I think that you can and should say more, but not more of the same. That would save me the trouble of trying to work out the implications of what you've said. Some of us here think that the depicted strawberries are grey, and some of us here think that the depicted strawberries are red. What colour do you think that they are? And what do you think about what we think? Is the former group right and the latter group wrong, or is the latter group right and the former group wrong, or are both right, or are neither right? If your answer is implicit in what you've said, I think you should make it explicit.

I think it's pretty clear:

" it's all essentially a subjective matter and therefore just an arbitrary question of utility as to how we arrange a consistent agreement regarding our assignment of colour value"

and

"The colour of that light as this is perceived by any given observer results from an interplay between that objective value and the neural network of the particular observer's brain and accordingly is a subjective experience which will vary as the neural network of the particular observer varies."

So, you think that it's pretty clear, yet you don't use that to give a simple answer to the following question. Why not? That prior question was connected to the subsequent question and wasn't meant to be taken in isolation. Your reply is not helpful to me. I have already read what he posted multiple times and have given it some thought. I don't think that I'm asking for much. The options are simple and limited, even if the explanation is more complex. I still want an answer - a conclusion - rather than an explanation which leaves that implicit, and leaves it up to the reader to figure out. I am not sure what the answer would be based on what he has said. That's why I am pressing him for an answer.

I want clarification about what this means with regards to truth and being right or wrong. If this were ethics, for example, I wouldn't be sure whether he is a moral relativist, error theorist, or some other position.

My problem with this approach is that the spectrometer doesn't see red. The spectrometer absorbs photons and spits out some data based upon this measurement. But the ruler doesn't feel length, even though it does basically the same thing at a much better accuracy and precision than our visual intuitions are able to pinpoint.

Defining 'red' as between this and that wavelength implicitly relies upon what we already call and see red. We just happened to draw a line somewhere based upon the colors we already perceive. We could just as easily say that the strawberries don't look red because they don't have this very particular wavelength of light which we happen to associate with red -- but that misses the point entirely.

When you look at the picture what you see is red. When you pull a pixel out what you see is grey-green. But since the picture is not the pixel it doesn't make much sense to say that the picture is really grey-green.

When you look at the picture what you see is red. When you pull a pixel out what you see is grey-green. But since the picture is not the pixel it doesn't make much sense to say that the picture is really grey-green. — Moliere

If what we see is red, then what is it that we see? The picture is not the pixel (singular), but the picture is the pixels (plural), is it not? If so, then if the pixels are grey, the picture is grey. If not, then what is the picture?

I would say that the picture is made of pixels, but to say that the picture simply is the pixels isn't quite right. For one, there is the arrangement of the pixels which makes the picture. So even in a very reduced sense you have to account for that, too.

But then, I'd say that The Starry Night is not just paint on canvas. The Starry NIght is one particular painting made by one particular artist which regularly hangs in the Museum of Modern Art. It's more appropriate to just look at The Starry Night and describe how you feel and think when looking at it, and add to that various historical facts about The Starry Night and say that this what the painting is than to say it is this particular grouping of pigments on a canvas.


Granted, this image isn't a unique object in the same sense that The Starry Night is, so there may be room for making a distinction. I'm just trying to elucidate how I think about images and why, in general, I'd say they are different than what they are made up of. Our experience and perception of an image is sort of bound up in what said image is, if not entirely.

The metal has a light-reflecting surface with recognizable properties. So we see a silver oval, because that's what there is for us to see, and which we then can interpret as a coin. — jkop

I don't know about this "surface" you refer to. The coin consists of molecules which consists of atoms. What constitutes this so-called "surface"? And I don't even think it's proper to say that the object reflects light. If I understand the physics correctly, the electrons absorb the light, and reemit it. Electrons exist in some kind of cloud formation, so how cloud there be a surface? Does a cloud have a surface? So unless your speaking metaphorically about this surface, I'm going to turn that charge of bullshit back on you.

I would say that the picture is made of pixels, but to say that the picture simply is the pixels isn't quite right. For one, there is the arrangement of the pixels which makes the picture. So even in a very reduced sense you have to account for that, too.

But then, I'd say that The Starry Night is not just paint on canvas. The Starry Night is one particular painting made by one particular artist which regularly hangs in the Museum of Modern Art. It's more appropriate to just look at The Starry Night and describe how you feel and think when looking at it, and add to that various historical facts about The Starry Night and say that this what the painting is than to say it is this particular grouping of pigments on a canvas.


