The One is Infinite or Unlimited. — Apollodorus

Isn't "one", by its very definition, a unit and therefore limited?

What is at issue is not that there are different kinds of number, but what is different about the eidetic kind: — Fooloso4

I think that this is just like the modern difference between ordinal numbers and cardinal numbers, ordinals demonstrating an order, while cardinals count a quantity.

The point is that Being belongs to a higher intelligible order. — Fooloso4

Sure but if it's a higher order than rest or motion, how does this make it not simply a third category?

Also, remember that this is the position of "the Stranger" which is being expressed, not the position of Socrates or Plato, and usually Socrates ends up demonstrating how the positions of the others are faulty. So I would not attribute a lot of significance to what the Stranger says, as it's most likely just another form of metaphysics, popular in the day, which Plato is dismissing.

I believe that Plato should be read on his own terms. — Apollodorus

I agree. This is something I have said to you many times over the months!

And yet you say:

... the One imposes limitation on itself in order to manifest multiplicity from Forms to Mathematical Objects to the multitude of Particulars that make up the sensible world. — Apollodorus

Where does Plato say this?

If you are referring to what Gerson says, he says that according to the Platonic tradition, (not Plato) , the One imposes limit on the indefinite dyad, thereby producing Forms and Numbers. The One, according to this, does not impose a limit on itself, but on the indefinite dyad.

He also says that Plotinus rejected this because the One cannot be a principle of limitation. It is the Intellect that imposes limit on the One:

The denial of the One as a principle of limit follows from Plotinus' rejection of dualism of any sort, especially that which makes the Indefinite Dyad an irreducible first principle of unlimitedness, thereby requiring the One to be a coordinate principle of limit. (From Plato to Platonism)

The last point is important. For Plato the Indeterminate Dyad is "an irreducible first principle of unlimitedness."

... by lifting our gaze upward; and by opening our heart, the eye of our soul, to the Light of the One, — Apollodorus

Such stories may be inspiring and suitable for spiritual contemplation, but they should not be mistaken for Plato's metaphysics.

I think we agree that noesis is higher than dianoia, contemplation is important, as is the imagination, and that what is at issue is not an abstract intellectual exercise. However, in discussing Plato's metaphysics we cannot simply fly away to the land of One.

We spin our stories about things we do not know. You take the story you put together from other stories and take it for the truth.

Isn't "one", by its very definition, a unit and therefore limited? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. There is a difference between "unit" and "unity". The former refers to one among many, the latter to something that is one in the sense of simple or non-composite.

As unit, one is limited. As unity, it can be unlimited.

Where does Plato say this? If you are referring to what Gerson says, he says that according to the Platonic tradition, (not Plato) , the One imposes limit on the indefinite dyad, thereby producing Forms and Numbers. The One, according to this, does not impose a limit on itself, but on the indefinite dyad. — Fooloso4

As usual, you are not paying attention. It isn't Gerson, it's Aristotle I am talking about. You started quoting him, did you not?

What I said is this:

As Aristotle says, Plato teaches that from the Great and the Small, by participation in the One come the Forms and the Numbers:

Now since the Forms are the causes of everything else, he supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly the material principle is the "Great and Small," and the essence <or formal principle> is the One, since the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the One (Meta. 978b) — Apollodorus

Such stories may be inspiring and suitable for spiritual contemplation, but they should not be mistaken for Plato's metaphysics. — Fooloso4

I think Plato says very clearly that the philosopher must rise to the source of everything and then draw conclusions about everything else in the light of that:

By the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas (Rep. 511b-c).

Basically, there are two kinds of people. Some try to make their way out of the cave to the world outside and some stubbornly insist that the cave is the only reality there is without even considering any other possibility. If you insist on belonging to the latter, that is your problem, not other people's :smile:

Isn't "one", by its very definition, a unit and therefore limited? — Metaphysician Undercover

One of the first distinctions I learned in comparative religion was between monism and non-dualism. Monism posits a One, but a One can only exist in relation to another. So 'one' already implies 'two'. Whereas 'non-dualism' means 'not divided' or 'not two' - which is subtly but crucially different. (Consider that a footnote.)

