Wittgenstein will say we are compelled (to strip our world of any measure and replace it with a requirement for certainty). — Antony Nickles

As overblown as W makes that sound, it is actually what the human system attempts to do, if not attain to certainty, at least have some certainty by which to judge our comprehensions a priori. Hence, the three Aristotelian laws of logical thought, from which all proper deductive inference follows. Schopenhauer is credited for establishing the principle of sufficient reason to the three from the Ancients, but it is merely supplemental to the irreducible axiomatics.

Still, to be compelled implies the limitless, insofar as it demands an end even if it be contradictory or absurd, the very epitome of irrationality, but to merely wish implies its own limit, and it is always better to be unsatisfied that irrational.
———

I understand what you mean with....

capable of telling us its secrets........ — Antony Nickles

....but I like this as much more fluent.....

“.....(We) must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose....”

....found close to the bottom of the pile excavated from that 240yo hole.
—————

.....but not if we require that it be certain knowledge or necessarily stem from a cause. — Antony Nickles

Wait. Wha??? W says we’re compelled to certainty, but we should at the same time disregard the first principle of certainty, re: cause and effect?

You’re one of those few hereabouts not liable to self-contradiction, so.......what did I mistake?

In order to understand "reality", it behooves one to distinguish between objective reality ("the universe"), that which has existence apart from the scrutiny of the human mind, and subjective reality ("the world"), reality as filtered through the human consciousness, which may not be as "real", yet holds as much import for the human experience.

Wittgenstein will say we are compelled (to strip our world of any measure and replace it with a requirement for certainty). We may hope that a moral discussion will end in agreement, but the temptation is to define our morals beforehand so we are ensured of what is right. We may see the world as intelligible, capable of telling us its secrets, but not if we require that it be certain knowledge or necessarily stem from a cause. — Antony Nickles

In so saying, Wittgenstein draws the distinction between subjective, which is inherently uncertain, and objective, about which one may achieve certainty since it is composed of fact, realities

If we regard reality "as that part of our conscious experience that no amount of mental manipulation will alter" as TheMadFool stated then a lot of mental states generated in our central nervous system belong to that reality, i.e. depressions, nightmares or stressful memories. None of these we can alter at will.

Another question is whether an object belongs to the outside world and why it is so difficult to draw a line between mental objects and "objects in reality".
A purely speculative thought: As the nervous system arose from simple sensory cells that responded directly to specific stimuli from theire enviroment, perhaps that is why consciousness attributes everything that is supposed to trigger a reaction to something different than itself. Our brains may be a million times more sophisticated than those first sensory cells, but on cell level the old electrochemical switches still work.

I would define it [reality] as "That which is right now, irregardless of belief, attitude or consideration." — Cidat

(BTW, You might want to correct "irregardless" to "regardless".)

First of all, I will define "reality" as it is commonly used, so that I can comment on your description: "The state of things as they actually exist". I will only have to add "for us", i.e. we must refer to our own reality of the world and not to some absolute, objective reality, which cannot be known, or to the physical universe, something which a lot of people confuse or even identify it with.
This will do for now and for what I have to describe here as my response to the description of the topic.

1) Re "That which is right now": This is normally called the present. I don't know how you identify it with "reality". We can say only that it belongs to reality.
2) Re "regardless of belief": Beliefs are part of one's reality, so they cannot be removed from the "equation". (Note: Beliefs must be differentiated from "imagined or imaginary things".)
3) Re "regardless of attitude": Attitude has to do with a way of feeling or thinking and the behavior resulted by it. So it doesn't have to do with reality.
4) Re "regardless of consideration": Like beliefs, considerations are part of one's reality, so they cannot be removed from the "equation" either.

Is it possible to give a rigorous definition of 'reality'? — Cidat

The term "reality" is one of the hottest and most misunderstood ones in philosophy (and of course in the entire human race!). Each dictionary has its own definition, but this can be settled. The real problem is that reality is usually confused with the "physical universe", the "world", as we commonly say. So people talk about "absolute" and "objective" reality; a reality that is "outside us". And what is strange is that they can't go a step forward and ask themselves "If there were absolute, objective reality, who will be there to tell?" Isn't that very interesting? Because at least someone should be able to perceive and describe such a reality. But the "physical universe" is outside us. We exist or not, the physical universe is always there. If no human being were alive, what would be the meaning of a reality? So, reality can only be subjective. It is created and sustained in our minds as we perceive what is outside us (physical universe) and inside us (thoughts, beliefs, ideas, imagined things, memories, etc.)