Granted, this image isn't a unique object in the same sense that The Starry Night is, so there may be room for making a distinction. I'm just trying to elucidate how I think about images and why, in general, I'd say they are different than what they are made up of. Our experience and perception of an image is sort of bound up in what said image is, if not entirely. — Moliere

I agree, but not to the extent that the strawberries in the picture are red, if that is what you're suggesting, or if that is what you conclude from this. I don't see how the arrangement of the pixels makes anything we've referred to thus far red, whether the pixels, the pixels in a certain arrangement, the strawberries, or the picture. Unless you mean something other than what I mean when I talk about the picture. The strawberries appear red under certain circumstances, but I don't see how the circumstances would make the strawberries red. If what I see is red, it seems to me that it must be something else that I see. Perhaps some kind of distinction would be helpful here, like that between what I see and what I perceive: I see grey pixels in a certain arrangement, under certain circumstances, and I perceive them as an image of red strawberries.

elucidate how I think about images and why, in general, I'd say they are different than what they are made up of. Our experience and perception of an image is sort of bound up in what said image is, if not entirely. — Moliere

What does it mean to say [1] that an image is different from what it is made up of, and [2] that experience and perception are bound up in what an image is made of? Where does that leave the image we see? It makes no sense to me.

What does it mean to say [1] that an image is different from what it is made up of, and [2] that experience and perception are bound up in what an image is made of? Where does that leave the image we see? It makes no sense to me. — jkop

That's what I've been trying to explain to you, an image is a representation. Since the image is never exactly the same as the thing represented, it is always an interpretation of the thing represented.

My problem with this approach is that the spectrometer doesn't see red. The spectrometer absorbs photons and spits out some data based upon this measurement. But the ruler doesn't feel length, even though it does basically the same thing at a much better accuracy and precision than our visual intuitions are able to pinpoint.

Defining 'red' as between this and that wavelength implicitly relies upon what we already call and see red. We just happened to draw a line somewhere based upon the colors we already perceive. We could just as easily say that the strawberries don't look red because they don't have this very particular wavelength of light which we happen to associate with red -- but that misses the point entirely.

When you look at the picture what you see is red. When you pull a pixel out what you see is grey-green. But since the picture is not the pixel it doesn't make much sense to say that the picture is really grey-green. — Moliere

Indeed the spectrometer doesn't see red, it measures wavelengths. I don't see this as a problem. What's the problem that this implicitly relies on what we call red? A standard meter didn't become a standard meter by taking that from somewhere outside ourselves either. We told a meter what it should be (a meridional definition) by convention but the 1870 meter bar was actually 0.02% shorter than that. Then we calculated back from wavelengths to the meridional meter and recently from the speed of light as to what a meter should be. Quite similarly, we told "red" what it should be in terms of wavelength as well (although less accurately). We don't have a problem trusting a ruler over our own sense of distance but somehow colour is an issue for some.

To get back to my example of the banana. The yellow of the banana does not change from one second to the next and I know this when I put it on the dark blue blanket. I will still experience the yellow as more vibrant and bright. Following your line of thinking the banana got more vibrant and bright yellow. But we know nothing about the banana changed.

Here grey is included as part of a picture that causes us to white balance it causing the grey to appear red. Nothing happened to the grey that it all of a sudden became red. It's the surrounding teal that causes us to perceive it as red.

Here grey is included as part of a picture that causes us to white balance it causing the grey to appear red. Nothing happened to the grey that it all of a sudden became red. It's the surrounding teal that causes us to perceive it as red. — Benkei

Yep. It seems that some people want to include our perception in the object that we're talking about, but under scrutiny that makes no sense, and that kind of talk is misleading. What makes sense is the distinction between perception and object, and between what it is to appear and to be.

Yep. It seems that some people want to include our perception in the object that we're talking about, but under scrutiny that makes no sense, and that kind of talk is misleading. What makes sense is the distinction between perception and object, and between what it is to appear and to be. — Sapientia

Well, happy someone agrees but it certainly appears to be the minority position!

Well, happy someone agrees but it certainly appears to be the minority position! — Benkei

I'm quite sure I've argued against a similar position myself before, but I just thought about it real hard and ended up here. Funny how things turn out.

Since it seems we're pretty much reiterating positions here, let me at least finish with a few questions that people might want to answer so that I can at least understand their position better.

