But do you imagine, as I believe some people did, and that perhaps some people still do, that non-human animals are just "wet" machines, biological analogues if you will of an automobile? — tim wood

I wouldn’t go that far. Some animals have demonstrated a sense of self, so it isn’t like they’re cognitively dead. It’s more of a continuum.

And why would you suppose that, even if non-human animals don't have - not being human - certain human qualities that they cannot have non-human animal analogous behaviors. — tim wood

I’m open to this being the case. I just can’t understand what something analogous to morality would be. That’s why I’ve been asking you to clarify. Do you mean an innate sense that motivates their behavior? Instinct? Emotional systems like guilt or regret that cause them to act in certain ways?

1. The difference between animals and humans (interspecies). [The Name A Trait Argument] — TheMadFool

This is what my post was addressing. Humans possess morality, whereas animals do not.

2. The difference between one person and another (intraspecies). — TheMadFool

I’m not sure what this matters. Are you looking for justification for why we don’t endorse cannibalism? This justification, whatever it may be, doesn’t have to be related to the justification for eating non-human animals. I think we’re just biased towards our own species. We naturally react negatively to harming others (with some exceptions).

Why do we not or, at the very least, are reluctant to kill each other? — TheMadFool

I would say because we’re members of the same species.

Humans possess morality, whereas animals do not. — Pinprick

Categorical. Make your case. What is morality that humans possess it and animals do not? If you retreat to the notion of human morality, then you have said nothing and are saying nothing.

For my part, I infer from observed behavior. I try not to suppose that I know from either not knowing, or from that I don't know.

1. The difference between animals and humans (interspecies). [The Name A Trait Argument]
— TheMadFool

This is what my post was addressing. Humans possess morality, whereas animals do not. — Pinprick

:ok:

The difference between one person and another (intraspecies).
— TheMadFool

I’m not sure what this matters. Are you looking for justification for why we don’t endorse cannibalism? This justification, whatever it may be, doesn’t have to be related to the justification for eating non-human animals. I think we’re just biased towards our own species. We naturally react negatively to harming others (with some exceptions). — Pinprick

It matters for the simple reason that the difference between animals and humans (moral sense is your example) can be found as a difference betweeen one human and another (saints & sinners). Ergo, if you kill animals because they lack moral sense, you can kill sinners as well. We do kill sinners (death penalty), at least we aren't hypocrites but...capital punishment is losing support all over the world or so I hear. Ergo, we shouldn't kill animals based on the absence of a moral sense. Isn't it intriguing how human issues spill over into our relationship with other forms of life?

Returning to the name the trait argument, what we have to find is a trait, X, such that it's present/absent in animals and if X is present/absent in a human, we can kill that human.

In other words, X justifies the killing of animals and so X in humans too should, to avoid a contradiction, be reason enough to put those humans to death.

Definition of trait X:

1. A trait present/absent in animals that gives us a reason to kill them.

2. The trait above when applied to humans gives cause to kill humans.

...the second part of the question if our moral system likewise ascribes (not equal but rather) sufficient moral value to non-human animals. If not, the third and final part of the question asks us what is it that is true of humans that would have to be true of animals in order for us to ascribe sufficient moral value to condemn killing them for food. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Alright. Let's get serious then.

First, you assume that implicit in our moral system, that is, if we believe we have a moral system, implicit in this system is condemning killing humans for food. Correct?
Second, if we have a moral system, does it ascribe sufficient moral value to animals?
Third, if we do not extend this moral system to animals, then what is it that we possess that animals don't? (Or the reverse, what is true of us that is also true of animals so that we also condemn killing animals for food).

Let me rephrase: We fucking hate being killed for food. Do you remember the last time you were hunted for food? It was fucking annoying, to say the least! And we hate it because we are moral agents. We have morals. Yet, we fucking love killing animals for food. What is it that separates us from animals so that we're okay eating them, at the same time condemning killing humans for food.

