functionalist says there are only functions of consciousness like reportability. There's no extra awareness. IOW, functionalists basically think we're all p-zombies or Turing AIs. — frank
Couldn't one hold this "doctrine" while remaining agnostic about the "extra awareness" you indicate? I suppose one might adopt a functionalist account of "mental states", and even of "mind", without denying that some or all minds have that "extra" awareness, and perhaps without any interest in that proposition. — Cabbage Farmer
So far as I can make out, that would mean there's no sense in talking about p-zombies for them. For the rest of us, it will seem as though their conception of sentience is akin to our conception of the p-zombie. — Cabbage Farmer
I mean, on what grounds would they require that an AI system pass the Turing test in order to count as "conscious"? — Cabbage Farmer
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