If you prefer, Baker, pretend like all of history were otherwise and someone said to you, suffering is unfilled desire, life involves unfulfilled desire and therefore suffering, the only way to end suffering is to end life, and the way to end life is to kill yourself. What fact is important in that scenario? Does someone sitting under a tree 2,500 years ago change the value in those four statements? If people built a religion around those four statements, does it matter what came before to the current adherents of the religion aside from aesthetic sensibilities?

This is why "truth" and "Truth" are given nuance in some conversations. Whether someone sat under a tree in the past is "true" or not. Whether there is wisdom in the story of someone sitting under the tree is about "Truth" and that "Truth" doesn't change because the story does. People who find wisdom in the story do not find that wisdom impotent, ineffective, or non-factual just because you quibble about whether they are properly called Buddhists or posers or whether you think their community is a religion or not. They don't even care if you scream, "YOU'VE GOTTEN IT WRONG! THAT IS NOT WHAT BUDDHA SAID!" That isn't the point of their presence or participation.

But even if there was no wisdom in the story and no fact in the story, sometimes it is enough that it is the story that your mother told to you and that reminds you of her when you tell it to your children. Or that a familiar tune brings a smile to your face. Or that your favorite teachers are at a particular school. Or that you want to associate with a particular group of people but need a context. The reason to be in religious community may have nothing whatsoever to do with the doctrine of the theologians or the wit of the academics. And it may be utterly unreflected participation as simply that which the person has always done. You don't get to define people away so that you can feel comfortable that language does what you want it to do or so that some concept you lay claim to fulfills your requirements.

You simply cannot account for religion by pointing to dogma generally or dogma of a particular religion.

If you and I were having a chat at a bar, I'd undeniably be a pedant if I denied that it is fact that George Washington was the first president of the United States. There is no quibble. — Ennui Elucidator

Would you say that it isn't a fact that he was the first president of the U.S., though, or that the claim he was is non-factual? This is what you seem to be saying if I understand you correctly.

On a philosophy forum in the context of making broad statements about "religion" with a selective recounting of "facts", I am not sure that my highlighting that we can only look to things that exist now to support our claims about what happened in the past is being a pedant. — Ennui Elucidator

I don't think that would make anyone a pedant. I don't think it follows, though, that our claims about what happened in the past are non-factual. In many cases the things that exist now provide substantial support for claims about what happened in the past. We have (for example) written records which have survived which are consistent with one another though from different sources; we have buildings or structures which have survived, though they may not be entirely intact, the age of which can be determined at least approximately; we have inscriptions, etc.

If absolute certainty is required in order for something to be factual, not many statements will qualify as statements of fact regarding the past or the present. But we can make statements regarding organized religions, what their adherents practiced and believed, what their authorities claimed or demanded or decreed, with a degree of certainty which I think makes it pedantic to claim that all such statements are non-factual--implying if not expressly stating that they're unreliable.

Have listened to Dawkins debate some Muslim guy and came to a few conclusions... — stoicHoneyBadger

You shouldn't take Dawkins too seriously. He has his own view on God. He just calls it Evolution. Evolution has created us. He states litteraly, in The Selfish Gene, that all organisms are just vessels in service of the selish genes (and memes, in the case of people) to ensure their survival. What a meme! Lamarck though has a different interpretation of evolution, something that is a fact. But why take it seriously, this fact? Religion is not about this fact but about God who created it and made it all happen.

*sigh*

It looks like you're wed to the position that religion is ineffective, that it doesn't deliver what it promises -- and that this is perfectly okay.

What does it promise?

Salvation from eternal damnation, nirvana, etc. depending on the individual religion.

Soteriology? God secular Christians suck at talking about anything besides Christianity. Stop selling the shortcomings of Christianity. I get it. Why be Christian without heaven and hell? Who cares? Christianity is not the only religion. Yes, yes, Islam can go in that bucket, too.

It seems a whole lot like when you die you are dead and suffering ceases, so maybe Buddhism hits the nail on the head.

