We all know Nozick's experience machine, Brave New World...just because people think they have a good life doesn't mean they actually do. — darthbarracuda

And conversely, just because people think they have a bad life doesn't mean they do.

I don't know if that is the case. From my perspective, believing that one has a good life is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of having a good life; necessary in that without it, the good life is impossible, but not sufficient, in that simply believing that one has a good life does not mean one actually has one.

But the same cannot be said of a bad life. Since it is not sufficient to believe that one has a good life to have a good life, it must be possible to believe that one has a good life, but in fact have a bad life. But since it is necessary that one believes that one has a good life in order to have a good life, if they fail to have this belief - for instance, if they believe they have a bad life - then they do not have a good life.

See this diagram I sketched:

Hmm. I've known a lot of people who think they have lived with suffering and depravation and frankly, their only real problem is a tendency towards theatrical pessimism, a slavish devotion to social media and consumer goods, and the never-ending regret they weren't born wealthy.

You wrote that what a good life is will forever remain a mystery. So when you say that "A good life is worth living; conversely, a bad life is not worth living." you're uttering nonsense, in the sense that you do not know what you are talking about. Of course, then you only attack the first part, but it's only logical that if having a good life is impossible, because we can't know what a good life is, then, conversely, having a bad life is impossible too, because we can't know what a bad life is.

So, all that would be fine if it didn't sabotage your own argument and I would even agree that good and bad are nonsensical in this context. Meaningful/meaningless is a better pair of terms when it comes to justifying life. If one thinks his life is meaningful, then it's justified and it was worth having. Unlike good/bad, it's clear to me if my life is meaningful or not. It's not even a matter of knowing/not knowing if my life is meaningful. Not anymore than knowing that I'm in pain. It's nonsensical to question whether I know or not if I'm in pain. Even more nonsensical is for someone else to question it.

You wrote that what a good life is will forever remain a mystery. So when you say that "A good life is worth living; conversely, a bad life is not worth living." you're uttering nonsense, in the sense that you do not know what you are talking about. — hairy belly

I don't think that's a charitable interpretation of my argument. I said a complete representation of a good life will forever remain a mystery. This does not preclude the possibility of knowing partial representations of it, such as, that a good life is worth living.

Of course, then you only attack the first part, but it's only logical that if having a good life is impossible, because we can't know what a good life is, then, conversely, having a bad life is impossible too, because we can't know what a bad life is. — hairy belly

Again I don't think that's charitable and I sense you have not understood my argument. When a bad life is conceived as that which is not a good life, then if a good life is impossible, all lives are ipso facto bad lives.

Meaningful/meaningless is a better pair of terms when it comes to justifying life. — hairy belly

Well, I would say that meaning in life is necessary for having a good life, but it's not obvious to me that it's sufficient. Meaning would belong in the subjective category, and according to the diagram above, there would also need to be objective features present to make a life a good life.

You're free to disagree with this, but I think it would absurd to if you thought about it more.

I don't think that's a charitable interpretation of my argument. I said a complete representation of a good life will forever remain a mystery. — darthbarracuda

You can spin it however you like, the fact remains that what you tried to do is exclude the possibility of a good life based on our inability of forming a good enough conception of it. If you don't remember this, here it is:

"2. There is no complete conception of what a good life is, but only partial representations of what may be considered a good life, and such a complete conception will probably never be known, i.e. a complete conception of what a good life is will forever remain a mystery.
3. Therefore, it is not possible to have a justified true belief that one has a good life.
4. Therefore, it is not possible to have a good life."

Your "partial representations" are not enough for forming a JTB and a JTB is (according to you) a presupposition of recognizing a life as good. Therefore, the reason that we can never recognize a life as good is that we can't have a good enough conception of it.

Again, spin it however you like, that's what your argument says, so I don't think that my interpretation is uncharitable.

Again I don't think that's charitable and I sense you have not understood my argument. When a bad life is conceived as that which is not a good life, then if a good life is impossible, all lives are ipso facto bad lives. — darthbarracuda

I'm not sure you understand the arguments. When two terms have definitions that depend on each other, then, if one of the definitions is untenable, the other one is ipso facto untenable too.