We spin our stories about things we do not know. You take the story you put together from other stories and take it for the truth. — Fooloso4

I think it's more that Plato is being looked at through the prism of Christian Platonism, which is difficult not to do. (Another footnote.)

I think it's more that Plato is being looked at through the prism of Christian Platonism — Wayfarer

I think another possibility is that there are similarities between Platonism and Christianity just as there are similarities between Platonism and Buddhism or Hinduism.

How would you look at Plato in such a way as to avoid all appearance of looking at him through a "Christian Platonist" prism?

How would you look at Plato in such a way as to avoid all appearance of looking at him through a "Christian Platonist" prism? — Apollodorus

More like @Fooloso4, and less like Apollodorus!

That said, I'm more drawn to the 'spiritual Plato' myself, and consequently find a lot of what you say congenial. But I think Fooloso4 does a good job of presenting what the dialogues do and don't say on their own merits and is clearly knowledgable about them. I'm also aware of my own lack of education in 'the Classics' (although I sometimes think had I had them beaten into me by the old school approach I would probably detest the whole subject.)

I do feel Folloso4's interpretation is lacking in some respects, but I don't feel obliged to try and set it right all the time. It's valuable to have a knowledgable contributor making such comments as it obliges me to think it through and also shows me very many interpretive points I never would have considered on my own reading.

My approach is more synoptic and thematic - there are particular ideas and themes that I'm trying to understand through the discipline of 'history of ideas', which is more like the approach employed by comparative religion than by the academic study of philosophy as such. And I will acknowledge that mine is an existential quest, not an academic one. Anyway, enough about all of that, this is a great thread, let's stick to the topic, I won't digress further.

Apropos of which:

there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled afresh by... studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes ; for only by it is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine. For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning.

Plato, Republic 7.527

But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine. For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning. — Wayfarer

That's a very good point. As Plato says, the ignorant multitude just can't think of anything outside the cave and insist on staying inside their little world of shadows ....

He also says that Plotinus rejected this because the One cannot be a principle of limitation. It is the Intellect that imposes limit on the One: — Fooloso4

Plotinus may say whatever he pleases. It does not mean that Plato says it.

It is important not to confuse one author with another.

Besides, according to Plotinus, the One acts through the instrumentality of Intellect.

(A). The One acts through the instrumentality of Intellect.

(B). Intellect imposes limit on the One.

(C). Therefore the One imposes limit on itself (through the Intellect).

The Intellect is nothing but the Indefinite Dyad that is generated by the One!

In other words, (1) the One generates the Indefinite Dyad, (2) the Dyad is formed into Intellect, (3) Intellect in turn produces intelligible matter by manifesting the Forms that already exist in the One.

Pretty elementary IMO.

This is why I quoted Aristotle (Meta. 978b), above, which Plotinus himself quotes in support of his interpretation of Plato.

For Plato the Indeterminate Dyad is "an irreducible first principle of unlimitedness." — Fooloso4

That's not what the text says. Are you sure you can read?

In the Philebus, Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad.

These dyads include:

Limited and Unlimited

Same and Other

One and Many

Rest and Change

Eternity and Time

Good and Bad

Thinking and Being

Being and Non-being — Fooloso4

At first glance, prima facie, I thought dyads were opposites (one and many, same and other, good and bad, being and non-being, limited and unlimited) and then these (thinking and being, rest and change, eternity and time) come along to disrupt the yin-yang pattern unless...thinking is non-being or being is unthinking and change is regarded as motion and eternity is timelessness.

Raises some interesting possibilities:

1. Thinking = Non-being & Being = Unthinking.

Cogito ergo sum [I think. Therefore, I am (being)] — René Descartes

2. Is change = motion? There seems to be something fundamental about movement. Is it the examplar of change or does it carry a deeper meaning in that all change is motion?

