If you fail to explain the connection you think you see. or address the difference I noted, in a convincing way, it isn't my fault is it?

Edit: I apologize, I misread you. I thought you were saying something else: and I think see what you were getting at now — Janus

The immaterial is the first step - one answers the question, "is God material?" with a no!. The next question, naturally, is "is God immaterial?' and the answer to that is also no! We're now in apophatic theological territory.

Then the question becomes "Is God" and the answer is "No" or "God is...not". Or if you are a fan of dialetheism, the answers to the question would be "Neither yes nor no" and/or "both yes and no", and then " Both "Neither yes nor no" and "Both yes and no" and neither ""Neither yes nor no" nor "Both yes and no"". And then...see where this is going? Where does this leave us...and God?

Is Apo phat or phin or in crisis?

Why so prejudiced against dogs? lol I'll be the contrarian for entertainment (perhaps I've misunderstood some feature of the argument so far, and you guys can point that out).

A fairly unique aspect of human thinking is not only how we seem to intellect in the abstract, but how we fail or refuse to recognize full ranges of possibility, underachieve, by becoming attached to certain concepts (not talking about anyone in particular). Our cognitive blind spots are not so dissimilar in their organic nature from a dog's, but of different kind. Humans are capable of thinking and imagining in extremely versatile ways, especially as it relates to generalized concepts (the universals you guys are talking about), but commonly refuse to or shrink away from doing so. I think this constant, arbitrary stereotyping of conceptual categories shows that rationality is without a doubt material, rooted in the body.

If the so-called immaterial is to be understood, it must be via reconfiguring physical knowledge to account for its material and physiological foundations in novel ways.

Then the question becomes "Is God" and the answer is "No" or "God is...not". Or if you are a fan of dialetheism, the answers to the question would be "Neither yes nor no" and/or "both yes and no", and then " Both "Neither yes nor no" and "Both yes and no" and neither ""Neither yes nor no" nor "Both yes and no"". And then...see where this is going? Where does this leave us...and God?

Is Apo phat or phin or in crisis? — Janus

There really is no problem with the apophatic technique if you will allow me to call it such. Nagarjuna's tetralemma comes to mind.

Why so prejudiced against dogs? — Enrique

If I asked my dog if I could use him as an example, I'm sure he wouldn't object, provided I didn't hit him (which I never do).

rationality is without a doubt material — Enrique

In what sense? What do you mean by that?

More to the point, it's the problem of objectification which is the major issue. Through the sensory abilities, we know about things that exist as objects for us. And that 'objective field' includes - well, pretty well everything that we can conceive of, from the sub-atomic to the galactic. If it's not part of that field, then it must, the reasoning goes, be 'in here' - an artefact of thought.

As if the two domains are totally separable.

More to the point, it's the problem of objectification which is the major issue. Through the sensory abilities, we know about things that exist as objects for us. And that 'objective field' includes - well, pretty well everything that we can conceive of, from the sub-atomic to the galactic. If it's not part of that field, then it must, the reasoning goes, be 'in here' - an artefact of thought.

As if the two domains are totally separable. — Wayfarer

Indeed. The traditional division of reality into physical and mental, however they may be related, is inadequate, apophatically speaking. For sure God is not physical but then is God mental (nonphysical)? No, not even nonphysical (mental).

There really is no problem with the apophatic technique if you will allow me to call it such. Nagarjuna's tetralemma comes to mind. — TheMadFool

There can be nothing wrong with it because there is nothing to it. QED

There can be nothing wrong with it because there is nothing to it. QED — Janus

Well, apophatically, God is not anything so, is God nothing? You know the answer to that question.

I think it follows that if God is not anything then God is nothing, to put it slightly differently if God is not any thing then God is no thing. Of course that just means God is not a thing, so then the thing is, what is a thing? But then maybe God is a thing; maybe God is a feeling. If you have a feeling, is that, or is that not, a thing? You know the colloquialism as expressed in examples like "Wearing red, is that a thing?". Meaning is given by use, right?

Humans are capable of thinking and imagining in extremely versatile ways, especially as it relates to generalized concepts (the universals you guys are talking about), but commonly refuse to or shrink away from doing so. I think this constant, arbitrary stereotyping of conceptual categories shows that rationality is without a doubt material, rooted in the body.

