It is a fact that there was a blown fuse. — InPitzotl

Yes, it's an observable and verifiable fact, empirical, the kind I like. The kind that "turns out".

Wanted to acknowledge that I have not yet responded to this:

We have simply agreed to take certain actions -- one paying the other what is owed -- based on the outcome of an event. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think this cuts to the idea of what a bet is. Suppose Joe needs $10 and offers to wash my dishes to earn it. I tell Joe, "sorry, I only have $5, and I just bet on the Celtics game with Srap. Tell you what, though. If the Celtics win, I'll let you wash my dishes for $10." Despite what Joe and I have being conditioned on the same actions and events our bet is conditioned on, Joe and I do not have a bet... it's simply a conditional contract. — InPitzotl

That's a nice hard case, but I wanted to lay out my view more fully before tackling it.

I'm taking some time and mulling it over. If I can't come up with a good response, it's certainly trouble for my position. Just wanted you to know I didn't miss this argument, @InPitzotl.

No, I really did mean to say we're not competing, because I don't think betting is competing.
When you're competing in a contest — Srap Tasmaner

"Competing in a contest" and "competing" denote distinct things.

This is hard to see clearly, I think, but if this were a contest, I could make an effort to make it more likely that if the Lakers win, you'll owe me, or to make it less likely that if the Celtics win, I'll owe you. — Srap Tasmaner

But it's wrong (in the sense that it does not follow). We cannot interfere in the Lakers game, but that does not entail we're not in a contest. We're not playing basketball; we're playing a prediction game. You chose the basketball game we bet on. You chose to bet on the Lakers winning. You chose the $5 wager. I chose to accept the wager. These are the variables that went into the bet.

Once again, the bridge analogy is great here... it's pretty clear when you're bidding how you're playing a game in and of itself, and the distinction between and relationships to that game and the game you play with the hands, and the bidding is half the fun of the game.

Yes, it's an observable and verifiable fact, empirical, the kind I like. — Olivier5

Yes, if I open the fuse box, I might see the blown fuse. But it does not seem to matter whether I'm doing so to verify there's a blown fuse or figure out if there's a blown fuse. It might be quicker if I check the fuse box first, but both are observing and verifying, quite frankly, the same exact fact.

And then the hypothesis that this blown fuse was the reason your car was not starting occured to you and you changed the fuse and then the car started, proving that the blown fuse was at least in part responsible for the condition today.

So the facts of the matter are that you found a blown fuse and that the car started when you replaced it. The rest, ie the idea the your car didn't start yesterday because of that blown fuse, are theories, not facts.

And then the hypothesis that this blown fuse was the reason your car was not starting occured to you and you changed the fuse and then the car started, proving that the blown fuse was at least in part responsible for the condition. — Olivier5

You're clearly not talking about this:

It is a fact that there was a blown fuse. — InPitzotl

So the facts of the matter are that you found a blown fuse and that the car started when you replaced it. The rest, ie the idea the your car didn't start yesterday because of that blown fuse, are theories, not facts. — Olivier5

Your distinction sounds completely arbitrary. If you're trying to clarify the difference between the totally disparate "fact" and "theory" concepts, you're doing a bad job illustrating the difference.

Is it really a fact of the matter that I found a blown fuse? Or is the fact of the matter that I came under the impression that I appeared to have found a blown fuse, and the notion that I did in fact appear to have found a blown fuse a theory, as is the notion that I found a blown fuse a theory? Are there any facts at all, or is everything a theory? If we're just drawing a line somewhere about what we get to presume, there had better be a good reason to draw the line here versus there. Where do you draw the line, and what is the good reason to draw it there?

If you're trying to clarify the difference between the totally disparate "fact" and "theory" concepts, you're doing a bad job illustrating the difference. — InPitzotl

Why don't you try and do a better job than me? This is indeed an important distinction, which I am trying to uphold.

Why don't you try and do a better job than me? This is indeed an important distinction, which I am trying to uphold. — Olivier5

I don't think it's a matter of where you draw the line in the first place. You establish that something is the case to your own satisfaction, and that becomes a fact from which you can infer something else. Maybe you're wrong sometimes, but that's okay; this is a game you play with a pencil and an eraser, not a pen.

I still think there is an important distinction to make between empirical facts and theories. And since theories can (at least in theory!) be true, equating facts with truth erases that distinction.