3. Eternity = Timelessness. In a sense, yes; after all, if something is eternal, time is meaningless for that thing. To live forever is to, in a sense, be outside of time.

Indeed the whole defies predication (is indeterminate) for it is, as an example, both "this and not this" and on pain of contradiction, necessarily that we must divvy up the whole into parts but then we're no longer talking about the whole.

:joke:

Not necessarily. There is a difference between "unit" and "unity". The former refers to one among many, the latter to something that is one in the sense of simple or non-composite.

As unit, one is limited. As unity, it can be unlimited. — Apollodorus

Well, I don't accept any of this. I see no reason why a "unit" must be one among many, and not just a defined "whole", without the need for others to validate the definition. And I see no possible way that "unity" could be unlimited, as necessarily limited by that which unites.

Monism posits a One, but a One can only exist in relation to another. So 'one' already implies 'two'. — Wayfarer

As above, in the case of "unit", I do not agree that One implies two. "One", as commonly defined (as distinct from mathematically defined), is a fundamental unity, an individual, a whole. To describe, or define a unity, individual, or whole, does not require reference to others. It is only when "one" is defined as referring to the first, in an order, or succession, that there is a second implied. This is the mathematical way, based on "ordinals". But in this definition the second is not actually necessary, it is implied as possible, the possibility of something following the first. In other words, the position of the first is defined by allowing for the possibility of followers, and it does not require actual followers.

We discussed this issue in another thread on the difference between cardinal numbers and ordinal numbers. Modern mathematical theory derives cardinals from ordinals, so the primary definition of "number" places "one" as having a position in an order, thereby implying others. But this does not make "one" refer to a unit, individual, or whole, because that requires a different definition. It makes "one" refer to a position in an order.

But if this is the case, then "one" is not a unit, or individual, but a place, and we cannot truly derive the cardinal numbers in the way that mathematicians do, because they count these places as if they are objects, when by definition they are not objects but places. In reality therefore, cardinal numbers cannot be derived from ordinal numbers, because the two rely on distinct definitions of "number".

I don't accept any of this. I see no reason why a "unit" must be one among many, and not just a defined "whole", without the need for others to validate the definition. And I see no possible way that "unity" could be unlimited, as necessarily limited by that which unites. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand your concern. However, the issue arose from your previous objection:

Isn't "one", by its very definition, a unit and therefore limited? — Metaphysician Undercover

"One" as unit, i.e, one among other units, is indeed limited.

"One" as a whole consisting of parts would be many and therefore limited.

"One" as unity, in the sense of simple or non-composite, need not be limited.

Indeed, Plato says quite clearly that the One is not a whole consisting of parts and that it is "unlimited" (apeiron). This is precisely why there is nothing else like the One.

And unfortunately, we can't go against the text!

I think that this is just like the modern difference between ordinal numbers and cardinal numbers, ordinals demonstrating an order, while cardinals count a quantity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The ordinal numbers are orders of numbers. It applies to anything that is ordered in some way as first, second, third.

Eidetic numbers are relations of eidos or Forms. Their order is determined by kind.

Sure but if it's a higher order than rest or motion, how does this make it not simply a third category? — Metaphysician Undercover

If you are counting categories then it is a third, but what is being counted are Forms at some level of order. Rest, Change, and Being are not at the same level of order and so are not counted together.

Also, remember that this is the position of "the Stranger" ... — Metaphysician Undercover

You are making a lot of assumptions about the Stranger.

Why would Plato write this long, detailed, difficult dialogue if the point is to just to dismiss the Stranger?

What the Stranger says should not go unquestioned, but what Socrates says should not either.

In the Timaeus, the qualities of Being and Becoming are starkly differentiated: — Valentinus

Right, and Plato's metaphysics must address both sides of this differentiation. On way side there is the vertical order of Forms. On the other side, the order of beings. The order of intelligible being is timeless and unchanging, the order of beings is changing and indeterminate.