If the so-called immaterial is to be understood, it must be via reconfiguring physical knowledge to account for its material and physiological foundations in novel ways. — Enrique

The problem is, that when we follow "the material" all the way down, to its most fundamental constituents, as we are prone toward doing in scientific reductionist practices, we find that what is there, what supports the material world is the immaterial. So for example physics has found that immaterial wave fields are the foundation of material existence. When we encounter the immaterial at the bottom, as the foundation of all material existence, and our attitude is that the only way to understand the immaterial is as rooted in the body, then the immaterial is rendered as impossible to understand.

When this blockage toward understanding the immaterial is hit, we have no recourse but to reverse this attitude that the immaterial is rooted in the body, to account for the true fact that the body is rooted in the immaterial. When we make this reversal of attitude, all the various features of reality, like free will, and the so-called "hard problem", which are impossible to resolve from the perspective that the immaterial is rooted in the body, become highly intelligible.

I think it follows that if God is not anything then God is nothing, to put it slightly differently if God is not any thing then God is no thing. Of course that just means God is not a thing, so then the thing is, what is a thing? But then maybe God is a thing; maybe God is a feeling. If you have a feeling, is that, or is that not, a thing? You know the colloquialism as expressed in examples like "Wearing red, is that a thing?". Meaning is given by use, right? — Janus

No! Your post is wrong from beginning to end! :grin: I've been wanting to say that for ages. I picked it up from a book, forgot the title, just a coupla weeks ago (ages? go figure!)

Apophasis, at the end of the day, is simply denial on steroids. Nothing you say about what it is you want to say something about is right! The idea, it appears, is to end the discussion before it even starts. :chin: Talking but actually not talking.

As for meaning is use, I haven't really grasped what it is Wittgenstein wanted to convey.

Generally being affected by feelings is considered as being irrationally affected. — Janus

Agreed, but qualified by circumstance. Feelings getting in the way of reductionist empiricism, that is, the study of our relation to and understanding of the external world, is irrational, but feelings are nonetheless the necessary determinant factor in moral judgements.

I understand categories as being abstracted from perceived differences of material and form, so I think of them rather as material than immaterial. — Janus

Such may be common practice, yes, and may be true under the auspices of certain cognitive theories. It’s all a matter of answering the age-old question......where to begin with metaphysical inquiries: do we begin with that which is given to us, or do we begin with that which is in us, that it is given to.

Eenie, meenie, miney, moe......
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Are you saying that one example of say five objects cannot ground our understanding of number? — Janus

Yessiree, bub, exactly what I’m saying. I’m of the opinion we must already have the concept of “quantity” resident in understanding, or if you prefer, resident in basic human intelligence. As such, objects don’t ground our understanding of number, but number grounds our understanding of objects. What five represents would have precious little meaning if its place in a series of units didn’t relate to something beyond itself. It must be easy to see all particular numbers, therefore number itself in general, presupposes quantity. A bunch represents quantity, as well as a group, or a set, even a bucketful, but none of those make numbers necessary, which is sufficient reason to authorize something common to all of them.

There is further reduction, if you’re interested. There is a logical proof that knowledge of anything is impossible, if represented by a single conception. In other words, I can never know what a thing is, if I can relate to it only a single word. It is from that proof, that quantity must be both naturally intrinsic to, and a necessary speculative constituent of, human intellect.
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So all the abstract attributes of the number six can be perceptually shown. — Janus

Certainly. What this shows, is empirical proofs for logical conditions. This in turn shows “quantity” in not the only concept naturally resident in human understanding. So saying, there is nothing contained in the mere perception of six objects, that some relation exists between them. There must be a relation between the objects and us, but when we perform operations on numbers, it is the relation between them alone that makes possible the operations we perform.

There is nothing whatsoever given from, e.g., 29, alone, that says it is a prime number. That is it a prime, can only arise from some relation it must have. That it must have that relation comes from us, and what that relation is, can THEN be perceptually shown.
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Hopefully I'm not misunderstanding you and addressing something you weren't talking about. — Janus

Ehhhh....no worries. Hopefully I’m not over-analyzing. A vain hope, cuz I usually do, which explains why folks usually back gently towards the exists. (Grin)

The problem is, that when we follow "the material" all the way down, to its most fundamental constituents, as we are prone toward doing in scientific reductionist practices, we find that what is there, what supports the material world is the immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we think of a tree trunk, it can be modeled as a column, but that idealized geometry is only an approximation. The actual material structure or substance beneath the idealization is not precisely a column. If we think of subatomic matter, it can be modeled as a wave field, but that idealized geometry is also only an approximation. The actual material structure is some kind of oscillation and flow that does not precisely resemble any ideal wave.