Now, reality can be shared, i.e., two or more people can have the same or a similar reality about a subject. This is an agreement of views and the result is what we call "common reality". That is as far as an "objective" reality can be.

So, I can define "reality" in simple terms as "The total of things that exist for us and which we accept as facts". It is how we perceive the world. And it is how we think about the world and how we understand the world. And it is what we believe about everything. We may believe in God (or a "god"), we may believe that God doesn't exist or we may believe that there is a possibility that God exists. All that belong to our reality.

In short, reality has a meaning only for the individual. The only reality outside that is another individual's reality!

Illusions, mistakes and disagreements are most simply accounted for if what is the case is different to what is thought to be the case. Reality is not what one experiences. Reality is what is the case. — Banno

That my experience (what I saw, touched, tasted) can be an illusion, that I can be mistaken in my memory, my assumptions, makes it seem as if even the closest things to me cannot be trusted. We take the failure of our best case scenario as a sign there must be a different version which is not subject to the limitations of our ordinary means of judgment, instead of looking at it that our failure and limitation happens in normal rational ways. We are apart from each other and still learning and obscure to ourselves and subject to deception or lack of control. However, if we only ascribe certainty and solidity to the world, we strip away the ordinary fallible, different means of judging every separate type of thing.

As @Manuel has said, "reality" is a title with few duties except with respect to something else. And so as @Banno has said, we are mistaken, fall prey to illusions, etc. And as I have pointed out, we become deluded, fooled, dream, hope, etc., but "Reality" is not a thing or quality itself, but only a relation to a state of confusion. We find ourselves lost to our inquiry, away in our own thoughts, even in a picture created by our desire to simplify, and we need to be brought back to the case at hand. But this is not one thing, found in one way, judged by one standard.

We may see the world as intelligible, capable of telling us its secrets, but not if we require that it be certain knowledge or necessarily stem from a cause.
— Antony Nickles

Wait. Wha??? W says we’re compelled to certainty, but we should at the same time disregard the first principle of certainty, re: cause and effect? .....what did I mistake? — Mww

Our compulsion for certainty is from our fear of the failure of our ordinary means of judgment, and so we strip away any context, abstracting to "reality" as a generalization to which we can attribute a certain ground, a consistent cause that will ensure certainty. As you quote:

....(We) must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose.... — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

Wittgenstein attributes Kant's imposition of the terms of judgment as what blinds us to the vast variety of criteria of every different thing, as he himself was guilty of in the Tractatus, which led to his inability to speak on so much of our lives. The desire for certainty and resolution precludes the rational means we have of investigating and discussing everything else, though it may not lead to agreement or avoid our failings.

the human system attempts to... if not attain to certainty, at least have some certainty by which to judge our comprehensions a priori. Hence, the three Aristotelian laws of logical thought — Mww

Our fear of our groundlessness creates a desire for necessity worked out beforehand, thus the popularity of Aristotle's observations. If we can just find premises which ensure conclusions, then we can skip the messy work of sorting out an instant case based on what prior criteria our lives have for each thing. We forget that formal logic's stringent criteria limits its applicability only to certain topics (wanting instead to apply it everywhere). So we create "reality" to apply our own criteria universally and then we internalize uncertainty within ourselves in order to have control over it. Thus we "judge our comprehensions" before they have a chance for the regular failures the world has and we in it.

Still, to be compelled implies the limitless, insofar as it demands an end even if it be contradictory or absurd, the very epitome of irrationality, but to merely wish implies its own limit, and it is always better to be unsatisfied that irrational. — Mww

But to be unsatisfied in our wish for certainty makes us dismiss anything not able to meet that standard as "absurd" or "irrational". So we are the ones which create a "limit" for what rationality is: certainty, completeness, necessity, and the abstract removal of context and ourselves. And our limit (Kant's line) creates the picture of a "reality" which we can then judge everything else against in which we cannot be sure of beforehand (in ourselves, "a priori").