How does this sort of careful separation of different arguments relate to grand claims of explaining what is happening? It seems like Plato did both. — Valentinus

This gets back to the radical openness of Plato's metaphysics. There is always what is other and outside whatever account is being given.

One of the first distinctions I learned in comparative religion was between monism and non-dualism. Monism posits a One, but a One can only exist in relation to another. So 'one' already implies 'two'. Whereas 'non-dualism' means 'not divided' or 'not two' - which is subtly but crucially different. — Wayfarer

The indeterminate dyad is two, and yet is together with its Other, the One, in unity and divisiveness, sameness and difference.

"One" as unity, in the sense of simple or non-composite, need not be limited. — Apollodorus

Such a sense of "One" is definitely limited. If it was not limited there would be nothing to maintain its status as simple or non-composite. That is a limitation, whatever prevents it from being a mixture.

Indeed, Plato says quite clearly that the One is not a whole consisting of parts and that it is "unlimited" (apeiron). This is precisely why there is nothing else like the One. — Apollodorus

I never saw a clear and coherent definition of "the One" in Plato, perhaps you could show me where this is stated. Nevertheless what I did see stated about the One seemed confused and incoherent, so I tend not to agree with it. I have the same problem with what Plotinus said about the One, though it seems much clearer than what Plato said, it still appears to me to be inconsistent.

The ordinal numbers are orders of numbers. It applies to anything that is ordered in some way as first, second, third.

Eidetic numbers are relations of eidos or Forms. Their order is determined by kind. — Fooloso4

So eidetic numbers look very similar to ordinal numbers to me, as an ordering of Forms. Numbers are Forms, and orders are relations. Differences of "kind" is insufficient for determining an order, because relations between the kinds is what order is.

Rest, Change, and Being are not at the same level of order and so are not counted together. — Fooloso4

I don't see how you can justify this claim. What puts being at a different level from rest and change?

Why would Plato write this long, detailed, difficult dialogue if the point is to just to dismiss the Stranger? — Fooloso4

Have you not read many Platonic dialogues? That's what he did with them. He wrote long difficult dialogues to show the faults of, and dismiss the views expressed by the people taking part in the dialogues.

You seem to be very fond of the word “indeterminate” even though it is very rarely used by Plato.

And you still haven’t explained what your actual point is.

You have told us that:

“Being belongs to a higher intelligible order than rest or motion”.

“Eidetic numbers are relations of eidos or Forms. Their order is determined by kind.”

“If you are counting categories then it is a third, but what is being counted are Forms at some level of order. Rest, Change, and Being are not at the same level of order and so are not counted together.”

Of course Being comes first as it consists of “all moving and immovable things” (Sophist 249d), for which reason it blends with Rest and Change but the latter do not blend with one another.

Therefore, it may be said that Being is a Kind (Genos) that is followed by Subkinds (Rest and Change) followed by Changeless Things (Forms), followed by Changing Things (Particular Instantiations of Forms), etc. On its part, the One from which Being is derived is above being.

So, we have three levels of reality: (1) the One above Being, (2) Intellect and Forms which represent Being, and (3) the sensible world of Becoming.

In any case, it’s a well-known fact that Plato’s metaphysics is a hierarchy. Its technical details may or may not be debatable. But its general structure, which is what really matters and which needs to be grasped first, has nothing mysterious about it.

I never saw a clear and coherent definition of "the One" in Plato, perhaps you could show me where this is stated. Nevertheless what I did see stated about the One seemed confused and incoherent, so I tend not to agree with it. I have the same problem with what Plotinus said about the One, though it seems much clearer than what Plato said, it still appears to me to be inconsistent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that we should not agree with things that are confused and incoherent.

However, the critical question is how the world of multiplicity, expressed as the gradations of Being, arises from the absolute One.