In any event, one need not believe in heaven or hell, reward and punishment, or any other divine judgment to be religious.

This is more a discussion for the other thread of what a fact is, but here is an approximation of what I might say in a more robust discussion. Facts generally sound in metaphysics - states of affairs, ontology, etc. To the extent that facts are metaphysical, I have no use for them. If, however, we are to understand "facts" as part of epistemology and the sort of thing that plays a role in our beliefs, they are useful in the contingent sort of way you mentioned. Saying that there are no historical facts in this context is similar to saying that there is no present observation we can make that will naively demonstrate it as a fact (compare having a rock in your hand which you can observe/evaluate in any way you like verses looking at intermediary evidence such as other people's testimony or purported presentations of instrumental/personal observations about the rock). In essence, a historical fact is always a deeper level of interpretation/theory than a present fact.

What makes human history even harder is that history is political - what exists today is directly related to what those that came before decided should be preserved and/or endure. For instance books are burned, stories re-written, buildings destroyed, cultures spread to the winds (or wiped out). Even those writings that survive were written with an agenda - to glorify, to demonize, to legitimize, etc. What we do today is try to interpret what is inherited in hopes that it gives a glimmer of information about what "really" happened. So yes, contingency is inherent in any discussion of facts, but not all facts share the same level of uncertainty. Historicty as a concept seems to be about intellectual humility and the recognition that we have special problems when discussing the past.

Why close our eyes to the obvious? Why not consider the possibility that religion is the way it is precisely because it is intended to be that way? — baker

Intended by whom? Do you envision a committee having met thousands of years ago and arriving at all sorts of explanations about the universe, packaging it up into a concise book, and then peddling it to the masses so that thousands of years later they could use it to control the world? If that is what happened, then my hat's off to them, and I think they ought to control the world, considering their seemingly divine intelligence and foresight.

I also don't know what you mean by "religion is the way it is." How is religion? What is the essence of "religion" that you claim exists across the board, from the Wiccans to the Greek Orthodox to the Chasidim to the Amish to the Mormons and to the Hindus that makes them all so terrible? I suppose you mean the caricature religion where they yell at you about going to hell and then take all your money? Suppose that isn't religion as it must be, but is just one really bad form?

If you don't like the church you're going to, go to a different one. If you don't want to go to church at all, that's fine too, but I don't see where you have this great insight and knowledge into where I go and can make comments on it. All this talk about facts, yet here you're just factually incorrect.

So our core nature is to kill, rape, and pillage? — baker

Murdering raping and pillaging are rather hyperbolic examples of it, but yes, our core nature directs us to: (a) survive, (b) attain a position of social dominance, and (c) procreate well (better than others of our species group), in that order of priority. Every Biologist who has studied social mammals will see this nearly as clearly in homo sapiens as in any other social mammal. The sociobiological literature is full of this characteristically manmalian behavior. The innate desire/instinct to socially dominate is why men get into "bar fights" for percieved slights, why every man wants to be the CEO and otherwise be in command, why men strive after wealth in excess of their contemporaries, why they spend hours each week in the gym getting "jacked" (a visible sign of physical dominance), why they generally want to be with the most attractive woman in public, why they subconsciously posture and pose in social situations, why they all want the arbitrary "group" (whether their ethnicity, their 'race', their religion...) which they view as their own to be predominant, and yes, why they rape and kill. It explains much of human behavior.

If this is our core nature, then why take issue with killing, raping, and pillaging, whether it be done in the name of religion or not? — baker

Because our core nature, the equivalent of Freud's "Id", our emotionally driven instinctive selves, is not the sum total of our nature. There is also the "Superego", the rational and idealistic aspect of our minds, with which the Id does constant battle, to varying degrees of success among differing people, to form the Ego, the objective personality. This Superego is the result of the continued evolution of our brains. Lions do not possess a Superego, and so they cannot view as immoral that a new pride Alpha will immediately engage in an orgy of infanticide to eliminate the previous Alpha's Gene's from the group, and more quickly bring the lionesses to estrus. Humans, though, do have the car to see immorality in this.