In the case of the tree trunk, the distinction between the ideal and the real is easily inspectable with vision, while in the case of subatomic matter, its structure morphs at a rapid rate and in such complex orientation that we are mostly reliant on an indirect process of manipulating ideal concepts for any empirical comprehension we can achieve (though techniques such as electron microscopy give us some direct insight). But subatomic matter is no less material than a tree trunk, we simply don't have sense-perceptual insight at the subatomic scale to make this obvious.

The nature of what we approximately model as a waveform is not rooted in our physiology, but rather the material bodies it is composed of, which also comprise substances in the environment surrounding us. At the subatomic level, the distinction between physiological and nonphysiological dissolves, but these minuscule structures are no less fundamentally material than a macroscopic object.

Our reasoned understanding of objects intuitively seems to be rooted in the immaterial substance of thought, but it has been demonstrated that consciousness of anything is firmly attached to brain structure, so the apparently immaterial is more delimited by the body than are the basics of materiality, though a knowledge of the body is not exhaustive of so-called immateriality's nature, as any explanation of human will or solution to the hard problem must undoubtedly show.

but it has been demonstrated that consciousness of anything is firmly attached to brain structure — Enrique

On the contrary, consciousness determines 'brain structure', not vice versa. For instance, in patients who suffer brain trauma, the brain is reorganised in such a way as to compensate and re-organise its activities to compensate for the trauma (this is one of the discoveries of neuroplasticity).

Besides, on an abstract and general level, it can be shown that symbolic forms and logical relationships are not dependent on any particular material configuration, because they can be realised in many different material and symbolic forms. The meaning of a sentence can be preserved exactly across different languages and different media, so how could the meaning be determined by the material form?

As for meaning is use, I haven't really grasped what it is Wittgenstein wanted to convey. — TheMadFool

A fairly simple idea: how people use words shows their meanings.

Such may be common practice, yes, and may be true under the auspices of certain cognitive theories. It’s all a matter of answering the age-old question......where to begin with metaphysical inquiries: do we begin with that which is given to us, or do we begin with that which is in us, that it is given to. — Mww

I tend to think that what is in us is given to us as much as what is external. I see it all as part of a relational reality in which the notions of external and internal are not absolute, but are relative to what we consider to be the boundaries of our organisms.

So saying, there is nothing contained in the mere perception of six objects, that some relation exists between them. There must be a relation between the objects and us, but when we perform operations on numbers, it is the relation between them alone that makes possible the operations we perform. — Mww

If I understand what you say here, then my comment is that I was thinking of six similar objects, or six identical kinds of objects; for example six oranges. In any case it doesn't matter to my arguments, you could imagine six objects of any kind that are small enough to move around. My point was that we can arrange them in all the ways necessary such as to show the attributes that go to define the quantity six.

There is nothing whatsoever given from, e.g., 29, alone, that says it is a prime number. That is it a prime, can only arise from some relation it must have. That it must have that relation comes from us, and what that relation is, can THEN be perceptually shown. — Mww

So, in reference to what I wrote above, if we have 29 objects we can try all the ways of arranging them to see if they can be divided into any number of equal groups, and find that we cannot. We don't need any numerals to so this, all we need is the pattern recognition ability to distinguish between single objects and groups.

We don't know of any examples of consciousness that are not the functions of brains.

We have discussed the voluminous evidence for children recalling past lives numerous times on this forum. The fact that it’s generally rejected on philosophical grounds doesn’t explain it away.

In the case of the tree trunk, the distinction between the ideal and the real is easily inspectable with vision, while in the case of subatomic matter, its structure morphs at a rapid rate and in such complex orientation that we are mostly reliant on an indirect process of manipulating ideal concepts for any empirical comprehension we can achieve (though techniques such as electron microscopy give us some direct insight). But subatomic matter is no less material than a tree trunk, we simply don't have sense-perceptual insight at the subatomic scale to make this obvious. — Enrique

What subatomic physics, quantum mechanics, demonstrates, is that the reality of continuous subatomic existence is best represented as immaterial (wave function). There is no reality to where the electron, as a material entity, a particle, is at a specific time, because the evidence indicates that it does not exist as a material particle.

This is the inverse of what you say about the tree trunk. Every attempt to represent the tree trunk as an immaterial form fails, as you say, because the form of the trunk is given to us through our senses. What you are not accounting for though, is that our senses are deficient, as you probably already know, they commonly mislead us. So the form which our senses gives us of the tree trunk is incorrect, due to the deficiencies of the senses. As chemistry and physics show us, the trunk is not really as it appears to our senses. So the fact that the ideal does not match up with the tree trunk, as perceived by the senses, is because the senses misrepresent the tree trunk to us, The senses provide a much more deficient perspective than the intellect does with its ideals, so it is clearly not a case of the ideals being wrong, while the senses are right .

This is exactly the issue of Plato's cave. The common people believe that the world is as it appears to the senses, and if the intelligible principles are not consistent with what the senses give us, the intelligible principles must be wrong.. But what Plato says, is that what the senses are giving us is just a representation of the world, and the senses are far less reliable in representing the world than the intellect is. The real world is completely different from how the senses represent it to us, the sense representations being the shadows referred to in the op. Modern science confirms that Plato was absolutely right. The real world is completely different from how it appears to our senses, and the intellect demonstrates to us that the intelligible forms are far more reliable in giving us the real world, then are the senses.

A fairly simple idea: how people use words shows their meanings. — Janus

It isn't as simple as that. The claim meaning is use is ambiguous. As far as I can tell, Wittgenstein made that declaration as a refutation of the idea that words have an essence.

My problem is if words do possess an essence, we still use words - to stand for, to refer to that essence. Wittgenstein doesn't clarify how the word "use" in his claim that meaning is use differs from the word "use" in I'm now going to use the word "water" for that clear liquid that we drink, cook with, wash with, put out fires with. Notice how there's an essence to the word "water" in the latter (bolded) and yet I still use the word "water"

You've lost me. I have no idea what it could mean for words to "have essences".

"Water" doesn't have one essential meaning , but various associated meanings according to what people use the word for.

Consider these:

" I had water on the knee" referring to some fluid not H2O

" I need to get the dirty water off my chest" referring to ? Mucous? A bad feeling?

Of course these usages are related to the usage of 'water' to refer to H2O. That's why Wittgenstein uses the notion of family resemblances.

You've lost me. I have no idea what it could mean for words to "have essences".

"Water" doesn't have one essential meaning , but various associated meanings according to what people use the word for.

Consider these:

" I had water on the knee" referring to some fluid not H2O

" I need to get the dirty water off my chest" referring to ? Mucous? A bad feeling?

Of course these usages are related to the usage of 'water' to refer to H2O. That's why Wittgenstein uses the notion of family resemblances. — Janus

Let's meet at the halfway point.

1. Words do possess essences. [traditional view]

2. Words can be assigned any set of essences. [meaning is use]

On the contrary, consciousness determines 'brain structure', not vice versa. For instance, in patients who suffer brain trauma, the brain is reorganised in such a way as to compensate and re-organise its activities to compensate for the trauma (this is one of the discoveries of neuroplasticity).

Besides, on an abstract and general level, it can be shown that symbolic forms and logical relationships are not dependent on any particular material configuration, because they can be realised in many different material and symbolic forms. The meaning of a sentence can be preserved exactly across different languages and different media, so how could the meaning be determined by the material form? — Wayfarer

Human meaning in all cases, whatever the medium, reduces to brain structure. Brains have much plasticity, true, but all of this is mediated by neuronal connections, and the degree of plasticity is constrained. An only partial reconfiguration of function commonly occurs, such as long-term pot use counterbalancing suppressed frontal lobe activity with increases in visual cortex acuity, or delayed onset of dementia due to compensation by less damaged areas of the brain. The way structural changes manifest as functional change can be subtle, but targeted tests will reveal a difference, if only a slight dulling or lack of stamina in relation to very specific tasks. Neuronal rewiring builds on existing structure, even if the total causation cannot be exclusively attributed to any particular brain region.

Meaning is essentially determined by interpretation, and as such is subjected to massive amounts of illusoriness. I'd claim that if we find a way to get past the illusions, cognitive change will usually if not always reveal itself extremely sensitive to preexisting brain structure. Not to diminish that consciousness seemingly transcends the brain in some way, but I don't consider this an immaterial phenomenon.

To clarify my view of immateriality:

The relatively informal meaning of "immaterial" makes sense, as not consonant with the principles of classical physics that are the bedrock of our intuitions about material reality.

I regard an ontological proposition that the immaterial is a fundamentally distinct substance from physical matter as fallacy.

If what has traditionally been referred to as immaterial is a distinct substance in some sense, it at least has to have causal principles in common with conventional matter by virtue of interaction, and the entire range of phenomena becomes part of one theoretical edifice modeling a single reality, which will presumably be a revised physical reality of matter in various forms.

I don't know if what is purported to be evidence that some children can 'remember' details of lives that they could not possibly have gleaned from anywhere is really good evidence of that.

And even if it were it might be a case of the children somehow contacting some kind of encoded memory of past events. We might be living in a simulation and it might be a software glitch for example.

Or the physical universe might somehow encode information about everything that has ever happened which a human brain can sometimes inexplicitly access ( if everything is at the quantum level "entangled" for example).

I have no doubt reality is stranger than we imagine perhaps stranger than we can imagine. And in any case those children have functioning brains don't they?

We are not compelled to default to explanations imagined by the ancients who did not have the benefit of all the scientific knowledge acquired since their time.

I still think W's notion of family resemblances is more accurate to the facts of usage than the ancient idea of essences. But each to their own I guess.

I still think W's notion of family resemblances is more accurate to the facts of usage than the ancient idea of essences. But each to their own I guess. — Janus

Family resemblance goes to show that meaning assignment of words is arbitrary but not that words are essenceless. Perhaps it's an issue of scope. When I say the word "God" has an essence, I mean it within theism or deism or panentheism or... I'm not saying "God" has an essence that spans these various denominations of God beliefs i.e. not true that "God" possesses an essence in theism and deism and panentheism and...

Human meaning in all cases, whatever the medium, reduces to brain structure. — Enrique

This discussion has nowhere to go then.

Although I suppose I could ask you this question: as the 'structure' to which 'meaning' is ostensibly reducible is constantly changing, what is it that fixes the relationship between the neurophysiological configuration and the semantic meaning? How can symbolic code be 'represented' by neural events? Don't you think there's a possibility you're confusing the two levels, neurophysiological and semantic? The basis of meaning is the perception of meanings which remain stable between different people and cultures. Do you think that's reducible to neurophysiology?

Meaning is essentially determined by interpretation, and as such is subjected to massive amounts of illusoriness — Enrique

Isn't that what got philosophy started? You know that Aristotle's metaphysics got started by examination of the various senses of the verb 'to be'. So I'm inclined to say that this is not a particularly original insight.

Or the physical universe might somehow encode information about everything that has ever happened which a human brain can sometimes inexplicitly access ( if everything is at the quantum level "entangled" for example). — Janus

Akashic fields, or morphic fields. It's a no-go topic here, but suffice to say it stymies standard-issue physicalism.

I regard an ontological proposition that the immaterial is a fundamentally distinct substance from physical matter as fallacy.

If what has traditionally been referred to as immaterial is a distinct substance in some sense, it at least has to have causal principles in common with conventional matter by virtue of interaction, and the entire range of phenomena becomes part of one theoretical edifice modeling a single reality, which will presumably be a revised physical reality of matter in various forms. — Enrique

You seem to be neglecting the reality of time, and the division between past and future. In relation to the past, there is real 'material' truth concerning what has been. In relation to the future, there is real possibility. At any moment, my material arm might move to the right or to the left. There is no determinate truth as to where my arm will be in the next moment. This means that to speak of the material existence of my arm, on that side of the present, the future side, is to speak nonsense. But we can always speak truth about where my arm was on the other side of the present, the last moment.

We exist at the present, but there is a real incompatibility between the material existence of the past, that which has been experienced, and the immateriality of the future, that which cannot be experienced. However, we cannot say that the future is completely without substance, though it cannot be experienced because this would put it into the past. If the future was completely without substance, this would mean that absolutely anything is possible at any moment. So we can conclude that the "substance" of the future, as allowing for real possibility, is distinct, and separate from the "substance" of the past, which does not allow for possibility.

Clearly, the "causal principles" attributable to the substance of the future, which enable the reality of possibility, are not "in common" with the causal principles of the determinate matter of the past. This does not mean that the two do not interact, as they clearly do, at the present. What it means is that the causal principles which are applicable to the substantial existence of the observed past, are completely distinct, and separate from, incompatible with, the causal principles which are applicable to the substantial existence of the unobservable future.

Therefore the dream of "a single reality" where everything behaves according to a single, consistent and coherent, set of causal principles, because it is composed of a single substance, is just that, a dream. And you appear to be living in this illusion, which others have created for you, and impressed upon you, until you accepted it without appropriate scrutiny. Either that or you created the illusion yourself because you are intellectually lazy, and the true nature of reality is too complex for you to grapple with.

How can symbolic code be 'represented' by neural events? Don't you think there's a possibility you're confusing the two levels, neurophysiological and semantic? The basis of meaning is the perception of meanings which remain stable between different people and cultures. Do you think that's reducible to neurophysiology? — Wayfarer

Verbiage on the computer monitor I'm looking at reduces to characters on a page which my brain interprets into meanings.

Language spoken to me reduces to sounds which my brain interprets into meanings.

The coffee machine beeping is interpreted by my brain to mean that the coffee is ready.

My brain interprets waking up early as meaning that I might have a long, challenging day of exhaustion ahead of me.

All these cases and every possible case I can think of reduce to my brain making an interpretation. Sure, meanings are agreed upon, but this agreement between humans is not fundamentally semantic, it is cognitive. The semantic is real only insofar as it is embodied in a medium that implies meaning to my consciousness doing the interpreting. If meaning is shared, if semantic content is mutual, this is because it is etched into the material environment such that multiple individuals have a collectively functional access, not because it exists in some higher realm of ideal form set apart from what everything is made of. The point about morphic fields might be pertinent: perhaps a domain of object-forms exists that transcends sense-perception and standard physics, but this is no less material. I'm getting the impression that you don't want to discuss morphic fields, but it would be interesting to know something about related theories.

The semantic only has reality insofar as it is embodied in neurophysiological matter or its correlates in the material world. I can't imagine what meaning even is apart from the substances it is instantiated in. Claiming that a substance is "immaterial" seems contradictory to me. "Meaning" is merely an aspect of what substance does in conjunction with my consciousness' interpreting.

There is no reality to where the electron, as a material entity, a particle, is

The real world is completely different from how it appears to our senses, and the intellect demonstrates to us that the intelligible forms are far more reliable in giving us the real world, then are the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there is no reality about what the electron is and quantum physics is purely a functional method utilized by technological practice, how can you say that the intelligible form of the phenomenon is more real than the sensible? Intellectual concepts might be more efficacious than sensory data alone, but not more real and certainly not independent of the senses, unless you mean something along the lines of the morphic fields that were mentioned by @Janus, with "intellect" partially defined as that aspect of consciousness which has exclusive access to them.

Therefore the dream of "a single reality" where everything behaves according to a single, consistent and coherent, set of causal principles, because it is composed of a single substance, is just that, a dream. — Metaphysician Undercover

When the past and future interact they are causally unified such that certain events could happen and alternate events couldn't. I don't claim that causality is fundamentally principled, that is only our functional interpretation of it. And as for "single reality", monism isn't exactly a fringe perspective. Do you subscribe to a metaphysical foundation that differs from monism?

If there is no reality about what the electron is and quantum physics is purely a functional method utilized by technological practice, how can you say that the intelligible form of the phenomenon is more real than the sensible? — Enrique

Obviously, the mathematics (intelligible form) is very reliable. Coming from the other direction, visible observation, we see material objects can be broken into parts, and we see molecules with microscopes, and theorize about atoms as material objects, and the parts of atoms, which are responsible for the bonding between atoms, as material parts. But then we cannot see where these proposed electrons (as material objects) are, so we cannot validate with our senses, that they even exist as material objects.

So the intelligible form of "the electron", is very reliable, and proven in scientific research therefore extremely real. But the "sensible form", as a particle, being a part of an object, cannot even be sensed at all, so we really cannot say that there is any reality to the "material form" of an electron. .

When the past and future interact they are causally unified such that certain events could happen and alternate events couldn't. — Enrique

This leaves out a huge portion of reality. Of the events which "could happen", there is a division between the ones which actually do happen, and the ones which don't happen. We cannot class the ones which don't happen with "events that couldn't happen", because they've already been placed in the other category, of "could happen", and this would effectively negate the category of "could happen", resulting in hard determinism.

Therefore we need a form of causation which is not the same as the causation of determinism, to allow that within the category of "could happen", some events are caused to happen, and some are not.