Well, I would say that meaning in life is necessary for having a good life, but it's not obvious to me that it's sufficient. — darthbarracuda

You clearly don't understand what is being said. Meaning is not necessary for having a good life. It is necessary for having a meaningful and therefore a justified life. No need to bring the "good life" in this, since it's such a failure of a term.

Sorry, I don't mean to be flippant or rude, but I don't understand your objection. What do you find problematic about the idea that, while we can't have a complete conception of a good life, we can have a partial representations of it, but that because we fail to have a complete representation, we never attain a good life?

We are mammals, so the people procreate and multiplied at incredible rates no matter what. May we can considered ourselves a plague. Sooner than latter may we don't have any kind of life.

Sorry, I don't mean to be flippant or rude, but I don't understand your objection. What do you find problematic about the idea that, while we can't have a complete conception of a good life, we can have a partial representations of it, but that because we fail to have a complete representation, we never attain a good life? — darthbarracuda

Well, I wrote about a few things I find problematic about your approach. If you got nothing out of it, then there's probably zero reason to repeat it. More generally, I find all of it rather contrived, but that's what usually happens when you begin with a conclusion and then you embark to find ways to justify it. Kinda like when you have a kid and then a contrarian challenges you on your shallow motives.

So, if I'm given zero reasons as to why a JTB is necessary for a good life, then there's not much the rest of it is gonna do. As I've hinted, I find this being absurd to the point of being funny, like asking someone evidence that they are in pain or that they are content. Before declaring that a JTB is necessary for a good life, you should explain how utterances like "I have a good life", "My life is shit" etc are descriptive and not expressive, you'd have to show that they are about belief and knowledge rather than emotion. For all I know, when I say "My life is shit", I usually mean "I feel like shit" and that has zero to do with belief or knowledge. Sure, when challenged, many of us try to justify or give evidence for things that have nothing to do with these. That's common. So, when someone comes and tells me that "shut the fuck up, your life isn't shit, look the kids in Africa", I might be tempted to provide "evidence" as to why my life is "objectively shitty" despite not being an African kid. Which, of course, has nothing to do with whether or not my life is shitty aka I feel like shit. If anything I might feel worse for being such a privileged crybaby.

Anyway, the point is simple, you haven't shown why "the good life", or whatever, is a matter of belief and not emotion. Cause if it's not about belief but about emotion, then your whole idea is a category error or however you philosophically inclined people call it.

Anyway, the point is simple, you haven't shown why "the good life", or whatever, is a matter of belief and not emotion. Cause if it's not about belief but about emotion, then your whole idea is a category error or however you philosophically inclined people call it. — hairy belly

Okay, so you disagree with the initial premise. I never argued for it, that's fair. I did not include the possibility that utterances about life might be expressive rather than descriptive. If having a good life is not dependent on believing that one has a good life, then my argument fails, no question about it. But that's obvious. It is odd that it took you this long to make that point.

Okay, so you disagree with the initial premise. I never argued for it, that's fair. I did not include the possibility that utterances about life might be expressive rather than descriptive. If having a good life is not dependent on believing that one has a good life, then my argument fails, no question about it. But that's obvious. It is odd that it took you this long to make that point. — darthbarracuda

So do you have a good argument as to this expressive/descriptive distinction? It seems fairly obvious that a good life doesnt entail recognition of it, especially when one accepts life can be objectively bad or good.
Whats your case for a good life requiring belief that that life is good?

It seems fairly obvious that a good life doesnt entail recognition of it, especially when one accepts life can be objectively bad or good.
Whats your case for a good life requiring belief that that life is good? — DingoJones

I started off with the assumption that it seemed obvious that it does entail this recognition, though it seems not everyone agrees.

Consider the proposition: "Stacey has a boyfriend named Paul." It would seem that, in order for Stacey to have a boyfriend named Paul, two things would need to be case: there exists a man with the name Paul, and there exists a belief in Stacey that this same man is her boyfriend. If either one of these is false, Stacey does not have a boyfriend.

With that example in mind, consider the proposition: "Stacey has a good life." If there does not exist in Stacey a belief that she has a good life, then she does not have a good life. See the diagram I posted above.