And my answer is this: our moral system does not have a built-in justification for following convention or practice by tradition. Please do not confuse acting with license to do something with being moral. There is a difference. We do not always behave morally. The problem with your OP is that you are already making conclusions before you even perform any examination of the moral system you're talking about. The "consistency" you're requiring is misplaced. What is true of humans that is also true of animals so that we do not kill animals for food? The will to live! Animals want to live. Which means, they recognize fun, entertainment, grief, family, and belonging. They have a sense of sustenance and comfort. I mean, the way humans treat animals -- Good Lord!

Btw, when we ascribe natural feelings to animals, do not overthink it. Empathy, for example, is not a logically-derived moral feeling. When I say animals have a will to live, I am not exercising my moral sense, only my natural observation and rationality.

If you retreat to the notion of human morality, then you have said nothing and are saying nothing. — tim wood

I would conclude that there is no “human morality” as compared to “non-human morality.” Morality is a trait just like any other that a species either has or doesn’t. And this isn’t saying nothing, it’s pointing out a difference (perhaps a significant difference) between humans and other animals.

For my part, I infer from observed behavior. — tim wood

Sure, we all do, but scientific evidence should also be part of the equation.

It matters for the simple reason that the difference between animals and humans (moral sense is your example) can be found as a difference betweeen one human and another (saints & sinners). Ergo, if you kill animals because they lack moral sense, you can kill sinners as well. — TheMadFool

But I’m not applying it like that. It has to apply to all members of the species. So, for example, if it is demonstrated that one cow actually possesses morality, then it wouldn’t be permissible to kill/eat any cows. I think that’s just erring on the side of caution. If one cow has morality, maybe others do as well, so we shouldn’t kill any of them just in case.

So with humans it’s the same thing. The only way it would be permissible to kill/eat them would be if no humans had morality, which includes human doing the killing in the hypothetical example. So if no humans possessed morality, then no humans would object to killing/eating other humans.

Morality is a trait — Pinprick

No. You are shameless at making categorical statements without support an that are false. What I described my cat doing was a behavior, not a trait. Nor, I think, is morality any kind of trait at all.

But I’m not applying it like that. It has to apply to all members of the species. So, for example, if it is demonstrated that one cow actually possesses morality, then it wouldn’t be permissible to kill/eat any cows. I think that’s just erring on the side of caution. If one cow has morality, maybe others do as well, so we shouldn’t kill any of them just in case.

So with humans it’s the same thing. The only way it would be permissible to kill/eat them would be if no humans had morality, which includes human doing the killing in the hypothetical example. So if no humans possessed morality, then no humans would object to killing/eating other humans. — Pinprick

You claim that we can kill animals because we know for a fact that they don't have morals.

I'm taking that to its logical conclusion: If I know for a fact that a person X lacks morals then, by the reasoning above, I should be allowed to kill X. This person X is like an animal (has no morals). Like should be treated alike, no?

Let's check what this means for the name the trait argument. For you this trait = lacking morals

1. You can kill animals because they lack morals. Ok!

So,

2. Can we kill humans if they lack morals?

No, you can't (the death penalty is not all that popular these days).

What explains this inconsistency?

On the one hand you kill (animals) because they (animals) lack morals and on the other hand you don't kill (humans) even if they (humans) lack morals.

We have to generalize this point. Suppose T is the trait such that it's present/absent in animals which if also present/absent in a human justifies the killing of a human.

Trait T is,

1. T is present/absent in animals (defines animals)

2. T if present/absent in humans permits the killing of humans.

Condition 1 is fulfilled - there are many traits that define animals. Condition 2 can't be satisfied.

For brevity, all I'll do here is point out that the name the trait argument works if we take traits singly, one by one that is but fails if we take all traits together. In the former case, the difference in traits is diluted by the similarities (human still) but in the latter, no similarities remain to compensate for the differences (nothing human left, the human has transformed into an animal).

The Beast (X-men), still human.

The American Werewolf In London. Complete transformation. No longer human.