Whatever else can be said of the man, and he had his theoretical faults and inconsistencies, Freud's model of the mind, along with Jung's concept of psychological archetypes, appears to myself absolutely key in understanding why we humans behave as we do. We must encourage people to allow their rational and idealistic selves to hold sway over the primal, emotional aspect of their minds.

No, it requires more than that. Belief in the historicity of Jesus is essential to Christianity. One has to believe that Jesus literally rose from the dead, or else the whole project of salvation becomes moot. — baker

Are you citing to some particular Protestant dogma that prescribes the particularities of the faith required for salvation, or are you just telling me your basic understanding or what you think ought be the case?

The point in religion is that particular moral tenets have to be believed for the right reasons. Ie., e.g. you have to believe that stealing is bad not because your mommy told you so or because you don't like being stolen from, but because God said that stealing was wrong. — baker

Now you're just making things up. It is not a universal tenant of religion that intent matters regardless of impact, and it is not universally considered sinful to do the right thing for the wrong reason.

It sounds like I'm just hearing a recitation of your recollections from Sunday school at this point and
you're presenting it as if they are universal axioms.

The type of problem you point to comes from reading literature primarily in a didactic, ideological sense, from reducing literature to a didactic, ideological message. It's a moralistic approach typical for American literary theory, but it is far from universal. It's not how we would read literature in continental Europe, for example. — baker

The story was originally in Greek I suppose, but do enlighten me how they read the fox and grapes story in continental Europe? Do they get held up when the fox starts talking and start looking for archeological evidence for talking foxes? Could you itemize those European nations for me that don't understand metaphor?

But this didn't do away with interreligious competition. On the contrary, it made it worse, far worse. — baker

Religions don't compete. People do, so it's hard to blame the idea over the person. But in any event, ideological differences lead to conflict, whether that be religious, political, or just general worldviews.

Very good. Perhaps I misunderstood what you were saying earlier. I understand that inquiry into the past imposes special demands.

I think it's in the nature of certain religions to make factual claims, however, and claims of certainty. It seems that as time passes adherents are inclined to argue those claims are not to be taken literally or are subject to interpretation, but unless we assume that's always been the case, which would be a questionable assumption to make, the religion is being changed, not explained or justified. The more a religion is changed, the more likely it is that it is that it initially made claims which are incredible.

Perhaps I misunderstood what you were saying earlier. — Ciceronianus

You wouldn't be the only one. :razz:

I agree with you that different people at different times have made claims of fact and certainty regarding religious myth/legend/etc. My point was merely that claims of people are different than the defining feature of religion generally or of a specific religion. The issue is one of descriptivism versus prescriptivism, perhaps.

Seasonal greetings to Humpty Dumpty land!

With a screen name like yours, I expected better.

Why close our eyes to the obvious? Why not consider the possibility that religion is the way it is precisely because it is intended to be that way?
— baker

Intended by whom? — Hanover

By religious people.

I also don't know what you mean by "religion is the way it is." How is religion?

I am sure that I wrote a meaningful English sentence.
I was commenting to this post of yours:
"My view here is just to accept there have been and currently are truly fucked up stewards of our religious traditions."
You're talking about "truly fucked up stewards of our religious traditions". I'm saying that maybe they aren't "fucked up", but that what you call "fucked up" is precisely how religion is supposed to be, and as such, isn't "fucked up".

I suppose you mean the caricature religion where they yell at you about going to hell and then take all your money?

Why should we think that this isn't what religion is supposed to be like? Why assume some kumbaya?
What if religion is supposed to be about the proverbial killing, raping, and pillaging? Jesus brought the sword, remember.

If you don't like the church you're going to, go to a different one. If you don't want to go to church at all, that's fine too, but I don't see where you have this great insight and knowledge into where I go and can make comments on it. All this talk about facts, yet here you're just factually incorrect.

Huh?