1. Why must the perception of an object's colour and the [actual] object's colour be the same? Or, why can't I say the grey in that picture appears red to me? By insisting I cannot say this, are you saying I'm lying?
2. Why shouldn't I incorporate what we scientifically know about "red" into the definition of "red"?
3. Why shouldn't I apply a descriptive definition to "red" to my experience?
4. Is this just a matter of definition/semantics? If I define red as what I experience as red unless it turns out that a spectrometer tells me it isn't because it does not have an emphasis of wavelengths between x and y, then by definition the strawberries aren't red.
5. What is red? (e.g. what's your definition).

Writing down these questions I think we can conclude we all use red with the assumption we have a shared meaning of the word and it's starting to appear that we actually might not.

1.Why must the perception of an object's colour and the [actual] object's colour be the same? Or, why can't I say the grey in that picture appears red to me? By insisting I cannot say this, are you saying I'm lying? — Benkei

I would say that objects don't have any color. Color is a property of visual perception, just like smell is a property of olfaction, not the chemical makeup of the odors themselves.

2. Why shouldn't I incorporate what we scientifically know about "red" into the definition of "red"? — Benkei

Scientifically speaking, the world is without color or smell, except for creatures who see color and smell odors. Color is a secondary property, not a primary one, qua Locke.

3. Why shouldn't I apply a descriptive definition to "red" to my experience? — Benkei

That's fine, as long as it's understood in philosophical discussion that the colors we see are based on how human visual perception works and not the properties of objects or photons themselves.

4. Is this just a matter of definition/semantics? If I define red as what I experience as red unless it turns out that a spectrometer tells me it isn't because it does not have an emphasis of wavelengths between x and y, then by definition the strawberries aren't red. — Benkei

In ordinary language, which assumes naive realism, strawberries are red. But given a scientific understanding of atoms, photons and how our visual system works, strawberries are not red.

5. What is red? (e.g. what's your definition). — Benkei

The color we experience seeing for a certain wavelength of light, depending on the exact visual circumstances.

Scientifically speaking, the world is without color or smell, except for creatures who see color and smell odors. Color is a secondary property, not a primary one, qua Locke. — Marchesk

Fair enough. How does the fact that we've imported primary qualities into the definition of secondary qualities affect this distinction? E.g., wavelengths reflected by an object has in a sense been incorporated into this, which is why we are even capable of this discussion. If we had no way of knowing the pixels in dispute are really gray there would be no disagreement here.

Fair enough. How does the fact that we've imported primary qualities into the definition of secondary qualities affect this distinction? — Benkei

I'm not sure how to answer your question other than to point out that these types of discussion ultimately are about the nature of objectivity, with Nagel's view from nowhere, Locke's primary and secondary colors, direct vs indirect realism vs anti-realism, Kant's categories of thought, and so forth.

There was a previous discussion on the old forum (I think) about whether direct realism entailed color realism, and if the scientific evidence was against color realism, then direct realism could not be the case. Needless to say, the direct realists strongly disagreed, leading to charges of anti-realism, and ultimately, a disagreement over terms.

So yes, we do recognize a distinction between wavelengths of light and the color we experience seeing. What that means for perception is disputed. I think it means colors aren't real. It's like the sun rising and setting, which is naive realist language, and still useful to say, but everyone knows it's false in the modern world.

Fair enough. How does the fact that we've imported primary qualities into the definition of secondary qualities affect this distinction? — Benkei

Also, I think this distinction has implications for consciousness and Chalmer's hard problem, because if color is a secondary quality, but science makes use of primary qualities, then explaining the experience of color is going to be a conceptual dead end, as Nagel recognized, which again goes back to questions about the nature of objectivity.

Indeed the spectrometer doesn't see red, it measures wavelengths.

...

We don't have a problem trusting a ruler over our own sense of distance but somehow colour is an issue for some. — Benkei

The problem with colour is not as straight forward as measuring with a ruler. The colours which we see are combinations of different wavelengths, and the way that our eyes deal with combinations may not be straight forward mathematics.

Here grey is included as part of a picture that causes us to white balance it causing the grey to appear red. Nothing happened to the grey that it all of a sudden became red. It's the surrounding teal that causes us to perceive it as red. — Benkei

"Grey" is not a straight forward wave length, it is a combination of wavelengths. So the issue here is how are we to define a "combination". We might produce a grey colour by combining wavelengths at the very same location. Or, we might produce a grey by having tiny points of different colours side by side. From a close up perspective, the latter could not be called grey, it is points of different colour. But from a distant perspective, that object would be grey. The colour of the object is perspective dependent. From one perspective it is points of different colours, but from another perspective, it is mixed wavelengths.

