Another striking difference that ought to be pretty obvious is that Socrates’ philosophy serves a higher purpose which is to attain a vision of the Good, whilst the Stranger’s sophistry is for its own sake. — Apollodorus

This is an important point. Plato came across the importance of "the good" in his attempts to understand the reality of ideas. In The Republic, "the good" is described as that which makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun is what makes visible objects visible. We can say :the good" is the reason for the intelligibility of intelligible objects.

Aristotle then proceeds with a much better definition of "the good". "The good" is that for the sake of which, "the end", as what is intended.

In seeking philosophical knowledge it is of the highest importance that "the good", meaning what is sought, the end, (in Aristotelian terms), or that which illuminates the ideas making them intelligible to the person (in Plato's terms), is real understanding, and truth. Without this true goal of real understanding, any goal, such as financial gain, honour, the pride of vanity, etc., might take the place of the true goal, real understanding, and serve to illuminate ideas as intelligible, instead. And the ideas which serve such goals, though they are highly intelligible to a person who has that goal, will not be intelligible to the person who has the highest, true goal of real understanding.

This is the position of the sophist. The sophist has some goal, a good, which is other than the goal of truth and real understanding. So the principles which the sophist argues appear to be highly intelligible to anyone else who has a similar goal. But these principles are seen as unintelligible to anyone looking for the real good, the true goal of real understanding. Therefore Aristotle proposed a distinction between the real good, and the apparent good.

The first problem addressed in the dialogue is not the identity of the sophist but the identity of the philosopher. At the start of the dialogue Theodorus calls the Stranger "a real philosopher". Socrates responds:

I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind ... sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen,and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad.

The philosopher appears to be what he is not. If the Stranger is a philosopher then he may appear to be what he is not. It is only by successfully identifying the philosopher that we can identify the imitator.

The Stranger proposes that begin with the sophist. He warns them against doing the very thing you are doing:

For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. (218b)

The Stranger's concern is with Kinds, with what is same and different. The limits of his approach is found in the Statesman:

... you rated sophist, statesman, and philosopher at the same value, though they are farther apart in worth than your mathematical proportion can express. (257b)

The Stranger's method abstracts from value, it treats such differences as the same. His concern is not Socrates' concern for the good. But this does not mean he should simply be dismissed as a sophist. If the search for the good is the mark of philosophy then Socrates would be the first philosopher. He was not.

As Socrates said, the class of the philosopher is not the class of the gods. Philosophy is never complete. It is dialogical. Rather than dismiss the Stranger, the investigation of the dyad same and other is part of the quest for truth.

Doesn't Parmenides' school have a lot to say about "that which is not"? — Metaphysician Undercover

It does. The Stranger is identified as a member of that circle. (216a) How do we reconcile Parmenides' denial of not-being with the Stranger's affirmation? The solution is in the dyad 'same and different' or 'same and other'. In this case, what is and is not being.

Once this dichotomy is produced, there is no place for becoming, which is neither being nor not-being. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you maintain the distinction between being and becoming then you maintain the distinction between being and not-being. As you say, becoming is not being.

It does. The Stranger is identified as a member of that circle. (216a) How do we reconcile Parmenides' denial of not-being with the Stranger's affirmation? The solution is in the dyad 'same and different'. — Fooloso4

The Stranger reaffirms the Parmenides denial while presenting the dyad of 'same and different' during the discussion of false statements:

Stranger: And if it were not about you, it is not about anything else.
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Stranger: And if it were about nothing, it would not be a statement at all, for we pointed out that there could not be a statement that was a statement about nothing.
Theaetetus: Quite true.
Stranger: So what is stated about you, but so that what is different is stated as the same or what is not as what is--a combination of verbs and nouns answering to that description finally seems to be really and truly a false statement. — Sophist, 283c, translated by F.M. Cornford

The Eleatic Visitor has only conceded that language can deceive when used a certain way. He has not overturned the school of Parmenides.

The philosopher appears to be what he is not. If the Stranger is a philosopher then he may appear to be what he is not. It is only by successfully identifying the philosopher that we can identify the imitator. — Fooloso4

But the stranger appears to be a philosopher, he doesn't appear as a sophist. The question is whether he really is a philosopher, or a sophist.