Plato suggests the three principles or functions of the One, viz., (1) Unlimited, (2) Limit, and (3) "Mixed". Limit imposes limitation on the Unlimited, and the Mixed uses the other two in order to "shape" the substance of the One into Ideal Intelligible Objects (Forms).

There is in the universe a plentiful Infinite and a sufficient Limit, and in addition a by no means feeble Cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called wisdom and mind (Phileb. 30c)

The One, the Supreme Intelligence, by means of the Unlimited and Limit, becomes the Universal Intellect (Nous Kosmou) that organizes Unmanifest Intelligence into classes of Forms, Individual Forms, and Particular Instantiations of Forms, bringing about the multiplicity of the world of manifestation.

In other words, Intellect is nothing but Unformed Intelligence “shaped” by the Forms which are its objects. Without Forms, there is no Intellect and no cognition. There is just "blank" Intelligence or Awareness. This is why the Forms are the very essence of cognition, the One (the Good) being their ultimate source.

And “unity” with reference to the One is in the sense of "henad" (henados), i.e., opposite of multiplicity. This particular "unity" or "henad" is unlimited.

The One is unlimited (apeiron):

“Then the One (to Hen), if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d)

The One is creative, all objects of knowledge deriving from it:

The objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it (Rep. 509b)

Unfortunately, in order to better understand Plato, we sometimes need to turn to Aristotle, Plotinus, and other authors to fill the lacunae. But, whatever we do, we cannot go against Plato's text. Sometimes it is preferable not to know something than to make things up ....

To count rest, change, and being as three would be mistaken. Being is a higher order than rest and change. It is not a third thing to be counted alongside them. — Fooloso4

Makes perfect sense to me.

God and the universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot constitute a pair of objects. — Terry Eagleton

Have you not read many Platonic dialogues? That's what he did with them. He wrote long difficult dialogues to show the faults of, and dismiss the views expressed by the people taking part in the dialogues. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a lot more to the dialogues than Socrates pointing out the weaknesses of the arguments of others.

I do not think it is a case of Plato dismissing the views of others, but of you dismissing the dialogues of Plato.

There is a lot more to the dialogues than Socrates pointing out the weaknesses of the arguments of others.

I do not think it is a case of Plato dismissing the views of others, but of you dismissing the dialogues of Plato. — Fooloso4

In "The Sophist", the stranger, from Parmenides' school, is of the opinion that there is a difference between, a sophist, a philosopher, and a statesman, as three distinct intellectual capacities. What is demonstrated by Plato, is that the stranger, who thinks of himself as a philosopher, really behaves in the way that he describes a sophist. So the stranger is therefore the sophist, the namesake of the dialogue.
Why else is the dialogue called "The Sophist"?. It is clear that Plato is not supporting what the stranger is arguing, as the dialogue is presented as an example of the sophistry coming from the Eleatic school.

I don't understand the basis for calling the Stranger a Sophist. Can you point to one of the arguments he makes by way of example?

The same Stranger speaks in the dialogue of Statesman. Are you suggesting that dialogue is also an example of 'sophistry?'

In "The Sophist", the stranger, from Parmenides' school, is of the opinion that there is a difference between, a sophist, a philosopher, and a statesman, as three distinct intellectual capacities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is he mistaken in his opinion? If not, then what is the difference? Why is there a dialogue the Sophist and a dialogue the Statesman, but no dialogue the Philosopher. Where is the philosopher? Are they three?

In the third dialogue of the trilogy, the Theaetetus, the sophist Protagoras plays a role through his claim that man is the measure of all things. Since Protagoras was dead Socrates plays the part of the sophist (165e). The Stranger too plays a part in the dialogue.

What is demonstrated by Plato, is that the stranger, who thinks of himself as a philosopher, really behaves in the way that he describes a sophist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Have you noticed how often Socrates' behaves like a sophist? Aristophanes was not simply mistaken when he called Socrates a sophist.