It's something like what happens to us when we grow up. We are, at one point, definitely children at another positively adults but there's an in-between phase when we're neither children nor adults - teenage years they call it. The name the trait argument operates in the grey zone between animals & humans (part-animal, part-human) while non-vegetarianism is based on a clear distinction between them (fully animal or wholly human).

What I described my cat doing was a behavior, not a trait. — tim wood

Yeah, I never said the behavior was a trait.

Nor, I think, is morality any kind of trait at all. — tim wood

Ok, then what is it?

I'm taking that to its logical conclusion: If I know for a fact that a person X lacks morals then, by the reasoning above, I should be allowed to kill X. — TheMadFool

Only that’s not quite what I mean. If a species is without morality, then it’s ok to kill them. When applied to humans, it’s imperative that all humans lack morality. So for the above to be true, you would also have to lack morality, since you’re of the same species (human).

2. Can we kill humans if they lack morals? — TheMadFool

My answer is yes, if all humans lack morality it’s ok for them to kill each other.

For brevity, all I'll do here is point out that the name the trait argument works if we take traits singly — TheMadFool

That is a good point. Why is it that all the justification hinges on only one trait [rhetorical]?

Ok, then what is [morality]? — Pinprick

Behavior implementing/putting into practice rules felt/understood/reasoned to be appropriate for a given situation.

Absence of behavior not proof of immorality or amorality, though possibly suggestive of it.

Agree with this? Or roll your own.

That is a good point. Why is it that all the justification hinges on only one trait [rhetorical]? — Pinprick

The problem is when one takes traits that distinguish animals from humans one by one, we're sidetracked by the traits that we've failed to remove from the analysis - notice how we're talking about humans and how we might be justified in killing 'em given a trait that satisfies the conditions stipulated by the name the trait argument. No single trait may suffice to put the required distance between a human and, say, a cow (beef) to allow differential treatment. We need to take into account the entire trait set that defines humans and animals. Consider the simple example where the word "dog" represents animals and the word "cat" represents humans. So, one human is cat and another human too is cat. If I substitute "c" with "d" in one human, we get dat but dat still has something human, "at". Now, so long as you view the traits of animals (d-o-g) one at a time, there'll always be some human trait (c or a or t) to gum up the works. Only when you take all of the traits together as in dog or cat, will the two be distinct enough to require differential treatment.

Agree with this? — tim wood

Sure, but why can’t that be considered a trait?

My argument is that most animals don’t have the ability to understand/create these rules. I don’t think they can alter or change their behavior “at will” so to speak. Essentially they behave as they’re programmed to behave.

I make a distinction between this and human morality, where we have the ability to contemplate our behavior, and adjust accordingly, and to modify our “rules” as needed.

:up:

Essentially they behave as they’re programmed to behave. — Pinprick

Yours a throw-away line without substance for this discussion. Luck of the draw, I've observed a few litters of kittens. What struck me was the kittens trying to do things that cats cannot do, as if their brains were capable of and suggesting more than their bodies could manage. And soon enough they gave it up and became more cat/kitten like. I'll grant that animals, all animals, have characteristic behaviors, but "programming" as explanation or account won't cut it. And how many Youtube videos are there of animals doing just plain smart things - thousands?

Your opponent doesn't even consider a simple proposition such as "it is acceptable to eat animals" or "it is wrong to eat humans" - likely because such specific maxims don't seem like they belong in a simple axiomatic system. — SophistiCat

In Isaac’s defense, though his (subjectivist) moral system affirms the latter proposition, and denies the former proposition in your example, he is not arguing that either proposition cannot be an axiom within a logically consistent moral system. In fact, it is possible to have a consistent moral system that affirms such a proposition as “It is acceptable to eat humans (simpliciter)” so long as every other proposition within the moral system is compatible with it. The push-back on such a view would not be a logical one deriving an internal contradiction, but rather the push-back would be a pragmatic one deriving a reductio ad absurdum (showing that the view is reducible to position that most people will find intuitively absurd).