In general, it seems reasonable to say that a good life is a species of things that require for its existence both objective and subjective components, and furthermore that one of the subjective components is the belief that this thing exists.

So the problem you're going to run into in all of this is people will always object to the objective component. They will just ask for a regress "Why"? For example, it would seem "objectively" that a "Happy Slave" is an injustice. However, the slave "thinks" they are happy. So how can you say he's "wrong"? You see? They will just say a good life is always subjective.

"Stacey has a boyfriend named Paul." — darthbarracuda

"Stacey has a good life." — darthbarracuda

These two statements are not analogous. The first is a statement about objective facts, the second you intended to to be statement about Staceys belief about her life which is subjective.
In order for your two statements to be analogous the “happy life” of the second statement would have to be referencing objective components/qualifiers of a happy life. As soon as you do that it completely undermines your point because then Staceys subjective opinion about her lifes happiness isnt determinate of Staceys happy life.
If thats your case for a good life requiring recognition of it being a good life I think it falls short sir.

In order for your two statements to be analogous the “happy life” of the second statement would have to be referencing objective components/qualifiers of a happy life. As soon as you do that it completely undermines your point because then Staceys subjective opinion about her lifes happiness isnt determinate of Staceys happy life. — DingoJones

Not sure I follow, my point was that both Stacey having a boyfriend and having a good life depend on objective and subjective components.

Well I asked for your case for recognition of life being good required for a good life and you responded with your Stacey scenarios which I pointed out doesnt really support that recognition of life being good being required for a good life.
Now you are saying that you weren’t trying to make that case but rather a point about subjective/objective components.

So assuming there was a miscommunication I want to ask again, whats your case fir recognition of a good life required for a good life?

Well I asked for your case for recognition of life being good required for a good life and you responded with your Stacey scenarios which I pointed out doesnt really support that recognition of life being good being required for a good life. — DingoJones

Yeah, I wasn't able to follow your objection, can you clarify it?

Lets make sure Im not confused about what youre saying first.
For ease of reference, P1 = “recognition of a good life is necessary for a good life”

First you used

"Stacey has a boyfriend named Paul."

With an accompanying explanation. You then used

"Stacey has a good life." — darthbarracuda

With accompanying explanation. I read the intention of the two examples as an attempt to establish that if you accept the logic of the first then you have to accept the logic of the second since the two examples are the same in regard to P1. In other words, you wanted to show that your two examples are analogous in order to establish P1.

Is that correct?

Is that correct? — DingoJones

Yes. Just as Stacey must believe that Paul is her boyfriend in order for Paul to be her boyfriend, Stacey must believe that she has a good life in order for her to have a good life. That is my claim.

:100:

Yes. Just as Stacey must believe that Paul is her boyfriend in order for Paul to be her boyfriend, Stacey must believe that she has a good life in order for her to have a good life. That is my claim. — darthbarracuda

Ok, so my point was that those two examples are not analogous. The first references facts, part of which is what “boyfriend” means by definition. The second references opinion, not facts. The two examples are not like and therefore acceptance of the first does not entail acceptance of the second.

Stacey is in pain. Is that a fact or an opinion?

Almost Half Of The Pregnancies In The US Are UNPLANNED (The Washington Post)

Currently, an astonishing 45 percent of the 6 million pregnancies in the United States each year are unintended. — The Washington Post

I guess those who really cares about the future of their children are in the minority; if people were serious about the future prospects of their children, wouldn't pregnancies be a meticulously well-planned affair? Too. we're talking about what the conditions for children are in the apotheosis of modern civilization (the USA) - not as good as I'd thought/hoped. Just imagine what the situation must be like in the developing world?

The population explosion only means one thing - the slice of the resource pie each child can lay claim to gets smaller and smaller, a breaking point is then reached and civilization will collapse.

I haven't a clue why you would.
— darthbarracuda

Embrace the suck! — James Riley

Going God mode, eh?

That's what God must've thought when he sent his son, Jesus, to earth. Astonishingly, Jesus' life was, I suppose, what they call a divine plan and surely must've covered every eventuality (the crown of thorns and the crucifxion too) from womb to tomb.