The Stranger's method abstracts from value, it treats such differences as the same. — Fooloso4

To treat differences as the same is sophistry to me. It is contradiction.

His concern is not Socrates' concern for the good. But this does not mean he should simply be dismissed as a sophist. If the search for the good is the mark of philosophy then Socrates would be the first philosopher. He was not. — Fooloso4

It is very clear from Plato, that he believes that the search for the good is the mark of philosophy. Also, it is clear that Plato did not believe that Socrates was the first person ever to have concern for the good.

It does. The Stranger is identified as a member of that circle. (216a) How do we reconcile Parmenides' denial of not-being with the Stranger's affirmation? The solution is in the dyad 'same and different' or 'same and other'. In this case, what is and is not being. — Fooloso4

Being concerned with "that which is not" is the mark of a sophist (254).

If you maintain the distinction between being and becoming then you maintain the distinction between being and not-being. As you say, becoming is not being. — Fooloso4

In the context I was using it, "not-being" was a shortened form of "that which is not". Here, you use "not being" to indicate something which is other than being. "Becoming is not being". Equivocation is a tool of the sophist.

The philosopher appears to be what he is not. — Fooloso4

Exactly. The Stranger is the “philosopher” who will be exposed as a sophist! Hence the title.

The sophist has some goal, a good, which is other than the goal of truth and real understanding. So the principles which the sophist argues appear to be highly intelligible to anyone else who has a similar goal. But these principles are seen as unintelligible to anyone looking for the real good, the true goal of real understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. This is how the sophist is easily identified and exposed.

Plato states that the greatest lesson (megiston mathema) is the Idea of the Good (Rep. 505a). He also tells us why: the Forms that make up the Intelligible World which is the real world, can be fully understood or known only by knowing the Good.

Plato draws a clear line between (1) mathematicians who use discursive thinking (dianoia) and take as hypotheses their definitions and axioms and (2) true dialecticians who have full understanding (noesis) or true knowledge (episteme) of the Forms after ascending to the first unhypothetical principle, viz. the Good (Rep. 510b).

He later reiterates that the dialectical method is the only process of inquiry that rises above hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there” (Rep. 533c).

The Stranger himself says:

Stranger
But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness (Soph. 253e)

I think it is clear that if any of the two “pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness”, i.e. for the right purpose and using the right means, it is undeniably Socrates, not the Stranger.

Being concerned with "that which is not" is the mark of a sophist (254). — Metaphysician Undercover

The Stranger identifies the Socratic, i.e. the genuine philosophical school, as the "friends of the Forms" (oi philoi ton eidon) (Sophist 248a).

Obviously, the only way he can attack the genuine philosophers is by shifting the debate from the reality of that which is (the Forms) to that "which is not". As history shows, it was Socrates' teachings that ultimately won. Indeed, why would anyone believe in that which is not?

The question is whether he really is a philosopher, or a sophist. — Metaphysician Undercover

The question of whether he is a sophist or a philosopher cannot be adequately addressed until the question of who the philosopher is has been answered. But:

thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind ...

we have not, despite the claims being made about the philosopher, answered that question.

To treat differences as the same is sophistry to me. It is contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then we are all, including the philosopher, sophists. Five apples are five whether they are red or green or yellow. Unless we want a particular color apple we treat that difference as the same.

Also, it is clear that Plato did not believe that Socrates was the first person ever to have concern for the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which of the pre-Socratic philosophers make the good the focus of their philosophy?

Being concerned with "that which is not" is the mark of a sophist (254). — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet Plato is evidently concerned with "that which is not".

In the context I was using it, "not-being" was a shortened form of "that which is not". Here, you use "not being" to indicate something which is other than being. "Becoming is not being". Equivocation is a tool of the sophist. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the context in which it is being used in the dialogue that is at issue. The way the Stranger uses it.

The question of whether he is a sophist or a philosopher cannot be adequately addressed until the question of who the philosopher is has been answered. — Fooloso4

If the question of who the philosopher is, is answered, then the question of who the sophist is no longer arises.