And since theories can (at least in theory!) be true, equating facts with truth erases that distinction. — Olivier5

I'm not sure which concept of theory you're after, but it sounds like you just came up with a distinction on your own. A fact must be true. A theory may or may not be true. (I must explicitly point out that this is not the concept of a scientific theory, given this is a common misconception).

it sounds like you just came up with a distinction on your own — InPitzotl

I've brought it up before on the thread:

And it provides another reason to define facts as 'acurate observations', at least in scientific language: science is made of 1) observations and 2) induced theories tying the observation in a logical or mathematical net. Now, logicians tell us that induction never provides certainty, that just because you never saw a black swan doesn't mean there's no such thing. Therefore our induced theories are provisional. But the observations that were done, remain done, factum, unless they were poorly done of course. Any new theory would have to contend with past observations. So observations (and only they) are facts. — Olivier5

I've brought it up before on the thread: — Olivier5

Ah, in that case, as I understand it, a scientific theory will explain why a set of facts is the case. To contrast, and also to use in a moment, there are scientific laws... those do not explain a set of facts, but rather suggest there's a relationship between the facts. So for example Tycho Brahe's observations of the motion of the planets led to the development of Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion. Newton's Law of Gravity simplifies this law. General Relativity is a theory that explains and refines Newton's law.

So we have a theory of matter that describes matter as being made up of molecules, and molecules of atoms, and atoms of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Using this theoretical framework we build up theories of radiation that explain how spectra are produced that includes emission and absorption lines. Using all of these theoretical constructs and more, we can make observations of stars to measure the speed they are moving away from us (Doppler effects); similarly, we can use techniques such as standard candles to measure the distance that objects are away from us. This gives us a bunch of facts. Using these facts we observe that overall, the speed at which objects move away from us is proportional to the distance the objects are from us, and from those facts we infer Hubble's Law. Applying this and other laws of physics leads us to the Big Bang theory.

Note that the second paragraph flips your script on its head:

Therefore our induced theories are provisional. But the observations that were done, remain done, factum, unless they were poorly done of course. — Olivier5

...because the stellar/galactic facts that lead to Hubble's Law themselves rely on theory.

because the stellar/galactic facts that lead to Hubble's Law themselves rely on theory. — InPitzotl

Their interpretation relied on theory. Their collection, even, relied on theory but there is still such a thing as the brute picture taken of a distant galaxy, its spectrum analysis and the likes. Brute facts, the data, this data and not another. There is something here that goes beyond theory. Even if all the theories underlying the spectral analysis Hubbe relied on are false, these observations still happened and still gave the results they gave, and any new theory would have to explain them.

They are not totally synonymous except in a certain context as I already pointed out. They overlap when it comes to propositional claims.

is a fact that 1+1=2, — Janus


In base 2 numeration, 1+1=10. — Olivier5

You've pointlessly quoted me out of context, omitting the part in which I said I have not claimed that 1+1=2 is a fact, to make it seem that I have claimed that.

If I wanted to make that claim I could say that in the context of the decimal system it is a fact that 1+1=2 and in the context of the binary system it is a fact that 1+1=10. So what?

I misattributed the distinction to Searle; while he made use of it, it was Anscombe who first proposed it.

You've pointlessly quoted me out of context, omitting the part in which I said I have not claimed that 1+1=2 is a fact, to make it seem that I have claimed that. — Janus

Ah okay, apologies. Misunderstood you.

Their interpretation relied on theory. — Olivier5

Yes, and scientifically speaking, they are facts.

but there is still such a thing as the brute picture taken of a distant galaxy, its spectrum analysis and the likes. Brute facts, the data, this data and not another. — Olivier5

Back to drawing lines? Do the planets exist when you aren't looking at them, or is that just theory? Where does object permanence lie?

This just gets back to the lines you're drawing. Where do you draw the lines and what is your good reason to draw the lines there? We've explored, btw, my response.

No worries. :smile:

I said earlier I looked at that article and was not able to get it (my brain freezes when confronted with predicate calculus; I like to do my thinking in good ol' English). I came across an explanation in English on Wikipedia which I was able to understand:

Suppose p is a sentence that is an unknown truth; that is, the sentence p is true, but it is not known that p is true. In such a case, the sentence "the sentence p is an unknown truth" is true; and, if all truths are knowable, it should be possible to know that "p is an unknown truth". But this isn't possible, because as soon as we know "p is an unknown truth", we know that p is true, rendering p no longer an unknown truth, so the statement "p is an unknown truth" becomes a falsity. Hence, the statement "p is an unknown truth" cannot be both known and true at the same time. Therefore, if all truths are knowable, the set of "all truths" must not include any of the form "something is an unknown truth"; thus there must be no unknown truths, and thus all truths must be known.

The answer to this seems simple. We can stipulate that the sentence "p is an unknown truth" is true, just in case p denotes some undefined generic proposition, and that the truth of such propositions is in principle knowable. So the sentence "the sentence p is an unknown truth" is true, but it doesn't follow that we can know that p is true unless p becomes some concrete proposition, because otherwise knowing that p is true is meaningless. And that conflation between the generic indeterminate proposition p and any concrete proposition p is just what the apparent paradox depends upon. In other words "p is an unknown truth" is not itself an unknown truth, we know it is true if we take p to mean something like "there is some p"; it is unspecified p that is (stipulated to be) the unknown truth.