But the ordinary criteria in our lives do have prior standards of identity, judgment, completion, and other implications, though they do not ensure our actions or expressions, and are subject to the context and require our subsequent and continuing involvement (in contrast to our wish to structure rationality or ourselves to avoid, beforehand, this responsibility).

Our compulsion for certainty is from our fear of the failure of our ordinary means of judgment — Antony Nickles

Only the common, or the uninformed, succumb to such disaster. Everyone makes mistakes; no need to fear anything. The human compulsion for certainty is merely a reflection of our nature as rational agents to seek truth, and we seek truth because anything else is reducible to it. Simple as that.

Kant's imposition of the terms of judgment as what blinds us to the vast variety of criteria of every different thing — Antony Nickles

We’re only blinded....so to speak....to the remaining vast variety of criteria, after having determined the ones that fit. Every different thing already implies a vast array of criteria, but each thing has its own. Of course I’m blind to any variety of criteria that doesn’t fit my cognition of “water buffalo”, if that is what under judgement.

All this just seems like a solution in need of a problem.

Our compulsion for certainty is from our fear of the failure of our ordinary means of judgment
— Antony Nickles

Only the common, or the uninformed, succumb to such disaster. Everyone makes mistakes; no need to fear anything. — Mww

Tell that to Descartes. We imagine disaster though we have ordinary ways to mitigate it: excuses, apologies, etc. And we do not succumb, we react, creating the standard of reality and making the inherent potential for failure and uncertainty seem like only our (my) state rather than of everything.

The human compulsion for certainty is merely a reflection of our nature as rational agents to seek truth, and we seek truth because anything else is reducible to it. Simple as that. — Mww

Yet if we reduce the world to true or false, we make it impossible to see the variety and complexity of knowledge and wisdom that we seek.

All this just seems like a solution in need of a problem. — Mww

The problem is the projection of reality as a solution for our inability to manage with the imperfect criteria of our lives, our responsibility for them, and the otherwise groundlessness of our world.

A definition of realism is a contradiction in terms, for the ultimate purpose of any definition is to reduce theoretical nomenclature to observations and actions. Otherwise the definition is useless and unintelligible.

Tell that to Descartes. — Antony Nickles

Are you suggesting fear is synonymous, or compatible, with doubt? Either or, Rene was explicit in his doubt, but it can’t be said with sufficient justice, that he was afraid of it. In fact, it might be said he used it as a weapon. And if not a weapon, then certainly a most unconditioned judgement.

Even that rascally demon, which is nothing but a means for fear-mongering, with respect to Descartes’ metaphysics at least, was merely the other of a pair of extremes, in accordance with the human system of rational complementary. As such, he didn’t fear it, or its potential, but rather accepted its formal necessity, for without it, his idea of god would be meaningless.
————

And we do not succumb..... — Antony Nickles

....making the inherent potential for failure and uncertainty seem like (the) only state (left to us) — Antony Nickles

.....IS to succumb. It just makes no sense to me, to argue the validity in fearing a mere potential, or in doubting the possibility of avoiding it. Why would anybody even get out of bed in the morning, if he was constantly wracked with fear for making potential failure the rule of the day?

Nahhhhh.....no profit whatsoever in allowing the exception to the rule to become the expectation.
—————

If, as you say....

capable of telling us its secrets, — Antony Nickles

...and if, as The Esteemed Professor says....

“...approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it...”

.....then how exactly does this relate?

The problem is the projection of reality — Antony Nickles

As regards reality, if we always receive, who or what is projecting? I submit or your consideration, we don’t project anything upon, nor do we tell reality or Nature in general, anything at all, but always and only tell ourselves how reality appears to be. As soon as this is understood as the fundamental condition of the human state of affairs, there is no legitimate reason to fear, or doubt, the inherent potential for failure and uncertainty in the “ inability to manage with the imperfect criteria of our lives”. As a matter of due course, it is to be given, for without mistakes resulting from failures, learning is impossible, other than by sheer accident, the occurrence of which can never be itself a fear nor a failure.