In naming the trait, you are simply agreeing that: 1) humans are different than nonhuman animals; 2) humans have sufficient moral value whereas nonhuman animals do not; which necessarily commits you to a position affirming that there is something true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would converge your normative evaluation such that both lack sufficient moral value. The reason you are “necessarily” committed to such a view is because it is logically impossible to deny the proposition “There is something true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would make it morally acceptable to kill for food,” whilst simultaneously holding the view affirming “Humans have sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food, whereas nonhuman animals do not have sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food”. This is the case because in saying that there is no trait true of the animal that if true of the human would make it morally acceptable to kill them for food, you are then saying that there is no morally relevant difference between the animal and the human. In other words, you are saying that humans and animals are identical with regards to the moral value we place on them on the one hand; whereas, on the other hand, you are also saying that humans have sufficient moral value, and animals do not have sufficient moral value. This is a contradiction.

In case anyone has noticed my lack of participation in this post, this is mostly due to objections or questions raised which position me to defend NTT which is Ask Yourself’s construction. I actually agree with veganism as defined by the vegan society, which goes something like “The minimization of animal suffering to the greatest degree practicable,” and have found NTT to be a useful tool in getting people to assess their own moral values, moral reasonings, and moral motivations. However, as I have argued for in the OP, I believe to have found an area of NTT vulnerable to attack, and would appreciate critiques directed at my rebuttal. I am most uncertain in my interaction within the hypothetical (trait equalization process) situation. I am not sure if I am interacting within it appropriately. The attempted reductio asks whether or not the act of killing humans for food in a possible world wherein the act is normalized is acceptable on my view. Now, if it is my perspective from the actual world I reside in, then my answer would be relative to the world in question. The actual world I reside in the act is not normalized, and my perspective from this (actual) world would likely reflect this, and indeed has, and is against such an act. Now, my perspective from this (actual) world, upon observation of this possible world in which the act of killing humans for food is normative, from the outside looking in, I would say relative to their values that I accept their behavior as it reflects their values in their world. Since in this respect I am afforded my own moral perspective from the (actual) world I am now, which places the common good of a society above the good of the individual. Therefore, given my perspective from this (actual) world is retained, I would agree with the act. As an alternative, if we say that my perspective from this (actual) world is not retained, then my evaluative analysis of the hypothetical world would depend upon the development of my perspective from the factors of influence within the hypothetical world. If the factors of influence within the hypothetical world give rise to an act which is universally normalized, then a bayesian approach would put it in terms of a high probability that I would accept the act.

Argument in support of my position being irreducible to an absurdity.

P1) If an act is normalized, then it is largely accepted by a groups moral intuitions;

P2) If acts that are largely unaccepted by a groups moral intuitions are considered absurd, then an act that is largely accepted by a groups moral intuitions is necessarily not absurd;

P3) The act of killing humans for food is normalized in the hypothetical world;

C) Therefore, the act of killing humans for food is largely accepted by the groups moral intuitions in the hypothetical world.

C) Therefore, the act of killing humans for food in the hypothetical world is necessarily not absurd.

Argument in support of my position being logically consistent.

P1) If an act is acceptable for the moral agents of a given world, and for an observing moral agent not of the given world, then the act is acceptable;

P2) NTT asks if the act of killing humans for food is acceptable if it is acceptable for the moral agents of a hypothetical world;

P3) NTT’s question is reducible to the presupposition as stated by the antecedent of the conditional statement “[If] the act of killing humans for food is acceptable for the moral agents of a given hypothetical world, [is the act therefore morally acceptable?]”;

P4) The act of killing humans for food is acceptable for the moral agents of a given hypothetical world;

(Note that this assertion is an explicit presupposition that is built-in to the NTT question: “If there is a hypothetical world in which killing humans for food is normalized, would you accept that killing humans is morally acceptable?” thus any objection to P4 by NTT can only be raised on pain of contradiction.)

P5) As the observing moral agent, I accept the act of killing humans as practiced by the moral agents of the hypothetical world;

C) Therefore, the act is acceptable.

(Note also that the argument is reduced to tautology in P1 of the argument.)