This can easily be seen if we substitute some concrete proposition for p. Taking the example I used earlier, we could speculate that 'Leonardo was gay' is an unknown truth that is in principle knowable (since someone at the time may have known that Leonardo was gay). Of course it might not be true, but that doesn't matter, because it could be. And if we could somehow come to know the truth about whether Leonardo was gay that would not present a paradox because it would cease to be an unknown truth and the sentence "p is an unknown truth" is not a timeless proposition; it would simply become "p was an unknown truth but is so no longer".

We're not playing basketball; we're playing a prediction game. You chose the basketball game we bet on. You chose to bet on the Lakers winning. You chose the $5 wager. I chose to accept the wager. These are the variables that went into the bet. — InPitzotl

Prediction is interesting and there's a lot one could say about it. But the question for us, is how does betting engender facts in the world? I say that it creates obligations that we attach, arbitrarily, to the outcome of real events. Those obligations will be factual, once the event concludes, and they are determined by the event's outcome because we say they are. This, on my view, is the sense in which betting is a speech act. I say these are facts because once you've placed your bet, you are committed to acquiring an obligation, a debt, if that's how the event you were betting on turns out, and that connection is no longer up to you, but a fact. The one follows from the other as sure as the turning of the worlds.

How we decide what to bet on -- interesting though it may be, and important as it may be if you want to make a living doing this sort of thing -- doesn't matter in the least as far as the bets themselves are concerned. There are no points for style, no partial credit if you show your work. You can pick your horses using an ingenious system that needs a Cray to run it or you can close your eyes and jab the racing form with a pen. Your bets will pay off or not just the same. Being better at predicting is generally nice if you do it a lot, but you still don't get paid for making better predictions overall or for doing a better job of analysis than someone else; you get paid if and only if the horses finish as you said they would.

I don't think this cuts to the idea of what a bet is. Suppose Joe needs $10 and offers to wash my dishes to earn it. I tell Joe, "sorry, I only have $5, and I just bet on the Celtics game with Srap. Tell you what, though. If the Celtics win, I'll let you wash my dishes for $10." Despite what Joe and I have being conditioned on the same actions and events our bet is conditioned on, Joe and I do not have a bet... it's simply a conditional contract. — InPitzotl

It's neither a bet nor some other kind of contract but a promise. You have promised Joe that if the Celtics win you'll give him the dishwashing job. If the Celtics won, and Joe came around, you could get away with all sorts of excuses: "Sorry, Joe, I totally forgot I had promised my sister she could borrow ten from me. You understand." You freely promised, and people expect you to keep your promises, and Joe might think a little less of you, but then again he might not, since he had no claim on you. He might be very understanding and appreciative that you wanted to help him out even if you didn't end up doing so. You made a promise, but the Celtics winning doesn't mean you're in debt to Joe; the Lakers winning would mean you're in debt to me.

Honestly, I can't help you man. I think Fitch's paradox is crap, but TGW (of dear departed memory) thought it was a straight-up refutation of verificationism.

I only brought it up because you and @Olivier5 had essentially been debating verificationism -- I haven't followed the last couple pages of the exchange -- and I wanted to point you at prior art on that, but I thought it would be a little disingenuous to bring up a family of theories without noting that some people consider them already refuted.

So I decided just to point you at Fitch's as an entry point into the arguments around verificationism. I probably should have just said that.

How we decide what to bet on -- interesting though it may be, and important as it may be if you want to make a living doing this sort of thing -- doesn't matter in the least as far as the bets themselves are concerned. — Srap Tasmaner

Be more specific. The bet(1) is an offer; the bet(2) is a contract; betting is the act of negotiating a bet(2). Again in the bridge analogy, the bet(1) is a bid; the bet(2) is the result of bidding, and betting is bidding. "How we decide what to bet on" is equivalent to "how we bet(1) to arrive at a bet(2)" which is just betting. If we're betting on something we do not get to interfere with, then once we have a bet(2), we don't have any input. It sounds like that's what you're saying. Yes, that's true. However, we don't get to a bet(2) without betting, and when we are betting, we have inputs. We've been over this; you control your bet(1) as you negotiate the bet(2). Again with the bridge analogy, there's an entire skillset associated with betting; not only that, but there's a series of complex "signals" you give through bets (bidding systems) to communicate information critical to arriving at a bet(2).

You can pick your horses using an ingenious system that needs a Cray to run it or you can close your eyes and jab the racing form with a pen — Srap Tasmaner

I have no idea what you're trying to convince me of, but you're very unconvincing. Relating this to bridge, I translate what you're saying as that it does not matter how you arrive at your bet(1)'s to select the bet(2) as far as the bet(2) is concerned. And that is quite plainly false. It does indeed matter. If you bet(1) by jabbing your pen onto a board of possible bets, your partner will be furious and your opposition will wipe the floor with you.