The colour of the object is perspective dependent. From one perspective it is points of different colours, but from another perspective, it is mixed wavelengths. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perceptual relativity and the problem of perception, eh? How can we objectively say what color something is if it's relative to how we're viewing it, and the kind of visual system we possess?

Some animals see color better than we do, for example.

How can we objectively say what color something is if it's relative to how we're viewing it, and the kind of visual system we possess? — Marchesk

We can do so in accordance with an objective categorisation of colour. If it is so-and-so, then it is red. You just reject this categorisation, as it seems you must in order to conclude that objects do not have colour and that colour isn't real.

We can do so in accordance with an objective categorisation of colour. If it is so-and-so, then it is red. You just reject this categorisation, as it seems you must in order to conclude that objects do not have colour and that colour isn't real. — Sapientia

You can do so if anti-realism is fine with you. Also, science "paints" a rather colorless picture. Afterall, where is the color? Is it in the photon? Does that get transferred to the electrical signal travelling to your visual cortex?

We can do so in accordance with an objective categorisation of colour. If it is so-and-so, then it is red. — Sapientia

If the strawberry tastes sweet, then objectively, it's sweet, right?

You can do so if anti-realism is fine with you. Also, science "paints" a rather colorless picture. Afterall, where is the color? Is it in the photon? Does that get transferred to the electrical signal travelling to your visual cortex? — Marchesk

I was just about to delete my comment, but then I noticed that you'd replied. I was going to do so because, although that's a way of objectively saying what colour something is, I'm not sure that it meets the other part of your question.

Whether I'm fine with anti-realism depends of how that's defined. I'm a realist in a sense, because by this sort of categorisation, colour can be real, because colour can be categorised as something real, like wavelengths of light. That's real, isn't it? It's about the categorisation and accordance or discordance with it. In light of this, the answers to your questions needn't matter, and can be answered arbitrarily.

If the strawberry tastes sweet, then objectively, it's sweet, right? — Marchesk

If that's how sweet things are being categorised, then yes. But that might not be the best way of categorising them. One conventional way of categorising colour is by wavelength, but I don't really know of an equivalent way of categorising taste.

I agree, but not to the extent that the strawberries in the picture are red, if that is what you're suggesting, or if that is what you conclude from this. I don't see how the arrangement of the pixels makes anything we've referred to thus far red, whether the pixels, the pixels in a certain arrangement, the strawberries, or the picture. — Sapientia

Here's an image I created out of two color picked items, one from the teal (what was white-ish) table, and one from a part of a strawberry:

http://imgur.com/a/sumhF

(hopefully that works)

And a bit of a zoom in and stretch out to show a mid-scale version:

http://imgur.com/a/15yRf

Clearly there's no red at the two-pixel level, and you can start to see the red fading in the mid-scale picture. Another way of putting this -- you could take all the pixels of one color and put it on one side, and all the pixels of the other associated color and put it on the other side, and you might see red in the middle, but it would fade out. (wish I had the capability to do that, but I'm not that good)


So, yes, I'm suggesting the image of strawberries in the original picture are red.

Unless you mean something other than what I mean when I talk about the picture. The strawberries appear red under certain circumstances, but I don't see how the circumstances would make the strawberries red. If what I see is red, it seems to me that it must be something else that I see. Perhaps some kind of distinction would be helpful here, like that between what I see and what I perceive: I see grey pixels in a certain arrangement, under certain circumstances, and I perceive them as an image of red strawberries.

Seems to me that this is the same distinction as appearance vs. reality. But I think that this distinction rests on a compositional fallacy. The tiny bits of things are not what a whole is -- what a whole is or what properties it has can have different properties or even be different than what composes said whole.

And we can see this is so because we can look at both the picture and the pixel in isolation.

What does it mean to say [1] that an image is different from what it is made up of, and [2] that experience and perception are bound up in what an image is made of? Where does that leave the image we see? It makes no sense to me. — jkop

Point 2 may be a bit poetical, all depending on how we want to hash terms out. I mostly mean that you shouldn't doubt your perceptions of one thing just because your perception of another thing happens to differ, and the other thing happens to make up the one thing.


As for [1]: I'm still moving with the distinction between wholes and parts. That the parts in this case are the pixels (and in the case of the painting the dried oil paint on canvas, or even more broken down if you wish), and the whole is the image, and therefore they can have different properties from one another.

Indeed the spectrometer doesn't see red, it measures wavelengths. I don't see this as a problem. What's the problem that this implicitly relies on what we call red? — Benkei

Just seems to beg the question to me when you're proposing it as a means to adjudicate whether something is or isn't within said color category. Seems to me that it goes in the other direction -- first we determine said colors then we assign wavelengths. We can redefine our usage of 'red' at that point, of course -- but I'm telling ya, when I look at that image I see red.

It would be interesting to see what a spectrometer measured of the image, actually -- not sure if there's enough light from a monitor for it to work though.

To get back to my example of the banana. The yellow of the banana does not change from one second to the next and I know this when I put it on the dark blue blanket. I will still experience the yellow as more vibrant and bright. Following your line of thinking the banana got more vibrant and bright yellow. But we know nothing about the banana changed.

How do we know that latter bit, there?

Seems to me that it got more vibrant, no?

Here grey is included as part of a picture that causes us to white balance it causing the grey to appear red. Nothing happened to the grey that it all of a sudden became red. It's the surrounding teal that causes us to perceive it as red.

Right -- grey is part of the picture, as is teal. And the parts are different from the picture, since the picture is a whole. At least, that's how I'd parse it out. So we see the image as red, or perceive the image as red -- and thus, the image is red, just as the pixels are grey and teal. Nothing more to it than that.

So, yes, I'm suggesting the image of strawberries in the original picture are red. — Moliere

Okay, but that doesn't follow from anything you said, except the parts where you said that you see red, by that's false or misleading, since there is no red there to be seen.

Seems to me that this is the same distinction as appearance vs. reality. But I think that this distinction rests on a compositional fallacy. The tiny bits of things are not what a whole is -- what a whole is or what properties it has can have different properties or even be different than what composes said whole. — Moliere

I had already considered that objection. There is no compositional fallacy involved. I don't deny that a whole can be different in ways to its parts, and, unlike examples of the fallacy:

No atoms are alive. Therefore, nothing made of atoms is alive.

All cells are aquatic. All organisms are composed of cells. Therefore, all organisms are aquatic.

If someone stands up out of their seat at a cricket match, they can see better. Therefore, if everyone stands up, they can all see better.

...in this case, the quality pertains to both parts and whole. The pixels are grey and the strawberries are grey, despite how they look to you under various circumstances. You can zoom in and out or separate this part from that part, but they'll still be grey. Why? Because what you're calling red is actually just how they appear to you, which is different from what they are.

And we can see this is so because we can look at both the picture and the pixel in isolation. — Moliere

That doesn't demonstrate what you think it does. They're different, but not in terms of what colour they are.

In this case, the quality pertains to both parts and whole. — Sapientia

I suppose I would say the way we determine what color quality something has is we look at it -- full stop. I don't think there's a more accurate method, such as designating wavelengths of light, since the designation of the wavelengths depends upon what we perceive in the first place.

By what means would you say the gray quality -- or perhaps we could say "not-red", if we don't get too picky about what we mean by 'quality' ? -- applies to both the parts and the whole? Maybe I'm just dense, but it seems to me that the argument is that since the pixels are gray the image of the strawberries are gray. no?

I suppose I would say the way we determine what color quality something has is we look at it -- full stop. — Moliere

We do indeed tend to determine what colour something is by looking at it. But there's more to it than that. That's the reason why we tend to fall for optical illusions like the picture of the strawberries. Optical illusions show that this means of determining what colour something is is fallible and sometimes erroneous. That's a much better explanation than that the things themselves change colour. It has more to do with our perception and what we think than the colour of the object.

I don't think there's a more accurate method, such as designating wavelengths of light, since the designation of the wavelengths depends upon what we perceive in the first place. — Moliere

There is in some cases, such as the case we've been discussing: the picture of the strawberries. Your method says that they're red, but they're not, and my method says that they're some other colour, and they are. Your method either fails to distinguish or erroneously connects how they appear with what they are, and my method doesn't. So my method is more accurate.

By what means would you say the gray quality -- or perhaps we could say "not-red", if we don't get too picky about what we mean by 'quality' ? -- applies to both the parts and the whole? — Moliere

That's explained in the articles out there about this: see here.

Maybe I'm just dense, but it seems to me that the argument is that since the pixels are gray the image of the strawberries are gray. No? — Moliere

What if it is? That's not necessarily a fallacy. Either way, there is no red in either the pixels or the picture of the strawberries, so you're still wrong. Your argument can only work if you confuse appearance and reality, but that's not something that I'm willing to do.