And since you have not answered the first question, you have not adequately addressed the other question which is the same as the first question .... :smile:

The solution is in the dyad 'same and different' — Fooloso4

If the solution is in the dyad, then the problem has been solved. And it has been solved by Plato who wrote the dialogue!

If you maintain the distinction between being and becoming then you maintain the distinction between being and not-being. — Fooloso4

The point is that the Stranger exposes himself as a sophist by using distinctions and other things borrowed from Socrates for his own agenda which is “to win the argument”. But of course he has NOT refuted the Theory of Forms, which is the critical point.

Therefore the Stranger has failed to defeat the genuine philosopher.

As shown by the Sophist, among standard elements in the anti-Platonist method, we find the tendency to deliberately misinterpret statements, exaggerate ambiguities, or read things into the text that are not there.

Plato’s classification of things, for example, is not as mysterious as some are claiming.

His Theory of Forms is not (pace Strauss) “very hard to understand”, “utterly incredible”, or “absurd”. The human mind has a natural tendency to look at things in a way that unifies separate entities into categories in order to provide ordered relations within a harmonious and meaningful whole. This enables us to process reality in ways that are essential to life. The Forms reflect the mental processes that make things “intelligible”. As such they are the very essence of cognition and the basis of “intelligibility”. Hence their utmost importance in Plato’s scheme.

According to Plato we can see reality as it is only by bringing our sense-perceptions, emotions, and thoughts in order and acquiring an ordered perception of the world within us and outside us.

In the same way our own intelligence keeps our mental and emotional processes in harmonious working order, Plato says that the universe itself is ordered by a higher intelligence:

There is in the universe a plentiful Infinite and a sufficient Limit, and in addition a by no means feeble Cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called Wisdom (sophia) and Mind (nous) (Phileb. 30c)

Plato also tells us that his view merely “confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind always rules the universe” (30d).

And because there are these two intelligences, one in the world we live in and one within us, it makes sense to try to establish a connection between them, and for the lower, human intelligence to endeavor to learn about the higher, universal intelligence.

Moreover, in order to understand, and eventually obtain direct knowledge of, the higher intelligence, we need to learn how to think about the world and perceive it in as ordered a way as we possibly can. In other words, we must make our mind as much like the Cosmic Mind as possible.

By understanding the world, the philosopher comes to understand the intelligence behind the universe which is the ultimate source of all intelligences.

In contrast, the sophist, anti-Platonist, or antiphilosopher, makes no attempt to rise above his own sophistry.

Being concerned with "that which is not" is the mark of a sophist (254). — Metaphysician Undercover

The text of that passage is:

Stranger: It is, then, in some such region as this (where kind is distinguished from kind) that we shall find the philosopher now or later, if we should look for him. He too may be difficult to see clearly, but the difficulty in his case is not same as in the Sophist's.
Theaetetus: What is the difference?
Stranger: The Sophist takes refuge in the darkness of not-being, where he is at home and has the knack of feeling his way, and it is the darkness of the place that makes him hard to perceive.
Theaetetus: That may well be.
Stranger: Whereas the philosopher, whose thoughts constantly dwell on the nature of reality, is difficult to see because his region is so bright, for the eye of the vulgar soul cannot endure to keep its gaze upon the divine.
Theaetetus: That may well be no less true. — Sophist, 253d, translated by F.M Cornford

Aristotle appears to be referring directly to this part of the Sophist during his explanation for why there can be no science of 'accidental' being:

In the same way, the geometer does not investigate the attributes which are in a manner accidental to figures. nor the problem whether a triangle is distinct from a triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles. And this happens with good reason; for an accident is a mere name, as it were. And so Plato was not wrong when he ranked sophistry as being concerned with nonbeing. For the discussions of the sophists deal most of all with what is accidental, so to speak; for example whether the musical and the grammatical are the same or distinct.... — Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Epsilon, 1026b, translated by H.G Apostle

The passage connects to both the distinguishing between kinds and the use of 'same and different' being discussed in the dialogue. This also points to the indeterminacy being discussed in the OP since Aristotle argues that without accidental being, every thing that occurs would happen by necessity.