On the other hand, you might be indicating by “projection of reality”, a relative behaviorism, in that once reality is understood in a certain way, it is then the ground for the treatment of its other inhabitants, supporting your “otherwise groundlessness”. In which case, I understand “projection of reality” as a euphemism for projecting oneself as a reflection of a particular reality, which is common practice, yes. Then, perhaps the fear of failure and uncertainty is with respect to how one will be received by his projection, which, rather than a fear of one’s own understanding, is a fear of being misunderstood.

Perhaps we’re closer to each other’s theories than first appears. I make the case for wishing to be understood BUT NOT holding with any fear of failing in my own understanding, you make the case for the fear of not being understood BECAUSE of the potential for failure in one’s own understanding.

Or not.....

Q. A cognition-invariant, involuntary resistance to ineluctable facts of the matter.

A. What is reality? — Morpheus plays Jeopardy!

Poppin' red pills like breath mints since 1999. :party:

:blush:

Q. "A cognition-invariant, involuntary resistance to ineluctable facts of the matter."

A. What are "percepts"?
— George Berkeley plays Jeopardy

:zip:

Descartes’ metaphysics at least, was merely the other of a pair of extremes, in accordance with the human system of rational complementary. As such, he didn’t fear it, or its potential, but rather accepted its formal necessity, for without it, his idea of god would be meaningless. — Mww

Yes, I am saying the fear of the conclusions of the radical skeptic creates the need to answer him with a particular kind of solution, ignoring the ordinary means of judgment we already live within, because they are not a solution.

....making the inherent potential for failure and uncertainty seem like (the) only state (left to us)
— Antony Nickles

.....IS to succumb. It just makes no sense to me, to argue the validity in fearing a mere potential, or in doubting the possibility of avoiding it. Why would anybody even get out of bed in the morning, if he was constantly wracked with fear for making potential failure the rule of the day?

Nahhhhh.....no profit whatsoever in allowing the exception to the rule to become the expectation. — Mww

I'm not claiming this reality that we postulate is in response to a "mere" potential or that in abandoning its picture we are giving up. The ultimate groundlessness of knowledge is not an exception but our human condition, without an intellectual solution. Nevertheless we function, and fail; sometimes it does not work out; and we bear that ongoing burden.

As regards reality, if we always receive, who or what is projecting? ...[we] always and only tell ourselves how reality appears to be. As soon as this is understood as the fundamental condition of the human state of affairs, there is no legitimate reason to fear — Mww

This is not to deny the world, just its separation into appearance and reality; which is the differentiation we use to salvage reality as a generalized certainty, making our experience or perception what is limited, tainted, or only individual. The history of our lives, culture, and expressions are the fabric of our criteria for each thing, which responds to our inquiries, provided we are not demanding the answers provide generalizable certainty, as we equate with "reality".

I make the case for wishing to be understood BUT NOT holding with any fear of failing in my own understanding, you make the case for the fear of not being understood BECAUSE of the potential for failure in one’s own understanding. — Mww

As I mentioned previously, the confidence with which Emerson implores us to act is to rely upon our everyday criteria, which is not the same as an arrogance that we are not afraid of failing because we act on a certainty based on reality (not that that is your position). I am not making the case that we should be afraid, but that our creation of this picture of reality is the result and evidence of the fact that we are afraid (like an overcompensation to an insecurity); that we want to ensure our being understood, that we want our knowledge to guaranty our acts beforehand, relinquish us from responsibility for failure. This is not fear of failure of "one's own understanding", but the scisim of us from the world, and so we save the world and internalize the failure as our own; we take responsibility to avoid being responsible.

Sorry for the delay; duties of everyday life, doncha know.

the fear of the conclusions of the radical skeptic creates the need to answer him with a particular kind of solution, ignoring the ordinary means of judgment we already live within, because they are not a solution. — Antony Nickles

Hmmmm. I grant the need to answer the radical skeptic with a solution (rebuttal? refutation?) of a particular kind. But first, what does it mean to “fear” the conclusions of a radical skeptic? How would that conclusion manifest? Without understanding these, what kind of answer would I be able to formulate? If ordinary means of judgement result in truth, why wouldn’t that answer the radical skeptic, as a legitimate solution?