With a screen name like yours, I expected better. — baker

Minimal information, jumping to conclusions, and judging me for my failure to be as you expected. Seems like a pattern for your way of thinking. Go pat yourself on the back for correctly identifying that the world does not change just because you demand it.

No, it requires more than that. Belief in the historicity of Jesus is essential to Christianity. One has to believe that Jesus literally rose from the dead, or else the whole project of salvation becomes moot.
— baker

Are you citing to some particular Protestant dogma that prescribes the particularities of the faith required for salvation, or are you just telling me your basic understanding or what you think ought be the case? — Hanover

Read the whole sentence.

Or do you think it makes sense to have a doctrine of salvation and eternal damnation, but without considering Jesus a real historic person?

Sure, there are even those who consider themselves "atheist Christians", but, to the best of my knowledge, they have no doctrine of salvation.

All along, I've been talking about factuality and efficacy of religious practice. This is my theme.

The "old-school" versions of religions (not just of Christianity) work with the model "Do x, y, z, and you will be saved". IOW, they promise something, they have a goal, and they propose a path of practice toward said goal. A person is supposed to do something, and then they will attain something. Ie. the religious path is considered to be something that is effective, that has potency, and a lasting result.

Contrast this with the modern politically correct variations of religions (who like to see ancient teachings as metaphorical, "non-factual"): They promise very little, if anything at all, they have no goal, no path of practice toward a goal, and the most they can offer is some hope that with them you might be better able to "make it through the day". They know no hell, but also no heaven, and no salvation. They tend to operate out of a one-lifetime perspective. Thus, they are impotent, ineffective.

The point in religion is that particular moral tenets have to be believed for the right reasons. Ie., e.g. you have to believe that stealing is bad not because your mommy told you so or because you don't like being stolen from, but because God said that stealing was wrong.
— baker
Now you're just making things up. It is not a universal tenant of religion that intent matters regardless of impact, and it is not universally considered sinful to do the right thing for the wrong reason.

And you're on board with that, epistemically and ethically?

It sounds like I'm just hearing a recitation of your recollections from Sunday school at this point and you're presenting it as if they are universal axioms.

FYI, I didn't go to Sunday school.

The story was originally in Greek I suppose, but do enlighten me how they read the fox and grapes story in continental Europe?

We read it as didactic literature, not as art.
It's the mark of a plebeian mind to read everything as if it were a didactic text.

Religions don't compete. People do, so it's hard to blame the idea over the person. But in any event, ideological differences lead to conflict, whether that be religious, political, or just general worldviews.

Except that religion bolsters those conflicts with metaphysical underpinnings, thus giving the conflicts a dimension that is hard to master.

Because our core nature, the equivalent of Freud's "Id", our emotionally driven instinctive selves, is not the sum total of our nature. There is also the "Superego", the rational and idealistic aspect of our minds, with which the Id does constant battle, to varying degrees of success among differing people, to form the Ego, the objective personality. This Superego is the result of the continued evolution of our brains. Lions do not possess a Superego, and so they cannot view as immoral that a new pride Alpha will immediately engage in an orgy of infanticide to eliminate the previous Alpha's Gene's from the group, and more quickly bring the lionesses to estrus. Humans, though, do have the car to see immorality in this.

Whatever else can be said of the man, and he had his theoretical faults and inconsistencies, Freud's model of the mind, along with Jung's concept of psychological archetypes, appears to myself absolutely key in understanding why we humans behave as we do. We must encourage people to allow their rational and idealistic selves to hold sway over the primal, emotional aspect of their minds. — Michael Zwingli

Provided, of course, that we take for granted, based on no evidence, that this trichotomy is true (and not merely a theoretical construct bolstered by an ideology), and that the division of labor between the three is indeed as proposed.

You talk about the new alpha lion killing the previous one's offspring, and stating this as evidence that the lion has no superego. Okay, so a lion doesn't have a superego. But there are other animals who adopt the offspring of other animals, including the offspring of other species. Should we say that those animals have a superego?