I don’t see my position, which answers the challenge of NTT, to derive a contradiction, nor to be reducible to an absurd moral position. I think that in answering NTT with the extrinsic trait of “being morally normalized to kill for food” (remember what is true of the animal that if true of the human) produces a tautology (true in all possible worlds, trivially true).

Is there anything I am missing here?

We’re not talking about intelligence. Animals are intelligent because they have the ability to learn; they can make associations between X behavior or other stimuli, and Y consequence. None of this has any bearing on their ability to comprehend morality.

A wolf, for example, may understand intuitively it’s status in the pack, as well as how it’s status affects it’s behavior, but this doesn’t mean it knows/understands that certain behaviors are “immoral.” It just associates certain behaviors with certain consequences. The alpha’s aggression towards other wolves when they do X behavior doesn’t mean it thinks X behavior is wrong/bad/immoral.

this doesn’t mean it knows/understands that certain behaviors are “immoral.” — Pinprick

What do you mean by "immoral"? I ask because I am pretty sure you do not know what either it or "moral" means. That is, what does it mean for a wolf to be immoral?

What do you mean by "immoral"? — tim wood

Whatever is considered wrong or bad.

That is, what does it mean for a wolf to be immoral? — tim wood

That’s for them to determine. I’m not an objectivist.

Whatever is considered wrong or bad. — Pinprick

By whom? That is, if you have no idea what wolf morality is, then how o you conclude they're immoral, except by some misplaced standard. And that does not address wolf or other animal behavior that seems based in some kind of moral choice - or behavior that seems analogous to human moral behavior.

The problem here is that you keep arguing that you know from what you do not know. And I taking care to merely comment on observation.

By whom? — tim wood

In this case by the wolves.

That is, if you have no idea what wolf morality is, then how o you conclude they're immoral, except by some misplaced standard. — tim wood

I’m not claiming that. I’m claiming they have no concept of moral/immoral (I.e. they lack morality).

And that does not address wolf or other animal behavior that seems based in some kind of moral choice - or behavior that seems analogous to human moral behavior. — tim wood

Ok. So, here’s what I think. Complexity in species only develops when there is evolutionary pressure to do so. Worms, for example, are able to navigate their environment, reproduce, discern food from non-food, etc. They’re able to do all this without even possessing a brain or central nervous system. I think this points out an issue with observation. Were you to simply observe the worms behavior, you would likely conclude that the worm knows where it’s going and what it’s doing. It’s actions seem deliberate and intentional. However, there is nothing to suggest that deliberate and intentional behavior is possible without a brain/consciousness.

My sort of rule of thumb to remedy this issue is to ask yourself whether or not conscious deliberation is necessary for this animal to perform this action. Because if it isn’t needed, it’s very unlikely that the species even developed the capability to consciously deliberate. In short, if instinct or simple learned behavior suffices to explain the behavior, then there’s no need to posit a more complex phenomenon. I guess it’s basically an application of Occam’s Razor.

By whom?
— tim wood

In this case by the wolves.

That is, if you have no idea what wolf morality is, then how o you conclude they're immoral, except by some misplaced standard.
— tim wood

I’m not claiming that. I’m claiming they have no concept of moral/immoral (I.e. they lack morality). — Pinprick

So, they determine what they do not have on the basis of what they have no concept of?

Complexity in species only develops when there is evolutionary pressure to do so. — Pinprick

And this is just plain untrue. Another example of a categorical statement by you, that if you thought about or even knew better, you would not make.

So, they determine wht they so not have on the basis of what they have no concept of? — tim wood

No. The point is that they can’t determine it (that’s why I say they lack it). Morality does not exist for a wolf.

And this is just plain untrue. Another example of a categorical statement by you, that if you thought about or even knew better, you would not make. — tim wood

Ok, then how does complexity arise in species if not through evolution?

Ok, then how does complexity arise in species if not through evolution? — Pinprick

Random mutation, one way.

Yeah, that’s how change can occur, but if it isn’t fostered by evolution it isn’t going to develop complexity.