Aristotle also frames the matter of sophistry as a bait and switch operation:

And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was ready and rough. For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though anyone professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to obviate any pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of shoe-making or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present him with several kinds of shoes of all sorts: for he has helped him to meet his need but has not imparted an art to him. — Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, 184a, translated by E.M. Edghill

In this context, the role of the Sophist as a whole dialogue can be sought after. In what way does it impart the art of the philosopher?

:clap: thanks that is a very helpful analysis.

Thank you.

In this context, the role of the Sophist as a whole dialogue can be sought after. In what way does it impart the art of the philosopher? — Valentinus

Excellent question! Seeing in what way it does puts the dialogue in its proper perspective.

In this context, the role of the Sophist as a whole dialogue can be sought after. In what way does it impart the art of the philosopher? — Valentinus

Of course it is the whole dialogue that matters. The question as to who the philosopher or sophist is is secondary, especially in view of the fact that the attempt to construct Socrates as the sophist has failed.

What Plato is doing in the dialogue is to show that logical argumentation can be used by philosophers and sophists alike and that both can advance arguments that contribute to the discussion

However, we must not forget that, at the end of the day, the writer is Plato, and what really matters is Plato's teachings. On the whole, the dialogue does not contradict what Plato says in earlier dialogues.

For example, philosophers are said to be "divine", they "look on the life of men from a higher region", they "devote themselves through reason to the Idea of Being", etc. (Soph. 216c; 254a-b).

Then we are all, including the philosopher, sophists. Five apples are five whether they are red or green or yellow. Unless we want a particular color apple we treat that difference as the same. — Fooloso4

No we don't necessarily treat them as the same. "Five" to me, implies five distinct and different objects. They cannot all be the same or else there would not be five but only one. It's only if you think of "five" as implying five of the same, "ones", that you treat the different as the same. But that way involves contradiction, because there cannot be five of the same thing.

Which of the pre-Socratic philosophers make the good the focus of their philosophy? — Fooloso4

Many of the ancient myths which Plato refers to are concerned with the good. The difference between good and evil has been an issue for thousands of years.

It is the context in which it is being used in the dialogue that is at issue. The way the Stranger uses it. — Fooloso4

I know, that's the point, the stranger switches meaning, equivocates, because the stranger is a sophist.

In this context, the role of the Sophist as a whole dialogue can be sought after. In what way does it impart the art of the philosopher? — Valentinus

I don't think The Sophist as a Platonic dialogue was intended by Plato to "impart the art of the philosopher", I think it was meant to expose the Eleatics as sophists rather than honest philosophers. That's what I've been arguing. The stranger is an anonymous person from that school, who is portrayed as behaving in a way which is consistent with his description of how a sophist would behave. So what is imparted is a lesson, by way of example. Imagine if there was a dialogue where a person described what it was to be racist, and in the process of that description demonstrated themself to be just like the description.

The "art of the philosopher" would be to see through the stranger's disguise, and see him as the sophist which he is. So the lesson to be learned from Plato here, is that the sophist is well disguised, and the logical arguments of sophistry may appear infallible, but the sophist is best revealed as a hypocrite, behaving in a way which he would say is not a good way to behave.

The passage connects to both the distinguishing between kinds and the use of 'same and different' being discussed in the dialogue. — Valentinus

The visitor's use of "kinds" is the chief indicator that he practices sophistry. We might call this the theme of The Sophist. That mode of argumentation, which is to divide things into kinds, is extremely defective, and is actually just sophistry. This is because the division of a kind into further kinds may be extremely subjective, arbitrary, or done solely for the purpose of bringing about a particular desired conclusion.

The evidence that this is sophistry is thus. Socrates asks the stranger if he recognizes philosophers, sophists, and statesmen, as three distinct kinds. The stranger says yes, these are three distinct kinds. However, throughout the stranger's discourse, we see that each of the three shares characteristics of each of the other. So such a division of kinds is really just random, or proposed for a purpose, of producing a desired conclusion.