A person is supposed to do something, and then they will attain something — baker

Educate me on the eternal rewards provided to the righteous followers of Judaism denied to the sinners. This should be interesting.

But this is surely special pleading? It's fine for American Presidents but not for religion?

Where you go wrong is in assuming that they secretly believe they've done something wrong. — baker

Not at all. What is apparent is that they deny what is before us all; the fact of the destruction of classical literature by Christian zealots.

I think I said what is fine for a conversation in a bar is not necessarily fine for a conversation about philosophy. And since I was thinking about you in any event (not that this is related to your post), here is an amusing bit about dear W in the context of religion not being about factual claims (anti-realism, if you will). Some people here treat what I am saying as if I am the first to have said it or something like it.

SEP on Philosophy of Religion and Wittgenstein

2.2 Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion

Wittgenstein’s early work was interpreted by some members of the Vienna Circle as friendly to their empiricism, but they were surprised when he visited the Circle and, rather than Wittgenstein discussing his Tractatus, he read them poetry by Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), a Bengal mystic (see Taliaferro 2005b: chapter eight). In any case, Wittgenstein’s later work, which was not friendly to their empiricism, was especially influential in post-World War II philosophy and theology and will be the focus here.

In the Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously in 1953) and in many other works (including the publication of notes taken by his students on his lectures), Wittgenstein opposed what he called the picture theory of meaning. On this view, statements are true or false depending upon whether reality matches the picture expressed by the statements. Wittgenstein came to see this view of meaning as deeply problematic. The meaning of language is, rather, to be found not in referential fidelity but in its use in what Wittgenstein referred to as forms of life. As this position was applied to religious matters, D.Z. Phillips (1966, 1976), B.R. Tilghman (1994), and, more recently, Howard Wettstein (2012), sought to displace traditional metaphysical debate and arguments over theism and its alternatives and to focus instead on the way language about God, the soul, prayer, resurrection, the afterlife, and so on, functions in the life of religious practitioners. For example, Phillips contended that the practice of prayer is best not viewed as humans seeking to influence an all powerful, invisible person, but to achieve solidarity with other persons in light of the fragility of life. Phillips thereby sees himself as following Wittgenstein’s lead by focusing, not on which picture of reality seems most faithful, but on the non-theoretical ways in which religion is practiced.

To ask whether God exists is not to ask a theoretical question. If it is to mean anything at all, it is to wonder about praising and praying; it is to wonder whether there is anything in all that. This is why philosophy cannot answer the question “Does God exist?” with either an affirmative or a negative reply … “There is a God”, though it appears to be in the indicative mood, is an expression of faith. (Phillips 1976: 181)

At least two reasons bolstered this philosophy of religion inspired by Wittgenstein. First, it seemed as though this methodology was more faithful to the practice of philosophy of religion being truly about the actual practice of religious persons themselves. Second, while there has been a revival of philosophical arguments for and against theism and alternative concepts of God (as will be noted in section 5), significant numbers of philosophers from the mid-twentieth century onward have concluded that all the traditional arguments and counter-arguments about the metaphysical claims of religion are indecisive. If that is the case, the Wittgenstein-inspired new philosophy of religion had the advantage of shifting ground to what might be a more promising area of agreement.

While this non-realist approach to religion has its defenders today, especially in work by Howard Wettstein, many philosophers have contended that traditional and contemporary religious life rests on making claims about what is truly the case in a realist context. It is hard to imagine why persons would pray to God if they, literally, thought there is no God (of any kind).

Interestingly, perhaps inheriting the Wittgenstein stress on practice, some philosophers working on religion today place greater stress on the meaning of religion in life, rather than seeing religious belief as primarily a matter of assessing an hypothesis (see Cottingham 2014). — SEP on Philosophy of Religion

And a bit more, because wouldn't it be nice of we did some philosophy of religion in the philosophy of religion section?