“Tut, tut, child!” said the Duchess. “Everything’s got a moral, if only you can find it.” And she squeezed herself up closer to Alice’s side as she spoke. — Lewis Carroll (Alice In Wonderland)

The first references facts, part of which is what “boyfriend” means by definition. The second references opinion, not facts. — DingoJones

So yeah, it's as @schopenhauer1 alluded to earlier, if the value of something is entirely subjective, then there won't be any sense in which we can say as a matter of fact what the value of this thing is, if we're expected to provide something beyond subjective states.

But anyway, if having a good life is an opinion, it would seem that someone would have to hold that opinion, e.g. Stacey has to believe she has a good life in order to have a good life. It would be objectively true that Stacey has a good life, if and only if she subjectively believes that she has a good life (and nothing else). Just like for it to be objectively true that someone is in pain, they would actually need to feel pain. Having a good life would come down to whether or not someone thought their life was good.

The question I would ask then is, if a good life is based on opinion, then what factors influence this? How does one come to determine whether they consider their life to be good? My hunch is that this will involve things that are common factors across people. Things like: not feeling a lot of pain, accomplishing one's goals, having meaningful relationships, etc etc. Which I think gives some credence to the view that one might be mistaken in their opinion.

By opinion, did you mean an expression, like something that cannot be true or false? As in, Stacey saying she has a good life is not a real proposition but just a vocalization of her current satisfaction with life? Because that just does not seem correct at all, as evidence by the fact that we often make decisions based on the assumption that it is not just an utterance but has some degree of truth, like when we euthanize old dogs. We euthanize them because we judge it to be the case that their lives are very bad.

There is a long history of debate about what qualifies as a good life, but what I have not seen much of is a meta-analysis of the debate itself; we debate a lot about what a good life is, but we don't think as much about what it means to have this debate, or what the debate itself indicates about life.

That there is so much disagreement, confusion and mystery surrounding what it means to have a good life, that any steps to clarify it require a great deal of effort, that one usually has to be taught how to live a good life, all of these things seem to demonstrate that a good life is not common and is by no means given, but more importantly, that life is something that has to be fixed in a certain way for it to good.

There is the question about what makes a life good. But there is a deeper question, which asks what the value of having to ask this question is - i.e. is it a good thing that we have to ask the question about what makes a life good?

The pain example makes the exact same mistake. That is not a like example. A like example would be asking about how much pain. Whether she is in pain is a fact, how much the pain hurts is subjective.
Your last paragraph was just repeating the same mistake so clearly I have failed to make my point.
It looks like you moved on in your next post so Ill leave it at that.

@darthbarracuda@DingoJones

I am going to see this similar to the "Happy Slave" scenario. A slave is put in the unjust situation of being limited in freedom, but is somehow subjectively happy. Is the slave living the "good life"? If we were purely taking into account subjective attitude, then yes, absolutely. However, we don't judge situations by this alone. If we have all the relevant information, we use other criteria beyond subjective feeling like justice, rights, freedoms, consent, capacity, and a host of other relevant matters we deem important. Clearly the slave isn't allowed to live up to his full human capacities, his rights are being violated, and the situation itself is overall an injustice. These are things that don't necessarily constitute a good life, and they are relevant to the situation of being a human and being born into life.

The same goes for antinatalism. You can have people subjectively feel good they were born, but were still "forced" into an often harmful, inescapable game of life which was an injustice. There can be totally relevant non-subjective factors that relate to the "justness" or "rightness" of a moral/axiological situation. Surely having a just/fair life is something that factors into a good life, for example. Someone who is allowed full capacities versus someone who is not, let's say.

Whether she is in pain is a fact, how much the pain hurts is subjective. — DingoJones

For what reason can it not be said how much the pain hurts, as a matter of fact?

You can have people subjectively feel good they were born, but were still "forced" into an often harmful, inescapable game of life which was an injustice. — schopenhauer1

Indeed, though one objection, and I mean no offense, but wrapping a word in quotes makes it suspiciously imprecise. Either someone is forced to live by having been born, or they aren't; "forced" is questionably ambiguous, IMO.

For what reason can it not be said how much the pain hurts, as a matter of fact? — darthbarracuda

Because it is subjective, there is no fact of the matter that applies to everyone.