I was going to ask before, but didn’t, so I’ll ask now: what is an ordinary means of judgement? Are there extraordinary means? I’m guessing you have an explanation for what judgement is, in order to distinguish the ordinariness of it we already live within, from something other than that.
————-

The ultimate groundlessness of knowledge is not an exception but our human condition, without an intellectual solution. — Antony Nickles

I grant the contingency of empirical knowledge is a human condition, but reject the groundlessness of it. Knowledge is an intellectual process giving a solution in itself, which suffices as necessary ground. There is irreducible certainty in human rationality, therefore knowledge is possible. That which is possible must have a ground.
—————

we want to ensure our being understood...... — Antony Nickles

Yes.

we want our knowledge to guaranty our acts beforehand....... — Antony Nickles

Yes.

relinquish us from responsibility for failure. — Antony Nickles

Perhaps, insofar far as the failure is not mine, but the other’s. I try my best to be understood, and that I have tried relinquishes me from responsibility for you not understanding me. Nevertheless, I hold with no “overcompensation to an insecurity”. If I am not responsible, for having tried, there’s no insecurity for which overcompensation is a remedy.

and so we save the world and internalize the failure as our own..... — Antony Nickles

Yes, in the case where it is not a human-to human relation, but human-to-world relation, where one mis-judges something about the world.

we take responsibility to avoid being responsible. — Antony Nickles

I can see taking responsibility FOR avoiding being responsible, but if I do take responsibility, something I’m responsible for is presupposed. It would seem I cannot, then, take responsibility TO avoid being responsible. If I take responsibility I AM responsible for taking it, hence haven’t avoided being responsible at all.

what does it mean to “fear” the conclusions of a radical skeptic? How would that conclusion manifest? — Mww

I appreciate your asking questions; skepticism is of course a long story (and I won't tell it right), but with Plato and Descartes, etc. radical skepticism differs from regular doubt in that it is not just: how to identify a goldfinch from a robin, but: how do we know that is (an instance of) a table, or a piece of wax? Once we get to that question the fear is that there needs to be an answer or we end up in a place where we are asking how do we know what is real at all. To add fuel to the fire, we want to know what is the right thing to do and know about other people (their minds), and then the wheels come off the bus because we can't find any solution that has any weight in those instances.

I grant the need to answer the radical skeptic with a solution (rebuttal? refutation?) of a particular kind. — Mww

And this is the bottle we get trapped into, picturing the issue as a problem that must be solved. What Wittgenstein and others found is that the skeptic's abstraction from tables and goldfinchs to generalized terms like appearance and particular and meaning and true, stripped away our criteria for each thing and a context in which to apply them. Without those, our answer to the skeptic's picture of our groundlessness is to re-impose criteria which solve for that conclusion outside any context.

If ordinary means of judgement result in truth, why wouldn’t that answer the radical skeptic, as a legitimate solution? — Mww

Even if we put the skeptic's claims within an understandably context, the skeptic is correct about our ultimate groundlessness, our separation from each other, the possibility we may not bridge that gap, and that we can not do it with knowledge alone (beforehand, as it were: sidestepping our responsibility). And the fact our ordinary means of judgement are specific for each thing means that truth (true/false) is not the only measure of importance (or truth-value), nor are we setting (imposing) the bar equally across the board with certainty, a certain logic or rationality, etc.

what is an ordinary means of judgement? Are there extraordinary means? — Mww

The criteria we would ordinarily use would be the measure of, or what counts in deciding, say, the difference between an accident and a mistake. They are the yardstick by which we judge whether the expression of an excuse absolves me of the consequences of an action; whether my expression meets the categorical requirements to call it an excuse, one successfully pulled off. Now if we are worried about leaving our actions in the hands of classification and judgment after the fact, we could remove the context of before and after, and the surrounding circumstances, and simply abstract a generalized theory of action or speech which would remove our part in it.

