Under that new (less than perfect) definition, a table is definitely physical, even if only an illusion. — Samuel Lacrampe
While it is debatable that the table that I perceive is real or an illusion, the undeniable fact is that I perceive a table. — Samuel Lacrampe
I still think there is a misunderstanding. While it is debatable that the table that I perceive is real or an illusion, the undeniable fact is that I perceive a table. As long as the thing that I perceive has a shape or colour, then it is physical. — Samuel Lacrampe
Even if the table is an illusion, then it is an illusion of a physical thing. — Samuel Lacrampe
In contrast, non-physical things would be concepts such as logic, morality and justice, because they don't have physical attributes such as shape, colour, or energy. If these are illusions, then they would be illusions of non-physical things. — Samuel Lacrampe
So the only obstacle I see to a mutual understanding is to agree on the definition of a thing being "physical". Once clarified, then the original argument is easily understood. — Samuel Lacrampe
As I understand it, our disagreement lies around the definition of the term "physical". Let's take a step back. Instead of using the term "physical", let's use the term "colour" in the argument, as so:But I think what would be desired of anything that was truly physical, would be that it is real independently of any perception of it; its reality would not be dependent on it being perceived. — Wayfarer
There seems to be a logical fallacy in that statement: How can our perception of a thing be always mentally generated, since you agreed in premise 1 that it is not possible to imagine things that have not been perceived. Let's say I perceive a table. It could be that this table is mentally generated, because I perceived a similar table in the past. How can I explain the perception of the past? It could be that that too was mentally generated from a perception of another table before that, and so on ... But How did I get the very first perception? Logically, the first perception of a table must come from a real table, since we agree in premise 1 that it is not possible to imagine things that have not been perceived. Also, I would rectify the syllogism as so:We can now see that 1 is true but 2 is dubious as there's a possibility that our perceptions could be mentally generated, having no real physical correlate. — TheMadFool
How can I explain the perception of the past? It could be that that too was mentally generated from a perception of another table before that, and so on ... But How did I get the very first perception? — Samuel Lacrampe
It sounds like we will not agree on the definition of the term "physical". — Samuel Lacrampe
What if I simplify my original argument and use the term "colour"? It changes the conclusion a bit, but not really the intent of the argument. Here it is:
1. We cannot imagine things we have not experienced in the past.
2. We perceive colours.
3. Therefore colours exist. Not necessarily the ones I directly perceive right now, (because I could be dreaming right now), but these colours must have existed at least in the past in order to enable me to imagine them right now.
Any objections? If not, then the same argument can be used for shapes, smells, sounds and so on. — Samuel Lacrampe
While it is debatable that the table that I perceive is real or an illusion, the undeniable fact is that I perceive a table. — Samuel Lacrampe
If I perceive a table, then I perceive a table. If I perceive a desk, that I perceive a desk. Calling a desk a table does not change the perception (if I understand you correctly when you say "calling"). If I call a desk a table, then I am dishonest, but that does not change my perception of it.How can you say that it's undoubtable that what you perceive is a table when you could be perceiving something else, and incorrectly calling it a table — Metaphysician Undercover
So we agree that such things as colours, shapes, smells and sounds exist in the real world. That was the point of my original argument. It refutes the belief that no such things exists, that these are all illusions. — Samuel Lacrampe
I then categorized these things as physical things... — Samuel Lacrampe
It looks like we disagree on the definition of the term "physical", but that's okay, because at this point, we are merely arguing about labels. — Samuel Lacrampe
While I agree with the points you say previously, I disagree with this one. For if space, time and energy are subjective, then they do not exist in themselves in the real world. But my argument refutes that, insofar as we perceive them. Just plug the terms in the syllogism.or it will be rejected on the basis that "space", " time" and "energy" are subjective, not objective, and are just words or concepts. — Chief Owl Sapientia
That was my attempt at defining "physical". What is your (or the idealist's) definition then? Maybe we can resume the argument from there.unless your definition is accepted, which it probably will not be by most people who deny the physical. — Chief Owl Sapientia
Let's make sure we agree on the definition first. Idealism: system of thought in which the objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind. Is that adequate?Are you conceding that you cannot refute idealism — Chief Owl Sapientia
That is right.Am I right? — TheMadFool
You are correct too. Indeed, it appears the argument is refuted if there exists a being which can create (or imagine) something out of nothing, and then pass it on to us. Such a power is typically attributed to God. I think this is why Buddhism survives this argument, if I understand Buddhism correctly, as such: The physical world does not exist, but a God (pantheistic) exists which imagines it all.The point being what if mind precedes the physical? — TheMadFool
While I agree with the points you say previously, I disagree with this one. For if space, time and energy are subjective, then they do not exist in themselves in the real world. But my argument refutes that, insofar as we perceive them. Just plug the terms in the syllogism. — Samuel Lacrampe
That was my attempt at defining "physical". What is your (or the idealist's) definition then? Maybe we can resume the argument from there. — Samuel Lacrampe
Let's make sure we agree on the definition first. Idealism: system of thought in which the objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind. Is that adequate? — Samuel Lacrampe
You can be mistaken about the real thing you are perceiving, but how can you be mistaken about a perception? To use the specific example, how can you mistakenly call a desk a table if you are perceiving a desk? The only way I see how is because the person doesn't speak english very well and thus thought that a desk was called "table" in english. But this would be an error in language, not in perception. — Samuel Lacrampe
If I understand correctly, we at least agree that space is part of the physical. And we previously agreed that my syllogism works for things as colours and shapes. But how can we have colours and shapes without space? For us to perceive or even imagine colours and shapes, these must occupy an area (2D space). IE, shrink the area down to zero, and we can no longer perceive these colours and shapes. Thus space is an essential attribute of colours and shapes. Let's recap:The physical is that which relates to physics, which is the natural science that involves the study of matter and its motion and behaviour through space and time, along with related concepts such as energy and force. — Sapientia
No. As you said, you first perceived it as a table. You were not "mistaken in your perception" because a table is what you perceived. — Samuel Lacrampe
Again, you were not "mistaken in your perception" because a desk is what you perceived. Let's say the real thing was in fact a rock (that looked like a table from afar). Then both your perceptions were wrong in identifying the real thing, but you were not "mistaken in your perception", because even though we are not certain about the real thing that we perceive, we are certain about the perception itself. I think you are using the term "perception" incorrectly. — Samuel Lacrampe
Another example: Let's say I perceive a purple unicorn. I am not certain if it is an illusion or reality (though likely an illusion). One thing is certain though: I am perceiving a purple unicorn, and not a green dog. — Samuel Lacrampe
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