That works.

Nonfiction

It brings to mind an Emerson quote, emphasis added: — James Riley

Is that from one of his essays? Which?

Is it possible to give a rigorous definition of 'reality'? — Cidat

I don't know if I'd call this rigorous, but I find it very satisfying - the ground of being. It's what's all the way at the bottom when you've swept everything else away. It's a term sometimes used to describe the indescribable Tao.

Is it possible to give a rigorous definition of 'reality'? — Cidat

@Banno@James Riley

For philosophy, reality is an abstract quality, such as appearance or essence (though not of an object, but the whole world). The criteria for the quality that we impose is its fixed, certain nature.

Reality is the word we use when we go hunting for certainty. — Tom Storm

The sense is that we can be wrong about the world, but, if we are right, it is because of a relationship with reality (correspondence, reference, etc.). This is the common understanding of a fact that is true (or sometimes knowledge, compared to opinion or "belief").

But the "factness" of a scientific fact (its certainty, its dependability) is based on the method of science, not its correspondence with "reality". Its factness is its repeatability, its constancy, its reliability, its seeming causality. And this desire for a set relationship with something certain, universal, also tempts us to impose the criteria of reality on things other than those subject to the scientific method, instead of seeing what matters to each thing's judgment, identity, correctness, completion, etc.

And this is not to deny the world. In fact, we learn more about the (real) world we live in than a definition of reality by looking (passively receiving, describing) instead of saying so much (actively defining, grasping, imposing, explaining).

If we look at what we imply when we talk about "reality" (or what is real), we say: that we got fooled, as by a fake (not real); that we are deluded, as in creating our own world (own reality); that we should stop day-dreaming, and get back to the business at hand, with tangible (real) results; that hoping will not get us there if we do not deal with the realities (economics, logistics, etc.); that we are only speculating or opining, and not investigating, asking questions (about something other than our own thoughts); that we are in denial of something that happened, or that there is no such possibility. There is also the sense @180 Proof provides:

The real [reality] is that which hurts you badly, often fatally, when you don't respect it.

Say, "They can ignore the consequences all they like now, but at some point reality is gonna smack them in the face."

I'm sure there are more, as these are not my definitions (nor definitions at all), and there is more to rigorously dig into, with more specificity, precision, accuracy, distinction, variety, by drawing out examples of when we talk about reality (our history of expressions) to find the implications and criteria (in what contexts) that this data shows about our lives, thus ourselves, than the intellectual gymnastics that philosophy goes through to make our world "reality" before even getting started.

I think reality is circumstance. I think reality is nature. It brings to mind an Emerson quote, emphasis added:
— James Riley

Here [In nature] we find sanctity which shames our religions and reality which discredits our heroes. Here we find nature to be circumstance, which dwarfs all other circumstance, and judges like a god all men that come to her. — Emerson, Nature

I join in this focus on circumstance (we could say we make "heroes" of scientific certainty, ideals, forms), but I would tweak it that Emerson is not saying "reality is nature" (it is not a statement--he is not solving skepticism); but he is redirecting us to our ordinary circumstances (contexts Wittgenstein and Nietszche will emphasize). Not imposing certainty, but finding the criteria of each thing, in the contexts in which they live (could be extended to), instead of abstracting away from any context in order to apply "reality" to everything.

I don't know if I'd call this rigorous, but I find it very satisfying - the ground of being. It's what's all the way at the bottom when you've swept everything else away. It's a term sometimes used to describe the indescribable Tao. — T Clark

As you probably know, Paul Tillich, one of the most influential Christian thinkers of the 20th century, used this term 'ground of being' to describe god. God permeates all creation and is the answer to the ontological fear of non-being. Or something like that...

This is an interesting and well-written discussion.

As you probably know, Paul Tillich, one of the most influential Christian thinkers of the 20th century, used this term 'ground of being' to describe god. — Tom Storm

I've come across the phrase in a few different contexts. I probably heard it first from Alan Watts. As I said, I'm not sure it is any better a definition than any of the others, I just find it satisfying. It gets at what I mean when I say "reality."

Thanks, I've edited it a few times (and probably will again). I'm not sure how that works, but I think if you come at it from a link, you get the old version if you don't refresh the page.

Not sure how that works exactly. — Antony Nickles

In my experience, if you come across it on the page, you get the most recent version. If you follow a link to your name, you get the version that was current when it was first saved. If you add a mention to a post later, the person mentioned doesn't get a notice.

↪Caldwell
Basically, that which you are forced to accept. — Cidat

Nope. And that's the beauty of philosophy. You're not forced to accept anything. You accept it because it logically follows.

yup! In society, we must conform to a historically embedded logic to survive, but in philosophy, we survive by our abilty to construct our own categories. It's beautiful, I love it.

If you add a mention to a post later, the person mentioned doesn't get a notice. — T Clark

Try being more antagonistic...they'll notice

In my experience, if you come across it on the page, you get the most recent version. If you follow a link to your name, you get the version that was current when it was first saved. If you add a mention to a post later, the person mentioned doesn't get a notice. — T Clark

I emailed support and they said"

You're right, edits to comments do not generate new notifications. We have no plans to change this at this time.