What is it about a sophist that you think means he must be wrong? The sophists were not all the same, to simply to be dismissed. Their arguments must be attended to, as Socrates did. It should also be noted how often Socrates incorporates parts of what the sophists he is arguing with say.

So the stranger is therefore the sophist — Metaphysician Undercover

He was, as you said, from Parmenides' school. It was not a school of sophists.

What is demonstrated by Plato, is that the stranger, who thinks of himself as a philosopher, really behaves in the way that he describes a sophist. So the stranger is therefore the sophist, the namesake of the dialogue.
Why else is the dialogue called "The Sophist"?. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s a very good point.

I think it is instructive to note that Plato’s detractors often resort to arguments that Plato himself would have rejected as arguments employed by Sophists, not by genuine philosophers. Sophists, of course, deny the existence of the Forms, and in particular, of the Good. Therefore, their arguments, well-crafted though they may be, lack real substance.

More generally, the reason why some Plato readers lose track of Plato’s narrative is that they fail to pay attention to the general structure of Plato’s metaphysics or ethics and tend to become lost in a labyrinth of unexamined assumptions.

They fail to see that Plato has a larger picture in mind and as a result they cannot understand the inner logic of his system. Instead of taking Plato’s teachings as a whole, they get bogged down in discussions about details and deny that he has a system or even a philosophy!

If we think about it, Plato's students would have had some general knowledge of his teachings before attending his classes. They would not have started from scratch and certainly not from unconnected details.

IMO the correct approach is to first acquire a reasonable grasp of the larger Platonic picture, and then see how the details combine with each other to fit the whole.

Though anti-Platonists like to claim that Plato “doesn’t have a system”, the fact of the matter is that he does have a teaching or doctrine (dogma in Aristotle’s own words) that is pretty systematic and that can be further systematized if we wish. Indeed, Plato’s contemporaries regarded him as having a definite philosophical and political doctrine.

This doctrine may not be worked out in every single detail, but I think that where Plato leaves a question unanswered, he does so for two reasons, either (1) the issue is less important to his bigger picture than it seems, or (2) he wants us to do some thinking and fill in the gaps ourselves, always of course, following the larger picture.

To begin with, Plato’s doctrine is hierarchical. It begins with the observation that ordinary, unphilosophic man is unable to see the truth, or himself, because his vision is blurred and deceptive and his thought lacks order and is confused. The only solution is to organize our thinking and look upward, beyond and above appearances.

This is why Plato refers to philosophy as “The Upward Way”. The Platonic Way is an upward journey from the lowest to the highest levels of knowledge, that passes through several stages: (1) opinion, (2) belief, (3) reason, and (4) intuition or insight.

(1). Eikasia, fancy, illusion, or conjecture. This is the stage of ordinary man who lives in an illusory world of conjecture, unexamined opinion, and habitual patterns of thought and behavior.

(2). Pistis or faith. At this stage the would-be philosopher begins with a more structured worldview based on reasoned belief in the immortality of the soul, afterlife, divine beings, and divine judgment in the afterlife that results in a happy or unhappy existence in the other world in accordance with one’s conduct on earth. The deities at this stage are the Olympian Gods of established Greek religion.

From the above, there follows an ethical system that revolves on happiness, goodness, and justice: in order to be happy not just momentarily but in the long term, including in the afterlife, man needs to be good and just. In order to be good and just in relation to his fellow citizens and to himself, he needs to cultivate the four virtues of self-control, courage, wisdom, and righteousness.

Up to this point, the philosopher has inhabited the world of sensible objects where thought was based on sensory perception. This is now left behind and the philosopher enters the intelligible world of pure thought.

(Plato’s Analogy of the Divided Line given in the Republic (509d–511e) illustrates the continuum of knowledge by a line divided into two main sections representing the Sensible and Intelligible World, respectively. However, the two are not to be understood as literally separate and independent but logically divided into classes of reality.)