SEP on Religion and Science

There is some reason to think that Pinker’s case may be overstated, however, and that it would be more fair to characterize the sciences as methodologically agnostic (simply not taking a view on the matter of whether or not God exists) rather than atheistic (taking a position on the matter). First, Pinker’s examples of what science has shown to be wrong, seem unsubstantial. As Michael Ruse points out:

The arguments that are given for suggesting that science necessitates atheism are not convincing. There is no question that many of the claims of religion are no longer tenable in light of modern science. Adam and Eve, Noah’s Flood, the sun stopping for Joshua, Jonah and the whale, and much more. But more sophisticated Christians know that already. The thing is that these things are not all there is to religions, and many would say that they are far from the central claims of religion—God existing and being creator and having a special place for humans and so forth. (Ruse 2014: 74–75) — SEP on Philosophy of Religion

I think I said what is fine for a conversation in a bar is not necessarily fine for a conversation about philosophy. — Ennui Elucidator

Yes; you engaged in special pleading. You accept some historical facts but not others, for reasons external to history - reasons of religion.

It's good to see you reading a bit about Wittgenstein. Do you think that the piece you quoted somehow supports your position? How?

Indeed, in this regard, Judaism is a modern religion -- ineffective.

Not at all. What is apparent is that they deny what is before us all; the fact of the destruction of classical literature by Christian zealots. — Banno

But to them that's like burning a pile of trash. Ie., not a bad thing, not at all, but something useful.

Where you and the Christians differ is in the qualitative evaluation of some past events.

But there are other animals who adopt the offspring of other animals, including the offspring of other species. Should we say that those animals have a superego? — baker

No. That is evolutionary behavior, naturally selected for behavior, which is probably reinforced by learning/imitation, not behavior based upon reason and the type of abstract thinking that it takes to concieve of morality. That same animal species...the Bonobo is it?...would not be capable of regret for having committed an act which we humans would call "immoral". As far as we know, we are the only species to ever have been capable of that type of thought, and so to be viewed as having a "Superego", which is what makes us so unique, so (dare I say?) special.

Freud's tripartate model is exactly that, a theoretical model, but like the theory of gravitation, it explains the intended phenomena and it has held under scrutiny. My personal opinion is that it is brilliant, and one of the most significant theories of the twentieth century, a century chock-full of theorization, as it helps us to understand that most mysterious of things...ourselves, and so fulfill the old Delphic challenge: "gnothi seauton" ("know thyself").

To reiterate the thrust of my argument, though: despite the evolution of our human brains, and our resultant development of the ability to think abstractly and idealistically, the same instincts that are within the infanticidal lion, those which urge him to his acts of infanticide, remain within a part of our human mind within all of us, kept in check only by our ability to concieve of right and wrong. The evolution of the Superego did not remove the Id. If we choose to deny that savage, primal part of ourselves, then we inhibit our ability to ever come to know ourselves fully...to see completely the creature that we are.

Where you and the Christians differ is in the qualitative evaluation of some past events. — baker

I don't think so. That the books were not transcribed, were thrown in the rubbish, and were burned is not a question of opinion. Again, 90% of the literature of the classical world disappeared over a few hundred years, at the instigation of Bishops, christianised emperors and their acolytes. We have the commands they gave. We have descriptions of their deed in their own words. And we have the hole in our literary heritage.

Yes; you engaged in special pleading. — Banno

Are we really going to argue about ordinary language philosophy here? How I speak in a bar to people I suppose to be unsophisticated (or perhaps just uninterested) in things like epistemology is not the same as I would speak to you (even though I know better). It is called code switching and involves language communities rather than special pleading. Or if you prefer, it is jargon.

As for my reference to W, I think we are best off letting you decide whether anything W said would support my claim that when discussing a word, we should look for how it is used rather than how we wish it to be defined.

Are we really going to argue about ordinary language philosophy here? — Ennui Elucidator

You raised the topic. When asked to explain, you appear to back down.

I am well aware of Wittgenstein's views on religion. Explain how it is you think they support your case.

Because I do not think that they do.

What you have done is provided further evidence of special pleading, of a double standard, a public conversation and a somehow distinct, evasive religious one.