Links to a specific comment shouldn't change, regardless of whether it's edited or not. Are you sharing the comment's permalink (retrieve this using the "share" icon)? — supportatplushforumsdotcom

I don't think the Share arrow at the bottom of a edited and saved document does us any good, but it sounds like it doesn't send a new notification, which is fine, but if the link to a specific comment shouldn't change after its edited, I'm not sure the link passes through to the edited document. If you can use the notification link to get to this document and see if it has "TEST 1" at the bottom (which I will edit in after I post it, then we know the notification link points to the re-edited document.

TEST 1

It sounds like you're discussing the intersubjective aspects of object permanence -- on-topic -- but in code, or using the forum as a metaphor.

It sounds like you're discussing the intersubjective aspects of object permanence -- on-topic -- but in code, or using the forum as a metaphor. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. That's exactly right.

I would define it as "That which is right now, irregardless of belief, attitude or consideration." — Cidat

I would just shorten it to "That which is," where being includes not just "right now" but everywhere in a time dimension as well as everywhere outside a time dimension, and everything that is identical to itself. That seems to be the most all-encompassing definition of reality possible. But by "reality" people often mean just a part of reality that they call "concrete reality", which comprises all concrete objects (as opposed to general objects/properties), and more specifically concrete objects in spacetime, and even more specifically concrete objects in our spacetime or our universe. As a side note, concrete objects are collections (combinations) of other objects or empty collections (non-composite concrete objects).

Reality: that which meets the criteria for a posteriori human knowledge, or, which is the same thing, experience.

Hey! Haven't seen you around in a while. Or it could be that I've been away. I have a question for you:

What say you regarding a-priori knowledge and its status in regards to reality?

I mean, we can only have a posteriori knowledge if we have a priori "filters", so the a priori must be part of reality. But perhaps I am thinking wrongly about this.

It sounds like you're discussing the intersubjective aspects of object permanence -- on-topic -- but in code, or using the forum as a metaphor. — Srap Tasmaner

Hey, I can only point.

What say you regarding a-priori knowledge and its status in regards to reality? — Manuel

In short, a priori knowledge has nothing to do with reality in itself, that being an ontological domain. A priori conceptions, and by continuation, a priori cognitions, are the necessary ground for the possibility of experience of reality, given two conditions: a representational cognitive system, and that system operates under logical predicates, such as (theoretically) found in humans.

I won’t disagree with your “we can only have a posteriori knowledge if we have a priori "filters"”, which is, in effect, what I just said, but I would disagree that these “filters”, or any conceptions a priori, are part of reality.

Reality is best conceived as an empirical domain; real is best conceived as a rational quality. Separate accordingly, I should think.
————-

I’m always around. I just don’t talk as much as I read.

but I would disagree that these “filters”, or any conceptions a priori, are part of reality.

Reality is best conceived as an empirical domain; real is best conceived as a rational quality. Separate accordingly, I should think. — Mww

Interesting. And I can see your motivations from framing it as you do, for it is elegant. But I think things become fuzzy quite quickly in the a-priori vs. empirical domain.

Let me put it quite trivially: if whatever the a priori is that we have (in other words, whatever mechanisms actually come into play when we experience the world) is not a part of reality as such, then we can't speak of reality at all.

In effect, as you would probably agree, we can't experience the world from "a view from nowhere".

Even though we cannot see it (we cant go behind our a-priori mechanisms and see them in action) I can't say they aren't part of reality. Actually I could well be wrong here, no false humility, but I don't see how these can be separated neatly.

In any case, always nice speaking to you.

Aspects of reality encountering (other aspects of) reality – e.g. brains experiencing the(ir) world(s). The a priori corresponds to brain-CNS functions by which experiencing (i.e. brain-environment interactivity) autonomically happens, no? To say "the a priori is not part of reality" amounts to saying 'brain organization' doesn't constitute a functioning brain – "a part of reality" – when, in fact, it does. (So, no need for some quasi-platonic "transcendental deduction" ... pace Kant et al). Maybe I'm confused. Tell me where my thinking goes wrong.

I believe I'm saying something of the sort when I say that the a-priori is part of reality.

This can be spoken about in the language of computational theories of brain or neuroscientific models or cognitive models.

I don't have an issue with your thinking here, I think @Mww may be trying to make the distinction between empirical and epistemological knowledge such that the world is something we can point to, something which is "publicly available".

He'll correct me.

I think things become fuzzy quite quickly in the a-priori vs. empirical domain. — Manuel

It shouldn’t be all that fuzzy, if it be accepted that which we sense, the empirical, is very far from that which we merely think, which is always and only ever a priori. Brain mechanics aside, of course. How do we tell a beautiful object, if we don’t already have some notion of beauty?