Being better at predicting is generally nice if you do it a lot, but you still don't get paid for making better predictions overall or for doing a better job of analysis than someone else; you get paid if and only if the horses finish as you said they would. — Srap Tasmaner

This makes no sense. Probability does matter, even for a single event; that's why it's useful in the first place. Even so, all you are doing if you bet "a lot" is changing the probability that you win (e.g., if there's a 60% chance you win a single symmetric $5 bet, there's a 81/125 chance you'll come out ahead in 3 such bets).

You have promised Joe that if the Celtics win you'll give him the dishwashing job. — Srap Tasmaner

The dishwashing job is an agreement between myself and Joe for Joe to do something for me in exchange for the consideration of $20, which is a contract. The contract is agreed to based on a condition.

since he had no claim on you. — Srap Tasmaner

IANAL, but you do realize that verbal contracts in the US where we both live can be legally binding, right?

Most contracts can be either written or oral and still be legally enforceable, — FindLaw

What Contracts are Required to Be in Writing? (FindLaw)

No worries, thanks Srap, I think it's total crap too, so we agree on that.

Where do you draw the lines and what is your good reason to draw the lines there? — InPitzotl

That's easy, and already explained: data, empirical evidence, are facts. Theories are not.

If facts are theory, explain to me why we need facts (data, observations)? Why can't we just rely on theory? Why do you keep your eyes open when you drive your car? :-)

Where does object permanence lie? — InPitzotl

In my mind it's an absolute presupposition. I.e. it's part of metaphysics.

Banno is on his own orbit here — Olivier5

Banno is always on his own orbit, everywhere. That is why we all love and hate him so much.

He must have a nice side, but I have yet to see it.

I think it's total crap too, so we agree on that. — Janus

Agreed here as well.

Being better at predicting is generally nice if you do it a lot, but you still don't get paid for making better predictions overall or for doing a better job of analysis than someone else; you get paid if and only if the horses finish as you said they would. — Srap Tasmaner

This makes no sense. Probability does matter, even for a single event; that's why it's useful in the first place. Even so, all you are doing if you bet "a lot" is changing the probability that you win — InPitzotl

It's a simple point.

Suppose I have an urn with 75 red marbles in it and 25 blue marbles. You bet me $5 that without looking you can reach in the urn and draw a red marble. The odds are 3:1 in your favor, but you still might draw a blue marble, in which case you owe me $5. It doesn't matter that you made the smart bet, that the odds were in your favor, you owe me $5. If we made the same bet a great number of times, the odds would tell, and you would make money on the exercise.

That's easy, and already explained: data, empirical evidence, are facts. Theories are not. — Olivier5

You replied, but you did not answer the question.

If facts are theory, explain to me why we need facts (data, observations)? — Olivier5

If you're talking about the use of the terms in science, there's a distinction, but it's what I described, not what you described.

In my mind it's an absolute presupposition. I.e. it's part of metaphysics. — Olivier5

Again, you replied, but you did not answer the question. Is it a fact that planets exist when you aren't looking at them, or a theory that planets exist when you aren't looking at them?:

What a planet is doing when you're looking at it, let's say, is an "accurate observation". But when you look away, to posit that the planet is still there would be an induction: "induced theories tying the observations in a logical or mathematical net" (incidentally, this sounds more like a scientific law than a scientific theory). "Now, logicians tell us that induction never provides certainty," ...well, we can't be certain the planet is still there when you aren't looking at it. "Therefore our induced theories are provisional." ...so if we can't be certain objects aren't there when we aren't looking at them, it must be a theory. "But the observations that were done, remain done, factum," ...but that's a contradiction. You're using certainty as a criteria, and we can't be certain an object is there when we are looking at it either. "Any new theory would have to contend with past observations." ...we never observe the past. "So observations (and only they) are facts." ...but observations aren't certain.

Certainty eliminates the distinction from fact and theory that you suggest are distinct. So it's not really certainty you're after.

It's a simple point. — Srap Tasmaner

It's contradictory.

It doesn't matter that you made the smart bet, that the odds were in your favor, you owe me $5. — Srap Tasmaner

So what you're saying is because I might draw a blue marble, it does not matter what the probability is that I draw a red one.

If we made the same bet a great number of times, the odds would tell, and you would make money on the exercise. — Srap Tasmaner

But that doesn't change anything. If we play 100 times (with replacement), I might pick 51, or 52, or 53, all the way up to 100 blue marbles. In all of those cases I would owe you money. If what might happen means probability doesn't matter, it wouldn't matter here either. There is no number of times we can play where it's not true that you "might" win.