(3). Dianoia or reason. The cultivation and practice of virtues having resulted in a purification of the soul and a clear intellect, this is further developed and refined through the study of mathematical disciplines in a philosophical sense, which results in a greater capacity of abstract thought.

At this stage the philosopher’s perception of the world is not only mathematized and abstracticized but also spiritualized. The focus shifts from the Olympian Gods to the impersonal Planets which are seen as ensouled bodies among which the Sun occupies a central role. Indeed, the whole Cosmos is to be seen as a living being endowed with soul and intelligence.

The soul being the intelligent part of man, looking on heavenly bodies as having a soul is a step toward looking on intelligence (nous) as the underlying substratum of the universe.

(4) Episteme or knowledge. Finally, having passed through the preliminary stages, the philosopher can now turn his attention to higher forms of knowledge, or knowledge proper that has Forms, etc. as its objects, using his faculty of intuition, insight, and contemplation (noesis). The Deity at this stage is the One in its aspect of Creator God (Demiurge) or Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos).

So, we can see that, though Plato’s dogma is not presented in a strictly systematic manner, with a little reflection the reader’s mind can systematize it in thought without much difficulty.

The Platonic Way is a process of gradual elevation of human thought from the most primitive or unconscious to the most evolved or conscious, culminating in a direct experience of nothing less than the very source of all knowledge and all thought, the “Ineffable One”.

The key to the successful completion of the journey is a clear understanding of the need to constantly transcend lower forms of thought and ascend to the next-higher level to the very end.

And the first step on this long journey is to dislodge our intellect and our entire psychology from ordinary, unexamined, and unphilosophical patterns of thought, behavior, and experience tied to material things, and literally, as Socrates says, turn around and turn our gaze upward.

It must also be said that, though there is a general tendency to dismiss some of Plato’s statements as “myth”, it is important to understand that (1) speaking mythically about something does not make it "mythical", and (2) nothing in Plato is accidental or superfluous. His whole narrative serves the specific purpose of providing the reader with the intellectual framework or ladder necessary for the ascent.

In contrast, the Sophist uses elaborate arguments, including superficially convincing ones, to claim that there is no higher goal, no means of attaining it, and no need to even think of leaving the cave ....

In contrast, the Sophist uses elaborate arguments, including superficially convincing ones, to claim that there is no higher goal, no means of attaining it, and no need to even think of leaving the cave. — Apollodorus

Point to an example of that.

He was, as you said, from Parmenides' school. It was not a school of sophists. — Fooloso4

In the Theaetetus, Socrates refuses to trash talk Parmenides because Socrates had met him when he was young and had witnessed his sincerity. That is a clear reference to Plato's dialogue of Parmenides where the theory of Forms is critically examined. The Sophist makes more sense as the continuation of that review rather than a caricature of what to avoid.

I don't understand the basis for calling the Stranger a Sophist. Can you point to one of the arguments he makes by way of example? — Valentinus

Socrates asks the stranger at the beginning, about the difference between engaging others in the discussion, and simply making a long speech. The stranger claims to respect this distinction. But the entire dialogue turns out to be a long speech made by the stranger. Sure, the stranger pretends to engage Theaetetus in the discussion, but it's really only to ask him to agree at certain points, it's never to ask for his opinion. You can read the dialogue without paying any attention to what Theaetetus says, and it reads like a big long speech from the stranger. So this is just a pretense, to engage Theaetetus, and that is one of the things the stranger says a sophist is, an imitator.

Further, there is throughout the dialogue, many subtle indications that Plato (in writing the dialogue) is having the stranger do exactly the things that he says are characteristic of the sophist. For example, at 254, the stranger says "The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not...". Then, by the end of 256 the stranger is talking about "that which is not"... "So it has to be possible for that which is not to be..."

Remember, what is stressed over and over again throughout the dialogue, is that the sophist is hard to catch, appearing just like a philosopher, but really a poser, a pretender. The dialogue has to be read very carefully to see that Plato is portraying the stranger as a sophist, pretending to be a philosopher.