Even though we cannot see it (we cant go behind our a-priori mechanisms and see them in action) — Manuel

Ahhhh....but we can. We know it as thinking. And we do separate, by delineating that which is sensed, from that which is thought.
————-

if whatever the a priori is that we have (....) is not a part of reality as such, then we can't speak of reality at all. — Manuel

I think it incorrect to say we cannot speak of it at all, because that which is conceivable, can be spoken of, insofar any conception can be represented by a linguistic symbol, a word. And to speak about it, is merely to assemble words representing conceptions conjoined with it, and to speak about it sensibly is just the assemblage of conjoined representations of conceptions that don’t contradict each other. Still, to speak of a thing is sufficient to prove its possibility, but not sufficient to prove an empirical existence.

If reality in and of itself is not an empirical existence, then it must be that we can talk about only by means of a priori conceptions. We can think reality, but we are never going to have a sensation caused by it, right? Case in point....if reality is conceived as that which contains all real things, reality cannot itself be conceived as a real thing, for then reality must contain itself, an impossibility. If reality is not a thing, but can be represented in thought, hence subsequently talked about, then it is nothing more than a conception, and the conceptions conjoined with it to form propositions about it, must themselves be either hypotheticals or altogether unknowable.

Good speaking with you as well, and don’t sell yourself short. Nothing trivial about this stuff. It is what we do, after all.

Ahhhh....but we can. We know it as thinking. And we do separate, by delineating that which is sensed, from that which is thought. — Mww

I think this is our main point of disagreement. Not at all that I think experience is an illusion, I'm averse to eliminitavism of most stripes. I think experience is the which we are most acquainted with out of everything. But I don't think it's the main a priori facet, that is inscrutable to us. It's part of a process of which we only become aware of a tiny part of. In other words experience only gives us a small part of what is termed "mental".

Case in point....if reality is conceived as that which contains all real things, reality cannot itself be conceived as a real thing, for then reality must contain itself, an impossibility. If reality is not a thing, but can be represented in thought, hence subsequently talked about, then it is nothing more than a conception, and the conceptions conjoined with it to form propositions about it, must themselves be either hypotheticals or altogether unknowable. — Mww

Ah. Well if you include "things in themselves" as part of the conception of reality here, it gets much more complex. However, for the purposes of this thread, I think it suffices to say something like, reality is whatever there is (for us).

Anything beyond that or whatever grounds this reality, is admitted as mostly unknowable.

Good speaking with you as well, and don’t sell yourself short. Nothing trivial about this stuff. It is what we do, after all. — Mww

Thanks. Na man, it's that if I don't understand this for myself then it's a problem. I avoid complexity as much as I can. But I agree, it is what we do.

real is best conceived as a rational quality — Mww

I'm pretty sure when I post, it just flies into the ether (it feels unreal). Again, the abstraction of reality into a quality was caused by the desire to have certainty. We are digging in a 240-year-old hole.

...reality is whatever there is (for us). Anything beyond that or whatever grounds this reality, is admitted as mostly unknowable. — Manuel

And the fact that our (non-mathematical) world is not certain freaks us out so much we cut ourselves off from the thing-in-itself (from what essentially interests us) so that we can impose certainty onto the (our) world, even though we can't know (for certain) the "real" world. We kill the world before we even get started knowing each thing by their everyday criteria.

To say "the a priori is not part of reality" amounts to saying 'brain organization' doesn't constitute a functioning brain – "a part of reality" – when, in fact, it does. — 180 Proof

We would like the functions of the brain (science) to be responsible for our connection to the world, but a priori is a basis for judgment, and our judgments already (prior to experience) have everyday criteria (apart from us) for what makes each thing, necessarily, what it is (categorically); here, what matters to us about (i.e., the criteria for) reality is, in part, that it is in contrast to illusion, delusion, denial, fakery, etc.

Without any shadow of doubt [as: lack of confidence], amidst this vertigo of shows [appearances] and politics, I settle myself ever the firmer in the creed, that we should not postpone and refer [to a reality] and wish [for certainty], but do broad justice where we are [in a context], by whomsoever we deal with, accepting [before knowing] our actual companions and circumstances [conditions of each thing], however humble [ordinary the criteria] or odious, as the mystic officials to whom the universe has delegated its whole pleasure for us. — Emerson, Experience

And the fact that our (non-mathematical) world is not certain freaks us out so much we cut ourselves off from the thing-in-itself (from what essentially interests us) so that we can impose certainty onto the (our) world, even though we can't know (for certain) the "real" world. We kill the world before we even get started knowing each thing by their everyday criteria. — Antony Nickles

Hmm. I think that in our common sense folk science, we think we are studying "thing in themselves", that doesn't lead to theories. It can lead to very valuable stuff like art and the like.

I think the problem arises when we think that in studying say certain properties of trees or brains or anything else, many often assume we are studying a "tree-in-itself" or "the brain-in-itself". That's a mistake. However, we've gained lots of good information about the world this way.

I don't think "things in themselves" can be studied empirically. I think we can try and say negative things about it: what it's not and what it doesn't have, leaving very little room for positive contributions.

So I agree with the spirit of the argument, but I don't think we can study MUCH of "what interests us", in much depth. From phenomenal properties such as colors and sounds to political organizations. We just can't get much depth empirically about these things.

???

Reality _ the current dream.