I grant the contingency of empirical knowledge is a human condition, but reject the groundlessness of it. Knowledge is an intellectual process giving a solution in itself, which suffices as necessary ground. There is irreducible certainty in human rationality, therefore knowledge is possible. That which is possible must have a ground. — Mww

Math and formal logic and science are grounded within themselves. For the rest, we "give a solution" to ourselves" which is modeled on those and only recognizes "irreducible certainty" suppressing our ordinary, fallible rationale and the regular logic of our lives. There is no assurance of us being understood, no guaranty for our acts, no knowledge to secure our relationship to another.

This is the desire for certainty to] relinquish us from responsibility for failure.
— Antony Nickles

Perhaps, insofar far as the failure is not mine, but the other’s. I try my best to be understood, and that I have tried relinquishes me from responsibility for you not understanding me. — Mww

The generalized ideas of intention and meaning are abstractly related to our expressions as reality is to our world. That "I try my best to be understood", to mean something specific, is the desire to have what we say have a meaning that is certain, complete, contained. That I simply control what I say, rather than be answerable for what I have said, as the judgment of what matters in our expressions is after my saying it, to you, here, now.

we take responsibility to avoid being responsible.
— Antony Nickles

I can see taking responsibility FOR avoiding being responsible, but if I do take responsibility, something I’m responsible for is presupposed. It would seem I cannot, then, take responsibility TO avoid being responsible. If I take responsibility I AM responsible for taking it, hence haven’t avoided being responsible at all. — Mww

What I said was maybe a bit too poetic to be useful. What I was tracking was that if we want to ensure that the world is "real" (certain), then the fallible part must be me, my perspective, my individuality, my irrationality; if we want our expressions to have a "meaning" (fixed), then the problem must be "you not understanding me". We (humans) take the blame so that the world and our language have the sheen of certainty, because we do not want the burden, the exposure, the instability, of carrying the world and our communications forward ourselves (continually responsible for our lives, our expressions), rather than hiding behind right, rules, rationality, and fact.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/602937

.

In other words, reality just is and no amount of mental manipulation/acrobatics can/will alter/affect it. Reality then is that which you have to accept. — TheMadFool

Yep

I don’t care what anybody says, just gotta appreciate a guy who has an answer for a question, that doesn’t do anything but make another question inevitable, and this......

radical skepticism differs from regular doubt in that it is not just: how to identify a goldfinch from a robin, but: how do we know that is (an instance of) a table, or a piece of wax? — Antony Nickles

....answers my question unmistakably. And it follows, that if no further query is necessary for some sufficient understanding of an original, the way is left open for a counterpoint consistent with the answer to it. So saying, initially at least, the distinction between radical skepticism and mere doubt may be characterized as a matter of degree. The degree is, of course, knowledge, insofar as there would be little additional knowledge needed to differentiate between like kinds, re: finch/robin, but much more to differentiate between kinds, re: table/wax.

Skepticism is, at bottom, the consciousness of ignorance, and ought, instead of forming the conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge. If my ignorance is accidental, in which case I may not know a thing, or if my ignorance is necessary, in which case I have not the capacity to know a thing, it must incite me, in the first case, to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant; in the second, to a critical investigation into the limits of knowledge itself.

But I understand that’s not what you intend for me to derive from your answer. Just my preliminary counterpoint. The main point is here.....

Once we get to that question (taken from your “how do we know that is (an instance of) a table”), the fear is that there needs to be an answer or we end up in a place where we are asking how do we know what is real at all. — Antony Nickles

....to which I would counter with, superficially, it’s easy: in the first place, we know an instance of a thing from experience, and in the second, we know a real thing from the affect it has on us. Care must be given to temporal separations here, nonetheless, in that if an object has a word representing it, like table, the experience of it is not necessarily mine, but is necessarily the experience of the subject that assigned that representation objectively to it. It follows that I know an instance of a table because I already know what a table is, because somebody else gave it that name and I merely carried on with it. On the other hand, if it was possible I never had any experience whatsoever, in any way, shape or form, of this object otherwise represented as a table, it would be my first instance of it, its first affect on me, and as such, wouldn’t even be a table, to me. It would be nothing more than an “undetermined object of perception”. The implication of my radical skepticism regarding the “table” is invalid, insofar as I don’t even know it as anything.