Another indication is that the stranger is not named. The Eleatic school was highly regarded by the Greeks, and respected even by Socrates. Plato could not name a member of the school, and portray him as saying the things which the stranger says, because none of them would have actually said those things the way Plato presented them, so he'd be guilty of libel. The stranger from Elea is presented in a way which is less than flattering, as a sophist, and this is a serious attack on the Eleatic school, so it is disguised. As such, you might say it is itself a work of sophistry. Nevertheless, Aristotle later continued with this attack, more openly.

Is he mistaken in his opinion? If not, then what is the difference? Why is there a dialogue the Sophist and a dialogue the Statesman, but no dialogue the Philosopher. Where is the philosopher? Are they three? — Fooloso4

It's not that he is mistaken in his opinion, but the stranger behaves in a way which he himself says is the way of the sophist. In other words, Plato has the stranger describe what a sophist is like, while the stranger is behaving in the described manner.

Have you noticed how often Socrates' behaves like a sophist? Aristophanes was not simply mistaken when he called Socrates a sophist. — Fooloso4

Yes, as the stranger says, it is very difficult to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist, so just as the sophist appears like a philosopher, the philosopher will appear like a sophist. The way that they differ is that one is a pretender, an imitator.

One of the key differences mentioned is what I said above, that the sophist hides in the concept of "that which is not". It is a common ploy of sophists, mentioned by Aristotle, to produce a dichotomy of being and not being, that which is, and that which is not. Once this dichotomy is produced, there is no place for becoming, which is neither being nor not-being. This is the result of adherence to the law of excluded middle. From this platform, the sophist can "prove" all sorts of absurdities.

What is it about a sophist that you think means he must be wrong? The sophists were not all the same, to simply to be dismissed. Their arguments must be attended to, as Socrates did. It should also be noted how often Socrates incorporates parts of what the sophists he is arguing with say. — Fooloso4

Unlike philosophy which has one goal, described as a true desire to know, sophistry works toward many different ends. That's why "sophists were not all the same". But since it works toward an end, and that end is not true knowledge, as is the case with philosophy, the sophists arguments are designed toward proving whatever is seen as conducive to the end. The end is what Plato called "the good".

He was, as you said, from Parmenides' school. It was not a school of sophists. — Fooloso4

That is your opinion. The question is whether it was Plato's opinion or not. Notice my quote above, from 254, where the stranger says that the sophist runs off and hides in "that which is not". Doesn't Parmenides' school have a lot to say about "that which is not"?

Remember, what is stressed over and over again throughout the dialogue, is that the sophist is hard to catch, appearing just like a philosopher, but really a poser, a pretender. The dialogue has to be read very carefully to see that Plato is portraying the stranger as a sophist, pretending to be a philosopher. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. As clearly indicated by the title, the Sophist is about sophistry.

The serious reader of Plato should by now have sufficiently refined his intellectual abilities to perceive the subtle (and sometimes plain obvious) differences between Socrates and the Stranger.

The Stranger is a fake philosopher and a second-class imitation of Socrates.

Of course, both genuine philosophers and sophists use similar techniques of argument, which is the point Plato is making.

However, there are crucial differences. For example, the sophists' sole concern is to "win the argument" regardless of truth. They use argumentation "to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger" which is contrary to reason and to philosophy, i.e., inquiry into truth.

Another striking difference that ought to be pretty obvious is that Socrates’ philosophy serves a higher purpose which is to attain a vision of the Good, whilst the Stranger’s sophistry is for its own sake.

In sum, we can see why they refuse to answer the perfectly legitimate question as to why Plato calls the dialogue "The Sophist" (O Sophistes): an honest answer would demolish their case and would leave them without a leg to stand on!

This is why they are trying to turn Plato on his head and construct Socrates as the "sophist" and the Stranger as the "philosopher". Needless to say, an attempt doomed to failure from the start .... :smile: