@Wafarer

From the supposed neo-Darwinian fanatic Jerry Coyne, I give you his review of the book A Natural History of Rape by Thornhill and Palmer. One passage in particular stands out:

Let us be clear. It is not "biophobia" to reject the reduction of all human
feelings and actions to evolution. Quite the contrary. It is biophilia; or
at least a proper respect for science. The "choice between ideology and
knowledge" is a real choice; but it is Thornhill and Palmer and the
doctrinaire evolutionary psychologists who choose ideology over knowledge.
They enjoy the advantage that people seem to like scientific explanations
for their behavior, and the certainty that such explanations provide. It is
reassuring to impute our traumas and our misdeeds to our savanna-dwelling
ancestors. It lessens the moral pressure on our lives. And so the
disciplinary hubris of evolutionary psychology and the longing for certainty
of ordinary men and women have combined to create a kind of scientistic
cargo cult, with everyone waiting in vain for evolutionary psychology to
deliver the goods that it doesn't have. — Coyne

Hmm...does that sound like the writings of a man who obsessively applies evolutionary theory to every facet of human life?

http://www2.asa3.org/archive/evolution/200004/0012.html

Quibbling over terminology aside, the fact remains that it was an appeal to consequences: Dennett's "universal acid" leaves no place for philosophy (in your view), and ergo must be false. — Arkady

It's not my claim that 'it must be false'. Dennett's claim is that anything that amounts to 'a philosophy' in the traditional sense is one of the things that has been dissolved.

And again, this "classical tradition" would include secular works? — Arkady

The original intention of the secular state was to maintain the separation of church and state, so as to make room for a plurality of views. The meaning has changed considerably to now imply 'secular as opposed to religious'. But take for example the works of the Renaissance humanists, Ficino and Della Mirandola, both recognised as pioneers of humanism. They both skirted heresy and are poster figures for humanism, but they're not at all 'secular' in the 21st century sense; they were both indebted to Platonism and neo-platonism, which would both, I'm sure, be dissolved in said 'acid'.

So: the universe is a sign of higher intelligence, but this is not an empirical demonstration of God's existence? — Arkady

IN the sense that, even if it's true, how could it be demonstrated empirically? You think 'the first principle of existence' is something you're going to photograph? That it will show up in a bubble chamber at the LHC. (My, that would make for a headline.)

Even now, there are scientists who argue for God on the basis of science, and others who argue against God on the same basis. It will never be settled empirically, in my opinion. (Which is one of the reasons, incidentally, that Buddhism is not based on belief in God.)

Dawkins never says anything of the sort that science disproves God. — Arkady

The whole book, The God Delusion, is based on the premise that scientific method supersedes religious belief. The only reason he says it doesn't disprove it, is because he understands vaguely that it's not an empirical question.

Thirdly, even if Dawkins et al overreach with the scope of the application of evolutionary theory, why would that lead to a widespread rejection of the core precepts of the theory? After all, one can believe in, say, the common descent of all life on Earth as it developed over 4 billion years, and yet reject the contention that evolution explains, for instance, the human moral sense, or that art has an adaptive explanation. (I will point out for the umpteenth time that Coyne himself has written about some of the more dubious overreaches of evolutionary theory as it pertains to evolutionary psychology, an inconvenient fact which you continue to assiduously ignore so that you can refer back to Coyne as a bogeyman emblematic of all you despise.) — Arkady

With respect to the evolutionary explanations of such faculties as conscience, rationality, and the like, one can certainly explore the biological roots of h. sapiens without conceding thereby that the nature of such faculties can be explained in purely biological terms. I posted what I consider a very able review of that very issue, Anything But Human, by a humanistic scholar, and you dismissed it as rubbish, so no use raking over it again. Question has been asked and answered.

Creationism hails from around the 1920s in the US. Theistic evolution is another matter entirely, and, were I to choose sides, I would choose that, over Dawkin's and Dennett's materialism any day.

That quote from Coyne is interesting, and I have read some of his criticisms of evolutionary psychology elsewhere. I don't see anything to object to there. What I object to his strident 'ideological scientism'. Coyne's latest book is called Faith Vs Fact, of which science blogger John Horgan's review was titled 'Book by Biologist Jerry Coyne Goes Too Far in Denouncing Religion, Defending Science'. The subtitle of Coyne's book is 'Why Religion and Science are Incompatible':

Actually, Faith vs. Fact serves as a splendid specimen of scientism. Mr. Coyne disparages not only religion but also other human ways of engaging with reality. The arts, he argues, “cannot ascertain truth or knowledge,” and the humanities do so only to the extent that they emulate the sciences. This sort of arrogance and certitude is the essence of scientism — John Horgan

The key paragraph from Anything but Human [linked above]

I have no beef with entomology or evolution, but I refuse to admit that they teach me much about ethics. Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense.

While it's certainly true that religions embrace mythology, folklore, and also many forms of superseded knowledge, they also claim to indicate a reality 'beyond this world' - beyond the physical horizon of birth and death. That is represented in Christianity by the resurrection and the belief in Heaven (although whether 'eternal existence in Heaven' is what was originally intended by the phrase 'eternal life' is, I think, a moot point.)

Whereas the only desideratum a biological theory can really deal with is 'how species and individuals survive and evolve' (in a strictly biological sense.) So ultimately a biologically-oriented philosophy (such as that advocated by Sam Harris in The Moral Landscape) has to be a form of utilitarianism; 'the greatest good for the greatest number', the maximisation of human well-being. There's nothing else to aim for. And while there's nothing intrinsically the matter with such an aim, it fails to address the central problem of the 'human condition' in the way that religions claim to do, that problem being the transitory nature of existence.

There may indeed be a secular ethic - I have already mentioned utilitarianism - but what I am criticising is the way that today's scientific secularism equates any and all religious philosophies with superstition, or as a 'tribal bonding mechanism', or an archaic form of science, on a lower rung of the positivist view of history. And they often do that without any real understanding of what they've rejected, because their reaction is based on the criticism of a religious conception which had already ossified into dogma (e.g. Biblical creationism).

When I set out on the spiritual path, the first teachers I encountered were non-dualist Vedantins. That is a type of Hinduism, but the non-dualists were anything but starchy religious types. Actually they were quite dismissive of 'organised religion' themselves. But they were dismissive of it from a completely different perspective to materialism. They saw through it, or rather, beyond it, to the ineffable reality of Brahman. (They were dismissive of it, because they'd graduated from it, I later came to realise.)

So having investigated those and many other such spiritual traditions, I came to appreciate Christianity from a new perspective, namely, that of the 'unitive consciousness' that Richard Rohr speaks of in the video. It's not any kind of literalism or fundamentalism - in fact Richard Rohr would almost certainly have been indicted for heresy in an earlier place and time. (Nowadays it doesn't matter so much.)

So the truly transcendent elements of the spiritual traditions, point beyond themselves to a higher truth. That is neither what mainstream churches teach, nor what materialism denies, although it is categorised by materialists as part of the former. And that is what I'm complaining about.

The whole book, The God Delusion, is based on the premise that scientific method supersedes religious belief. The only reason he says it doesn't disprove it, is because he understands vaguely that it's not an empirical question. — Wayfarer

The premise of The God Delusion is that God probably doesn't exist. The fact you are speaking of "disproof" shows that you don't even understand the nature of empiricism. He believes that the balance of the evidence demonstrates that God probably doesn't exist, not that it "disproves," God. This is not due to to any "vague" understanding on Dawkins's part, but rather is the nature of empirical investigation (unlike religionists, scientists don't speak of "Truth" - note the capital "T" which so many Christians are fond of appending to the word - but only of "evidence" which either confirms or disconfirms hypotheses which can be used to make useful predictions or retrodictions in the service of explaining nature).

With respect to the evolutionary explanations of such faculties as conscience, rationality, and the like, one can certainly explore the biological roots of h. sapiens without conceding thereby that the nature of such faculties can be explained in purely biological terms. I posted what I consider a very able review of that very issue, Anything But Human, by a humanistic scholar, and you dismissed it as rubbish, so no use raking over it again. Question has been asked and answered.

In all honesty, you link to quite a bit, so I don't recall that particular work (was it in this discussion? We've exchanged a flurry of links, and my memory fails me). Anyway, in giving a quick skim at that article, I didn't see any too objectionable, so perhaps I've softened my view on it. I can view it in more detail a bit later.

Creationism hails from around the 1920s in the US. Theistic evolution is another matter entirely, and, were I to choose sides, I would choose that, over Dawkin's and Dennett's materialism any day.

Yes, and creationism entails a rejection of evolution to at least some degree, ergo your claim that the New Atheists are responsible for fomenting rejection of evolution in the U.S. to any significant degree is rather tendentious.

What would lead you choose theistic evolution over a purely materialistic conception of evolution? You reject that such things can be gleaned empirically, so what reasons do you have?

That quote from Coyne is interesting, and I have read some of his criticisms of evolutionary psychology elsewhere. I don't see anything to object to there. What I object to his strident 'ideological scientism'. Coyne's latest book is called Faith Vs Fact, of which science blogger John Horgan's review was titled 'Book by Biologist Jerry Coyne Goes Too Far in Denouncing Religion, Defending Science'. The subtitle of Coyne's book is 'Why Religion and Science are Incompatible':

Actually, Faith vs. Fact serves as a splendid specimen of scientism. Mr. Coyne disparages not only religion but also other human ways of engaging with reality. The arts, he argues, “cannot ascertain truth or knowledge,” and the humanities do so only to the extent that they emulate the sciences. This sort of arrogance and certitude is the essence of scientism — John Horgan

Firstly, I will say that Horgan (yet another quote!) is hardly unbiased himself. He has, for instance, made ill-informed and unsupported comments about particular fields which he simply doesn't like, such as behavioral genetics (the book Born That Way,about just such that topic, describes the author's rather frustrating encounter with Horgan on this matter).

Secondly, If you haven't read Faith vs. Fact, I'd encourage you to do so. Coyne criticizes, among other things, practices such as faith healing and religiously-motivated rejection of medical care (including for children), which I don't think any rational person can find odious.

And yes, Coyne (as well as I) do reject "other ways of knowing." This is not to say that he (or I) believes that all questions fall under the ambit of the natural sciences, but rather that claims must have some rational warrant in order to be accepted. In the case of humanities such as history, this would include marshaling evidence in support of some thesis, and crafting arguments to support this thesis.

As for the arts, Coyne does allow that the arts can be "ways of knowing" in certain ways, in that the arts can, for instance, tell us what certain historical figures looked like via their portraits. But for the most part, why should the arts be regarded as a truth-seeking or knowledge-generating endeavor? This is clearly a case of humanitiesism: the encroachment of the humanities on the domain of the natural and social sciences.

And finally, you are somewhat inconsistent in your criticism of Coyne. You seem to alternate between calling him a zealous adaptationist, who believes that every facet of human life and behavior is explainable by evolution, and by generically labeling him as "scientistic." Once I demonstrated that the former claim was unsupported by his statements, you switch to the latter tactic. But, of course, it's possible for someone to think that all questions must yield to science without believing that all questions must yield to evolutionary explanations. One could even ostensibly be a scientist and yet reject the power of natural selection to do even those things which the most sober-minded biologists attribute to it (cosmologist Fred Hoyle, for example, was famously dismissive of natural selection - he was the one who devised the 747/junkyard/tornado analogy, IIRC).

If you haven't read Faith vs. Fact, I'd encourage you to do so — Arkady

I don't need to read atheist polemics not to trust faith healers and those who reject blood transfusions.

unlike religionists, scientists don't speak of "Truth" - note the capital "T" which so many Christians are fond of appending to the word — Arkady

Capital T Truth denotes something like a 'vision of the whole' or at any rate a visionary state or encounter or epiphany. It has a vaguely religious connotation now, but in days of yore was also spoken of in suitably hushed tones by men of science.

And yes, Coyne (as well as I) do reject "other ways of knowing." This is not to say that he (or I) believes that all questions fall under the ambit of the natural sciences, but rather that claims must have some rational warrant in order to be accepted. — Arkady

But it's also clear that he and you are generally positivist in your orientation, 'positivism' being 'a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism'.

creationism entails a rejection of evolution to at least some degree, ergo your claim that the New Atheists are responsible for fomenting rejection of evolution in the U.S. to any significant degree is rather tendentious. — Arkady

Biblical creationism rejects Darwinian evolution holus bolus. But why I find fault with evolutionary materialism is because of the insistence that evolution 'proves' anything about God. It doesn't prove anything of the kind. Certainly it proves that the Earth wasn't created in 6006 bc. But if you're in a culture where Biblical faith fundamental, and then say 'look here, science shows your religious beliefs are superstitious nonsense', then what do you think a lot of people are going to do? They're going to reject it. That's why I'm saying these 'evangelical atheists' are doing a lot of damage to their own cause.

If I was teaching high-school biology and evolution, I would never for a minute bring intelligent design arguments into it. But if some kid asked, 'what do you think evolution says about "why we're all here"? Do you think it leaves room for a "higher purpose"?', I would never say that it doesn't. I would say, very interesting question, go and investigate - but not here. It's not a scientific matter.

So just as religion doesn't belong in science class, science doesn't prove anything about ultimate or first causes or whether there is a higher intelligence. It cuts both ways. Michael Ruse is far better at all of that, than any of the atheist writers we have discussed. And he's a professed atheist himself.

What would lead you choose theistic evolution over a purely materialistic conception of evolution? — Arkady

I remember I asked you once, do you think life is really just a kind of chemical reaction, and you said, what else could it be? Well, it could be 'the manifestation of spirit' - for all we know. Of course, Darwin never thought like that, but Wallace did. Anyway, maybe for all our cleverness, life itself is something we don't really understand very well.

So much of modern evolutionary materialism is shaped by the Enlightenment attitude that religion is a superstitious yoke to be thrown off. I have already explained in a very long post before your last reply, what I think is the matter with that; I'm just about done discussing it.

As for the arts, Coyne does allow that the arts can be "ways of knowing" in certain ways, in that the arts can, for instance, tell us what certain historical figures looked like via their portraits. But for the most part, why should the arts be regarded as a truth-seeking or knowledge-generating endeavor? This is clearly a case of humanitiesism: the encroachment of the humanities on the domain of the natural and social sciences. — Arkady

There is a long history of belief in the mystical relationship between musical principles (consonance and dissonance), and the secrets to the universe. This extends back through Christianity, Platonism, Pythagorean cosmology, and further. This belief is based in sound principles which manifest today in the difference between just, or pure intonation, and equal temperament tuning. Within this little problem, which deals with the fundamental relationship between wave frequency and time, lies the secrets to the nature of time. This problem is laid bare by the Fourier transform which exposes the frequency time uncertainty relation, which is dealt with in a particular way by physicists, producing the quantum uncertainty principle.

But an artist is inclined to face a problem with the attitude of "the way those people dealt with that problem is not the way that I am going to deal with it". And this is the benefit of the subjectivity, which we find in the artist's "way of knowing". The artist has to know in one's own way, not the way of another, so the artist is always seeking more accuracy, more efficiency, just overall "better" ways of knowing the same thing. Just take a look at the "What Colour are the Strawberries?" thread, to see a discussion on the importance of subjectivity. Creativity is the means by which we advance from the unknown, expanding the realm of knowledge. Therefore artistry is the true knowledge generating endeavor.

But an artist is inclined to face a problem with the attitude of "the way those people dealt with that problem is not the way that I am going to deal with it". And this is the benefit of the subjectivity, which we find in the artist's "way of knowing". The artist has to know in one's own way, not the way of another, so the artist is always seeking more accuracy, more efficiency, just overall "better" ways of knowing the same thing. Just take a look at the "What Colour are the Strawberries?" thread, to see a discussion on the importance of subjectivity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Everything is subjective to some degree. Even when scientists verify each others' observations, they do so by means of experiencing the requisite qualia (if one finds this term contentious, please feel free to substitute its closest synonym with which you agree) for themselves. However, one of the cornerstones of the scientific method is the replicability of results, which lends science its objective force. Given appropriate circumstances, one should (at least in principle) be able to replicate an experiment and obtain similar results.

As for artists striving for accuracy and efficiency, I can only wonder what is the basis for that contention. While accuracy of some work's representation of reality may be a desideratum of some artists, I don't see how accuracy is a goal inherent to the artistic process (except in the fairly trivial manner that artists often seek to realize their mental vision or concept of the art in executing it). How would one gauge the "accuracy" of, for instance, Beethoven's Fifth?

Creativity is the means by which we advance from the unknown, expanding the realm of knowledge. Therefore artistry is the true knowledge generating endeavor.

Non-sequitur. The scientific process requires creativity, sure (one must be creative in conjecturing hypotheses, devising empirical tests of said hypotheses, etc), but it doesn't follow that all creative endeavors are artistic in nature. The aims and goals of science and art are completely different.

I don't need to read atheist polemics not to trust faith healers and those who reject blood transfusions. — Wayfarer

I see. So you will happily quote scathing reviews of a book when said reviews comport with your views on religion and the "New Atheists," but you decline to read the actual book before opining on it? That sounds a bit, dare I say...close-minded. Coyne touches on a number of other issues, including demolishing Gould's "NOMA" arguments. Might be worth checking out, since you are so interested in this sort of thing.

Just curious: you have read The God Delusion, right?

Capital T Truth denotes something like a 'vision of the whole' or at any rate a visionary state or encounter or epiphany. It has a vaguely religious connotation now, but in days of yore was also spoken of in suitably hushed tones by men of science.

Well, we're no longer in days of yore, and every encounter I've seem to have had with the word "Truth" has come from a religious person (probably generally of the evangelical Christian variety). Once again, I'd ask who is the arrogant party here? Atheists and scientific rationalists must at least honestly admit that they are ignorant of some of the greatest mysteries of the universe: but it is religionists who have ready answers to these questions.

But it's also clear that he and you are generally positivist in your orientation, 'positivism' being 'a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism'.

Well, logical positivism is itself more or less moribund, wouldn't you say? As for metaphysics (which no doubt at least overlaps with theism), I am at a loss as to what a "verification" of a metaphysical thesis might look like. It seems the most that metaphysicians can do is try to find contradictions in opposing theses while trying to tighten up their own. The fact that debates over the veracity of universals, say, have raged for millennia in some cases does not make me optimistic that metaphysical debates are ever resolved in a timely and definitive matter, if they get resolved at all (through rational means: one can of course forcibly silence one's opponents, or ban their views, etc).

Biblical creationism rejects Darwinian evolution holus bolus. But why I find fault with evolutionary materialism is because of the insistence that evolution 'proves' anything about God. It doesn't prove anything of the kind. Certainly it proves that the Earth wasn't created in 6006 bc. But if you're in a culture where Biblical faith fundamental, and then say 'look here, science shows your religious beliefs are superstitious nonsense', then what do you think a lot of people are going to do? They're going to reject it. That's why I'm saying these 'evangelical atheists' are doing a lot of damage to their own cause. — Wayfarer

Your concern for the cause of "evangelical atheists" is touching, but they are not politicians. They don't soft-peddle their positions for mass appeal.

I remember I asked you once, do you think life is really just a kind of chemical reaction, and you said, what else could it be? Well, it could be 'the manifestation of spirit' - for all we know. Of course, Darwin never thought like that, but Wallace did. Anyway, maybe for all our cleverness, life itself is something we don't really understand very well.

We have dissected life down to its constituent atoms, and found no "spirit" to speak of. I know you hate when I call you a "vitalist," but if it quacks like a duck...

So much of modern evolutionary materialism is shaped by the Enlightenment attitude that religion is a superstitious yoke to be thrown off. I have already explained in a very long post before your last reply, what I think is the matter with that; I'm just about done discussing it.

None of this answers why you think that theistic evolution is probably the case, as opposed to purely naturalistic evolution. You have several "very long posts" (not that I'm complaining, mind you: I appreciate the time you put into them), so you will have to be more specific about where you laid out your reasons for believing that theistic evolution comports better with the facts than its naturalistic counterpart.

But, here is a broader problem with your position. When you wade into theistic evolution, you are saying something about the causes and forces operative in the world, ones which shape the course of nature and life on Earth. And, as with any other cause, we can tell a counterfactual narrative about it ("had the asteroid not struck the Earth 65 MYA, then the dinosaurs wouldn't have died out," "had sewage not contaminated the drinking water, then the cholera outbreak wouldn't have occurred", etc). That is, if God is involved in the evolutionary process, then the world looks different than it would had God not gotten involved at all. And yet, when asked for evidence to support this claim, you retreat behind the wall of crying "scientism", and saying that it's not a matter for empirical investigation. So, you want it both ways.

Just curious: you have read The God Delusion, right? — Arkady

Borrowed it when it came out. Read the first three chapters, skimmed the remainder, read many reviews. I think I'm thoroughly conversant with the philosophical arguments in it. It is the book that triggered my interest in Forums, as I signed up with the Dawkins forum when it was still in business. I think it's a terrible book, and his brand of atheism is based on many basic misconceptions about the subject.

You decline to read the actual book before opining on it? — Arkady

I don't need to read Das Kapital to have a view on Marxism. Jerry Coyne's reputation is terrible, outside anyone who isn't part of the new atheist scene. I could provide hundreds of quotes but I don't want to bore you. *

We have dissected life down to its constituent atoms, and found no "spirit" to speak of. — Arkady

Spirit is not an ingredient. There's the problem right there: if you don't know what you're looking for, how can you look for it? The idea that an elan vital is something like an ethereal essence or substance in the material sense is the whole problem. There's your scientistic modus operandi - first, define it in terms then science can comprehend. Then say: no such thing!

An analogy:

1. Metal detectors have had far greater success in finding coins and other metallic objects in more places than any other method has.

2. Therefore what metal detectors reveal to us is what is real.

Well, logical positivism is itself more or less moribund, wouldn't you say? — Arkady

I didn't say 'logical positivism', I meant 'positivism' as an overall historical and philosophical orientation, which is obviously the position you take. It's not intended as a pejorative, it's a description that applies to many secular and scientific philosophers.

A quote on the origins of positivism and Auguste Comte:

Comte saw a progression in the development of society from the ‘theological’ to the ‘scientific’ phase, in which data derived from empirical experience, and logical and mathematical treatments of such data, provide the exclusive source of all authentic knowledge. Even though Comte’s influence has waned in the intervening centuries, his conception of the evolution of society from theological to scientific - a model which might be called ‘historical positivism’ - has remained an important component of the modern outlook. In this world-view, the mechanistic model and the idea that the underlying reality of the Universe was matter was, then, the culmination of the idea of Progress.

Within that framework, the 'idea of heaven' is now replaced by the quest for interstellar travel, and science has replaced religion as the 'arbiter of truth'. 'Cosmos', said Carl Sagan, 'is all there ever was, is, and will be'. The Cosmos now occupies the place that was formerly occupied by God.

Find me anything in that, that you, Coyne, Dawkins, etc, would disagree with.

Atheists and scientific rationalists must at least honestly admit that they are ignorant of some of the greatest mysteries of the universe: but it is religionists who have ready answers to these questions. — Arkady

If they say they know, they're usually wrong and not to be trusted. Most of the time they're reciting dogma. Religious belief is not an alternative scientific hypothesis. That is the whole point of Richard Rohr's (remember him?) teaching on 'un-knowing'. To 'know God' is not to come up with a formula or hypothesis that explains phenomena on the level that science does. The idea that it does, is the whole problem that grew out of early modern scientific Deism - Newton, Descartes and so on. In that conception 'God' became an abstract equation, and finally 'a ghost in his own machine' (Ted Dace). But by that stage, the whole meaning had already become hopelessly lost.

So if the religious bludgeon others with dogma, then yes, they're arrogant. But they're also not being true to their own tenets.

But, here is a broader problem with your position. When you wade into theistic evolution, you are saying something about the causes and forces operative in the world, ones which shape the course of nature and life on Earth. — Arkady

Theistic evolution doesn't posit a 'designer god' on the level of an engineer or director. Theism is an explanation at a very different level - much more like the level of the fine-tuning argument. i.e. why is the Universe such that stars>matter>life evolves at all? Why is it not simply chaos or nothing? That is not a scientific issue, because science itself doesn't explain natural laws, it simply discovers them and then uses them to make predictions.

that is, if God is involved in the evolutionary process, then the world looks different than it would had God not gotten involved at all — Arkady

A theist would say, that if God had not created it, we wouldn't be here to discuss it! But that still doesn't make their notion of 'higher intelligence' part of a chain of efficient causes of the kind that positivism can identify. That's why classical theism doesn't have any truck with ID (a good essay on that topic here).

And yet, when asked for evidence to support this claim, — Arkady

A theist would say the universe is evidence. Your pointing at the whole cosmos, saying 'where is the evidence?' The believer will say 'you're looking at it!' Look at the current scientific 'creation story': the universe explodes into existence, from a single point, at a single instant. You know when the Pope learned this, he said 'That fits right into our story!' Georges LeMaitre, who had actually discovered it, was embarrased by that, and enlisted the Vatican Science Advisor to lobby him against saying it, as he believed the scientific and religious accounts ought not to be conflated. (But LeMaitre was a Catholic nonetheless!)

But, again, this debate can't be adjudicated - that is why ultimately it is a matter of faith - not the faith of 'clinging to dogmas', but of one's essential orientation towards existence. I think 'belief in God' is not properly a debate about 'something that does or does not exist', but about the meaning of the cosmos.

And yet, when asked for evidence to support this claim, you retreat behind the wall of crying "scientism", and saying that it's not a matter for empirical investigation. So, you want it both ways. — Arkady

That's because, again, your positivistic attitude is such that you only recognise certain things as 'evidence' - if you are to believe that God exists, then He must be, in principle, the kind of thing that science can understand. It's exactly the same problem that Eagleton 'complained about' (to use your terminology) in his review - which is why, I expect, you can't understand his criticism.

Even when scientists verify each others' observations, they do so by means of experiencing the requisite qualia (if one finds this term contentious, please feel free to substitute its closest synonym with which you agree) for themselves. — Arkady

An important point. Galilean science does that by reducing everything to the quantitative, i.e. what can be numerically represented, as being the 'primary qualities', with qualitative attributes being dealt with as secondary (and, since Darwin came along, as derivative of the former.) It does indubitably have much objective force, but that's all it has. As a philosophy, per se, it's inadequate, exactly because it relativises and subjectivises the domain of values.

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* One typical comment:

One might think that, if Coyne’s goal is to increase the acceptance of evolutionary ideas, he would emphasize their compatibility with religion, thereby reassuring religious Americans that evolution poses no threat to their belief systems. However, Coyne, a professor at the University of Chicago, has nothing but disdain for any such “accommodationism,” as he calls it. Rather, he argues not only that certain religious ideas (like “young-earth creationism”) are incompatible with dominant paradigms in biology and geology but that all of religion is incompatible with all of science. This is a rather extraordinary claim, and the arguments Coyne develops to support it are extraordinary mainly for their speciousness. — Austin L. Hughes

Non-sequitur. The scientific process requires creativity, sure (one must be creative in conjecturing hypotheses, devising empirical tests of said hypotheses, etc), but it doesn't follow that all creative endeavors are artistic in nature. The aims and goals of science and art are completely different. — Arkady

Here's our difference of opinion right here. My dictionary defines "art" as "human creative skill or its application", and that's how I generally use it. If we maintain this definition, your claim that "it doesn't follow that all creative endeavors are artistic in nature" is false by contradiction to the definition. All human creative endeavors are artistic, by definition. So it appears to me like you are trying to produce a highly restrictive, and contrived definition of "art", to support a claimed separation between science and art. But the fact is that science uses art as much as any other human endeavor, and where it uses art is in its approach to the unknown, conjecturing hypotheses, devising empirical test, etc..

If we can agree, that this is art, and that it consists of the same elements as any other art forms, subjectivity, experimentation, trial and error, etc., then we can look at how art actually is a knowledge generating activity.

However, one of the cornerstones of the scientific method is the replicability of results, which lends science its objective force. Given appropriate circumstances, one should (at least in principle) be able to replicate an experiment and obtain similar results. — Arkady

The same type of replicability, and objective force, which you associate with science, exists throughout the arts. There are objective principles concerning mixing the paint colours, and there are objective principles involved with musical scales. But in the arts, we learn to distinguish two distinct types of objectivity, one associated with truths derived from the nature of reality, and the other associated with truths according to convention. The latter is sometimes referred to as inter-subjectivity, so it is not true in a purely objective way, it is a subjective based objectivity, something which is true by agreement. So for example, that blue and yellow paint will mix to produce green is an objective truth. But that this type of green is more pleasing than that type of green, or that this type of theme is more likely to sell your artwork than that type of theme, is more likely just an inter-subjective truth, something which is true by common taste, the current trend, or conventions amongst the artists.

We find the same principles in music. There are objective truths, based in the nature of reality concerning the principles of the octave, and harmonies. But within the accepted scales, there are many conventions as well which have no such objective base. They are just subjective preferences, produced from pragmatic principles, or ancient practises which have obtained universal acceptance. Consider theatre and movies, the principles followed in those arts are overwhelming inter-subjective. But notice that inter-subjective truths are no less "true" than pure objective truths. That following a certain formula sells your artwork, because this is what people like, is no less of a truth for the artist than the objective fact that blue and yellow make green, or that the fifth is in harmony with the tonic. Nevertheless, in philosophy we can learn to distinguish between these two types of truth, and we can find them intermixed, but identifiable as distinct, in the arts.

As for artists striving for accuracy and efficiency, I can only wonder what is the basis for that contention. While accuracy of some work's representation of reality may be a desideratum of some artists, I don't see how accuracy is a goal inherent to the artistic process (except in the fairly trivial manner that artists often seek to realize their mental vision or concept of the art in executing it). How would one gauge the "accuracy" of, for instance, Beethoven's Fifth? — Arkady

Any time that human beings use art, there is always a concern about accuracy. And this is primarily accuracy in relation to pure objective fact. When the musician wants a harmony, that harmony must be as pure as possible. Tuning is critical, and a slight difference in frequency is repugnant to the trained ear. The same is the case in mixing paints, the artist wants to be able to precisely replicate the colour which was produced before and is now desired. This is no different from the art involved in the sciences. The scientist wants accuracy in relation to the pure objective facts.

However, inter-subjective objectivity mixes and intermingles with pure objective fact, in all of the arts. So even in the scientific arts such as conjecturing hypothesis and devising experiments, inter-subjective principles will enter, sometimes under the guise of being objective truths. There is a problem which is very peculiar to science, and this problem exists because science is the means by which we distinguish pure objective fact from inter-subjective fact. The problem is that because science is validated by empirical evidence, it has no mechanism within its own principles, which would allow it to distinguish between pure objective fact, and inter-subjective objectivity, within its own body of scientific knowledge. "Empirical evidence" implies agreement with respect to a judgement drawn from the experience of numerous human beings. But this is exactly what inter-subjectivity is. So the means by which the scientific method judges something as pure objective fact, is simply inter-subjectivity.

Here's our difference of opinion right here. My dictionary defines "art" as "human creative skill or its application", and that's how I generally use it. If we maintain this definition, your claim that "it doesn't follow that all creative endeavors are artistic in nature" is false by contradiction to the definition. All human creative endeavors are artistic, by definition. So it appears to me like you are trying to produce a highly restrictive, and contrived definition of "art", to support a claimed separation between science and art. But the fact is that science uses art as much as any other human endeavor, and where it uses art is in its approach to the unknown, conjecturing hypotheses, devising empirical test, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know that my definition of art is overly restrictive: in fact I offered no such definition (nor do I plan to, as such a quest can only be doomed to failure). Philosophy by dictionary definition is generally not advisable (nor am I bound to accept the dictates of a dictionary if I believe the definition is at odds with a term's general usage; dictionaries are authoritative sources, to be sure, but no authority is infallible).

I think you're missing the point in saying science is a "creative endeavor." The aim of art is to create. However, the aim of science is to explain. The fact that science involves some degree of creativity does not mean that it's art. Engineers, for instance, use quite a bit of creativity in their jobs in finding solutions to problems under the constraints of time, materials, and budget, but it doesn't follow that engineering is art.

Any time that human beings use art, there is always a concern about accuracy. And this is primarily accuracy in relation to pure objective fact. When the musician wants a harmony, that harmony must be as pure as possible. Tuning is critical, and a slight difference in frequency is repugnant to the trained ear. The same is the case in mixing paints, the artist wants to be able to precisely replicate the colour which was produced before and is now desired. This is no different from the art involved in the sciences. The scientist wants accuracy in relation to the pure objective facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm talking about "using" art: i'm talking about creating art. Beethoven didn't have to worry about producing or replicating a particular note: he worried about writing it. There is no issue of accuracy there, hence the difference between a composer and a musician.

To digress briefly into 'elan vital' (as I know my earlier response must be annoying).

The British biologist Julian Huxley dryly remarked that Bergson’s élan vital is no better an explanation of life than is explaining the operation of a railway engine by its élan locomotif ("locomotive driving force"). The same alleged epistemological fallacy is parodied in Molière's Le Malade imaginaire, where a quack "answers" the question of "Why does opium cause sleep?"

I think the underlying issue here is the prior rejection of the idea of forms that previously informed Western philosophy. The idea of 'forms', which was essential to the Scholastic tradition, but also a general tenet of many other schools of philosophy, provided a sense of purpose in the Aristotelean sense of 'telos', 'why' something exists, but not in the sense of 'why does iron rust'.

For example: in answer to the question 'why is the water boiling', one can either explain the action of water boiling at 100 degrees c, or one can say 'in order to make tea'. Both are valid answers, but assume a different kind of question.

Formal causality secures teleology—the ends or purposes of things follow from what they are and what is in accord with or capable of fulfilling their natures. In the natural world, this realist framework secures an intrinsic connection between efficient causes and their effects—an efficient cause produces its effects by communicating some formality: fire warms by informing objects with its heat.

Thanks to the nominalist rejection of forms, by the time of early modern philosophy the notion of 'formal causality' had become the explicit butt of humanist jokes. In Moliere’s Invalid Imaginaire, for instance, a doctor is mocked for explaining that a drug causes sleep because it has a virtus dormativa, a sleep-causing power.

That is very similar to Huxley's remark, and indeed the general basis for rejecting élan vital

So I don't believe the élan vital is anything that exists in the material sense, but it describes something real, albeit abstract from a physical point of view. It's not any kind of object of cognition, something that will actually be found by analysis.

Perhaps it is analogous is whatever causes the placebo factor to work (and it definitely does work). If you went looking for the 'placebo factor' in a pathology lab, you would, I think, be doomed to failure. That's not because placebo's don't work, but they don't work the way drugs work; they are dependent on the subject's belief which in such cases has an actual medical impact. But the nature of that dependency is still not, and may never be, something amenable to scientific explication.

Non-sequitur. The scientific process requires creativity, sure (one must be creative in conjecturing hypotheses, devising empirical tests of said hypotheses, etc), but it doesn't follow that all creative endeavors are artistic in nature. The aims and goals of science and art are completely different. — Arkady

Insofar as science is creative, it is an art. Of course all creative endeavors are examples of artistry; does that mean they are artistic in nature? I would say so, even if to say so seems to be somewhat out of keeping with common parlance. The aims and goals of architecture and music are completely different, and yet they are both arts. Science is partly art and partly craft as all the various arts also are. Of course I am not arguing that science is "normally" considered to be an art, but to the extent that it is not an art then it must be a craft, which is to say a discipline, and it is most certainly not unique in that.

There is no issue of accuracy there, hence the difference between a composer and a musician. — Arkady

It seems that you don't understand musical composition very well. There is certainly a critical kind of accuracy in choosing the best possible note at every point in a musical composition, just as there is in choosing the words that make up a poem or the tones and colours in a painting. It is like the accuracy of the archer hitting his mark perfectly. If you don't understand that it just shows your lack of experience.

Actually I want to acknowledge Arkady, with whom I have had vigorous arguments for years now. I realise we often talk past each other, but his questions have often made me think through what I really mean and clarified a lot of things in that way. He is quite a tough debater.

A comment I made earlier about 'the enlightenment narrative' is one such clarification. According to the enlightenment narrative, religion has been superseded by science, and religious belief by scientific reason. Individuals are responsible for themselves and are self-determining in a way our religious forbears couldn't have envisaged.

I was reading a column by David Brooks today, reflecting on the Enlightenment, in which he says:

The Enlightenment project gave us the modern world, but it has always had weaknesses. First, Enlightenment figures perpetually tell themselves that religion is dead (it isn’t) and that race is dead (it isn’t), and so they are always surprised by events. Second, it is thin on meaning. It treats people as bland rational egoists and tends to produce governments run by soulless technocrats.

Hear hear, I thought. But then, I'm someone who never accepted Nietszche's 'death of God' - but I also realise that the kind of syncretic approach which brings in ideas and insights from all kinds of different sources to create a religion of my own, is not what 'the Enlightenment project' had in mind when it criticizes religion, and for that reason not really the kind of target Arkady has in mind a lot of the time.

And that's why we're always talking past each other! Scientific rationalism has a very 17th century view of what religion ought to be- it ought to be very much as the Churches said it was back then. As such, it's a relatively easy thing to criticize. 'Stand still, where I can see you!' But the modern (or is it post-modern) kind of synthesis that I am interested in is a completely different kind of beast; much more like another David Brooks column, from quite a few years back, called the The Neural Buddhists, which is much closer to the kind of attitude that I have. And that, too, is perhaps an offshoot or development of the Enlightenment, albeit one that the sceptical French philosophes would have foreseen.

So anyway, all that said, I find that I agree with quite a few comments made by Arkady on subjects other than this one, on which I'm afraid we will never see eye to eye. But it has been, as I say, a constructive kind of disagreement, on the whole.

It seems that you don't understand musical composition very well. There is certainly a critical kind of accuracy in choosing the best possible note at every point in a musical composition, just as there is in choosing the words that make up a poem or the tones and colours in a painting. It is like the accuracy of the archer hitting his mark perfectly. If you don't understand that it just shows your lack of experience. — John

If my understanding is lacking, perhaps it's because my interlocutors' position has not been explained very well. Of course a composer strives to choose "the best possible note," just as a painter strives to choose the best possible combination of colors (which is no doubt part of the reason the great artists go through draft after draft of their work, rather than just tossing something onto a page or a canvas and calling it a day).

But, how is this a matter of "accuracy"? In my mind, "accuracy" denotes a statement or representation's degree of conformity to its object of reference. As I said above, an artist will attempt to realize his mental vision or concept of a piece in trying to execute it, so, in this trivial sense artistic works strive for "accuracy," but I don't see that "accuracy" is a desideratum of art in general. I remain to be convinced, however.

Insofar as science is creative, it is an art. Of course all creative endeavors are examples of artistry; does that mean they are artistic in nature? I would say so, even if to say so seems to be somewhat out of keeping with common parlance. The aims and goals of architecture and music are completely different, and yet they are both arts. Science is partly art and partly craft as all the various arts also are. Of course I am not arguing that science is "normally" considered to be an art, but to the extent that it is not an art then it must be a craft, which is to say a discipline, and it is most certainly not unique in that. — John

All I can say is, if science qualifies as "art", then virtually any human endeavor so qualifies. A plumber who devises a creative solution to stem a leak has thereby become an artist. Perhaps we should display his work in a modern art museum (it would have the added benefit of constituting a natural experiment as to whether anyone could tell the difference).

Borrowed it when it came out. Read the first three chapters, skimmed the remainder, read many reviews...

I don't need to read Das Kapital to have a view on Marxism. Jerry Coyne's reputation is terrible, outside anyone who isn't part of the new atheist scene. I could provide hundreds of quotes but I don't want to bore you... — Wayfarer

I see. So, in other words, you haven't even read the Book of British Birds.

The aim of art is to create. However, the aim of science is to explain. — Arkady

This is really quite petty. "Art" is a very general term. Yes, the aim of art is to create, but there is no limit to the number of different things which artists aim to create. If some artists aim to create explanations, how is that creative act, as a creative act, essentially different from the creative act which aims to produce a building, a bridge, a computer, a car, a movie, a piece of music, or a painting? These are all acts of human creativity, artistry.

I'm talking about "using" art: i'm talking about creating art. Beethoven didn't have to worry about producing or replicating a particular note: he worried about writing it. There is no issue of accuracy there, hence the difference between a composer and a musician. — Arkady

In agreement with John, I think you have a poor understanding of the act of composing music. There is an idea within the composer's mind, and the composer must reproduce that idea in musical notes. The effort is in producing the required musical notes, memorizing it, and building on it. The writing down is an aid to memorizing the parts. Sure, one could compose a piece of music, simply by writing it, according to a mathematical formula or something, but this would be a lifeless piece of music. The real act of composing is to bring an idea from the mind into the realm of musical tones.

Accuracy is very important, because the composer proceeds from an ideal within the mind, and works to replicate that in sound. You should not underestimate the fact that the composer is working from an ideal, trying to replicate that ideal in physical sound. If the sound does not fulfill the conditions of the ideal, the composer is dissatisfied and will continue to work, through reference to mathematical principles, as well as intuition and trial and error, until the sound becomes what is expected of the composer. Judging by the intricacies, and complexities of Beethoven's music, I would say that he was an extreme perfectionist. In fact, I believe many artists suffer through psychological problems involved with perfectionism. Artistry works with ideals, and the process of trying to bring to reality different ideals which are apprehended as there, somewhere, but very difficult to grasp. The process of grasping these ideals, and bringing them to fruition in the physical world is not easy.

But all this is a diversion from the point, which was your statement that Coyne doesn't believe that the arts should be regarded as a truth-seeking or knowledge-generating endeavor. You supported this position by separating the creative aspect of science, from art proper, with complete disregard for the fact that all human creative activities are by definition, art. Adhering to this unwarranted division will prevent you from taking what we know about artistic activities, which can be gleaned from studying the activities of the pure arts, and applying this toward understanding the creativity within science. By means of your imposed division, you have disallowed any association between the pure arts, and the creativity of science. This greatly impedes our ability to understand the use of creativity in science. So unless you rescind this imposed separation we will have no way of understanding the use of creativity in science because you will not allow comparison to any clearly exposed examples of creativity in the pure arts.

I think your intent is to separate the subjectivity of art from the objectivity of science. Your desire is to misrepresent the creative endeavour of science, which seeks to expand knowledge into the unknown, as some sort of objective activity. But clearly this is a misrepresentation. This creative endeavour, found within science, is no different from any other art, it is a purely subjective act. In fact, since this act serves as an approach to the unknown, it is the most purely subjective act of any creative act. Within the realm of the unknown, there are no objective guide points, no objective principles whatsoever, as "unknown", it is the completely untraveled road. This is the most purely subjective form of creativity. To approach the unknown requires the highest form of subjective discipline, and this is an artistic skill. if you disallow reference to the pure arts, to learn this skill, you have done yourself a great disservice.

But, how is this a matter of "accuracy"? In my mind, "accuracy" denotes a statement or representation's degree of conformity to its object of reference. — Arkady

As I already explained, "accuracy" in the case of the arts consists in 'hitting the mark'. Perhaps you could provide some concrete examples that show the way you want to use the term. "A statement or representation's degree of conformity to its object of reference" seems impossibly vague except in the most prosaic, mundane or everyday contexts.

As I said all human activities are both art and craft. They are art insofar as they are innovative, imaginative and creative and they are craft insofar as they are technique. I'll leave it to you to figure out what proportions of art and craft you want to assign to all the various human disciplines, unless you want to offer an actual argument as to why it should be thought that science or any other other disciple contains nothing at all of art.

Earlier you stated that science and art have very different aims. I pointed out that all the various arts have very different aims. I am not claiming that we should not think that the activities commonly known as the arts should not be considered as being, in their various ways, first and foremost art, and secondarily, craft. On the other hand, activities such as furniture and violin-making are generally thought of as 'craft' first and foremost, and that is because of the relatively constrained range of size and form violins and items of furniture must take lest they exceed the bounds of function.

This actuality of technical constraint is an aspect, to some degree, though, of all artistic disciplines as well. I have heard music variously referred to as 'the highest of the arts', and as the most craft-like of the "pure" arts on account of the precisely formulated harmonic and rhythmic constraints it must work under. So, there is really no simple, black and white distinction between art and craft.

The basic tenets and main arguments of the 'new atheists' can be adequately communicated in a couple of paragraphs. If the premises are fatally flawed, then dealing with all of the elaborations is not necessary.

The basic tenets and main arguments of the 'new atheists' can be adequately communicated in a couple of paragraphs. If the premises are fatally flawed, then dealing with all of the elaborations is not necessary. — Wayfarer

Well, there you go. Perhaps Dawkins could likewise claim that the "tenets and main arguments of the classical theists can be adequately communicated in a couple of paragraphs," thus absolving him of his failure to read all of that wonderful theology he's supposedly ignored? What's good for the goose is good for the gander, right?

Of course, the problem is you presume their arguments are fatally flawed, but you don't read the source material you criticize, or even favorable reviews, it seems (as those are under the spell of the "new atheists", and thus not worth paying attention to), so you know little to nothing of the reasoning underlying the authors' conclusions.

You have virtually obsessed over The God Delusion, and yet you haven't read it. You have criticized Faith vs. Fact without having read it, dismissively referring to it as an "atheist polemic." You know virtually nothing about Coyne (erroneously saying that he has a "terrible reputation"), and are seemingly ignorant of what his book contains, beyond the fact that he's mean to religion and believes it to be incompatible with science. You seem to understand almost nothing about The God Delusion, as your statements regarding what the book is even about are erroneous, and you attribute things to Dawkins which he not only doesn't say, but which he unambiguously denies in that book.

Your mindset is both an instantiation of the close-mindedness which you'd ascribed to me, as well as a perfect illustration of the aphorism that people learn nothing from books which they don't already know.

This is really quite petty. — Metaphysician Undercover

If pointing out obvious differences between radically different spheres of human activity is "petty," then I'm guilty as charged.

"Art" is a very general term. Yes, the aim of art is to create, but there is no limit to the number of different things which artists aim to create. If some artists aim to create explanations, how is that creative act, as a creative act, essentially different from the creative act which aims to produce a building, a bridge, a computer, a car, a movie, a piece of music, or a painting? These are all acts of human creativity, artistry.

Then, again, virtually any human activity whatsoever which requires even the slightest creative aspect would qualify as "art." Creativity may be a necessary condition of something's being "art" or "artistic," but it doesn't follow that it's a sufficient condition.

What, in your opinion, delineates artistic human activities from non-artistic ones? As I asked above, if a plumber devises a creative solution to stem a leaky pipe, has he thereby created art?

In agreement with John, I think you have a poor understanding of the act of composing music. There is an idea within the composer's mind, and the composer must reproduce that idea in musical notes. The effort is in producing the required musical notes, memorizing it, and building on it. The writing down is an aid to memorizing the parts. Sure, one could compose a piece of music, simply by writing it, according to a mathematical formula or something, but this would be a lifeless piece of music. The real act of composing is to bring an idea from the mind into the realm of musical tones.

I think you have a poor ability to read, as I at least twice acknowledged that artists strive for "accuracy" in trying to realize their mental vision of a piece when they actualize it in the creative process (though even this is not a hard-and-fast rule, as it does not allow for spontaneous changes to a piece which the artist hadn't originally conceived of). If that is all that is meant by "accuracy," with regard to the arts, I'm on board. But you and John seem to adhere to some stronger notion of the term.

As I already explained, "accuracy" in the case of the arts consists in 'hitting the mark'. — John

What's the "mark"?

Perhaps you could provide some concrete examples that show the way you want to use the term. "A statement or representation's degree of conformity to its object of reference" seems impossibly vague except in the most prosaic, mundane or everyday contexts.

A painting or drawing of the Statue of Liberty which adequately resembles the Statue of Liberty is an "accurate" representation of that object. Saying that J.S. Mill was a utilitarian is an "accurate" description of his position on ethics. Saying that Abraham Lincoln was assassinated in Ford's Theater is an "accurate" statement about history.

Well, there you go — Arkady

I notice that none of what you've said on this thread pertains to the video that the thread is about. Can I presume you've already discounted what's likely to be in it, as it is by a minister of religion?

As I said all human activities are both art and craft. — John

Then art describes anything and everything humans do, there can be no distinction between art and non-art, which makes the term useless.

I notice that none of what you've said on this thread pertains to the video that is about. Can I presume you've already discounted what's likely to be in it, as it is by a minister of religion? — Wayfarer

Nice try, but we're not going all the way back to the video. I didn't watch the video, but nor did I comment on it, much less condemn it.