This fact is further demonstrated by our discussion here, some of us say that the visitor is a sophist, and some of us say that the stranger is a philosopher, and neither of us is truly correct, because such a division of kind is not a true division. We say he is a sophist (he is of that kind) for the sake of discrediting his argumentation. Fooloso4 says he is a philosopher, for the sake of claiming that Plato is supporting the metaphysics he professes. In reality though, Plato is demonstrating that this form of argumentation, to divide things into "kinds", the various kinds being created solely for the purpose of the argument, is a very defective form of argumentation.

Any close examination of the proposed "kinds" will show that the divisions are defective. As demonstrated by the dialogue, the division between sophist, philosopher, and statesman, is an untenable division. And if we look at some of the other divisions which the stranger proposes, hunting, angling, trading, etc., we'll see the very same problem. Many instances cross the proposed boundaries, and the divisions are just created for the sake of producing the desired conclusion. Close examination, and understanding of the proposed kinds, and boundaries is required to expose the deficiencies. those deficiencies are what we've come to know through the existence of category mistakes.

This form of argumentation is what supports the stranger's metaphysics. The deficiencies of it are exposed more clearly in The Parmenides. But the proposed kinds, boundaries, and consequent category mistakes, expressed by Parmenides are extremely difficult to following, requiring great attention to detail. It is evident therefore, that Plato is rejecting this metaphysics, as based in faulty arguments, rather than supporting it.

But that way involves contradiction, because there cannot be five of the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "thing" is apples. They are all the same in that they are all apples. They are all the same kind of thing.

I see from another of your responses that you reject 'kinds'. You seem unaware that Forms are Kinds.

Fooloso4 says he is a philosopher, for the sake of claiming that Plato is supporting the metaphysics he professes. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say he is a philosopher. What I said is:

The question of whether he is a sophist or a philosopher cannot be adequately addressed until the question of who the philosopher is has been answered. — Fooloso4

We have not identified the philosopher. In your opinion the philosopher would not divide things into kinds. In your opinion then Socrates was not a philosopher, for he asks "What is the just?" and rejects all examples of justice as an adequate answer. He is asking about the kind of thing it is that makes all those examples examples of the just. He is asking in what way they are all the same and come under the same name.

The visitor's use of "kinds" is the chief indicator that he practices sophistry. We might call this the theme of The Sophist. That mode of argumentation, which is to divide things into kinds, is extremely defective, and is actually just sophistry. This is because the division of a kind into further kinds may be extremely subjective, arbitrary, or done solely for the purpose of bringing about a particular desired conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

An argument that employs any -- what shall we call it? "technique"? "method"? "approach"? -- that can be misused is sophistry? And by "misused" there I guess I have to mean something like "making the weaker argument seem the stronger", or perhaps deriving false conclusions from true premises. I don't really know what to put there.

The usual modern view is that the forms of inference we rely on, or should rely on, are merely truth-preserving, so an argument yields truth only by being founded upon truth. If you make a proper inference from what purports to be truth but is not, or if, in an informal argument, you rely on true premises that you have stated and untrue premises that you have not, you are abusing or misusing inference.

Do you have in mind an alternative, a means of reasoning that cannot be abused in such a way?

Many of the ancient myths which Plato refers to are concerned with the good. The difference between good and evil has been an issue for thousands of years. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. There is no doubt that “good” (kalon or agathon) was central to Greek thought, together with truth, justice, and beauty. Hence “good and beautiful” (kaloskagathos) as the Greek ideal of human perfection.

Diogenes of Apollonia, whom Socrates probably knew of, taught that everything was disposed for the best by divine dispensation. The very concept of a Cosmos was based on the idea of a cosmic order that was good and upon which everything else depended.

So the lesson to be learned from Plato here, is that the sophist is well disguised, and the logical arguments of sophistry may appear infallible, but the sophist is best revealed as a hypocrite, — Metaphysician Undercover

So well disguised that some may even mistake him for a “philosopher” and a “god”.

As we have seen, the philosopher is described as divine and as looking on the life of men from a higher place (Soph. 216c). And as we know from the Republic, it is through contact with real being that the philosopher has understanding, truth, and knowledge (Rep. 490b).

In contrast, the sophist is a disputer (antilogistikos) and one who imitates those who have knowledge, i.e., the genuine philosophers, but has no knowledge himself (Soph. 268e). This is confirmed by his name which, as pointed out by Theaetetus, is a derivation of “sophos” (“wise”).