Now it is the question becomes, to whom does the fear intrinsic to radical skepticism belong? It cannot be the subject that represented the object as “table”, because he said it was that, and it makes no sense for him to be skeptical of that which he himself declares to be the case. It cannot be he who is subsequently affected by the same object, because it has already been established that that thing is a table, which will serve as the consistent representation in all its instances, and it makes no sense for that subsequent perceiver to represent it as anything else, for if he does, he is more irrational than radically skeptical.

That which makes radical skepticism a valid conception, is epistemic certainty combined with the logic of the human cognitive system. We can think radical skepticism without contradiction, but it does nothing for us except stretch reason beyond its proper limits.
————-

Wittgenstein and others found is that the skeptic's abstraction from tables and goldfinchs to generalized terms like appearance and particular and meaning and true, stripped away our criteria for each thing and a context in which to apply them. — Antony Nickles

All the more substance for demurring from skepticism in general, and radical skepticism certainly, for they got the proverbial horse on the wrong end of the cart. We don’t abstract from, we assign to. Finches don’t inform us as to what they are, but only provide the data from which we tell them how they are to be known. That feat is accomplished with such speculative metaphysical predicates as appearances, particulars, meanings and truths, along with that which unites them all under a logical system, which doesn’t strip away, but PROVIDES our criteria for each thing and the context under which they are applied. All found out long before W and the others, and stemmed from Hobbes and Hume, moreso than others.

All we should ever be radically skeptical of, is the incantation of absolutes, which no proper rational agency does anyway.
————-

What I was tracking was that if we want to ensure that the world is "real" (certain), then the fallible part must be me, my perspective, my individuality, my irrationality — Antony Nickles

That is.....er......absolutely.....most agreeable. Although, on another note, I must say your “real” is not my “certain”. My certain is true, from which arises the possibility that the world can be very real without me being knowledgeable about the certainty of it.

Math and formal logic and science are grounded within themselves. — Antony Nickles

That seems to be the current paradigm, but it overlooks the intrinsic necessity for human reason. What if the human cognitive system is itself a logical system? If that is the case, how could the certainty of math and logic occur, if not by that which is of its own kind? Maybe math and logic broke no falsity because they arise from a system that cannot permit it. Maybe we use math and logic as a standard for any truth because our system is mathematically logical. Maybe there’s only mathematical objects in Nature because we put them there. And so on......

There’s your groundlessness and radical skepticism writ large. What ground do we have to prove certainty, when what we use to prove it, isn’t certain.

Toljaso.....we’re not so far apart.

We don't "define reality", we are defined by (foreseen and unforeseen) impacts with reality.

Is it possible to give a rigorous definition of 'reality'? — Cidat

Reality is what puts limits upon the possible imageinations of the world. If a rational being cannot make itself believe that "x is true", "x is not true" is reality.

@Banno @180 Proof @Cidat

Now the question becomes, to whom does the fear intrinsic to radical skepticism belong? — Mww

I probably can’t paint a picture with enough depth to instill the grip of skeptical doubt, but I do claim that it is not senseless nor should it be dismissed nor solved. We are not dealing with a simple case of attaching a word to an object; let's try: when two people disagree about not only what is important (what the essential criteria are) about an object, but, say, something like justice, e.g., is it restitution of prior wrongs? or just retribution for prior harms? If I say a table is flat with four legs and you say it’s something we study or eat on, we may struggle to see your world as the same as mine, and maybe then the question we imagine of what is real begins to worry us.

Skepticism is, at bottom, the consciousness of ignorance. — Mww

This seems to say that the take-away of the skeptic’s claim is that we realize we don't have enough (or the right kind of) knowledge, that our problem is an intellectual lack. You characterize this as a limit or that we do not have the capacity. My point is that this limitation is, in a sense, self-inflicted. I'm not saying that we could find the capacity or think our way around a limit, but that knowledge is limited (it's not our fault), which is where our responsibility begins (or we avoid it with the mirage of a perfectly-knowable reality). The truth of skepticism is that we are separate from each other so we can not know the other (their minds), we must respond to them, accept them (or reject them); that it is up to us to project an expression into a new context and then be answerable for the fallout (not that the meaning is in the saying); that we must act and be read by it without complete knowledge of the outcome. Cavell puts it that knowledge is not our only relation to the world. But instead of accepting the structure of the human condition we manufacture this picture of reality and blame ourselves for not knowing it, or it for being unknowable, rather than take on the burden that is the world and what we would be in it (or defined by it, as @180 Proof says). This does not quell our pursuit to learn about the world, only that we understand something in making explicit the various ways we measure each different thing (thus ourselves) rather than forcing one standard of judgment.