Another important point is that the philosopher uses hypotheses to elevate his thought out of the confusion of nonphilosophical existence to abstract or “mathematical” concepts and render it sufficiently refined to grasp higher realities. Ultimately, however, he transcends all hypotheses to arrive at the unhypothetical first principle, the source and cause of all knowledge.

On the other hand, the sophist, who is a “disputer” (Soph. 232b), not only becomes lost in the multitude of philosophical questions but multiplies them by means of hair-splitting arguments and counter-arguments. And this goes against Plato for whom the questions raised by intelligence are just the bridge or ladder that takes the philosopher to intelligence itself.

Being an obstacle to that which is at once the truth and the good, the sophist and his method may be described as the opposite of good, i.e., evil.

This form of argumentation is what supports the stranger's metaphysics. The deficiencies of it are exposed more clearly in The Parmenides. But the proposed kinds, boundaries, and consequent category mistakes, expressed by Parmenides are extremely difficult to following, requiring great attention to detail. It is evident therefore, that Plato is rejecting this metaphysics, as based in faulty arguments, rather than supporting it. — Metaphysician Undercover

While there can be no doubt that having the Eleatic visitor do the talking in the Sophist and the Statesman involves a markedly different approach than when Socrates is in charge, stating that what Plato thinks is entirely absent from the dialogues and that they are only demeaning caricatures of Parmenides is a proposition that does not fit with other circumstances.

In the Theaetetus, Socrates rips the Heraclitean thesis that "all things change" to shreds. When asked give the 'whole of things are at rest' thesis the same treatment, Socrates says:

Socrates: A feeling of respect keeps me from treating in an unworthy spirit Mellisus and the others who say the universe is one and at rest., but there is one being I respect above all. Parmenides himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, a 'reverend and awful' figure. I met him when I was quite young and he quite elderly, and I thought there was a sort of depth in him that was altogether noble. I am afraid we might not understand his words and still less follow the thought they express. Above all, the original purpose of our discussion - the nature of knowledge - might be thrust out of sight, if we attend to these importunate topics that keep breaking in upon us. In particular, this subject we are raising now is of vast extent. It cannot be fairly treated as a side issue, and an adequate handling would take so long that we should lose sight of our question about knowledge. Either course would be wrong. My business is rather to try, by means of my midwife's art, to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge. — Thaeatetus, 183d, translated by Benjamin Jowett

I see that Aristotle referring approvingly to what was said in the dialogue has left no impression upon you. He does, however, refer to the ideas as belonging to Plato. In the beginning of On Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle again refers to the language of the Stranger when noting:

In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine and sometimes not, though inexperience may make them appear ; for inexperienced people obtain only , as it were, a distant view of these things. — 164b, translated by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge

What is one to make of the Eleatic visitor being so warmly welcomed the next day by Socrates in the opening of the Statesman? That dialogue does introduce views of the Polis not expressed in the Republic but the author Plato is not setting the two dialogues against each other.

I will address the use of division and kinds in Plato in another post to avoid conflation with your proposition regarding Plato's intent here.

I see from another of your responses that you reject 'kinds'. You seem unaware that Forms are Kinds. — Fooloso4

I think that to say that a Form is a kind, is a misunderstanding of Forms.

We have not identified the philosopher. In your opinion the philosopher would not divide things into kinds. In your opinion then Socrates was not a philosopher, for he asks "What is the just?" and rejects all examples of justice as an adequate answer. He is asking about the kind of thing it is that makes all those examples examples of the just. He is asking in what way they are all the same and come under the same name. — Fooloso4

I am not saying that a philosopher would not divide things into kinds. I am saying that an argument which proceeds in this way could be deceptive. Because of this we have to be very careful to analyze, and carefully understand the proposed divisions, and boundaries, to ensure that they are appropriately created.

To ask in what way are all the things which are called by the same name similar, is a completely different process than to divide things into kinds. Do you see this difference? Take the strangers example of "the hunter". The stranger says, lets divide "hunters" in to type A and type B. Then we can take type B and divide that into B1 and B2, and further we can divide B2, etc.. The Socratic method is to look at all the different examples of people who are called "hunters", to see what they all have in common, so that we can glean an idea of what it means to be a hunter.

The usual modern view is that the forms of inference we rely on, or should rely on, are merely truth-preserving, so an argument yields truth only by being founded upon truth. If you make a proper inference from what purports to be truth but is not, or if, in an informal argument, you rely on true premises that you have stated and untrue premises that you have not, you are abusing or misusing inference. — Srap Tasmaner

The type of argument I am talking about here is the type which attempts to prove the truth or falsity of a premise. This is the issue, how do we determine whether premises are true or false. So, for example, in the dialogue The Sophist, there is a premise that the sophist, the philosopher, and the statesman, are three distinct types. But then in the course of the dialogue, it is demonstrated that this premise is not true. Therefore the stranger, who was introduced as a true philosopher, might also be a sophist, because the premise that the philosopher is a distinct type from the sophist has been shown to be false.

In the Theaetetus, Socrates rips the Heraclitean thesis that "all things change" to shreds — Valentinus

That Heraclitus is wrong does not mean that Parmenides is right. That would make a terrible argument. You are wrong, therefore anyone who says something different from you, must be right.

In the Theaetetus, Socrates rips the Heraclitean thesis that "all things change" to shreds. — Valentinus

Yet, Socrates was born, was a tot, grew into a brave young soldier, went on to "corrupt" the Athenian youth, was impious, was tried, was found guilty, was sent to the gallows, drank hemlock and passed away in 399 BC. No change at all. Denial of the obvious must have its merits but you'll have to explain it to me, if you don't mind. Please.

The type of argument I am talking about here is the type which attempts to prove the truth or falsity of a premise. This is the issue, how do we determine whether premises are true or false. So, for example, in the dialogue The Sophist, there is a premise that the sophist, the philosopher, and the statesman, are three distinct types. But then in the course of the dialogue, it is demonstrated that this premise is not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. Earlier today I was thinking a bit about the several "What is philosophy?" threads around, and thinking that the choice of terms, of the categorization of data, the work you do before engaging in inference, is a domain to be governed by reason but not logic, and thus a domain for philosophy distinct from both logic and science. (Certainly science is very much concerned with classification, but in a quite different way.)

I am not saying that a philosopher would not divide things into kinds. I am saying that an argument which proceeds in this way could be deceptive. Because of this we have to be very careful to analyze, and carefully understand the proposed divisions, and boundaries, to ensure that they are appropriately created. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I agree with this too, and precisely because this work is not covered by the rules of inference, it certainly presents an opportunity for deception, but also for simple failure. Philosophers do seem to spend a lot of their time re-classifying things.

Very glad you brought this up.

That Heraclitus is wrong does not mean that Parmenides is right. That would make a terrible argument. You are wrong, therefore anyone who says something different from you, must be right. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not saying anything of the kind. You proposed that the Sophist was written specifically as a refutation of Parmenides. I spoke of why that is doubtful.

Socrates was not denying things change. He was saying that if nothing stayed the same, there would be no knowledge.

Plato is not content with Parmenides' position either. The dialogue of that name has old man Parmenides schooling young Socrates on how difficult it will be to speak of a world of becoming to be connected to a realm of eternally present Being. This frames the career of Plato as one of attempting to do exactly that.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates seeks the 'nature of knowledge' that can refute Protagoras' appeals to the immediacy of experience on which to say 'man is the measure of all things.' This approach requires accepting the world of becoming as a starting place for the inquiry. At 178b, Socrates points particularly to predicting the outcome of future events where Protagoras is hiding. So at 179d, Socrates says:

We must, then , look more closely into the matter, as our defense of Protagoras enjoined, and study this moving reality, ringing its metal to hear if it sounds true or cracked. However that may be, there has been no inconsiderable battle over it, and not a few combatants. — translated by F.M Cornford

While Socrates declines to address Parmenides directly in his inquiry he is looking to establish a third way that is not premised upon either absolutely stated position. Parmenides is not sufficient for his needs.

Socrates was not denying things change. He was saying that if nothing stayed the same, there would be no knowledge. — Valentinus

The modern view of knowledge takes into account the ever-changing, dynamic, nature of knowledge - no aeroplanes back in Socrates' time but now round the clock flights to and from Athens. Of course, the laws of nature don't seem to be that flexible but you never know. Mathematics, an altogether different story.

As for the dispute with Protagoras, my hunch is Socrates and Plato were on the back foot rather than making any sorta headway in refuting Protagoras' subjectivism. If Protagoras was/is right, Plato's allegory of the cave and with that all of philosophy goes out the window as utter tripe.

The subjectivity is not refuted. The very portion of Theaetetus I am referring to is the acceptance of personal immediate experience. In the effort to address it, Socrates inquires into perception and knowledge and on what basis they encounter other beings. It is through making a distinction between perception and knowledge that Socrates seeks to defend himself against Protagoras.

The subjectivity is not refuted. The very portion of Theaetetus I am referring to is the acceptance of personal immediate experience. In the effort to address it, Socrates inquires into perception and knowledge and on what basis they encounter other beings. It is through making a distinction between perception and knowledge that Socrates seeks to defend himself against Protagoras. — Valentinus

Basically, Plato's allegory of the cave.

I think that to say that a Form is a kind, is a misunderstanding of Forms. I am not saying that a philosopher would not divide things into kinds. I am saying that an argument which proceeds in this way could be deceptive. Because of this we have to be very careful to analyze, and carefully understand the proposed divisions, and boundaries, to ensure that they are appropriately created. — Metaphysician Undercover

The misconception of Forms as “kinds” or even “universals” is a standard device employed by anti-Platonists who use Aristotle to attack Plato. Lloyd Gerson correctly calls it “an enduring urban myth in the history of philosophy”.

Moreover, if we pay attention to Plato’s wider theoretical framework we can see that he uses all fields of human knowledge and activity in the service of a higher goal, which is “to become godlike (homoiosis Theo) as far as possible”:

Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible (Theaet. 176a – b)

Plato uses religious beliefs and ethical principles to elevate the would-be philosopher’s mind to an intellectual and moral level where he can begin his philosophical practice. Similarly, mathematical disciplines are not studied for empirical purposes, but with a view to acquiring an ability for ordered and abstract thinking. The same is true of logic or dialectic. The ultimate telos or goal is always the One. The philosopher can fully understand the world and himself only in the light of the One which is the source of all knowledge and all truth.

If the philosopher is to become “as godlike as possible”, then he must make his mind as similar to the mind of God as he can. The intellectual training he has undergone in the preparatory stages has served the purpose of lifting him out the morass of ordinary human condition. But that training itself must be transcended. He must leave logic and everything else behind in order to have an experience of intelligence itself.

We can see why some forms of logic may be fruitful. Trying to grasp how divine intelligence creates the world, for example, by means of Ideas or Forms that impart their properties and, therefore, being to particulars that make up the sensible world, may help the philosopher to understand how divine intelligence works.

But other forms of logic may be less helpful in what the Platonic philosopher is aiming to achieve. Doing too much dividing and classifying, asking too many questions, raising too many doubts, etc., does not seem to be the best way to make one’s mind godlike.

In other words, there must come a time when thinking or any other mental activity becomes counterproductive. If a higher intelligence does exist and it is changeless, then, in order to catch a glimpse of it, it is necessary to make our mind equally changeless and still, as Socrates says in the Phaedo:

But when the soul inquires alone by itself [i.e., undisturbed by body, sense-perceptions, and thoughts and emotions associated with these], it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom (phronesis) (Phaedo 79d)

It is the wisdom acquired through a grasp of the One that enables the philosopher to approach philosophical problems by appealing to first principles. And we can arrive at Plato’s One only through a process of simplification or reduction: the multiplicity of sensible particulars is reduced to intelligible Forms, and Forms are reduced to the One. This is the inner logic of Plato’s metaphysics. Hair-splitting mental exercises may be intellectually interesting, but they lead in the opposite direction, i.e., the direction aimed at by the sophist who (covertly or overtly) denies the existence of metaphysical realities ....