We don’t abstract from, we assign to. Finches don’t inform us as to what they are, but only provide the data from which we tell them how they are to be known. That feat is accomplished with such speculative metaphysical predicates as appearances, particulars, meanings and truths, along with that which unites them all under a logical system, which doesn’t strip away, but PROVIDES our criteria for each thing and the context under which they are applied. — Mww

I could not have put the train of thought any better myself that leads to us creating the world for ourselves. If we can agree that each thing has its own criteria in various contexts, the "logical system" (for each differently) is provided to us, not imposed by us as abstraction into generalized terms. The “data” of a thing are the preexisting criteria that are only "assigned" as they have developed as part of the history of all our lives (forever) with things and others. Rather than tell the world how it is to be known, we must listen for what rationale a thing has for itself, wait for what matters to us about a thing (hidden in the criteria to gauge it, see it done, etc.).

What I was tracking was that if we want to ensure that the world is "real" (certain), then the fallible part must be me, my perspective, my individuality, my irrationality
— Antony Nickles

That is.....er......absolutely.....most agreeable. — Mww

This was not meant as a statement or claim. I was telling the story we create about ourselves for the world to maintain a sense of stability. And we might not know the world with certainty, but instead of settling for the ordinary fallible limited understanding we can have, complete certainty remains the gold standard for what "knowledge" is (for reality), so then we assume the fallible part is us, that we only see appearances, etc.

What if the human cognitive system is itself a logical system? — Mww

Or this is the other fantasy we tell ourselves: that we operate a certain way, say, that we have a systematic perception (once it was a moral faculty), and if we (neuroscience!!) could figure us out, or how we can't see the real world, then we will understand how we are certain, or could compensate for our imperfection, or, as you say:

What ground do we have to prove certainty, when what we use to prove it, isn’t certain. — Mww

if we (neuroscience!!) could figure us out, or how we can't see the real world, then we will understand how we are certain, or could compensate for our imperfection, or, as you say:

What ground do we have to prove certainty, when what we use to prove it, isn’t certain.
— Mww — Antony Nickles

The root of the whole problem, isn’t it. Neuroscience wants to be able to figure us out, insofar as we are composed of that which adheres to natural law, but if and when it does figure us out with the certainty of natural law.....will “I” disappear? Even if proved illusory, not needed in conformity to law, superfluous with respect to determinism writ large.....do we then relinquish relative truths?

Beat the clock: shitcan “humanity” by proving roboticism? Yeahhhh-no, that’s just never going to work.

You described the problem of objectivity well.
Still, in everyday use, we talk about real vs unreal. Eg. a real woman vs a cross dresser (sorry LBGQ etc). So what is 'real' then here, without reference to objectivity? Can 'real vs unreal' make sense without objectivity?

You described the problem of objectivity well. — Yohan

Thanks. It's good to have an audience. Even of a single person!
But ... what about subjectively? It wasn't as good? :smile:

Still, in everyday use, we talk about real vs unreal. — Yohan

Certainly. The word "real" has a lot of meanings and it can be used in a lot of different contexts. But here, I believe the word "reality" has to be taken in a philosophical context, i.e., as a philosophical term, even if there are almost as many definitions of it as there are people who try to define it!

Yet, what one must first do in examining all these different definitions and views about reality is to divide them into two main categories: those in which it is considered as something absolute and/or objective and those in which it is considered as something subjective. This is very important since we are talking about two very different "worlds". The difference is so huge and the views diverge so much in each case, that any comparison and discussion between them is impossible. I tell this based on my own experience from a lot of discussions on the subject.

Can 'real vs unreal' make sense without objectivity? — Yohan

Actually, I believe that it can't make sense without subjectivity! :smile:

I reduced the quote to memory many decades ago. Turns out I was close, but not exact: https://www.bartleby.com/90/0306.html